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
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THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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JANUARY, 1908.

EDITORIAL.

The "SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW" takes the place of the annual volume of collected "Papers" in which proceedings of the Sociological Society have been published hitherto. By quarterly publication it is possible to secure greater continuity of treatment and more scope for the scientific handling of the subject; and the publishing of a Review is felt to be the best method of putting the work of the Society on a permanent footing and rendering it accessible to the world. The work of the Society, has, among other things, done something towards clearing up misconceptions of the nature and problems of Sociology, and defining the scope of any sociological journal. But it would be ill to pretend that we have arrived at general agreement on this initial question. We cannot yet assume that Sociology means the same thing to all people or that there would be universal agreement as to the appropriate contents of a sociological journal. Not only are there still many who deny the bare existence of Sociology, but, what is more serious, among Sociologists there are still many deep divergences of view as to the nature and province of the enquiries which they professedly pursue in common. This divergence is, however, not a sign of disease but rather of the raw vigour and exuberance of youth. An enemy is doubtless entitled to make the most of the fact that the enthusiasts for a science have not hitherto been able to decide among themselves what their science is about. But if disagreement as to its fundamental definitions is used as a proof that a science does not exist and cannot be brought into existence, it is to be feared that other sciences will follow Sociology to annihilation. Political Economy is generally admitted to be a science, but economists would not seek to prove it by pointing to the general agreement in their definitions of Wealth, of Capital, of Production and other fundamental conceptions. Biology is a science, but how many Biolo-

gists can satisfy themselves—to say nothing of satisfying one another—with any definition of Life. What in the light of recent researches is the limit between Chemistry and Physics? Is it certain that the present demarcation between the sciences of Life and those which deal with inanimate matter is of any permanent validity? Indeed if a science sets out to deal with the properties of matter, must we demand that it should first define satisfactorily what matter is and what it means by a property, and if so, should we find that any physical science can yet be reckoned among the number of human achievements? In reality it is precisely the most elementary conceptions that remain longest in the dark. The physicist can far more readily teach us what matter does than what matter is. The dialectician may prove that this is absurd, but the fact is so. The biologist finds it a great deal easier to tell us about life than to tell us what that life is which he is talking about. We are able to follow him (if we are not dialecticians) because we already have some rough notion of what life means. We are not prepared with a definition but “if you do not ask we understand.” So it is with the biologist himself. He has a rough, broad conception which serves as a starting point for his investigations. He finds it difficult to put this conception into a rigid formula, and if he succeeds in doing so the very progress of his enquiry will probably confute him. As he learns more and more about his subject matter so does his original conception of that matter grow and change and remodel itself under his hands. The more he knows about living things the more adequate his definition of Life. But if this is so it is clear that the definition which is to satisfy everybody must come not at the beginning but at the end of discovery. We must know what we are investigating only in the sense that we must have a rough and provisional outline of the field of work. If this imperfect and broken knowledge be ruled out, it remains that we can only know what we are looking for when we have found it.

What may be fairly demanded of Sociologists then is not that they should have a nicely rounded definition of the object of sociological investigation which should command universal agreement, but rather that they should have sufficient common understanding of the nature and aims of a science of Society to render discussion fruitful and co-operation possible. They must have a rough and provisional conception of “Society” just as in Biology students must have a rough and provisional conception of Life. That is, the term must be at once generic and distinctive. It must

serve to group certain matters together and to distinguish them from others, as possible objects of scientific investigation. Does the phrase science of society serve this purpose? If it allows room for cavil among sociologists it is probably in the use of the term "science" rather than of the term "society." Some would doubtless prefer to speak of Social Philosophy and deny that Society can be an object of a science comparable to Physics or Biology. This objection, however, can only be grounded on the more restricted use of the term science in which it is opposed to philosophy. If by science we mean merely unprejudiced investigation, accurately measured statement and the systematic prosecution of a subject through all the windings of interrelated facts—then philosophy itself aims at being a science. It is only if certain presuppositions as to the subject matter of science be allowed, if for example there is a separation between "nature" and that which is not of nature, or between the sphere of law and that of "freedom," and if science be restricted to one side of the partition, that any question can arise as to the use of the term in connection with society. As long as no such presuppositions are covertly introduced by the use of the term probably all Sociologists will agree that their object is the Science of Society. They hold that is to say that the Social Life constitutes a distinct field for investigation, and that it should be investigated in a scientific spirit—that is to say in the spirit which makes the ascertainment of the truth the immediate object, which aims at accurately measured statement, and at the systematic interconnection of the facts which it ascertains. I do not know whether all who profess and call themselves Sociologists would accept this account of their views, but on the other hand I do not know of any serious work on sociology which does not on its own lines seek to fulfil this purpose.

Within the limits of such a conception, however, very great variety of treatment is of course possible and the reader who wishes to know something of the scope and plan of a new journal may be expected to ask for something more definite. It is not, fortunately, among the recognised duties of an Editorial Committee to produce definitions, but in view of the admitted divergences in the handling of sociological investigations, it is perhaps well for those responsible for a sociological journal to give some indication of the ground which they hope to cover. This ground, I think, can only be marked off at the present stage by reference to the actual work done or in the doing by sociologists, that is, by all

who treat problems of social life in the scientific spirit. As already pointed out this would by no means exclude many of those who would maintain that their own method was not scientific but philosophical. The fundamental questions of social life were for long studied mainly under the aegis of political philosophy and one of the first points which a modern sociologist, seeking to define his subject, has to consider is the relation of his method to this older discipline. He finds to begin with that systematic political thinking developed in close connection with the general movement of metaphysics and moral philosophy. For this there is a double reason. On the one hand political philosophy whether in Hobbes or Locke, in Rousseau or Bentham, in John Mill or T. H. Green, closely resembles general philosophy in its method. Like metaphysics or ethics, it takes as its starting point common current conceptions, conceptions of law and government, of liberty and obligation, of the individual and society, conceptions which we all use and all suppose ourselves to understand until someone asks us what we mean by them. This someone is the philosopher and in the use of such conceptions as have been instanced, it is the political philosopher. That is to say, the political philosopher has sought for light by scrutinising those principles of human association which are so fundamental that everybody else takes them for granted. In other words he is dealing according to his lights with the most general conditions of social life, the intimate nature of the social bond, the problems arising out of the bare fact that distinct personalities form a social whole. On this side then he is in line with contemporary enquirers into those broad sociological principles which are independent of time and place. He has been and is laying down the lines of a general sociology. On the other side political thought has been closely associated with moral philosophy. For political thinkers have not merely sought to determine what society is, but have pretty uniformly conceived their analysis as having at least an important bearing on the question, what it ought to be. On the face of the facts these are two very distinct questions, and if there is any ultimate sense in which they are one that sense is only reached by a long philosophical analysis which not all will follow. But without such analysis many people confuse them or at least pass from the one to the other without sufficiently clear consciousness of the step that they are taking. It may be that some schools of political philosophy have fused, if they have not confused, these two questions. Be that as it may, sociological thinking must start with a clear cut distinction

between the "is" and the "ought," between the facts of social life and the conditions on which society actually rests and the ideal to which society should conform. If indeed it finds that any element of the ideal enters into the facts or the conditions, that is matter of fact, capable of proof or disproof. But it must hold in full clearness from the outset that the question of fact is one thing and the question of right and wrong another. An ideal is not proved to be an actual condition of social life because it is an ideal nor is a factor in the actual life of society to be identified with a moral law merely because it is proved to be a factor. The "laws" of Political Economy are not as the old jest has it laws to be "obeyed," but statements of certain relations of cause and effect to be taken into account by anyone who wishes to achieve certain economic results; and so with any other "laws" of Sociology.

Political Philosophy if this view is correct, has concerned itself with two questions which in thought are quite distinct. The first of these questions concerns the general conditions of social life; the second is the problem of Moral Philosophy. It may be asked whether this latter problem is properly the concern of Sociology at all. Sociology, it may be said, is a science, and science is to be understood in a more limited sense than that given above. A science deals with facts and the interconnection of facts. It discovers laws and makes predictions. Hence it tells us what has been, what is, and what will be, but it has no concern with what ought to be. Not that social science leaves ethics out of account. There is the science of Comparative Ethics which tells what men have thought and think about right and wrong. It may even help us to forecast what they are likely to think about right and wrong, but it does not profess to say what they ought to think about right and wrong. If this is a question which can be determined at all it belongs to Philosophy and not to science. Sociology as a science then, it may be said, has no concern with the right and wrong of human conduct, or with the good and bad of social life, but only with the nature and conditions of the social structure and the observable laws of its growth and decay.

But the very terms of the protest show how impossible it is to keep Sociology—especially the broader investigations of general Sociology—in permanent separation from all ethical considerations. On the one side if right conduct is truly social conduct the results of sociology cannot be indifferent to the moral philosopher. We said above, that to discover one of the conditions of human

association is not all one with discovering an element in the ethical ideal. But there are circumstances in which the two come very nearly to the same thing. For if the condition is a vital and unalterable condition of social life, if science proves that the social life cannot subsist without it, and if moral philosophy regards the maintenance of the social life as a necessary part of its ideal then the scientific truth is at once translatable into a moral command. The deliverance of science and the deliverance of moral philosophy on the subject are still distinct. The one states a fact and the other lays down an injunction. But the fact and the injunction issue from two sides, if the phrase be allowed, of the same human consciousness in relation to the same human data. More generally, those who take seriously the social side of Ethics look forward to the gradual formation of an Applied Ethics which will stand in much closer relation to life than the disputations of the schools, that is in effect to an Art which, resting on Moral Philosophy as its theoretical foundation, would use the results of the social sciences as Medicine uses those of Physiology. The widest conception of Sociology then—and however individual thinkers may differ, it is the widest conception that should shape the policy of a review—takes the subject as embracing not only a Science, but a Philosophy and an Art, as dealing not only with the facts and conditions of social life, but with its ideals, and the means of their realisation.

Indeed, if Sociology as a science of facts and conditions is important to Ethics, it may equally be argued that Ethics cannot be indifferent to a student of Sociology. For what after all is the material of Sociology? It is the kind of common life achieved by human beings, beings that is to say moved by impulses and purposes. The interplay of purpose we may say, is to Sociology what mass and motion are to physics or the metabolism of cellular tissue to Biology. Doubtless there are conditions, physical conditions, biological conditions, for example, which come cramping in, hedging round the play of purpose, sometimes determining its direction, sometimes twisting its result. But the distinctive feature of our subject matter, the feature that makes Sociology a distinct science is the web of purpose wherein men act on one another and react on the conditions that make them. But purpose and the relations of purpose also constitute the subject of the ethical judgment. Ethics and social science have, generically, the same subject matter and though they regard it from different points of view yet as every sociologist is also a man he cannot, so to say,

wholly divest himself of the one kind of consciousness in putting on the other. Nor is it desirable that he should do so. The Ethical judgment is scientifically by far the most important judgment which has to be passed on human purposes. For we cannot ask any more vital questions about purposes than how far they attain their ends, whence our fundamental question about the interaction of distinct purposes and the purposes of separate personalities is how far they tend to frustrate or to further one another, how they conflict or harmonise. But to raise this question is at once to revert to the old ethical problem of the individual and the common good. And any answer that we give to this question, that is as much as to say any deep-reaching definitions, classifications, any conception of growth, development or decay in human society will consciously or unconsciously be framed in terms of our conception of the common good. It is better for the sake of clearness that it be done consciously, and accordingly our most purely "scientific" work in Sociology is likely to be done best, if we have in mind an articulate system of clear cut ethical conceptions.

Even were it otherwise, were the scientific, the philosophic, and the practical sides of sociological work separate in essence rather than distinct in thought, a Review which seeks to offer common ground for sociological workers to meet upon could hardly neglect the speculative or the practical approach to the subject. Its conductors would have to realise that a subject which is treated by some as a science in the more limited sense of that term, is, and has been, approached by others from the speculative and by still more from the human and practical point of view. They would have to take these points of view into account and to bear in mind, among other things, that the "practical" interest in Sociology has often taken, and seems more and more likely to take shape in the form of experiments in verification of hypotheses, experiments which the most precisely limited science cannot ignore. So what a Review has to ask is that the sociological interest, whether practical or theoretical, should be "scientific" in the broad sense here given to that term, that to find expression in these pages it should be prompted by an unprejudiced desire for truth, rendered in measured accuracy of expression, and be such as to assist in the systematic following up of interconnected facts.

So far we have spoken of General Sociology and have seen reasons for giving the term for our purposes a wide interpretation. But the advance of Sociology in recent years has been more marked

in the growth of special sciences than in the fresh development of fundamental ideas. Indeed sociology as a general discipline has been sometimes threatened with destruction at the hands of its own offspring. It tends to be dispersed and disappear into a number of specialisms. In place of sociology we have social sciences and the question of urgency for sociology is whether they are to develop independently each on its own lines or are to be kept in touch with one another and with the fertilising principle of social unity by means of a general study of Sociology.

The division of Sociology into special sciences is in itself only in accordance with the normal conditions of scientific growth. So vastly complex a whole as Social Life cannot be studied for long without a division of labour, and as soon as certain elements can be distinguished, certain fields of work marked out in *prima facie* distinctness from the remainder, economy suggests a concentration of different minds on each of these in turn. The selection is justified and the economy is real on two conditions. (1) There must be real cohesion of certain social phenomena which brings them closer to one another than they are to other sides of social life, and (2) since society is after all one, and no portion of its life can be really divorced from the remainder, the specialist should be ready at every stage to take into account the influence in his own sphere of forces emanating from some other part of the field. It is on this side that the natural limitations of specialism are often the cause of confusion of voices, stagnation in discovery, and positive errors in the practical guidance of affairs—and this not in Sociology alone. It is here that the function of General Sociology becomes all important. Properly considered General Sociology is neither a separate science complete in itself before specialism begins, nor is it a mere synthesis of the social sciences consisting in a mechanical juxtaposition of their results. It is rather a vitalising principle that runs through all social investigation nourishing and nourished by it in turn, stimulating inquiry, correlating results, exhibiting the life of the whole in the parts and returning from the study of the parts to a fuller comprehension of the whole. We cannot indeed attempt any reasoned distribution of social functions among separate sciences without being struck by the unsubstantial nature of our divisions. We may think of Society first as a Structure and consider its constitution, the main groups of which it is composed, the mode of government by which it is held together, the nature of its relation to other societies. We see here foundations for the study of the Family, the Class,

the Tribe, the Nation; for the Science of Government; or for the study of International Law. We may turn to the Directive Conceptions and Institutions which condition the life of society, and distinguish law, ethics, religion; industrial organisation; science and philosophy; literature and art. The systematic treatment of any of these is on one side a sociological investigation, and each in turn may be subdivided into further specialisms. We may enquire into the concrete facts of society, the actual life of a people as affecting and affected by the constitution and the directive institutions of the social structure, and then we obtain demographical investigations of the life conditions of the social classes, and of the distribution of personal qualities among groups. In any or all of these departments a science may be "Descriptive," limited to a straight-forward account of the facts of a given time and place; it may be Analytical, resolving complex effects into elementary principles, causes, or conditions; and it may be Comparative bringing phenomena of different societies into relation with one another and seeking through comparison and classification to discover lines of growth. But we can no sooner make these or any similar divisions of the possible field of sociology than we become aware of forces that pass over all our boundaries. What can we know of the nature, say, of the family and of the various forms which it has assumed without taking some account of general ethics, of religion, law, and even of industrial and governmental organisation? How far could we carry a treatise on government without law, or on law without reference to religion and ethics, and what mountains of specialism we must raise between our eyes and the facts before we could fail to see the interaction of any one of these with the contemporary state of science and philosophy, of literature and art. We may carry specialism further in one field than in another according as the facts are more or less closely knit but whenever we take one side of social life, be it the economic, the religious, or any other, and treat it as though it stood alone we are on the road to fallacy.


It is not the function of a sociological journal to produce a ready made scheme of Sociology. But it is its function to assist in the work which General Sociology has to do, in bringing the work of specialists together and in affording facilities for the discussion of the broad sociological bearing of each specialistic investigation. It should aid in familiarising the Economist with the conclusions of Comparative Jurisprudence or with the philosophic analysis of society; the historian of thought with the

facts of industrial and political development; the investigators of contemporary social conditions with the earlier phases of social life; and all students of society with the best that is known or thought of the bearings of Biology and Psychology on their own investigations. At the same time it will afford them collectively the opportunity of defending the study of society from aggressions which would destroy its character as a distinct science or from usurpations which would merge it in the work of one of its own departments. It must give a fair field and no favour to the practical interest in Sociology. Needless to say it will approach questions of living interest without party bias, but it will be among its prime objects to show that even questions of the day, like questions of 3,000 years ago, can be approached in a scientific spirit with a disinterested desire to find out the truth about them.*

It may be objected that the Review would on these lines become an organ of all the specialisms, an attempt which considerations of print and paper forbid. But this is once again to misapprehend the position of Sociology. It does not lie within our province to cater for the detailed investigations of the recognised specialist. We invite him rather to discuss his principles and broad results with representatives of other specialisms and in the presence of those interested in Sociology at large.

We seek to touch each specialism at the point where it comes in contact with General Sociology. In each department there are matters of little interest except to those far advanced in that branch—matters of controversy on which the specialist alone can decide, investigations of detail of which he alone can see the bearing. The natural home for discussion of such points is the journal of the specialism. But there are also in each branch matters of general interest, results of importance to other investigators, controversies in which a material part of the evidence falls within the competence of another department, and of these the natural home is the journal for sociologists in general. Thus,

* By restricting the term science to its narrower sense of an inquiry into facts as opposed to ideals we may make the result of the discussion clear by a systematic arrangement. Thus :



Economics is logically a branch of Sociology and every economic truth is a sociological truth. But there are economic investigations which would be best suited to the *Economic Journal*, and others—such as touch most nearly the general life of the people—that would find an appropriate place in the *Sociological Review*.

We shall, therefore, welcome contributions alike from the philosopher and the specialist, from the comparative sciences which search the whole human record for their data, and from the detailed study of contemporary tendencies. We shall hope to show that in the study of social evolution the organisation of a mediæval city, or the genesis of an Oriental religion have their place alongside of the analysis of contemporary institutions. We hope to show at the same time that the problems of the day are just as much objects of science as any period of past history or any phase of primitive life. To the sociologist "nothing that is human is foreign." Not that such scattered fragments of Sociology are of real value for the science till they are brought or rather till they grow together. On the contrary it is one of the functions of Sociological criticism to prevent the crude use of fragments of history and of empirical generalisation from isolated cases. But the main problem of Sociology at the present day is to build up the great Comparative Science which alone can put the theory of social evolution on a firm basis. To form by a philosophic analysis a just conception of human progress, and trace this progress in its manifold complexity in the course of history, to test its reality by careful classification and searching comparisons, to ascertain its conditions, and if possible to forecast its future—this is the comprehensive problem towards which all sociological science converges and on the solution of which reasoned sociological effort must finally depend. In the light of this conception everything that concerns human development acquires value and all sociological work achieves unity. The comparative study of law, of government and the social fabric; the history of science and philosophy, of art and literature; the study of the ethical and religious consciousness in their manifold phases; the story of the industrial arts and the gradual conquest of nature, all these have their sociological side. All contribute to the general enquiry into the nature, conditions, and possibilities of human progress and to understand their contributions is the work of sociology.

L. T. HOBHOUSE.

SUICIDE : A CHAPTER IN COMPARATIVE ETHICS.*

Suicide, or intentional self-destruction, has often been represented as a fruit of a higher civilisation; Dr. Steinmetz, on the other hand, in his essay on 'Suicide among Primitive Peoples,' thinks it probable that "there is a greater propensity to suicide among savage than among civilised peoples." The former view is obviously erroneous; the latter probably holds good of certain savages as compared with certain peoples of culture, but cannot claim general validity.

Among several uncivilised races suicide is said to be unknown. To these belong some of the lower savages—the Yahgans of Tierra del Fuego, the Andaman Islanders, and various Australian tribes; whilst as regards most other tribes at about the same stage of culture information seems to be wanting. Of the natives in Western and Central Australia Sir G. Grey writes, "Whenever I have interrogated them on this point, they have invariably laughed at me, and treated my question as a joke." When a Caroline Islander was told of suicides committed by Europeans, he thought that he had not grasped what was said to him, as he never in his life had heard of anything so ridiculous. The Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush, though they have no intense fear of death, cannot understand suicide; "the idea of a man killing himself strikes them as inexplicable."

Among many savages and barbarians suicide is stated to be very rare, or to occur only occasionally; whereas among others it is represented as either common or extremely prevalent. Of the Kamchadales we are told that the least apprehension of danger drives them to despair, and that they fly to suicide as a relief, not only from present, but even from imaginary evil; "not only those who are confined for some offence, but such as are discontented with their lot, prefer a voluntary death to an uneasy life, and the pains of disease." Among the Hos, an Indian hill tribe, suicide is reported to be so frightfully prevalent as to afford no parallel in any known country:—"If a girl appears mortified by anything that has been said, it is not safe to let her go away till she is soothed. A reflection on a man's honesty

* Owing to considerations of space, footnotes, in which the authorities for the statements in the following article were fully given, have been omitted.

or veracity may be sufficient to send him to self-destruction. In a recent case, a young woman attempted to poison herself because her uncle would not partake of the food she had cooked for him." Among the Karens of Burma suicide is likewise very common where Christianity has not been introduced. If a man has some incurable or painful disease, he says in a matter-of-fact way that he will hang himself, and he does as he says; if a girl's parents compel her to marry the man she does not love, she hangs herself; wives sometimes hang themselves through jealousy, sometimes because they quarrel with their husbands, and sometimes out of mere chagrin, because they are subject to depreciating comparisons; and it is a favourite threat with a wife or daughter, when not allowed to have her own way, that she will hang herself. Among some uncivilised peoples suicide is frequently practised by women, though rarely by men.

The causes which, among savages, lead to suicide are manifold:—disappointed love or jealousy; illness or old age; grief over the death of a child, a husband, or a wife; fear of punishment; slavery or brutal treatment by a husband; remorse, shame or wounded pride, anger or revenge. In various cases an offended person kills himself for the express purpose of taking revenge upon the offender. Thus among the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold Coast, "should a person commit suicide, and before so doing attribute the act to the conduct of another person, that other person is required by native law to undergo a like fate. The practice is termed 'killing oneself upon the head of another,' and the person whose conduct is supposed to have driven the suicide to commit the rash act is visited with a death of an exactly similar nature"—unless, indeed, the family of the suicide be pacified with a money compensation. With reference to the Savage Islanders, who especially in heathen times were much addicted to suicide, we are told that, "like angry children, they are tempted to avenge themselves by picturing the trouble that they will bring upon the friends who have offended them." Among the Thlinkets an offended person who is unable to take revenge in any other way commits suicide in order to expose the person who gave the offence to the vengeance of his surviving relatives and friends. Among the Chuvashes it was formerly the custom for enraged persons to hang themselves at the doors of their enemies. A similar method of taking revenge is still not infrequently resorted to by the Votyaks, who believe that the ghost of the deceased will then persecute the offender. Sometimes

a suicide has the character of a human sacrifice. In the times of epidemics or great calamities the Chukchi sacrifice their own lives in order to appease evil spirits and the souls of departed relatives. Among some savages it is common for a woman, especially if married to a man of importance, to commit suicide on the death of her husband, or to demand to be buried with him; and many Brazilian Indians kill themselves on the graves of their chiefs.

In various other cases, besides the voluntary sacrifices of widows or slaves, the suicides of savages are connected with their notions of a future life. The belief in the new human birth of the departed soul has led West African negroes to take their own lives when in distant slavery, that they may awaken in their native land. Among the Chukchi there are persons who kill themselves for the purpose of effecting an earlier reunion with their deceased relatives. Among the Samoyedes it happens that a young girl who is sold to an old man strangles herself in the hope of getting a more suitable bridegroom in the other world. We are told that the Kamchadales inflict death on themselves with the utmost coolness because they maintain that "the future life is a continuation of the present, but much better and more perfect, where they expect to have all their desires more completely satisfied than here." The suicides of old people, again, are in some cases due to the belief that a man enters into the other world in the same condition in which he left this one, and that it consequently is best for him to die before he grows too old and feeble.

The notions of savages concerning life after death also influence their moral valuation of suicide. Where men are supposed to require wives not only during their lifetime, but after their death, it may be a praiseworthy thing, or even a duty, for a widow to accompany her husband to the land of souls. According to Fijian beliefs, the woman who at the funeral of her husband met death with the greatest devotedness would become the favourite wife in the abode of spirits, whereas a widow who did not permit herself to be killed was considered an adulteress. Among the Central African Bairo those women who refrained from destroying themselves over their husbands' graves were regarded as outcasts. On the Gold Coast a man of low rank who has married one of the king's sisters is expected to make away with himself when his wife dies, or upon the death of an only male child; and "should he outrage native custom and neglect to do so, a hint is conveyed to him that he will be put to death, which usually

produces the desired effect." The customary suicides of the Chukchi are solemnly performed in the presence and with the assistance of relatives and neighbours. The Samoyedes maintain that suicide by strangulation "is pleasing to God, who looks upon it as a voluntary sacrifice, which deserves reward." The opinion of the Kamchadales that it is "allowable and praiseworthy" for a man to take his own life, was probably connected with their optimistic notions about their fate after death. And that the habitual suicides of old persons have the sanction of public opinion is particularly obvious where they may choose between killing themselves and being killed.

Whilst in some cases suicide opens the door to a happy land beyond the grave, it in other cases entails consequences of a very different kind. The Omahas believe that a self-murderer ceases to exist. According to the Thompson Indians in British Columbia, "the souls of people who commit suicide do not go to the land of souls. The shamans declare they never saw such people there; and some say that they have looked for the souls of such people, but could not find their tracks. Some shamans say they cannot locate the place where the souls of suicides go, but they think they must be lost, because they seem to disappear altogether. Others say that these souls die, and cease to exist. Still others claim that the souls never leave the earth, but wander around aimlessly." So also the Jakuts believe that the ghost of a self-murderer never comes to rest. Sometimes the fate of suicides after death is represented as a punishment which they suffer for their deed. Thus the Dacotahs, among whom women not infrequently put an end to their existence by hanging themselves, are of opinion that suicide is displeasing to the "Father of Life," and will be punished in the land of spirits by the ghost being doomed for ever to drag the tree on which the person hanged herself; hence the women always suspend themselves to as small a tree as can possibly sustain their weight. The Pahárias of the Rájmahal Hills, in India, say that "suicide is a crime in God's eyes," and that "the soul of one who so offends shall not be admitted into heaven, but must hover eternally as a ghost between heaven and earth." The Kayans of Borneo maintain that self-murderers are sent to a place called *Tan Tekkan*, where they will be very poor and wretched, subsisting on leaves, roots, or anything they can pick up in the forests, and being easily distinguished by their miserable appearance. According to Dyak beliefs, they go to a special place, where those who have

drowned themselves must henceforth live up to their waists in water, and those who have poisoned themselves must live in houses built of poisonous woods and surrounded by noxious plants, the exhalations of which are painful to the spirits. In other instances we are simply told that the souls of suicides, together with those of persons who have been killed in war, or who have died a violent death, are not permitted to live with the rest of the souls, to whom their presence would cause uneasiness. Among the Hidatsa Indians some people say that the ghosts of men who have made away with themselves occupy a separate part of the village of the dead, but that their condition in no other wise differs from that of the other ghosts.

It is, however, hard to believe that the fate of the self-murderer, whether it be annihilation, a vagrant existence on earth, or separation in the other world, was originally meant as a punishment; for a similar lot is assigned to the souls of persons who have been drowned, or who have died by accident or violence. It seems that the suicide's future state is in the first place supposed to depend upon the treatment of his corpse. Frequently he is denied burial, or at least the ordinary funeral rites, and this may give rise to the notion that his soul never comes to rest or, possibly, even ceases to exist. Or he is buried by himself, apart from the other dead, in which case his soul must naturally remain equally isolated. Among the Alabama Indians, for instance, "when a man kills himself either in despair or in a sickness, he is deprived of burial, and thrown into the river." In Dahomey "the body of any person committing suicide is not allowed to be buried, but thrown out into the fields to be destroyed by wild beasts." Among the Fantis of the Gold Coast "il y a des places réservées aux suicidés et à ceux qui sont morts de la petite vérole. Ils sont enterrés à l'écart loin de toute habitation et de tout chemin public." In the Pelew Islands a self-murderer is buried not with his own deceased relatives, but in the place where he ended his life, as are also the corpses of those who fall in war. Among the Bannavs of Cambodia "anyone who perishes by his own hand is buried in a corner of the forest far from the graves of his brethren." Among the Sea Dyaks "those who commit suicide are buried in different places from others, as it is supposed that they will not be allowed to mix in the seven-storied heaven with such of their fellow-countrymen as come by their death in a natural manner or from the influence of the spirits." The motive for thus treating self-murderers' bodies is superstitious fear. Their ghosts, as the

ghosts of persons who have died by any other violent means or by accident, are supposed to be particularly malevolent, owing to their unnatural mode of death or to the desperate or angry state of mind in which they left this life. If they are not buried at all, or if they are buried in the spot where they died or in a separate place, that is either because nobody dares to interfere with them, or in order to prevent them from mixing with the other dead. So also murdered persons are sometimes left unburied, and people who are supposed to have been killed by evil spirits are buried apart; whilst those struck with lightning are either denied interment, or buried where they fell and in the position in which they died. We sometimes hear of a connection between the way in which a suicide's body is treated and the moral opinion as regards his deed. Among the Alabama Indians his corpse is said to be thrown into the river "because he is looked upon as a coward"; and of the Ossetes M. Kovalewsky states that they bury suicides far away from other dead persons because they regard their act as sinful. But we may be sure that moral condemnation is not the original cause of these practices.

It is comparatively seldom that savages are reported to attach any stigma to suicide. To the instances mentioned above a few others may be added. The Waganda, we are told, greatly condemn the act. Among the Bogos "a man never despairs, never gives himself up, and considers suicide as the greatest indignity." The Karens of Burma deem it an act of cowardice; but at the same time they have no command against it, they "seem to see little or no guilt in it," and "we are nowhere told that it is displeasing to the God of heaven and earth." The Dacotahs said of a girl who had destroyed herself because her parents had turned her beloved from the wigwam, and would force her to marry a man she hated, that her spirit did not watch over her earthly remains, being offended when she brought trouble upon her aged mother and father. In Dahomey "it is criminal to attempt to commit suicide, because every man is the property of the king. The bodies of suicides are exposed to public execration, and the head is always struck off and sent to Agbomi; at the expense of the family if the suicide were a free man, at that of his master if he were a slave." On the other hand, it is expressly stated of various savages that they do not punish attempts to commit suicide. The negroes of Accra see nothing wrong in the act. "Why," they would ask, "should a person not be allowed to die, when he no longer desires to live?" But they inflict cruel punishments

upon slaves who try to put an end to themselves, in order to deter other slaves from doing the same. Among the Pelew Islanders suicide "is neither praised nor blamed." The Eskimo around Northumberland Inlet and Davis Strait believe that anyone who has been killed by accident, or who has taken his own life, certainly goes to the happy place after death. The Chippewas hold suicide "to be a foolish, not a reprehensible action," and do not believe it to entail any punishment in the other world. In his sketches of the manners and customs of the North American Indians, Buchanan writes:—"Suicide is not considered by the Indians either as an act of heroism or of cowardice, nor is it with them a subject of praise or blame. They view this desperate act as the consequence of mental derangement, and the person who destroys himself is to them an object of pity."

From the opinions on suicide held by uncivilised races we shall pass to those prevalent among peoples of a higher culture. In China suicide is extremely common among all classes and among persons of all ages. For those who have been impelled to this course by a sense of honour the gates of heaven open wide, and tablets bearing their names are erected in the temples in honour of virtuous men or women. As honourable self-murderers are regarded servants or officers of state who choose not to survive a defeat in battle or an insult offered to the sovereign of their country; young men who, when an insult has been paid to their parents which they are unable to avenge, prefer not to survive it; and women who kill themselves on the death of their husbands or *fiancés*. In spite of imperial prohibitions, sutteeism of widowed wives and brides has continued to flourish in China down to this day, and meets with the same public applause as ever; whilst those widowed wives and brides who have lost their lives in preserving their chastity, are entitled both to an honorary gate and to a place in a temple of the State as an object of worship. Another common form of suicide which is admired as heroic in China is that committed for the purpose of taking revenge upon an enemy who is otherwise out of reach—according to Chinese ideas a most effective mode of revenge, not only because the law throws the responsibility of the deed on him who occasioned it, but also because the disembodied soul is supposed to be better able than the living man to persecute the enemy. The Chinese have a firm belief in the wandering spirits of persons who have died by violence; thus self-murderers are supposed to haunt the places where they committed the fatal deed and endeavour to persuade others to

follow their example, at times even attempting to play executioner by strangling those who reject their advances. "Violent deaths," says Mr. Giles, "are regarded with horror by the Chinese"; and suicides committed from meaner motives are reprobated. It is said in the Yü Li, or "Divine Panorama"—a Taoist work which is very popular all over the Chinese Empire—that whilst persons who kill themselves out of loyalty, filial piety, chastity, or friendship, will go to heaven, those who do so "in a trivial burst of rage, or fearing the consequences of a crime which would not amount to death, or in the hope of falsely injuring a fellow-creature," will be severely punished in the infernal regions. No pardon will be granted them; they are not, like other sinners, allowed to claim their good works as a set-off against evil, whereby they might partly escape the agonies of hell and receive some reward for their virtuous deeds. Sometimes suicide is classified by the Chinese as an offence against religion, on the ground that a person owes his being to Heaven, and is therefore responsible to Heaven for due care of the gift.

"The Japanese calendar of saints," says Mr. Griffis, "is not filled with reformers, alms-givers, and founders of hospitals or orphanages, but is overcrowded with canonised suicides and committers of *harakiri*. Even to-day, no man more . . . surely draws homage to his tomb, securing even apotheosis, than the suicide, though he may have committed a crime." There were two kinds of *harakiri*, or "belly-cutting," one obligatory and the other voluntary. The former was a boon granted by government, who graciously permitted criminals of the Samurai, or military, class thus to destroy themselves instead of being handed over to the common executioner; but this custom is now quite extinct. Voluntary *harakiri*, again, was practised out of loyalty to a dead superior, or in order to protest, when other protests might be unavailing, against the erroneous conduct of a living superior, or to avoid beheading by the enemy in a lost battle, or to restore injured honour if revenge was impossible. Under any circumstances *harakiri* cleansed from every stain, and ensured an honourable interment and a respected memory. It is said in a Japanese manuscript, "To slay his enemy against whom he has cause of hatred, and then to kill himself, is the part of a noble Samurai, and it is sheer nonsense to look upon the place where he has disembowelled himself as polluted." In old days the ceremony used to be performed in a temple.

Among the Hindus we meet with the practice of self-immolation

of widows—until recently very prevalent in many parts of India—and various forms of self-destruction for religious purposes. Suicide has always been considered by the Hindus to be one of the most acceptable rites that can be offered to their deities. According to the Ayen Akbery, there were five kinds of suicide held to be meritorious in the Hindu, namely :—starving ; covering himself with cow-dung and setting it on fire and consuming himself therein ; burying himself in snow ; immersing himself in the water at the extremity of Bengal, where the Ganges discharges itself into the sea through a thousand channels, enumerating his sins, and praying till the alligators came and devoured him ; cutting his throat at Allahabad, at the confluence of the Ganges and Jumna. To these might be added drowning at Hurdwar, Allahabad, and Saugor ; perishing in the cold of the Himalayas ; the practice of dying under the wheels of Juggurnath's car ; and the custom of men throwing themselves down from certain rocks to fulfil the vows of their mothers, or to receive forgiveness for sins, or to be re-born rajas in their next state of transmigration. It is also common for persons who are afflicted with leprosy or any other incurable disease to bury or drown themselves with due ceremonies, by which they are considered acceptable sacrifices to the deity, or to roll themselves into fires with the notion that thus purified they will receive a happy transmigration into a healthy body. Suicide was further resorted to by Brāhmans for the purpose of avenging an injury, as it was believed that the ghost of the deceased would persecute the offender, and, presumably, also because of the great efficacy which was attributed to the curse of a dying Brāhman. When one of the Rajput rajas once levied a war-subsidy on the Brāhmans, some of the wealthiest, having expostulated in vain, poniarded themselves in his presence, pouring maledictions on his head with their last breath ; and thus cursed the raja laboured under a ban of excommunication even amongst his personal friends. We are told of a Brāhman girl who, having been seduced by a certain raja, burned herself to death, and in dying imprecated the most fearful curses on the raja's kindred, after which they were visited with such a succession of disasters that they abandoned their family settlement at Baliya, where the woman's tomb is worshipped to this day. Once when a raja ordered the house of a Brāhman to be demolished and resumed the lands which had been conferred upon him, the latter fasted till he died at the palace gate, and became thus a Brahm, or malignant Brāhman ghost, who avenged the injury he had suffered

by destroying the raja and his house. At Azimghur, in 1835, a Brāhman "threw himself down a well, that his ghost might haunt his neighbour." The same idea undoubtedly underlies the custom of "sitting *dharna*," which was practised by creditors who sat down before the doors of their debtors threatening to starve themselves to death if their claims were not paid; and the sin attached to causing the death of a Brāhman would further increase the efficacy of the creditor's threats. At the same time religious suicide is said to be a crime in a Brāhman. And in the sacred books we read that for him who destroys himself by means of wood, water, clods of earth, stones, weapons, poison, or a rope, no funeral rites shall be performed by his relatives; that he who resolves to die by his own hand shall fast for three days; and that he who attempts suicide, but remains alive, shall perform severe penance. The Buddhists allow a man under certain circumstances to take his own life, but maintain that generally dire miseries are in store for the self-murderer, and look upon him as one who must have sinned deeply in a former state of existence. It should be added that in India, as elsewhere, the souls of those who have killed themselves or met death by any other violent means are regarded as particularly malevolent and troublesome.

The Old Testament mentions a few cases of suicide. In none of them is any censure passed on the perpetrator of the deed, nor is there any text which expressly forbids a man to die by his own hand; and of Ahithophel it is said that he was buried in the sepulchre of his father. It seems, however, that according to Jewish custom persons who had killed themselves should be left unburied till sunset, perhaps for fear lest the spirit of the deceased otherwise might find its way back to the old home. Josephus, who mentions this custom, denounces suicide as an act of cowardice, as a crime most remote from the common nature of all animals, as impiety against the Creator; and he maintains that the souls of those who have thus acted madly against themselves will go to the darkest place in Hades. The Talmud considers suicide justifiable, if not meritorious, in the case of the chief of a vanquished army who is sure of disgrace and death at the hands of the exulting conqueror, or when a person has reason to fear being forced to renounce his religion. In all other circumstances the Rabbis consider it criminal for a person to shorten his own life, even when he is undergoing tortures which must soon end his earthly career; and they forbid all marks of mourning for a self-murderer, such as wearing sombre apparel and eulogising him.

Islam prohibits suicide, as an act which interferes with the decrees of God. Muhammedans say that it is a greater sin for a person to kill himself than to kill a fellow-man; and, as a matter of fact, suicide is very rare in the Moslem world.

Ancient Greece had its honourable suicides. The Milesian and Corinthian women, who by a voluntary death escaped from falling into the hands of the enemy, were praised in epigrams. The story that Themistocles preferred death to bearing arms against his native country were circulated with a view to doing honour to his memory. The tragedians frequently give expression to the idea that suicide is in certain circumstances becoming to a noble mind. Hecuba blames Helena for not putting an end to her life by a rope or a sword. Phaedra and Leda kill themselves out of shame, Haemon from violent remorse. Ajax decides to die after having in vain attempted to kill the Atreidae, maintaining that "one of generous strain should nobly live, or forthwith nobly die." Instances are, moreover, mentioned of women killing themselves on the death of their husbands; and in Cheos it was the custom to prevent the decrepitude of old age by a voluntary death. At Athens the right hand of a person who had taken his own life was struck off and buried apart from the rest of the body, evidently in order to make him harmless after death. Plato says in his "Laws," probably in agreement with Attic custom, that those who inflict death upon themselves "from sloth or want of manliness," shall be buried alone in such places as are uncultivated and nameless, and that no column or inscription shall mark the spot where they are interred. At Thebes self-murderers were deprived of the accustomed funeral ceremonies, and in Cyprus they were left unburied. The objections which philosophers raised against the commission of suicide were no doubt to some extent shared by popular sentiments. Pythagoras is represented as saying that we should not abandon our station in life without the orders of our commander, that is, God. According to the Platonic Socrates, the gods are our guardians and we are a possession of theirs, hence "there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him." Aristotle, again, maintains that he who from rage kills himself commits a wrong against the State, and that therefore the State punishes him and civil infamy is attached to him. The religious argument could not be foreign to a people who regarded it as impious interference in the order of nature to make a bridge over the Hellespont and to separate a landscape from the continent; and the idea that

suicide is a matter of public concern evidently prevailed in Massilia, where no man was allowed to make away with himself unless the magistrates had given him permission to do so. But the opinions of the philosophers were anything but unanimous. Plato himself, in his "Laws," has no word of censure for him who deprives himself by violence of his appointed share of life under the compulsion of some painful and inevitable misfortune, or out of irremediable and intolerable shame. Hegesias, surnamed the "death-persuader," who belonged to the Cyrenaic school, tried to prove the utter worthlessness and unprofitableness of life. According to Epicurus we ought to consider "whether it be better that death should come to us, or we go to him." The Stoics, especially, advocated suicide as a relief from all kinds of misery. Seneca remarks that it is a man's own fault if he suffers, as, by putting an end to himself, he can put an end to his misery:—"As I would choose a ship to sail in, or a house to live in, so would I choose the most tolerable death when about to die. . . . Human affairs are in such a happy situation, that no one need be wretched but by choice. Do you like to be wretched? Live. Do you like it not? It is in your power to return from whence you came." The Stoics did not deny that it is wrong to commit suicide in cases where the act would be an injury to society; Seneca himself points out that Socrates lived thirty days in prison in expectation of death, so as to submit to the laws of his country, and to give his friends the enjoyment of his conversation to the last. Epictetus opposes indiscriminate suicide on religious grounds:—"Friends, wait for God; when he shall give the signal and release you from this service, then go to him; but for the present endure to dwell in the place where he has put you." Such a signal, however, is given often enough: it may consist in incurable disease, intolerable pain, or misery of any kind. "Remember this: the door is open; be not more timid than little children, but as they say, when the thing does not please them, 'I will play no longer,' so do you, when things seem to you of such a kind, say I will no longer play, and be gone: but if you stay, do not complain." Pliny says that the power of dying when you please is the best thing that God has given to man amidst all the sufferings of life.

It seems that the Roman people, before the influence of Christianity made itself felt, regarded suicide with considerable moral indifference. According to Servius, it was provided by the Pontifical laws that whoever hanged himself should be cast out unburied; but from what has been said before it is probable that

this practice only owed its origin to fear of the dead man's ghost. Vergil enumerates self-murderers not among the guilty, but among the unfortunate, confounding them with infants who have died prematurely and persons who have been condemned to die on a false charge. Throughout the whole history of pagan Rome there was no statute declaring it to be a crime for an ordinary citizen to take his own life. The self-murderer's rights were in no way affected by his deed, his memory was no less honoured than if he had died a natural death, his will was recognised by law, and the regular order of succession was not interfered with. In Roman law there are only two noteworthy exceptions to the rule that suicide is a matter with which the State has nothing to do: it was prohibited in the case of soldiers, and the enactment was made that the suicide of an accused person should entail the same consequences as his condemnation; but in the latter instance the deed was admitted as a confession of guilt. On the other hand, it seems to have been the general opinion in Rome that suicide under certain circumstances is an heroic and praiseworthy act. Even Cicero, who professed the doctrine of Pythagoras, approved of the death of Cato.

In no question of morality was there a greater difference between classical and Christian doctrines than in regard to suicide. The earlier Fathers of the Church still allowed, or even approved of, suicide in certain cases, namely, when committed in order to procure martyrdom, or to avoid apostacy, or to retain the crown of virginity. To bring death upon ourselves voluntarily, says Lactantius, is a wicked and impious deed; "but when urged to the alternative, either of forsaking God and relinquishing faith, or of expecting all torture and death, then it is that undaunted in spirit we defy that death with all its previous threats and terrors which others fear." Eusebius and other ecclesiastical writers mention several instances of Christian women putting an end to their lives when their chastity was in danger, and their acts are spoken of with tenderness, if not approbation; indeed, some of them were admitted into the calendar of saints. This admission was due to the extreme honour in which virginity was held by the Fathers; St. Jerome, who denied that it was lawful in times of persecution to die by one's own hand, made an exception for cases in which a person's chastity was at stake. But even this exception was abolished by St. Augustine. He allows that the virgins who laid violent hands upon themselves are worthy of compassion, but declares that there was no necessity for their doing so, since

chastity is a virtue of the mind which is not lost by the body being in captivity to the will and superior force of another. He argues that there is no passage in the canonical Scriptures which permits us to destroy ourselves either with a view to obtaining immortality or to avoiding calamity. On the contrary, suicide is prohibited in the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," namely, neither thyself nor another"; for he who kills himself kills no other but a man. This doctrine, which assimilates suicide with murder, was adopted by the Church. Nay, self-murder was declared to be the worst form of murder, "the most grievous thing of all"; already St. Chrysostom had declared that "if it is base to destroy others, much more is it to destroy one's self." The self-murderer was deprived of rights which were granted to all other criminals. In the sixth century a Council at Orleans enjoined that "the oblations of those who were killed in the commission of any crime may be received, except of such as laid violent hands on themselves"; and a subsequent Council denied self-murderers the usual rites of Christian burial." It was even said that Judas committed a greater sin in killing himself than in betraying his master Christ to a certain death.

According to the Christian doctrine, as formulated by Thomas Aquinas, suicide is utterly unlawful for three reasons. First, everything naturally loves itself and preserves itself in being; suicide is against a natural inclination and contrary to the charity which a man ought to bear towards himself, and consequently a mortal sin. Secondly, by killing himself a person does an injury to the community of which he is a part. Thirdly, "life is a gift divinely bestowed on man, and subject to His power who 'killeth and maketh alive'; and therefore he who takes his own life sins against God, as he who kills another man's slave sins against the master to whom the slave belongs, and as he sins who usurps the office of judge on a point not referred to him; for to God alone belongs judgment of life and death." The second of these arguments is borrowed from Aristotle, and is entirely foreign to the spirit of early Christianity. The notion of patriotism being a moral duty was habitually discouraged by it, and, as Mr. Lecky observes, "it was impossible to urge the civic argument against suicide without at the same time condemning the hermit life, which in the third century became the ideal of the Church." But the other arguments are deeply rooted in some of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity—in the sacredness of human life, in the duty of absolute submission to God's will, and in the extreme

importance attached to the moment of death. The earthly life is a preparation for eternity; sufferings which are sent by God are not to be evaded, but to be endured. The man who deliberately takes away the life which was given him by the Creator displays the utmost disregard for the will and authority of his Master; and, worst of all, he does so in the very last minute of his life, when his doom is sealed for ever. His deed, as Thomas Aquinas says, is "the most dangerous thing of all, because no time is left to expiate it by repentance." He who kills a fellow-creature does not in the same degree renounce the protection of God; he kills only the body whereas the self-murderer kills both the body and the soul. By denying the latter the right of Christian burial the Church recognises that he has placed himself outside her pale.

The condemnation of the Church influenced the secular legislation. The provisions of the Councils were introduced into the law-books. In France Louis IX. enforced the penalty of confiscating the self-murderer's property, and laws to the same effect were passed in other European countries. Louis XIV. assimilated the crime of suicide to that of *lèse majesté*. According to the law of Scotland, "self-murder is as highly criminal as the killing our neighbour." In England suicide is still regarded by the law as murder committed by a man on himself; and unless declared insane, the self-murderer forfeited his property as late as the year 1870, when forfeitures for felony were abolished. In Russia, to this day, the testamentary dispositions of a suicide are deemed void by the law.

The horror of suicide also found a vent in outrages committed on the dead body. Of a woman who drowned herself in Edinburgh in 1598, we are told that her body was "harled through the town backwards, and thereafter hanged on the gallows." In France, as late as the middle of the eighteenth century, self-murderers were dragged upon a hurdle through the streets with the face turned to the ground; they were then hanged up with the head downwards, and finally thrown into the common sewer. However, in most cases the treatment to which suicides' bodies were subject was not originally meant as a punishment, but was intended to prevent their spirits from causing mischief. All over Europe wandering tendencies have been ascribed to their ghosts. In some countries the corpse of a suicide is supposed to make barren the earth with which it comes in contact, or to produce hailstorms or tempests or drought. At Lochbroom, in the North-West of Scotland, the people believe that if the remains of a

self-murderer be taken to any burying-ground which is within sight of the sea or of cultivated land, this would prove disastrous both to fishing and agriculture, or, in the words of the people, would cause "famine (or dearth) on sea and land"; hence the custom has been to inter suicides in out-of-the-way places among the lonely solitudes of the mountains. The practice of burying them apart from other dead has been very widespread in Europe, and in many cases there are obvious indications that it arose from fear. In the North-East of Scotland a suicide was buried outside a churchyard, close beneath the wall, and the grave was marked by a single large stone, or by a small cairn, to which the passing traveller was bound to cast a stone; and afterwards, when the suicide's body was allowed to rest in the churchyard, it was laid below the wall in such a position that no one could walk over the grave, as the people believed that if a woman enceinte stepped over such a grave, her child would quit this earth by its own act. In England persons against whom a coroner's jury had found a verdict of *felo de se* were buried at cross-roads, with a stake driven through the body so as to prevent their ghosts from walking.¹ For the same purpose the bodies of suicides

1. Why were suicides buried at cross-roads? Possibly because the cross was supposed to disperse the evil energy ascribed to their bodies. Both in Europe and India the cross-road has, since ancient times, been a favourite place to divest oneself of diseases or other evil influences (Wuttke, *Der deutsche Volksaberglaube der Gegenwart*, §§ 483, 484, 492, 508, 514, 522, 545, pp. 325, 326, 331, 341, 345, 349, 361. *Hymns of the Atharva-Veda*, pp. 272, 473, 519. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, pp. 267, 268 n. 1). In the sacred books it is said that "a student who has broken the vow of chastity shall offer an ass to Nirriti on a cross-road" (*Gautama*, xxiii. 17), and that a person who has previously undergone certain other purification ceremonies "is freed from all crimes, even mortal sins, after looking on a cross-road at a pot filled with water, and reciting the text, 'Simhe me manyuh'" (*Baudhāyana*, iv. 7, 7). In the hills of Northern India and as far as Madras, an approved charm for getting rid of a disease of demoniacal origin is to plant a stake where four roads meet, and to bury grains underneath, which crows disinter and eat (*North Indian Notes and Queries*, i. § 652, p. 100; Madden, 'The Turae and Outer Mountains of Kumaon,' in *Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal*, xvii. pt. i. 583; Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern India*, i. 290). In the Province of Bihar, "in cases of sickness various articles are exposed in a saucer at a cross-road" (Grierson, *Bihar Peasant Life*, p. 407). According to a Bulgarian tale, Lot was enjoined by the priest to plant on a cross-road three charred twigs in order to free himself from his sin (Strausz, *Die Bulgaren*, p. 115). The Gypsies of Servia believe that a thief may divert from himself all suspicions by painting with blood a cross and a dot above it on the spot where he committed the theft (von Wlislöcki, 'Menschenblut im Glauben der Zigeuner,' in *Am Ur-Quell*, iii. 64 sq.). In Morocco the cross is used as a charm against the evil eye, and the chief reason for this is, I believe, that it is regarded as a conductor of the baneful energy emanating from the eye, dispersing it in all the quarters of the wind and thus preventing it from injuring the

were in many cases burned. And when removed from the house where the act had been committed, they were commonly carried out, not by the door, but by a window, or through a perforation specially made for the occasion in the door, or through a hole under the threshold, in order that the ghost should not find its way back into the house, or perhaps with a view of keeping the entrance of the house free from dangerous infection.

However, side by side with the extreme severity with which suicide is viewed by the Christian Church we find, even in the Middle Ages, instances of more humane feelings towards its perpetrator. In mediæval tales and ballads true lovers die together and are buried in the same grave; two roses spring through the turf and twine lovingly together. In the later Middle Ages, says M. Bourquelot, "on voit qu'à mesure qu'on avance, l'antagonisme devient plus prononcé entre l'esprit religieux et les idées mondaines relativement à la mort volontaire. Le clergé continue à suivre la route qui a été tracée par Saint Augustin et à déclarer le suicide criminel et impie; mais la tristesse et le

person or object looked at (Westermarck, 'Magic Origin of Moorish Designs,' in *Jour. Anthr. Inst.* xxxiv. 214). In Japan, if a criminal belonging to one of the lower classes commits suicide, his body is crucified (*Globus*, xviii. 197). When, under Tarquinius Priscus (or Tarquinius Superbus), many Romans preferred voluntary death to compulsory labour in the *cloaca*, or artificial canals by which the sewage was carried into the Tiber, the king ordered that their bodies should be crucified and abandoned to birds and beasts of prey (Pliny, *Historia naturalis*, xxxvi. 24; Servius, *Commentarii in Virgilii Æneidos*, xii. 603). The reason for thus crucifying the bodies of self-murderers is not stated; but it is interesting to notice, in this connection, the idea expressed by some Christian writers that the cross of the Saviour symbolised the distribution of his benign influence in all directions (d'Ancona, *Origini del teatro italiano*, i. 846; Tauler, quoted by Peltzer, *Deutsche Mystik und deutsche Kunst*, p. 191. I am indebted to my friend Dr. Yrjö Hirn for drawing my attention to this idea). With reference to persons who had killed a father, mother, brother, or child, Plato says, in his 'Laws' (ix. 873): "If he be convicted, the servants of the judges and the magistrates shall slay him at an appointed place without the city where three ways meet, and there expose his body naked, and each of the magistrates on behalf of the whole city shall take a stone and cast it upon the head of the dead man, and so deliver the city from pollution; after that, they shall bear him to the borders of the land, and cast him forth unburied, according to law." The duels by which the ancient Swedes were legally compelled to repair their wounded honour were to be fought on a place where three roads met (Leffler, *Om den fornsvenska hednalen*, p. 40 sq. In various countries it has been the custom to bury the dead at cross-roads (Grimm, 'Ueber das Verbrennen der Leichen,' in *Kleinere Schriften*, ii. 288 (Bohemians); Lippert, *Die Religionen der europäischen Culturvölker*, p. 310 (Slavonians); Winternitz, *Das altindische Hochzeitsrituell*, p. 68; Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, pp. 267, 268, 562 n. 3)—a custom which may have given rise to the idea that cross-roads are haunted (Winternitz, *op. cit.* p. 68; Oldenberg, *op. cit.* p. 267 sq.; cf. Wuttke, *op. cit.* § 108 p. 89 sq.).

désespoir n'entendent pas sa voix, ne se souviennent pas de ses prescriptions." The revival of classical learning, accompanied as it was by admiration for antiquity and a desire to imitate its great men, not only increased the number of suicides, but influenced popular sentiments on the subject. Even the Catholic casuists, and later on philosophers of the school of Grotius and others, began to distinguish certain cases of legitimate suicide, such as that committed to avoid dishonour or probable sin, or that of a condemned person saving himself from torture by anticipating an inevitable death, or that of a man offering himself to death for the sake of his friend. Sir Thomas More, in his *Utopia*, permits a person who is suffering from an incurable and painful disease to take his own life, provided that he does so with the agreement of the priests and magistrates; nay, he even maintains that these should exhort such a man to put an end to a life which is only a burden to himself and others. Donne, the well-known Dean of St. Paul's, wrote in his younger days a book in defence of suicide, "a Declaration," as he called it, "of that paradoxe, or thesis, that Self-homicide is not so naturally sin, that it may never be otherwise." He there pointed out the fact—which ought never to be overlooked by those who derive their arguments from "nature"—that some things may be natural to the species, and yet not natural to every individual member of it. In one of his *Essays* Montaigne pictures classical cases of suicide with colours of unmistakable sympathy. "La plus volontaire mort," he observes, "c'est la plus belle. La vie despend de la volonté d'aultruy; la mort, de la nostre." The rationalism of the eighteenth century led to numerous attacks both upon the views of the Church and upon the laws of the State concerning suicide. Montesquieu advocated its legitimacy:—"La société est fondée sur un avantage mutuel; mais lorsqu'elle me devient onéreuse, qui m'empêche d'y renoncer? La vie m'a été donnée comme une faveur; je puis donc la rendre lorsqu' elle ne l'est plus: la cause cesse, l'effet doit donc cesser aussi." Voltaire strongly opposed the cruel laws which subjected a suicide's body to outrage and deprived his children of their heritage. If his act is a wrong against society, what is to be said of the voluntary homicides committed in war, which are permitted by the laws of all countries? Are they not much more harmful to the human race than self-murder, which nature prevents from ever being practised by any large number of men? Beccaria pointed out that the State is more wronged by the emigrant than by the suicide, since the

former takes his property with him, whereas the latter leaves his behind. According to Holbach, he who kills himself is guilty of no outrage on nature or its author; on the contrary, he follows an indication given by nature when he parts from his sufferings through the only door which has been left open. Nor has his country or his family any right to complain of a member whom it has no means of rendering happy, and from whom it consequently has nothing more to hope. Others eulogised suicide when committed for a noble end, or recommended it on certain occasions. "Suppose," says Hume, "that it is no longer in my power to promote the interest of society; suppose that I am a burthen to it; suppose that my life hinders some person from being much more useful to society. In such cases my resignation of life must not only be innocent but laudable." Hume also attacks the doctrine that suicide is a transgression of our duty to God. "If it would be no crime in me to divert the Nile from its course were I able to do so, how could it be a crime to turn a few ounces of blood from their natural channel? Were the disposal of human life so much reserved as the peculiar province of the Almighty that it were an encroachment on his right for men to dispose of their own lives, would it not be equally wrong of them to lengthen out their lives beyond the period which by the general laws of nature he had assigned to it? My death, however voluntary, does not happen without the consent of Providence; when I fall upon my own sword, I receive my death equally from the hands of the Deity as if it had proceeded from a lion, a precipice, or a fever."

Thus the main arguments against suicide which had been set forth by pagan philosophers and Christian theologians were scrutinised and found unsatisfactory or at least insufficient to justify that severe and wholesale censure which was passed on it by the Church and the State. But a doctrine which has for ages been inculcated by the leading authorities on morals is not easily overthrown; and when the old arguments are found fault with new ones are invented. Kant maintained that a person who disposes of his own life degrades the humanity subsisting in his person and entrusted to him to the end that he might uphold it. Fichte argued that it is our duty to preserve our life and to will to live, not for the sake of life, but because our life is the exclusive condition of the realisation of the moral law through us. According to Hegel it is a contradiction to speak of a person's right over his life, since this would imply a right of a person over himself, and no one

can stand above and execute himself. Paley, again, feared that if religion and morality allowed us to kill ourselves in any case, mankind would have to live in continual alarm for the fate of their friends and dearest relations—just as if there were a very strong temptation for men to shorten their lives. But common sense is neither a metaphysician nor a sophist. When not restrained by the yoke of a narrow theology, it is inclined in most cases to regard the self-murderer as a proper object of compassion rather than of condemnation, and in some instances to admire him as a hero. The legislation on the subject therefore changed as soon as the religious influence was weakened. The laws against suicide were abolished in France by the Revolution, and afterwards in various other continental countries; whilst in England it became the custom of jurymen to presume absence of a sound mind in the self-murderer—perjury, as Bentham said, being the penance which prevented an outrage on humanity. These measures undoubtedly indicate not only a greater regard for the innocent relatives of the self-murderer, but also a change in the moral ideas concerning the act itself.

As appears from this survey of facts, the moral valuation of suicide varies to an extreme degree. It depends partly on the circumstances in which the act is committed, partly on the point of view from which it is regarded and the notions held about the future life. When a person sacrifices his life for the benefit of a fellow-man or for the sake of his country or to gratify the supposed desire of a god, his deed may be an object of the highest praise. It may, further, call forth approval or admiration as indicating a keen sense of honour or as a test of courage; in Japan, says Professor Chamberlain, “the courage to take life—be it one’s own or that of others—ranks extraordinarily high in public esteem.” In other cases suicide is regarded with indifference as an act which concerns the agent alone. But for various reasons it is also apt to give rise to moral disapproval. The injury which the person committing it inflicts upon himself may excite sympathetic resentment towards him; he may be looked upon as injurer and injured at the same time. Plato asks in his ‘Laws’:—“What ought he to suffer who murders his nearest and so-called dearest friend? I mean, he who kills himself.” And the same point of view is conspicuous in St. Augustine’s argument, that the more innocent the self-murderer was before he committed his deed the greater is his guilt in taking his life—an argument of particular force in connection with a theology which condemns

suicides to everlasting torments and which regards it as a man's first duty to save his soul. The condemnation of killing others may by an association of ideas lead to a condemnation of killing one's self, as is suggested by the Christian doctrine that suicide is prohibited in the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." The horror which the act inspires, the fear of the malignant ghost, and the defiling effect attributed to the shedding of blood, also tend to make suicide an object of moral reprobation or to increase the disapproval of it; and the same is the case with the exceptional treatment to which the self-murderer's body is subject and his supposed annihilation or miserable existence after death, which easily come to be looked upon in the light of a punishment. Suicide is, moreover, blamed as an act of moral cowardice, and, especially, as an injury inflicted upon other persons, to whom the agent owed duties from which he withdrew by shortening his life. Even among savages we meet with the notion that a person is not entitled to treat himself just as he pleases. Among the Goajiro Indians of Colombia, if anybody accidentally cuts himself, say with his own knife, or breaks a limb, or otherwise does himself an injury, his family on the mother's side immediately demands blood-money, since, being of their blood, he is not allowed to spill it without paying for it; the father's relatives demand tear-money, and friends present claim compensation to repay their sorrow at seeing a friend in pain. That a similar view is sometimes taken by savages with regard to suicide appears from a few statements quoted above. The opinion that suicide is an offence against society at large is particularly likely to prevail in communities where the interests of the individual are considered entirely subordinate to the interests of the State. The religious argument, again, that suicide is a sin against the Creator, an illegitimate interference with his work and decrees, comes to prominence in proportion as the moral consciousness is influenced by theological considerations. In Europe this influence is certainly becoming less and less. And considering that the religious view of suicide has been the chief cause of the extreme severity which it has been treated in Christian countries, I am unable to subscribe to the opinion expressed by Professor Durkheim, that the more lenient judgment passed on it by the public conscience of the present time is merely accidental and transient. The argument adduced in support of this opinion leaves out of account the real causes to which the valuation of suicide is due: it is said that the moral evolution is not likely to be retrogressive in this particular point after it has

followed a certain course for centuries. It is true that moral progress has a tendency to increase our sense of duty towards our fellow-men. But at the same time it also makes us more considerate as regards the motives of conduct; and—not to speak of suicides committed for the benefit of others—the despair of the self-murderer will largely serve as a palliation of the wrong which he may possibly inflict upon his neighbour.

EDWARD WESTERMARCK.

THE CRIMINAL PROBLEM.

In so far as it is legitimate to generalise about the history of the past, it may be said with a considerable amount of truth that the idea of political emancipation was one of dominant watchwords of the 19th century. The desire for political emancipation was at the root of the great movement which led to the liberation of so many European nationalities from a foreign yoke, and which has done so much to transform the map of Europe. Among nations which had not burdens of this kind to shake off, the desire for political emancipation took the form of an agitation on the part of the unfranchised classes for a share in the government of their country and a voice in shaping the laws which they were expected to obey. The task which lay before the civilised world at the beginning of the 19th century has been with some exceptions to a large extent accomplished, and the 20th century finds itself confronted with problems of another kind.

It is always hazardous to attempt to forecast the movements of the future, and it is impossible to say in these early days of the 20th century what its dominating ideas are likely to be. But at the present moment in whatever direction we choose to look we shall find that the idea of social emancipation is occupying the same place in men's minds now as the idea of political emancipation occupied in the minds of our predecessors in the century which has passed away. At the bottom of all the unrest which now prevails among so many important sections of the community in Europe and America is a keen sense of dissatisfaction with the existing social order of things. When men look with an impartial eye on society as it is at present constituted they are compelled to feel that it is burdened and oppressed by social miseries from which it must be liberated, if the race is to advance towards higher forms of civilised life. Amongst the most conspicuous of these social miseries are the oscillations of employment, pauperism, insanity, and crime. All these problems, although they differ in outward appearance, are intimately and organically connected, and as a whole may be said to constitute the social problem. But, for purposes of enquiry, it is better to consider each of them apart, and in the following remarks it is our intention to confine ourselves to a consideration of the problem of crime.

The most important materials for appreciating the nature of this problem are to be found in the annual returns dealing with the operations of the criminal courts and the prison administration. Almost all civilised States compile an annual record of the amount of crime which has been committed in their midst. The French were the first to establish this system of tabulating the criminal statistics of the community. Their example has been followed by other European States, and it is possible, with the aid of these annual returns, to estimate approximately the amount of crime which has been committed in each country from year to year. Attempts have been made from time to time to institute international comparisons. But these international comparisons, when we look closely into them, are found to be of little value. In no two countries are crimes classified in the same way. No two countries possess exactly the same criminal law or the same forms of criminal procedure or the same definition of the various crimes. These differences, as well as many others which need not here be mentioned, stand in the way of accurate and satisfactory international comparisons. If we take the crime of homicide, for example, we shall find that it is not defined in the same manner in any of our modern criminal codes; at the same time it is probably easier to institute some kind of comparison between homicide in one country and the same crime in another than it is with respect to any other kind of offence.

The fullest returns of the amount of crime committed from year to year consist of the number of offences annually reported to the police. For instance, in the quinquennial period 1901—05, the latest period concerning which we possess official information, the number of indictable offences reported to the police amounted to 87,591, a proportion of 262 indictable offences per 100 thousand of the general population. The number of offences reported to the police is in many respects a valuable index of the criminal condition of the community. But it must be borne in mind that it is by no means an accurate test of the total volume of crime. Many offences are committed which never reach the ears of the police at all. These offences cannot be included in the annual returns of crime. On the other hand, many of the offences which are reported to the police may turn out to be of a different character from the reports which the police receive of them. It is only after an offender has been tried and convicted that we are able to say with a considerable amount of accuracy what his offence has been. Police reports are more valuable as a test of the efficiency of the police in the detection

of crime than as a test of the total amount of crime. If we find that there is a high ratio of apprehensions and convictions to the number of offences reported to the police, we are able to infer from this fact that the police are doing their work efficiently as far as regards the detection of crime. If we find, on the other hand, that there is a low ratio of apprehensions and convictions to the number of offences committed, it at once raises the question of the efficiency of the police.

At the same time, it must be remembered that there are circumstances in which the efficiency or non-efficiency of the police force cannot be measured by the ratio of offences committed to convictions obtained. The effectiveness of the police force is always largely determined by the attitude of the population towards the criminal law. If public sentiment is on the side of the law, the police are easily able to obtain witnesses and information of all sorts as to the crime which has been committed. If, on the other hand, public opinion is hostile to the criminal law as a whole or to certain parts of it, it is much more difficult for the police to secure convictions, even if they are a capable body of men. We have a striking illustration of this in connection with certain offences committed in Ireland. Irish public opinion is not on the side of the law in so far as it relates to agrarian crime. The result of this is that it is exceedingly difficult for the police to secure convictions for agrarian offences. The feeling of the public is with the agrarian offender. Witnesses will not come forward to give evidence; juries, when these cases come before the higher courts, are unwilling to bring in a verdict of guilty, no matter how clear the evidence of guilt may be. The result is that the police are thrown back entirely on their own resources, and when this is the case the proportion of convictions to the number of crimes committed is necessarily small. Irish public opinion is on the side of the law with regard to offences which are not agrarian in their nature. Offences of this kind are much more likely to be detected and punished, not because the police are more vigilant in the one case than in the other, but simply because they have the public behind them in the one case, and hostile to them in the other.

A less comprehensive but more accurate record of the amount of crime annually committed within the community is the number of offences which come up for trial in the criminal courts. In all cases in which a person comes up for trial there is usually a certain amount of evidence against him. And even if this evidence is

incomplete or amounts to very little when sifted before the judicial bench, it is at least sufficient in most cases to show that an offence against the law has been committed, although the person charged with committing it may not be the guilty party. Convictions are the most accurate record of the amount of crime committed from year to year. We can never be really sure what sort of crime has been committed until it has come up for minute and searching investigation in a court of justice. A charge of murder, when the case is tried, often resolves itself into a case of manslaughter, or perhaps into a case of justifiable homicide. A charge of burglary when it comes up for trial finally resolves itself into a case of simple theft. A charge of embezzlement may turn out, upon judicial investigation to be an act which is quite within the limits of the law. Other instances might easily be adduced to show that we cannot say what the nature of an offence really is until it has been submitted to the judgment of a judicial tribunal. The following recent instance from a report of police proceedings in the "Times" will make this clear:—The collector of an insurance company was charged on remand with attempting to shoot a detective with a revolver. It appears that the collector, in the course of his duties, had to go in a very rough neighbourhood with the company's money in his pockets. He therefore possessed himself of a small revolver for his own protection. On the evening in question he had between £2 and £3 in his possession. When the detective approached him he did not say who he was, and the insurance collector foolishly pointed the revolver at him, but he had no intention of discharging it. When these circumstances were explained to the magistrate, he said he was satisfied that the defendant did not mean to shoot the detective. The probability was that he felt frightened, and thought he was going to be interfered with. But it was a serious matter to point a revolver at anyone in this way, and he fined the defendant £5. In this case an offence which seemed to be of a very serious character assumed much smaller proportions when it came before the courts, and the magistrate was able to dispose of it by the imposition of a small fine.

The chief courts in this country for the trial of criminal cases of an indictable character are the Assizes, which include the Central Criminal Courts and the courts of Quarter Sessions. The Assizes are courts presided over by H.M. judges when they go on circuit for the administration of justice. These courts are held as a rule three times a year for each county. On the other hand,

the Central Criminal Court, sitting in London, is held twelve times in the year. The courts of Quarter Sessions exist in each county, and in boroughs which have received the right to hold a separate court. In boroughs of this kind the court consists of the recorder of the borough. In the counties the courts consist of the justices for the county. A court of Quarter Sessions has less extensive powers than the courts of Assize. Such offences as treason, murder, perjury and libel can only be tried at Assizes. All cases tried at Assizes and Quarter Sessions are tried on an indictment presented by a Grand Jury, and the trial is always by jury. So much as to the character and composition of the higher criminal courts.

Minor offences are tried in the police courts or courts of summary jurisdiction. In these courts the magistrates decide both as to the law and facts, and the trial is conducted without a jury. In order to constitute a court of summary jurisdiction the presence of at least two justices of the peace is usually necessary, although there are certain cases in which such a court may consist of one justice only, but in such cases the powers of the court are extremely limited. In some of our large cities, such as London, Liverpool and Leeds, there are stipendiary magistrates, who preside over the police courts, and have all the powers of two or more justices. All cases, whatever their gravity, come, in the first place, before courts of summary jurisdiction for preliminary investigation. If the court considers that the case is too serious in character to be dealt with summarily the accused is either remanded to prison to await his trial at the Assizes or Sessions, or, if the case admits of it, he is liberated on bail until the Assizes and Sessions are held.

Offences in this country are divided into two classes—indictable and non-indictable. All statutory offences, unless the statute expressly provides for some other method of trial, are indictable, and so are all the ancient common law offences. All non-indictable offences are created by statute, and in every case it is expressly declared in the statute that such offences can be tried by courts of summary jurisdiction. Within the last twenty years the powers of courts of summary jurisdiction have been considerably extended, and many offences which used to be tried on indictment at Sessions and Assizes may now be tried summarily. On the other hand, certain offences which are usually tried summarily may be sent before Assizes and Sessions as if they were indictable. Such cases include assault, intimidation and cruelty to children.

The proceedings at Sessions and Assizes are commenced by the

preferring of a bill of indictment before the Grand Jury. When the Grand Jury consider the case and arrive at the conclusion that there is no satisfactory evidence against the accused person they decide that there is no true bill, and the prisoner is released. The prisoner is tried when the Grand Jury find that there is sufficient evidence in the indictment or formal accusation against him. He is then formally accused before the ordinary jury, and if at this stage he is discovered to be insane and unfit to plead he is not tried, but is ordered to be detained during H.M. pleasure. After hearing all the facts of the case a jury may arrive at one of three verdicts—a verdict of acquittal, a verdict of conviction or a verdict to the effect that the prisoner was guilty but insane at the time when he committed the crime. The duty of pronouncing a verdict rests with the jury, the duty of pronouncing a sentence of punishment rests with the judge.

The punishments which may be imposed upon a convicted offender by the law of England range from an order to the prisoner to come up for judgment when called upon, to the penalty of death. In addition to these punishments a convicted offender may be sentenced to penal servitude, a punishment which ranges between a sentence of three years' detention and a sentence for life in a penal servitude prison. In this country prisons are divided into two classes, that is to say, prisons for the detention of offenders sentenced to three years and over, a punishment which is known as a sentence to penal servitude, and prisons for the detention of prisoners sentenced for two years and under. The latter are called local prisons. These local prisons were formerly known as county prisons, and they were at that time under the management of the county authorities. But in the year 1877, an Act was passed transferring the county prisons from the jurisdiction of the local authorities to the jurisdiction of the Crown. Under this new system the management of all county or local prisons fell into the hands of the Home Secretary, and the central government is now responsible for the treatment of the whole prison population, whether in local prisons or in penal servitude.

Another form of punishment existing in this country consists in the detention of delinquent juveniles in a reformatory school. These schools are available for juveniles under sixteen years of age. Another method of dealing with juveniles is to commit them for a certain period to an industrial school. Children under twelve years of age may be committed to these schools. In recent years a new method of punishment has come into operation for habitual

drunkards. Offenders of this type may now be committed to what is called an inebriate reformatory. It will be seen that sentences to penal servitude, to imprisonment, to detention in a reformatory or industrial school, and to detention in an inebriate reformatory are all punishments which involve the loss of liberty.

Corporal punishment is still a weapon used by the English law. It exists in two forms—whipping with a birch-rod and flogging with the cat. As a rule, whipping is usually reserved for juvenile offenders and flogging for adults. A punishment of a more mitigated character than either the loss of liberty or corporal punishment consists in the imposition of a fine. A new form of punishment will also shortly come into operation called the probation of offenders. The probation of offenders has existed for a considerable number of years in many of the States of the American Union. It has now been made law by the present Parliament, and its application as a means of dealing with lighter offences rests mainly with the local authorities. The fundamental principle of the new Act is that an offender, after being convicted, instead of being fined or whipped or temporarily deprived of his liberty by being sent to prison, will be put upon probation, that is to say, upon his good behaviour for a certain number of months, and will have to submit himself to the supervision of an official, who will be called the probation officer. It is hoped by the advocates of this new Act that its operation may have the effect of preventing a considerable number of petty offenders from coming to prison. When the Probation of Offenders Act comes into force the criminal law of this country will possess ten different kinds of penalties rising in severity in accordance with the nature of the offence and character of the offender. These penalties may be briefly described as an order to the prisoner to come up for judgment when called upon, probation, fine, corporal punishment, detention in an industrial school, in a reformatory school, in an inebriate reformatory, imprisonment, penal servitude, and capital punishment.

It will now be of interest to show the extent to which these various forms of punishment at the disposal of the criminal law are inflicted upon persons convicted of crime. Taking the most serious cases first, we will deal with the number of persons convicted for murder and sentenced to death. If we take the year 1905, we find that the number of persons sentenced to death in England amounted to thirty-two. Of this number nearly one-half had their sentence commuted to penal servitude for life; the others suffered the extreme penalty of the law. The number of offenders sentenced

to penal servitude in England and Wales in the year 1905 amounted to 977, a ratio of practically 3 persons per 100 thousand of the population. The number of persons sentenced to imprisonment, that is to say, to detention for two years and under, amounted in round numbers to 197,000, or 586 per 100 thousand of the population. The total number of habitual drunkards committed to inebriate reformatories amounted to 433. The number of criminal lunatics committed to the criminal lunatic asylum at Broadmoor and to the various county asylums amounted to 196. The number of juveniles committed to reformatory schools amounted to 1,186. The number of juveniles committed to industrial schools of all kinds, day industrial, truant industrial schools, and ordinary industrial schools, amounted to 5,134. The number of persons sentenced to corporal punishment by courts of summary jurisdiction amounted to 2,403. The number at Assizes and Quarter Sessions sentenced to be whipped or flogged amounted to 6. The vast majority of cases which come before courts of summary jurisdiction are dealt with by the imposition of a fine. The number of fines inflicted in these cases amounted to a total of 535,151. On the other hand, cases tried at Sessions and Assizes are usually too serious to be dealt with by the infliction of a pecuniary penalty, and we find that of the total number of cases tried in these courts, only 53 were punished by fining. We now come to the lightest punishment of all, namely, recognizances with or without sureties. The numbers dealt with in this way amounted to 16,084.

What are the offences for which the above-mentioned punishments are inflicted? As far as serious offences are concerned, they may be divided into two classes—offences against the person and offences against property. The great bulk of serious offences, that is to say, offences tried at Sessions and Assizes, are offenders against property. Only between 4 per cent. and 5 per cent. of the total number of serious offences can be placed in the category of offences against the person. Nearly the whole of the remaining 95 per cent. consist of offences against property. These offences against property, when we analyse the returns, are found to consist of such crimes as burglary, house-breaking, shop-breaking, larceny, embezzlement, obtaining goods by false pretences, frauds, malicious injuries to property, forgery, and offences against the currency. The great bulk of offences against property are cases of simple larceny. Offences against the person when of a serious character consist of such crimes as murder, attempting to murder,

manslaughter, felonious and malicious wounding, assault, intimidation, cruelty to children, indecent assaults, abduction and bigamy.

Crimes of the serious kind which have just been mentioned constitute a very small fraction of the total number of offences. Most of the offences committed in this country are of such a nature that they can be dealt with summarily in the police courts without invoking the elaborate machinery of a judge and jury. The annual average number of persons tried by jury in the five years 1901—05 only amounted to 11,711, whereas the annual average of persons tried during the same period in the police courts numbered 787,714. Of this vast total drunkenness amounted to close upon 22,000 cases. The other offences which run into high figures are assaults, offences against the Elementary Education Acts, adulteration of food, cruelty to children and animals, offences against the game laws, the highway Acts, the liquor laws, the labour laws, malicious damage, offences against police regulations, against the poor law, the revenue laws, sanitary laws, vagrancy Acts, and petty theft. It will be seen that many of the offences tried in the police courts are not criminal in character, and would not brand the perpetrator of them as in any way a criminal. Offences against local Acts and bye-laws or offences against the highway Acts or offences against police regulations are very seldom of a deliberately criminal character, and the commission of such offences does not as a rule involve the loss of personal reputation. On the other hand, offences against the Elementary Education Acts which usually means the deliberate and persistent neglect on the part of parents to send their children to school exhibit such a serious lack of the sense of parental responsibility and often involve such serious consequences on the children themselves, that they almost come within the category of actual crimes.

One of the most conspicuous facts in connection with the administration of the criminal law in recent years has been the tendency to mitigate the severity of punishments. Many cases which used to be dealt with by the infliction of a fine or whipping are now dealt with by the much simpler and more humane expedient of sureties for good behaviour. There has been an enormous increase in cases of this kind. Cases which used to be dealt with by a sentence of imprisonment are now dealt with by the infliction of a fine. There is a great reduction in the longer terms of imprisonment, and a very great decrease in the longer sentences of penal servitude. The Summary Jurisdiction Act which enables

offenders charged with certain indictable offences to be tried summarily, has also had the effect of diminishing the severity of punishment. It is very remarkable that the apparent decrease of crime and the decided decrease in the severity of punishments have gone forward in this country hand in hand. Whether this condition of things is a mere coincidence or whether it is a relation of cause and effect it would be exceedingly difficult to say. But it is a fact which deserves to be particularly noted as it raises the great question of the effect of punishment on crime.

The effect of punishment upon crime is a very difficult and obscure problem. It is perfectly well known, for example, to all criminals who commit murder in this country that murder is punished with the penalty of death. But, in spite of this well-known fact, the number of persons sentenced to death for murder varies comparatively little from one quinquennial period to another.

The same statement holds true with regard to offences against property accompanied by violence, such as burglary and house-breaking. The perpetrators of these offences know perfectly well that they will be severely punished if they are convicted, yet the proportions of them to the population have remained very much the same for the last twenty years. In the case of murder, it has been contended by eminent authorities that the dread of capital punishment has little or no effect upon the class of persons who commit such crimes. Crimes of violence against property, such as burglary and house-breaking, are very often committed by habitual criminals, most of whom have already served either long terms of imprisonment or sentences of penal servitude. But the punishment which they have experienced in the past, and not merely the dread of it, as in the case of would-be murderers, has, it is contended, little or no effect upon their future conduct in the world.

A conclusion is drawn from the yearly repetition of a similar amount of crime that criminal acts, which seem to be a matter of free individual choice, are in reality determined by a variety of other circumstances with which the individual will has comparatively little to do. It is not maintained that criminal statistics are adverse to a belief in the freedom of the will, but it is held that the testimony of these statistics goes to show that the determinations of the will operate within a narrower range than is commonly supposed. Notwithstanding the fact that punishment seems to have so little effect upon the total volume of serious crime, it would be hazardous, and in fact unjustifiable, to assert that it has no effect at all. All that we can really infer from the regularity with which

a certain number of serious offences are committed from year to year is that there exists a certain section of the population who are not deterred from committing these offences by the terrors of the criminal law. We do not know the number of persons who may possibly be deterred from committing crime by the probability that they will be punished for it. In order to get at satisfactory evidence of this kind we should have to make the experiment of abolishing the penal code altogether and watch for the result. A man like Tolstoy would urge us to make such an experiment, but society is not likely to take his advice in this matter for many a year to come.

Whatever opinion may be held about the value of punishment, it is indisputable that the fear of punishment or the actual experience of punishment has only a limited effect upon the annual dimensions of crime. It is absurd to set it up, as is sometimes done, as a remedy for crime. We are sometimes told that if punishments were made sufficiently severe, criminals would become as rare as wolves. But statements of this kind fly in the face of experience, and I can only repeat what I stated several years ago on this subject. As a matter of fact and of history the existing system of penal treatment is a re-action, a conscious and deliberate re-action, against the futile barbarities which preceded it. Sir Samuel Romilly, Sir James Macintosh, Sir Robert Peel and their successors were practical statesmen of the highest character and experience, and they systematically proceeded to abolish the severities of the old criminal law on the ground that they were not effective as deterrents. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the penal laws of England were written in blood. Townsend, a celebrated Bow Street runner, stated before a Parliamentary Commission that he had known as many as forty people hanged in one day. At Kingston, seven persons, four men and three women, were convicted of being concerned in robbing a pedlar: "they were all hanged in Kent Street, opposite the door." One hundred and sixty different offences were punishable by death without benefit of clergy. Forgers were executed at the rate of one every three weeks between the years 1805 and 1818. I might multiply instances by the score to exemplify the drastic fashion in which criminals of all kinds were treated at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But such examples would only appal and horrify the reader. The facts are too well known to be disputed.

The universal testimony of historians and writers on crime who have examined this period is that the savagery of the criminal law

defeated its own ends. In face of the penalties to which they knew a convicted man would be exposed witnesses would not come forward to give evidence. Even when the evidence was clear, juries would not consent to convict. Justice was partially paralysed. The conscience of the community was at variance with the enactments of the law. The elaborate machinery of the penal system broke down. That was result number one. Result number two was the increase of crime by leaps and bounds. Professional blackmailers lived in opulence and security. A Parliamentary Committee, which sat in 1828, reported that more than sixteen banks had been forced to pay blackmail to thieves, and that more than £200,000 worth of property had in a short space been the object of negotiation or compromise. Blackmailers received their spoils from bankers "accompanied by a clearance from every risk, and perfect impunity for their crimes." The highways outside London were infested with professional footpads, and I was told by an old lady that in the first quarter of the last century her father never used to ride down as far as Acton without a brace of pistols in his belt. In London itself the law was powerless to prevent crime. The police were unable to give protection. Shopkeepers combined to provide patrols to watch the fronts of their shops. Householders had to arm themselves against burglars, and house-breakers were kept off by man-traps and spring guns. The country was deluged with spurious coin and counterfeit bank-notes, and it has been estimated that there were as many as fifty fraudulent mints in the Metropolis alone. As for the police, they admitted that there were many streets in London which they dared not enter. John Sayer, a Bow Street officer, stated before a Parliamentary Committee that such places as Duck Lane, Gravel Lane, and Cock Lane, in Westminster, were so infested by gangs of ruffians that no policeman dare venture near them, unless accompanied by five or six others, for fear of being cut to pieces. Yet every one of these ruffians knew that he would be executed or transported for life if convicted of theft.

It will be seen from these facts, which are taken from official documents, that the attempt to make "really bad offenders as rare as wolves" by hanging and transporting them was given a good trial, at one period of our history, and absolutely failed. The failure was so complete that responsible statesmen of all parties were ultimately obliged to admit it. The logic of facts was too strong for the preconceived theory that punishment will be effective if you only make it severe enough. In place of that theory

statesmen came round to the principle enunciated in the House of Commons by Sir James Macintosh in 1822 that the way to increase the efficiency of the criminal law is to mitigate its severity. It is on this principle that penal legislation in England has ever since proceeded. The principle has been accompanied by an enormous increase in social security and an equally great decrease in human misery and suffering. "Brutal laws," says Montesquieu, "brutalise the population," and in inflaming the lower instincts they increase crime instead of diminishing it.

Contemporary penal science has arrived at the conclusion that crime as a whole springs from conditions which punishment cannot touch, and therefore cannot cure. In fact, it may be regarded as a sociological law that the volume of crime in civilised society is mainly determined by the outward and inward conditions of its individual members. In the effort which must be made to reduce the proportions of crime a very secondary place must be given to the fear of punishment. Attention must mainly be concentrated on the individual and social circumstances which tend to produce the criminal. The principal individual circumstances are the defective physical and mental outfit with which he has to face the world. In an industrial society such as ours industrial fitness is a fundamental requirement. Those who are industrially unfit cannot obtain employment or cannot retain it when they have obtained it. The only resource left to such people is a life of vagrancy, pauperism or crime. Industrial incapacity is sometimes physical and sometimes mental. One of the causes of crime is that a certain proportion of the population are either physically or mentally unfit to take their place in the ranks of industry, and resort to a criminal life on account of this defect. Many of the mentally unfit are not defective in mental capacity, although a certain percentage undoubtedly are. But those who are not defective in this respect consist of a class who have had no mental discipline, whose will and character have not been developed by regular and strenuous habits at this period of life when habits are formed, and who are unable to sustain the regularity involved in modern industrial conditions. An improvement of the mental and physical equipment of the population would remove some of the most potent causes of crime.

Defective parental circumstances are also a fruitful source of crime. Children who are the offspring of degraded or dissolute parents, and who have lost one or both parents in early life are in danger of degenerating into the criminal class. Such children

are as a rule deprived at the most critical period of their life of parental supervision and of industrial opportunity. When they reach manhood in many cases they have no definite occupation and no industrial habits, and they easily drop down into the ranks of crime.

It will be gathered from these observations that crime is much more a social problem than a penal problem. It is certain that whatever changes may be made in the penal law will have comparatively little effect on the amount of crime. Just as most fevers arise from defective sanitary conditions so do most crimes arise from defective social conditions. The real remedy for these fevers is not improved hospital treatment, but better sanitary arrangements. The real remedy for crime is not more elaborate methods of punishment, but an improvement of the adverse social conditions of the community as a whole. The real problem is social, not penal; it forms one branch of the great social problem which is now confronting and puzzling the world.

W. D. MORRISON.

A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION.

I. *Comparative Religion as a branch of Psychology.*

Although anthropologists of the British School have on the whole troubled little to make explicit to their readers or even to themselves the precise method of their researches in Comparative Religion, there is no doubt that one and all, if challenged, would declare that method to be, broadly speaking, psychological. In other words, they would profess to be trying to understand the religious consciousness, or religious experience, of mankind 'from the inside,' as the phrase is. Treating ritual, language, organization, and so on, as but the "outward signs" of an "inward and spiritual" condition, they seek to penetrate, they would say, beyond and beneath these phenomena, by the only available, if indirect, means, namely the exercise of sympathetic insight, to those subjective factors of which the objective manifestations form the more or less loose-fitting garment. Further—though here might be found a greater divergence of opinion—religious experience would be characterized by most thinkers of this school as preeminently of the practical rather than of the speculative or mystic type, a mode of the life of purpose and action rather than of the life of thought or faith. After all, considering the national tendency to emphasize the ethical side of Christianity, it is not surprising that the scientific conception of religion should echo this pragmatic tone.

Does the rest of the world agree with the British school in regarding psychological and subjective elements as fundamental in religious history? Of course no one in their senses—not even a theorist defending a thesis—would deny that subjective elements are there to be taken stock of, or that, when taken stock of, they have a certain value in revealing ultimate conditions. But a profound distrust of the subjective as providing altogether too shifting a base for the philosophy of the human sciences exists both here and abroad. Indeed, if British anthropologists (from amongst whom Spencer may for our present purpose be excluded as founder of a distinct school of his own) have acquiesced in purely psychological results, might not the reason be that, busy with their beloved facts, they have not troubled to look beyond the ends of their noses? Hence, both here amongst admirers of

the Synthetic Philosophy, and abroad where system is more of a cult, determined efforts of all sorts have been made to reduce the psychological to its presumed non-psychological and objective conditions. Sociological or historical method in general rather than the method of Comparative Religion in particular has naturally furnished the immediate topic of most pronouncements. Yet it would be easy to show that Comparative Religion no less than any other of the special departments of Social Science has been seriously affected by this and that attempt to refer the will and fancy of man to causes that transcend the arbitrary.

To enumerate and classify the multitude of these objectivist theories is too formidable a task to be attempted here, but some representative views may be cited by way of illustrating, and at the same time criticizing, their general tendency. First we have the evolutionism of the biological school with its organicist or even mechanist analogies, which applied wholesale and unconditionally to Sociology have notoriously begotten a mythology. When all has been said in favour of the suggestiveness of the ideas of such writers as Novicow or Espinas, it remains certain that sociological phenomena belong primarily to a plane distinct from that of instinct, and admit of specific explanation in terms not heterogeneous but appropriate. No doubt there are remoter conditions of a biological order that have a certain relevancy. To exalt these, however, at the expense of proximate conditions, as this school is led by its *a priori* bias to do, is gratuitously to hamper observation and description with a radically false perspective. Closely associated with the line of thought is the view of such thinkers as Lapouge and Ammon, who make race the dominant factor in human development—a notion which seems likewise to underlie the somewhat different work of Gumplowicz. But, strictly taken, race is the vaguest and most elusive of conceptions, as any physical anthropologist is perfectly ready to admit.* The races of mankind, it is plain, are a thoroughly mixed lot. If on the other hand race be taken loosely in the sense of nationality, it is clear that analysis has not yet said its last word. In another category are the economic interpretations of Loria and others, this type of theory deriving itself from the 'historical materialism' of Marx. Distinct, but of very similar tendency, is the anthropogeography of Ratzel and his school, a method that is rapidly gaining ground in this country. Now

* Compare, for instance, P. Topinard, *Éléments d'anthropologie générale* (1885), p. 202.

regarded in themselves such studies, whether of food supply, or of soil or climate, in relation to distribution of population and other objective matters, are highly important, nay indispensable. National character and policy are certainly not to be understood apart from the consideration of environing conditions of this kind. It is only when, or so far as, they are taken to explain the national history to all intents and purposes finally, *milieu* or some prominent aspect thereof being regarded as the determining cause of genius itself, that no soundly empirical and tentative philosophy of man can bear with them any longer. The trouble with all these theories we have reviewed is their apriorism. It is assumed offhand firstly, that for all the manifestations of mind, individual and collective, there must be an explanation in terms of necessary causation of a physical and external type; secondly, that some one cause must be more fundamental than the rest, and must therefore be capable of accepting responsibility, as it were, for the whole affair. But these are but prejudices, begotten it may be by a passion for the objective, but nevertheless deserving the denomination of subjectivist at its most abusive. As empiricists we must work, not from metaphysical fancies, but from facts—from that which, as Aristotle puts it, is 'better known to us.'

A defender of these views will retort: "But granting you that instinct and race are somewhat intangible, here in food-supply or soil are the very facts you profess to be after. Surely they are 'better known to us,' because directly presented to the senses, than the accompanying subjective states that sympathetic insight must indirectly divine." To this the reply is that undoubtedly they are directly presented to us as facts; but not as causes. Description may well begin from them; it does not follow that explanation will end with them. We begin, let us say, by describing in objective terms the proportion borne by the agricultural to the manufacturing portion of the population in this country, or its position as a group of islands set over against a continent. Is it possible for explanation to deduce therefrom without further ado the amount of corn we import or the size of our battle fleet? If this seem possible to some, it is only because the middle term, a fact of another order, a psychological fact, namely the national desire for self-preservation, is tacitly assumed as a constant factor in the situation. But nations make mistakes. They are capable of ignoring or at least misconceiving the dictates of self-preservation. The 'free fooders' and the 'blue-water school' do not have it all their own way. But what becomes then

of the 'laws' supposed objectively and necessarily to connect preponderance of manufacturing population with the importation of grain, or insular position with the command of the sea? They turn out to be but laws of the moral type, laws which ought to be kept if certain ends are to be realized, but which actually are broken as often as these ends are not affirmed by the general will. In short, if we are not composing in the slap-dash style of evolutionary biology some a priori science of national health in general, but are seeking empirically to describe in their detailed relations to each other the actual conditions under which the historical life of peoples is carried on, psychical factors must not only be considered, but specially emphasized. For the peoples concerned, and therefore for the observer, the psychical factors—this sentiment, that policy, and so on—underlie and condition the material factors. If more remotely the psychical factors be themselves conditioned, it is certainly not by the material factors as directly presented either to the observer or to those he is observing, but by certain transcendent causes somehow discerned by the metaphysician at the back of these factors. We may add that we have represented the case for objective determinants of an economic and geographical kind at its strongest, namely where, as when food or defence from foes is in question, the psychical accompaniments are relatively simple and constant. Where art or religion have to be accounted for, material explanations at once become palpably incomplete and arbitrary. It is true that we have gone for our illustration to a civilized nation where sentiments and policies are clearly in evidence. But the primitive tribe has its sentiments and even its policies likewise. That they are harder to discover does not confer the right to treat them as directly deducible from *milieu*.

There remains to be considered another group of sociologists, the school of Durkheim and his brilliant colleagues of *L'Année Sociologique*. These thinkers are, or tend to be, objectivist, but theirs is a psychological not a materialistic objectivism. Their explanations are framed in terms of idea, sentiment, and purpose, which is the all-important matter. So long as they do not force the psychology to suit their metaphysical postulate of determinism—and they shew no strong inclination to do that, a test-case being their handling of the association of ideas on sound apperceptionist principles—there can be no harm in believing, with at least half the psychological world, that ultimately the subjective and objective orders are at one in a cause-bound necessary series or system of

correlated realities. If they admit the phenomenal existence of the contingent in the shape of human purpose, they are welcome to disbelieve in its real existence, whatever that may mean. Their merit is that they go straight to the facts, objective and subjective, of human life as directly or indirectly observed, philosophizing as to principles of explanation as they go, that is, as the principles are demanded by the actual work of specific and detailed research. With these, therefore, the British school of anthropology, with its radical empiricism that puts facts before laws and is happy if it can see a stride-length ahead in the dark, has no quarrel; nay from them it has much to learn. What this school names *Morphologie Sociale*, the study of the exterior conditions and forms of social agglomeration, of all in short that a statistical demography should describe, is a branch of investigation to which more attention might well be paid on this side of the Channel, as witness sundry gaps in the *questionnaires* our anthropologists are wont to circulate among workers in the field.¹ But you may have too much of a good thing, if the other good things of life are for its sake neglected. There are certain signs that Psychology may in the long run suffer from one-sided explanations of morphological derivation. Thus that most able and thoroughgoing of anthropological researchers, M. Mauss, in his *Essai sur les variations saisonnières des Sociétés Eskimos*² goes so far as to claim that he has here verified crucially³ the hypothesis that all the forms, including the religious form, of the social life of the Eskimo are a function of its material substrata, namely the mass, density, organization, and composition of their modes of agglomeration. All he shows, however, is that, if the mode of agglomeration changes, the religious custom and so on does as a fact alter. Just so in the case of the individual, as the brain-matter is modified, the ideas appear to change; but surely it does not follow necessarily that thought is a function of the brain, if this is to mean that thought is the effect, or even the unconditional correlate, of cerebration. Yet if it mean less than this, and unknown conditions may possibly vitiate the correspondence, explanation is not reached, since we are left with the merely analogical. A similar tendency would seem to be the stress laid by the school of Durkheim on the objectivity of their method—on the fact that throughout they are dealing with ‘things.’ They appear to regard

1. Cf. *L'Année Sociologique*, ix. 138.

2. *Ibid.*, 39 sqq.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

social phenomena, whether morphological or psychological, as objective simply in the sense of independent of individual control. Now no doubt the individual often finds himself powerless in face of the mass, though the mass is probably in every case moved by its ringleaders. No doubt, again, the subconscious nature of most popular contagions favours a treatment which verges on a mechanist dynamic. But do these writers mean more than that in a certain abstract aspect of society mechanism, or something psychologically equivalent, prevails? Probably not. But they at least show no wish or power (happily for those who have profited largely from their researches) to limit their science to the study of this abstract element and its conditions—a bare fragment at most, suppose it *per impossibile* isolated, of the vast mass of sociological material calling for analysis. The truth would seem to be that these thinkers, in reacting against the ideological constructions of the fancy-free anthropologist—a pretender who is fast being hustled from the field even in this land of distinguished amateurs—have bent the stick over to the other side. By all means let us avoid what Bacon calls *anticipatio* as contrasted with *interpretatio naturae*—the flying to the widest axioms without progressively graduated research. But at least let Psychology as Psychology preserve its integrity as a kind of bridge-work between the objective and the subjective elements of our experience. Let no premature abstraction cut up the field into strips before the whole has been surveyed. One day, perhaps, social explanations may be assimilated to mechanical; or one day, as we incline to hope, the very opposite may come about. In the mean time, however, whilst so much observation remains to be accomplished, let metaphysical questions, so far as they do not immediately bear on the exigencies of practical procedure, remain open. In particular, let necessity and contingency be treated as complementary, though antithetic, bases of explanatory construction in dealing with a human experience that, in despite of logic, empirically faces both ways at once and together.

II. *Comparative Religion as a branch of Social Psychology.*

There seems, then, to be good reason to respect the British tradition which ordains that Psychology must preside over the investigations of Comparative Religion. It remains to make explicit what anthropologists of the British school have hitherto recognized but vaguely, that a Social, not an Individual, Psychology can alone be invested with this function.

The ordinary Psychology bases itself on the assumption that this soul of yours or mine is something individual. There can be no great harm in this if individual here mean no more than self-complete. What is fatal, however, is to take it—as is often done by inadvertence—in the sense of self-contained. It is absolutely necessary to assume with common sense that souls can communicate—by indirect means, let us say, putting aside the question of the possibility of telepathy—and that by communicating they become more or less complementary to one another in a social system. For certain limited purposes, however, Psychology has found it convenient to make abstraction of the social dimension, as it may be termed. In so doing it can never afford for a moment to forget that it is dealing with what, being highly abstract, it is safest to term a fiction—to wit, a soul stripped of ninety-nine hundredths of its natural portion of soul-life. Herodotus¹ tells how King Psammetichus of Egypt caused certain infants to be isolated and in their inarticulate babbling sought for the original tongue of man, with results more satisfying to himself than to a critical posterity. Such an incubator-method, as it may be termed, is by no means to be despised in certain psychological contexts. As is well known, the instincts of newborn animals have been distinguished by precisely this means. So, too, in a somewhat similar if less exact way the psychologist who merely observes having made abstraction of the pabulum provided by society together with such effects on the mental digestion as may be traced to the particular nature of the food, may pay exclusive attention to the digestive apparatus which the individual is supposed to bring with him to the feast. But apply this incubator-method to the origins of language, of law, of morals, of religion, and how is the fallacy of Psammetichus to be escaped? Yet on all sides this application is being made. To take but the case in which we are primarily interested, namely that of religion, what is commoner, than to imagine a religious instinct, inherent in our individual nature, that out of itself by a sort of parthenogenesis bears fruit in the shape of historical religion? Or if the stimulus to religion is thought of as coming not so much from within as from without, from God by revelation, or from the world by the awakening of awe at its marvels, it is still the self-sufficient individual who is thought of as the subject of the experience. An example from a neighbouring field is the claim of various anthropologists to be able to deduce the phenomena

1. Herodotus, ii. 2.

of magic from the laws of association as they work in the individual mind. And yet that very incubator-method which is here parodied and abused might have taught these all too simple theorists their mistake. We cannot, perhaps, isolate an infant after the example of Psammetichus, and watch to see whether *proprio motu* it not merely talks but prays. We might, however, transplant the infant from savage to civilized surroundings, or, for the matter of that, might reverse the process. With what result? Would a young totemist notwithstanding evolve in the one case and a young Christian in the other? Or would not the child acquire the religion of its adopted home, of the society that rears and educates it? Even when full allowance is made for the fact that each child reacts on its education in individual fashion, can there be the slightest shadow of a doubt that the supreme determining influence must rest with the social factor?

If religion, then, is pre-eminently the concern of a Social, and not an Individual, Psychology, in what sort of shape will its natural laws or tendencies be exhibited? It has just been pointed out that a religion is so closely bound up with a particular organization of society that to abandon the one is to break with the other. May we, therefore, go further and say that a religion is identical with a particular organization of society, that it is a social institution? Certainly not, unless we are speaking loosely. We must say that the religion is materialized, incorporated, enshrined, in the corresponding institution or group of institutions. Perhaps an analogy may be drawn (though analogies are always dangerous if pressed) between a religion embodied in a social structure and a piece of literature, the work of many hands, consigned to a manuscript. In either case the one depends for very existence on the other, yet they differ as spirit from outer form; and the spirit is to a greater or less extent functionally independent of the form, since often it palpably governs it, stamps it with its own pattern, makes it the instrument of its own intent. Bad literature, indeed, will conform itself to the manuscript; just so many pages are wanted; the scribe must not be troubled to rewrite. And so bad religion enslaves itself to the outer form, truckles to a usage that imposes bounds, becomes fossilized to suit its ministers' convenience. Judged by which test, it must be admitted, there is a vast amount of bad religion in existence. Nevertheless world-literature and world-religion at their best and most typical are by no means the hacks of publishers and priests. In view, then, of the functional independence of the spirit, that

is, the ruling meaning and purpose, of historical religion at its most essential, its laws or tendencies must be described in terms appropriate to spirit, in terms of meaning and purpose. A Social, no less than an Individual, Psychology is concerned, primarily and directly, with soul only.

But at once the question occurs : Whose soul ? Whose spirit ? Whose meaning and purpose ? For those who recognise the possibility of a Social Psychology, there can be but one answer. Primarily and directly, the subject, the owner as it were, of religious experience is the religious society, not the individual. Now the subject of psychical states and processes as conceived by Individual Psychology is in no small measure abstract and fictitious ; and there is no harm in this abstraction so long as Individual Psychology knows what it is about and does not claim substance for its shadow-pictures. It remains to add, in fairness, that Social Psychology too has to operate on a figment—a figment which it is the business of Sociology to exhibit in its true nature, namely, as a methodological device of an abstract kind. Suppose we wish to explain the totemism of an Australian tribe. There is only one possible way to do this appropriately and essentially, namely to describe its general meaning and purpose by means of what Seignobos would call a *formule d'ensemble*.¹ Do we thereby commit ourselves to the assertion that this meaning and purpose exist ? Most certainly yes in a sense. For whom, then, do they exist in this sense ? Not for the individual tribesman taken at random, nor even for a leading elder, but for the society as a whole. It is absolutely necessary, if we would avoid the psychologist's fallacy, the mistake of letting our own feelings mix with what has to be impersonally observed, that we should fix our eyes throughout on the meaning and purpose totemism has, not for us, but for them, and for them not as so many individuals but as a group. Totemism is one of those psychical effects of intercourse which are methodologically, that is, for the working purposes of our science, specific. In terming such effects specific, however, Empirical Psychology implies no more than that they feel, think, and act in society otherwise than if apart, in a degree and to an extent deserving careful discrimination. It does not pronounce, because it has no methodological interest in pronouncing, on the metaphysical question whether, as common

1. Cf. Langlois et Seignobos, *Introduction aux études historiques*, 1898, p. 244.

sense inclines to hold, a society as such has no self-contained unitary soul, or, as Green and Bosanquet would affirm, the general will belongs to a collective soul of another and higher power than this soul of yours or mine.

Social Psychology, then, would appear to be immediately concerned with the soul-life of this abstraction or figment, the social subject. It is the business, however, of Sociology, understood as the general philosophy of the social sciences, in which capacity its concern is with method rather than results, to remind Social Psychology of the abstract and conditional nature of its findings; since it is notorious that in science one is apt to hug one's pet abstraction so devotedly that one's fool's paradise comes in the end to be mistaken for the real world. Sociology, therefore, will do well to insist that, in dealing with such a subject as religion in the concrete variety of its historical manifestations, Social Psychology should qualify its results by making allowance for those of an applied form of Individual Psychology on the one hand, and for those of Social Morphology on the other.

Thus in the first place, though its interest is primarily in the social subject, Social Psychology must never for an instant ignore the qualifying fact of the existence of the individual subject. We should be very far from the truth were we to suppose that the savage society as such assigns any consistent meaning and purpose to its totemism, or, for the matter of that, were we to impute consistency of view and intention to the most intelligent and organic religious society the world has ever known. Souls communicate, but always imperfectly. They are always more or less at cross-purposes and cross-meanings. It is well to remember this when we feel inclined to deify society, the collective intelligence, the public conscience, the spirit of the age, and the like. Objectively reviewed, no doubt, society dwarfs the individual, such is the impressiveness of its sheer mass and momentum. Subjectively considered, however, society compares badly with the best individuals. The social mind is not merely hazy but even distraught, whether we look at it in its lowest manifestation, the mob, or in its highest, namely the state. At its best it is the mind of a public meeting, at its worst it is the mind of Babel. It is pointless to retort that society is always right. Society is always actually right (until physical catastrophe occurs), in the sense that whatever happens happens. But it does not know and will the ideally right, the right that is not actual but to-be-actualized, to anything like the same extent as do the best in-

dividuals. So much is this the case that the historian of civilization, when he seeks to render the inwardness of some development or movement, will be tempted to abandon the strictly social standpoint for another which may be termed the standpoint of the representative individual. Thus how describe the spirit of the French Revolution? Socially, it is a seething mass of cross-currents. In a representative individual, say Rousseau, at least we can distinguish the general set of the tide. At the level of primitive culture, however, where representative individuals are not easily met with, where, to our eyes at least, one man is very like another, the social method, the method of the composite photograph, may and must have the preference. Yet Social Psychology cannot afford to forget that the individual members of a primitive society find it extremely hard to communicate successfully with each other, to understand what they are severally or together after. Hence there is a danger of ascribing a psychical tendency to a social movement where there is none. The very word tendency is ambiguous. It may stand for a drifting together, which is physical, or for a pursuing or at least a groping together, which is psychical. The latter kind of tendency is the only one that concerns a Social Psychology as such. If therefore the collective mind of a savage society is asserted to mean and purpose this or that, proof must be forthcoming that there actually is something of a mutual understanding to this or that effect; and it will always be wise to make allowance for the possibility of alternative interpretations in regard to even the most firmly rooted custom, as well as for the possibility of interference on the part of that bugbear of Social Science, the individual who has a view of his own.

A second qualifying circumstance to be constantly borne in mind when working from the notion of a social subject or collective mind is one that is likely to appeal more strongly than the other to those who are in sympathy with Continental sociology. This is the fact already alluded to that social meanings and purposes exist mainly as embodied in social institutions. We have claimed for the former at their best and most typical a certain functional independence that entitles them to be dealt with as phenomena essentially psychical. At the same time this independence, it is clear, can never be absolute; whilst often it is purely titular, the form, a thing in itself wholly soulless and material, ruling in the place of the spirit. Moreover, religion in particular would seem of all the spiritual activities of man the most subservient to form;

ritual is religion's second nature. Hence a Social Psychology must beware lest in religion or elsewhere it pretend to find living purpose where there is none or next to none. The organism may be lying dead in its shell. Or, as is the commoner case, whilst the shell persists intact, the original owner may have disappeared, and in its place another more or less inappropriate and alien tenant have crept in, to the confusion of honest naturalists unpractised in detecting sports. Nay, to pursue the metaphor, the empty shell may harbour quite a crowd of such casual immigrants. Bad religion is quite capable of saying: This is what you must all do; but each may think as he likes. Now it is perhaps the most characteristic feature of civilization that it encourages the free meaning, giving it the power to dispense, not indeed with form altogether, but with this or that form whenever it is found to hamper. But primitive culture is form-bound through and through. A proof is the extreme difficulty with which ideas travel from tribe to tribe. So integrally are they embodied in the tribal customs that apart from those customs they are but empty ineffectual ghosts of themselves. No wonder that many a sociologist says in his haste that they are the customs, neither more nor less. But Social Morphology cannot rightfully thus supersede Social Psychology any more than grammar can supersede logic. Yet Social Psychology must work with Social Morphology ever at its elbow. Let us remember that social purposing has a psychical nature of a very low order, especially when, as at the level of savagery, it is not continuously fed by contributions from the minds of enlightened individuals. The policy of an enlightened individual may be said to start from some more or less definite character, mental disposition, or whatsoever we like to call it. At least we cannot get behind this, however well-informed we may be as to the man's heredity and *milieu*; for us there is in greater or lesser degree spontaneous origination, a fresh cause to be reckoned with. All this is far less true of the action of a society as such. Nevertheless, in a civilised society genuine originators are to be found amongst the prophets and leaders and other representatives of the social tendency to progress, who, apart from their personal contribution to its furtherance, stand as vouchers for the diffused presence in the community at large of the power to originate by conscious and reflective means. Turn, however, to primitive society, and self-caused ideas as moving forces are but rarely to be met with. Instead, we are for the most part thrown back on mental processes of the lowest order—say, Tarde's "cross-

fertilization of imitations," or something equally crepuscular in its psychical quality. Meanwhile, lest we civilized observers lose our way in these regions of mist, there before our eyes stands the rite, objective, persistent, of firm outline; and, however much we desire to psychologize, we are bound to cling to it as our make-shift standard of reference. Nor is our convenience the only excuse for working round to spirit by way of form. For the savage society likewise the rite forms a sort of standard of reference. Out of it proceed the random whys; back to it go the indecisive therefores; and at this the common centre the meanings coalesce and grow ever more consistent, so that at last, perhaps, they react as one systematic idea on the supporting custom, and may henceforth rank as an originating psychical force of the higher order. Since, then, it falls to the lot of the social morphologist to describe the rite as externally presented, his ways and those of the social psychologist can never lie far apart at the level of the lower culture. And, even if the latter has a distinct and from the human standpoint a higher task, at least he must check his account of the tendencies of the social mind by constant use of the data provided by his colleague.

To sum up. Comparative Religion is a branch of empirical science which aims at describing in formulæ of the highest generality attainable the historical tendencies of the human mind considered in its religious aspect. Its method will primarily be that of a Social Psychology; since it will work directly from the implied or explicit notion of a social subject, to which the tendencies it describes will be held to belong essentially. The use of this method will, however, be qualified throughout by a secondary attention to the methods of two allied disciplines, namely Individual Psychology and Social Morphology. On the one hand, allowance will be made for the effects of the indirectness and imperfection inherent in the communications of the individual members of society with one another, as also for the results of individual initiative. On the other hand, there will be taken into account the influence on sentiments, ideas, and purposes of social forms and institutions in their external character as rallying and transmitting agencies, or again as agencies that fossilize and pervert.

R. R. MARETT,

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF HISTORY.

That great and profound investigator, Hippolyte Taine, after writing works upon the Human Intelligence, the History of English Literature, the Philosophy of Art, and the origin of contemporary France, explained once that all his vast and miscellaneous literary activity could be summed up under the head of "applied psychology." Man was regarded as the product of three factors, the race, the *milieu*, the moment, whose operations could be disengaged and dissected, and as the characteristics of different ages and civilizations were condensed in certain types of human character, so those types could be known through their expression in the medium of art, literature, or politics. The author of the Cortegiano might be taken to illustrate the social structure of the Italian Renaissance; the hard, pedantic, morality of the Jacobin was reflected in Robespierre, its mad blood-thirstiness in Marat, its rough unscrupulous vigour in Danton; a delicately finished Teniers implied the climatic, economic, and social forces which have built up the national genius of the Dutch. The scientific spirit which animated Taine, and which prompted him to recommend a young Oxford historian to begin his training under Charcot at the Salpêtrière rather than under Meyer at the École des Chartes, was carried a step further by a passionate disciple, who treated the evolution of literary forms upon biological lines, and considered the history of French lyrical poetry as a series of stages in the development of the self-conscious *ego*. M. Brunetière's attempt to discover scientific laws for the most intimate deliverance of the human soul has not been generally regarded as successful, but the influence of the master is undiminished by such vagaries. Not long ago that eminent scholar, Emile Boutmy produced a work upon the psychology of the English People, which attributed the lyrics of Shelley and the democratic Imperialism of Mr. Chamberlain to the humidity of our climate, its want of distinct outlines and bright colours. Few branches of enquiry appear to be more attractive to the French intellect than applied psychology.

I am not competent to express an opinion as to whether the science of psychology is in a sufficiently advanced condition to bear all the drafts which sociologists are likely to make upon it.

It is clear, however, that sociology presumes some psychological analysis. Sociology is the science of human society, and human society is composed of men acting upon one another in all kinds of ways in virtue of their characters and volitions. Some investigation into the operation of the human mind is therefore essential to the sociologist, whether the object he has in view be to describe society in general, or some particular force, such as imitation, acting in society, or the motives which produce the phenomena of political obedience or the laws which govern social development; and it is becoming increasingly recognised that the attention of the enquirer must be directed not only to the psychology of individuals, but to the psychology of crowds, and to the psychological states produced by the aggregation of men in urban centres. "There be thoughts," wrote F. W. Maitland, "which only come to men when they are tightly packed;" and the psychology of the Stock Exchange still awaits its Walter Bagehot. Valuable results may no doubt be obtained in any one of these branches of enquiry without a profound study of Wundt or Munsterberg or William James; but some working hypotheses there must be, and the more thoroughly these hypotheses are tested by observation, the more valuable the results. Brilliant examples of the application of common-sense psychology to the field of social enquiry may be cited. There is Walter Bagehot's *English Constitution*, Tarde's *Lois de l'imitation*, Mrs. Bosanquet's *Rich and Poor*. It is, perhaps, the most important service of the novel that, exploring as it does the infinite combinations of psychological casuistry, it tends to educate a curiosity in human character as such and to exhibit the psychological forces which work in society. Portraits of Balzac and Tolstoi should hang in any gallery dedicated to the pioneers of social science.

Lord Acton tells a story of a Pole, who being sent to prison without any books, began to write a philosophy of history. We have now given up writing philosophies of history, and, indeed, there is none better than the earliest, Lessing's *Education of the Human Race*. I do not mean to deny that Comte made an important observation when he remarked that Society has progressed from a religious to a metaphysical and from a metaphysical to a positive stage, or that Hegel shot a lucky arrow of conjecture when he put rationality at the end instead of at the beginning of social development. Able men with a wide view of things often make new epochs, and suggest whole libraries. But it must be understood that these general statements are not laws, but summaries of

recorded facts; that they give no ground for prediction, possess no character of necessity, and are only true if they are supported by evidence. There is not the least reason for supposing that if a community of human beings supports life upon a distant planet it will go through Comte's three stages, even if we admit—and it is a large admission—that the progressive society of Europe has gone through them. Nor can a statement based upon some general historical teaching without reference either to the question of permanent psychological needs, or to biological conditions claim to be adequate. The natural history of the Christian Science movement—one of the most interesting of the fields recently opened to sociological enquiry—suggests a defect in one quarter, and if it be true that biological conditions favour the survival of Roman Catholics, because amongst other things John Stuart Mill's *Political Economy* is on the Index, and indiscriminate breeding is encouraged by the Roman Church, then there will soon be another rent in the great Positivist generalisation. Indeed, there is some ground for thinking that the most valuable generalisations come not from the professed philosophers of history, but from the historical specialists who go to their work with open eyes and hospitable minds. Maine's famous summary of the stages of Ancient Law may not be exactly true of all communities, and we know that in England at least there was legislation mixed up with the earliest Code, but it throws an enormous flood of light upon the operations of the human mind, the limitations of primitive sovereignty, and upon the way in which human beings have regarded the social organisms of which they are part. Maitland's "*Domesday Book and Beyond*" is a treatise of a technical kind upon Anglo-Saxon Law and Society; but it has done more to overthrow the myth that early institutions are simple, than the ambitious guess of Hegel, to which it gives the weight of its support. Instances could be multiplied almost indefinitely, from Guizot who explained the contribution of the Teutonic Races to European civilization, from Savigny who showed law to be part of the organic growth of a community, from Gaston Paris who exhibited the mythopœic faculty at work in the Legend of Charlemagne, or from Robertson Smith who penetrated into the soul of the Religion of the Semites.

Everyone who has read much history is made sensible of the extreme complication of human affairs and of the difficulty of framing any large proposition to which exception may not be taken. The element of chance, of "*conjunctur*," as the German economists call it, is so large, and the more closely we look into the

tangled intermixture of biographies which is termed history, the more difficulty we feel in framing the kind of condensed statement which is ambitiously termed a sociological law. The sociologist on the other hand has been apt to treat history somewhat cavalierly. Mr. Herbert Spencer warns us indeed against the error of supposing, with Comte, that there is such a thing as Humanity independently of the men and nations who compose it; but after delivering this monition, he is content to ignore almost the whole course of human history. He collects some facts about savage tribes, he casts a glance on the nineteenth century. The intermediate process appears to him to be irrelevant. And yet it might be supposed that a science of Society should include a knowledge of the stages through which society has passed, and of the various forces, physical, moral, intellectual, which have produced the successive social transformations of which history is witness.

There is, indeed, a view of the scope of sociology which precludes such an appeal to experience. It has been argued by an able French writer, M. Fouillée, that as the science of hygiene is concerned with the social conditions making for the maximum of physical well-being, so the science of Society should be essentially normative, concerned that is to say primarily with ends and only secondarily with means contributing to those ends. The function of the sociologist is to state the conditions which make for social justice and social well-being, to give an answer to the question "How best can justice and well-being be realised in society." To this end he must operate chiefly with two sciences, the philosophy of law which explains how distributive justice is best secured by legal enactment, and the science of political economy which shows how society may obtain the greatest amount of wealth and the most equitable distribution of it. But since societies in order to be just and prosperous must first live, the sociologist cannot neglect the general laws of life. He finds that society is an organism possessing an alimentary system, a directing power, and distributive agencies corresponding respectively to the stomach, brain, and blood-vessels of the individual; and the biological analogy provides certain normative precepts which may be of value to the politician. It has, however, to be confessed that there is some disagreement among sociologists as to what the precise political lessons of biology may be; for while some hold that they point to a monarchical organisation of society, others on the other hand, like M. Fouillée himself, declare that "liberalism is the legitimate conclusion of biology when applied to politics."

It is obvious that such a scheme as this, ignoring as it does many of the objects which men deem to be precious, such for instance as art, cannot be regarded as satisfactory. It is equally clear that in a purely normative view of social science, historical enquiry has a place, only so far as the validity of the general precepts is held to be conditioned by factors, such as national character, which have been shaped by time and experience. This, however, is a large exception. As soon as the economist begins to allow for "friction," he admits the complexity of experience and makes way for the historian. As soon as the jurist declares that the societies have prospered equally under different rules of inheritance, let us say primogeniture or partition, and that each system possesses an adequate sanction in the moral feelings of the society which supports it, we are clearly in the presence of an historical problem which must be weighed by the statesman who is considering the advisability of changing the law to which his society has been accustomed. Even, therefore, on the most severely practical interpretation of the sociologist's duties, there is room for historical enquiry. Indeed, without such, the practical counsels are worthless.

There is a particular kind of sociological investigation, which has not, I think, yet been pursued with anything like scientific exactitude, in spite of the fact that John Stuart Mill recommended it half a century ago. I refer to the natural history of national traits. There is a good deal of vague theorising about national characteristics, and a few, but none too many, books on comparative law and institutions. But I do not know of any single treatise which may be called thorough and exhaustive upon such a matter for instance as the French view of the Family. It is, indeed, common knowledge that the French view of family life differs from our own, that parental power is more pronounced in France than in England, and that there is an institution known as the *Conseil de Famille*, which has no counterpart on this side of the Channel. Nor do we, who read so many excellent French novels and see so many excellent French plays, ignore the part played by the "*mariage de convenance*" in the economy of French life. That a whole nation should continue to observe the political view of marriage, which we are even surprised and somewhat shocked to see surviving in the circle of our Royal Family, is a fact which seems to the ordinary British citizen an indication of deficiency of sentiment, and a patent cause of perennial domestic calamities.

What then is the source of this curious phenomenon, this group of habits and sentiments, which exercises so profound an effect on French society? A nation famous for the clemency of its jurymen cannot be accused of hard-heartedness. The home of medieval chivalry and the principal source of the Crusading movement cannot be accused of a narrow exclusive devotion to material gain. Nor can the secret be found in any special facilities for dissolving the marriage union if unhappy, since divorce was not legalised in France till the Revolution. To write an adequate answer to the question would demand years of labour.

My own attention was first directed to this particular problem by a study of the references to the *Lettres de Cachet* which is found in the *Cahiers* or statements of grievances drawn up by every organised body of men in France during the elections to the States General in 1789. It struck me as curious that while everybody was united in denouncing the power of arbitrary imprisonment, a great many *cahiers* petitioned, that if the *Lettres de Cachet* should be abolished, some other means should be found by which the authority of the family might be maintained. On looking into the matter further, I found that these *Lettres de Cachet*, which committed men to prison instantly and without any trial, formality or public advertisement of the fact, were at least during the later half of the Eighteenth century issued mainly at the request of parents who wished to shut up some member of their family from whose unsoundness of mind, fractiousness, or vice they either experienced discomfort or were likely to suffer shame. Indeed, when the Parliament of Paris petitioned in 1756 for the abolition of this arbitrary power of detention, it was told that the *Lettres de Cachet* were chiefly preserved "to save the honour of families." The power, in other words, which the autocracy of the French crown put at the disposal of any head of a family during the Ancien Régime, was strictly analogous to that which the Code Napoléon lodges in the *Conseil de Famille*. It was more arbitrary, it was more unlimited, it was more irregular; it was the source of monstrous and exaggerated acts of parental despotism; but it was the product of the same group of feelings as prompted the petitions of 1789 and the lawyers of Napoleon's Council of State. And it is one of the most substantial elements in the French social consciousness at the present time.

There is an extraordinary passage in Cato which describes the Celts as pursuing two things with immense industry, arms, and clever oratory; and this passage, taken into connection with a

number of acute observations in Cæsar's *De Bello Gallico*, produces an impression that time and circumstance have done little to change the characteristics of the Gallic race. Whether national characteristics are fixed or alterable is one of those problems which has always been vaguely discussed without making much substantial advance: Provisionally, however, we may lay down the thesis that physical conditions affect human character, and that a change of physical conditions, such for instance as would be affected by the introduction of wide-spreading or chronic malaria is certainly capable of affecting a change in the psychology of a whole people. Whether it has actually done so in any given case, Greece, for instance, is a matter which could only be decided after elaborate investigation. But it is clear that no prejudice in favour of the fixity of natural characteristics ought to stand in the way of a close or open minded investigation of national psychology as revealed in the successive phases of history. If the result in certain instances be to report "no substantial change" this will not be conclusive for all instances. No race is more perdurable than the Jew; but usury, with all that it implies, was the result of Christian persecution; and the Inquisition which exterminated the fairies in Spain—is cause as well as consequence of a certain austere unimaginative rigour in the religion and art of the Iberian races. Sometimes the most unlikely historical cause will produce effects which the unlearned observer might be tempted to refer to some original quality in the national psychology. Henry II. of England, with an eye to judicial profits and animated by a shrewd apprehension of the truth that good justice is more attractive and, therefore, more lucrative than bad justice, contrived to make his Royal Court effective and supreme. The result was that the royal Judges, administering a common system on a common plan, extended the rule of primogeniture, which properly belonged only to tenure in chivalry, to other tenures as well; and this achievement of our first Angevin King, resulting as it did in the generalisation of the custom of primogeniture, which in turn has exerted no little influence on English colonisation, has really more to do with Mr. Chamberlain's democratic imperialism than the defective sunlight of our befogged island, or those delicious half lights which have driven our poets to introspection and our proletariat to alcohol.

For such reasons as these the student of the natural history of the French family will not rest content with an unexamined reference to certain fixed aboriginal traits in Celtic psychology, how-

ever strong may be the reason for supposing that the psychology of the Celts has suffered less change than the psychology of some other nations. He will ransack not only the *Coutumes*, which embody the family law of the Ancien Régime, but the chronicles and memoirs, which exhibit the living organism of French family life; the poems, the stories, the sermons, and the tracts which reveal the moral ideas of the French from age to age. Nor will he neglect the external and, as it may seem, fortuitous elements of history, the invasions of the eighth and ninth century which dissolved the mechanism of the Empire and threw political power and responsibility into the hands of the holders of military fiefs. the need for cavalry warfare which necessitated primogeniture; the slow growth of the royal power and the correspondingly jealous retention of what, for lack of a better name, may be called the feudal habit of society, a habit making for local and family autocracy, intense family pride and persistent hostility to the intrusions of the royal jurisdiction. The extent to which the absence of state-supported asylums for lunatics may have played a part in this curious chapter of history; the influence of Roman law; the diffusion of autocratic ideals from the Papacy and the Monarchy downwards, not to speak of a whole train of economic forces, would require most careful attention. We have a suspicion that in the end it would be found that in this, one of the most essential particulars of national life, the French are the most conservative people in Europe.

A series of studies conducted upon such lines as these would do a good deal of clear up the neglected science of ethnology, which is, I take it, not indeed co-extensive with sociology, but an important and interesting department of that science or rather aggregate of sciences. In any case it is indisputable that more is to be gained at the present moment by such specialised study than by an attempted synthesis of the laws which have governed or govern human society in general. But in speaking of such studies as these as specialised, we are using a phrase which may create a false impression. The sociological enquirer who enters the historical field must use as many categories as possible. To explain an institution, a sentiment, a custom, he must be jurist, historian, moralist, economist, equally prepared to find the important secret in some obscure and technical piece of medieval procedure, in a malady or a drug, or in the incalculable intrusion of some decisive personality.

The history of comparative law and institutions is another

branch of enquiry which may properly be called sociological. It should be observed, however, that the terms compared are not entirely separate and unrelated facts but phenomena sprung from a common source, part of a common process, obedient to a large extent to common laws and subject to mutual interactions. Civilization is one fact, of which the laws and institutions of the separate civilized races are so many different manifestations. Thus the growth of representative government in Europe during the middle ages is not only conditioned by the general social, economic, and intellectual forces of the age, such for instance as the medieval theory of monarchy, the organisation of the industrial classes in guilds, the survival of old Teutonic liberties, but also by the special conditions which affected constitutional development in each of the European countries. A study of comparative institutions will therefore have to take account not only of the special national conditions, but also of the general conditions both those which belong to the common stock of human psychology and those which are the special features of contemporary civilization. And these institutions the sociologist will be specially concerned to exhibit as dependent upon social states or as illustrative of national psychology. Thus if he institutes a comparison between the history of representative institutions in France and England, he will mainly concern himself with the influence of social structure upon political mechanism. He will remark that in England there was a strong, rural middle class, while in France there was a yawning gulf between noble and peasant; that in England centralization came early, that in France it was long delayed; that in England the Teutonic common law obtained a complete, in France only an incomplete ascendancy; that in England there was legal unity, while in France there were nearly three hundred customs. Public institutions, in other words, will not be regarded as detached pieces of mechanism, but as exhibiting one of the many ways in which the social consciousness finds expression. The perspective will be somewhat different from that employed in the ordinary historical text-books, since the epochs will be marked not by the deaths of kings nor by any such redistribution of weights as may be the result of the shifting play of political parties, but by the entrance of new social forces, and by the successive modification of the organs of government rendered necessary by industrial and social progress. Thus the real English Revolution occurs not in 1215, nor in 1640, nor in 1689, but in 1832, 1867, and 1884, when a constitution adapted to

an agricultural state was by successive stages expanded under the stress of an industrial revolution, to admit merchants and tradespeople, artisans and ploughmen, to control the destinies of the nation.

One of the most important aspects of the study of comparative law and institutions is what may be called the natural history of Transplantation. Grafts as it were from institutions, laws, ideas, are borrowed, planted in alien places, where they take root and grow; but the plant is very different from the parent stock. Sometimes the process is effected as the result of violent conquest, sometimes as the result of colonisation or intermarriage, sometimes it is the effect of slow unconscious assimilation, sometimes of sudden and deliberate borrowing. The influence of physical inventions upon human imitativeness has no doubt been enormous. Printing and photography, the steam engine and the electric telegraph have rendered conscious and unconscious imitation much easier than it was in the middle ages. Just as illustrated Trade journals diffuse a knowledge of new mechanical improvements, so hardly a country embarks upon a political departure without consulting the experience of its neighbours. On the other hand, historical studies and political experience have fortified the national self-consciousness, and supplied nations with an apparatus of tests, some of them operating in such an automatic way as to be instinctive, by which they may know whether a particular foreign institution is likely to suit them or not. There is, so to speak, a natural limit, formed by historical, psychological, and political conditions, to the borrowing power of nations. No nation, for instance, has ever willingly abandoned its own language for another, nor has any religion succeeded in establishing itself without violence, in a country to which it was originally strange, without assimilating some of the customs and beliefs of the invaded people. The example of Japan seems, indeed, to show that the receptivity of a nation may be much more elastic than could have been supposed *a priori*. The limits to Japanese receptiveness require, however, careful study, and it is possible that the lapse of a few generations will show that the mere appropriation of the material conquests of the advanced nations, when unaccompanied by the pain and labour of acquiring them, does not necessarily involve any deep transformation of national character. A systematic enquiry into the interaction of Eastern and Western life, would help to clear up our ideas as to the limits within which transplantation has taken place or is capable of

doing so. The success of Christianity in the West, and the astonishing manner in which not only the character of the Founder of the Christian Religion, but also the teaching of the early Christian Church has become transformed "in the climate of Roman Law," should suffice to warn the enquirer that moral ideas possess a penetrating power which the most complete opposition of civilization is sometimes unable to withstand, however much it may do to transmute and adapt them. On the other hand, it is a matter of common observation that without a conducting medium, such for instance as was supplied to Christianity by Hellenism, moral or religious movements of the highest degree of intensity may die away without communicating any part of their impetus to alien nations. Accordingly, the circumstances which give to any idea, habit, impulse, creed or institution the quality of transferability, is as much a matter for consideration as the natural history of the idea, habit, impulse, creed, or institution prior to and subsequent to transplantation. It is reasonable to suppose that in view of the extraordinary state of things in Japan and America, the attention of social investigators will be directed in an increasing measure to this group of problems; that economists will write monographs on the Japanese banking system; that lawyers will study the dissolving influence of English legal conceptions on Indian society; that our political psychologists will discuss the ethical and psychological implications of American democracy, while our biologists will report on the effects of the racial intermixture in the United States upon the physique and morale of the American people. In this, as in other directions, no advance can be made without close observation and specialised study. Why is it that some race mixtures succeed, while others do not, that the union of German and Slav, for instance, produces fine results while the union of German and South American Spaniard produces poor ones, that intermixture has been prosperous in England, the reverse in the Levant? Or again, in virtue of what qualities or historic accidents have certain languages, such as French, obtained a wide diffusion, and therefore a power of communicating thoughts and habits which for want of such a medium might have had a narrowly circumscribed influence, while other languages, apparently not less capable of answering the needs of a refined society have enjoyed a comparatively obscure or provincial destiny? To what causes again should we attribute the different working of representative institutions in North and South America?

What are the sociological lessons to be learnt from history as to the effects of the juxtaposition of races differing from one another in the scale of or in the capacity for civilization? An endless series of questions presents itself, each one of which requires an answer based upon minute historical enquiry.

It was one of Mr. Lecky's contributions to social history to point out that though the contents of the moral consciousness remain much the same from age to age, the emphasis laid upon the virtues is subject to frequent change. Now it is courage, now humility, now self-control and balance of mind, now active benevolence which is the subject of the highest commendation and the chief prize of ethical effort. And as the scale of the virtues alters from age to age, so it alters from place to place. A history of morals must clearly take account of these conditioning circumstances of time and place, and not proceed upon the assumption that there is such a thing as Man in general whose ethics may be discussed without reference to the century in which he lived, the place in which he was born or the society of which he formed a part. While the ethical philosopher interrogates the contents of his own ethical consciousness the sociologist who wishes to explore social development upon its ethical side will find himself called upon to read legal records for the moral minimum insisted on by any society at any given time, as well as those sources from which he may hope to discover the ideals of the best members of society. The actual practice of the majority of the nation will fluctuate between the moral minimum set by the penal law and the moral maximum revealed in the utterances of poets, preachers, or social reformers; and it will be just this actual practice or average common-place view, which will be most difficult to fix with precision. On the whole, perhaps, the best way to understand the history of national morals is to study the history of its criminal law, not because such a history gives a full view of the whole subject, but because it gives a clear view of part of it. The history of criminal law enables us to understand the attitude adopted by society as a whole towards those parts of human conduct which it has decided to regard as anti-social; it bears witness to the gradual strengthening of the social consciousness, and so enables us to measure, not indeed the whole extent of its advance, but those stages along the line of moral progress which are regarded as most essential to the common welfare. It is probable that the supplementary information necessary to obtain a fuller view of moral progress can be most safely obtained from

a carefully selected representative collection of autobiographies or biographies. What a world of light is thrown upon the moral ideas of the Arabs at the time of the Second Crusade by the wonderful autobiography of Ousama? or upon the moral state of England under Charles II. by the diaries of such men as Pepys, Evelyn, and Fox! A single anecdote is sometimes sufficient to illuminate a whole region of ethical feeling.

I have said nothing so far about the savages, not because I wish in any way to minimise the importance of the results which may be obtained from a study of savage morals and savage institutions. In the face of our anthropologists, Buckle could hardly persist in his negation of the reality of moral progress; and the evidence collected by anthropologists is beginning to work wonders in the hands of our most intelligent interpreters of Hellenic religion. But though the study of these very rudimentary and stationary societies may throw light upon primitive ideas and emotions, it does not in itself disclose that portion of the primitive consciousness which has been an operative force in the evolution of the progressive nations. But this is just what it principally concerns the student of society to know. Anthropology is to the sociologist what archæology is to the historian, a valuable auxiliary, supplying amidst a mass of irrelevant, because uninfluential, detail, some hints of living and shaping influences, but no adequate account of their operation. Such an account can only be obtained by studies which belong to the realm of history; and it is, therefore, upon the importance and interest attaching to investigations which are popularly called historical, that I have laid my stress in this paper.

H. A. L. FISHER.

DISCUSSIONS.

I. THE SURVEY OF CITIES.

The problem before the student of Cities is obviously of the greatest complexity. Amid such vast and varied centres, such a crowded phantasmagoria of life, how shall we agree upon any orderly methods of observation and description, such as that required in each and every department of science? How shall we compare our observations and generalise them? And if we here or there reach some penetration of analysis, some generality of view, some depth of insight, how are we even to communicate our ideas to each other in adequately scientific terms? Yet how many are interested in the observation of their own and other cities? How many must have speculated on the resemblances and differences among these, or at least discussed their respective qualities and defects? How many, too, and in all countries, are awakening to deal with the practical tasks of Citizenship, ever increasingly pressing as these are? Never since the golden times of cities has there been so much interest, so much goodwill as now; it is the right moment, therefore, and surely in a Sociological Society and Journal, if anywhere, to raise the question: How best can we set about the study of Cities? How organise if possible, in each, in all, at any rate here and there among ourselves to begin with, some such common understanding as to the methods as are needed to make observations at all, and to compare and generalise them?

As regards the description of Cities there are vast materials in literature; travellers and geographers, archaeologists and historians, artists and art-critics, are all available to us. From Herodotus to Gibbon, from Pausanias to Schliemann and Arthur Evans, or from John Ray to Ruskin, indeed to the latest writers, there is no lack of help towards visualising cities, whether past or present, nor even of entering into their life, be this buried or no. The present unparalleled wealth of illustrated monographs, the activity of the daily Press, the availability of Murray and Baedeker, are alike bringing the consciousness of our own city and of other cities more and more fully into being. It is surely time, therefore, for Sociologists—that is for all who care for the advance of science into the social world—to be taking counsel as to the ways and means of bringing an increasing order into all this growing accumulation of knowledge.

We are not entitled as yet to postulate any but the very simplest and common elements of knowledge, much less of accepted belief or doctrine; our experiences of cities are still too personal and individual, and are, therefore, so far isolated and uncomparred. Still less can we assume any common ground or starting point towards action, for all manner of regional and local

circumstances isolate us; differing interests and divergent tendencies divide us also. How then can we proceed towards proving a scientific study of cities to be practicable, even towards making this general, as it must obviously become, if our comparisons are to be fruitful, our generalisations safe?

Here plainly is no easy problem; it has largely occupied the writer's life these twenty-five years or more, in constantly renewing endeavours towards finding some adequate method of approach towards its solution. Historic cities, actual cities, incipient towns or cities, great or small, have each in turn promised to yield their secret; museums and galleries with their treasures of the past, local and international exhibitions with their encyclopædic presentments of the activities of the present, even utopias of the future, have each suggested some clue to the city's labyrinth. Geographer and historian, economist and aesthete, politician and moralist have each been utilised as guides: here the optimist, there the pessimist has seemed the truer. Sometimes, too, it has seemed that it must be by the fullest detachment of purely scientific outlook, or in seeking to devise the needed Civic Museum, that the synoptic vision of the City must be reached; yet again, through other years, the hope has seemed more fruitful of attaining this through participation in the many-sided life of actual Citizenship. Now the statistical method has seemed to be the fundamental one, in its development from Quetelet to Booth; again the fundamental occupations, the family unit, and family budget, with Le Play; and so on: hence it is only of late years that he has been able to reach even such imperfect outlines towards a study of cities as are to be found in the three volumes of "*Sociological Papers.*" Acceptance of these cannot be assumed from the present reader, nor even knowledge of them: it is best, therefore, within these limits of mere preliminary suggestion especially, to start afresh, as the Sociological Society is itself doing, with its newly formed "*Cities Committee.*" Without here entering into that general discussion of municipal organisation, of social life and betterment which is bringing forward the city problem everywhere, and making the scientific study of cities increasingly urgent, it may be enough here, for the present, to indicate some of the main practical steps which have led up to the formation of this Cities Committee.

I. Like other professional bodies, the Museum Curators of Great Britain have their Annual Congress: this took place in Dundee this year. Having listened to the natural and proper lamentations of the curators as to the deficient support of their institutions, and to various expressions of their anxiety to increase public interest accordingly, the writer threw his paper into the form of a practical proposition, which may be summed up somewhat as follows:—

You lament that you have not sufficient funds adequately to maintain your Museums and still less to increase them. Is it not needful to discover some way adequately to advertise your institutions—(of course properly and legitimately, in due curatorial fashion) by making them interesting to a larger proportion of your community? At present your antiquities attract only the antiquarians, a dwindling class. Thus you have here your admirable City history collection, your town in 1800,

1700, 1600, 1500, and yet beyond, to the primitive Celtic hill fort or its Roman transformation; and this does naturally attract the antiquarians. But the value of this collection depends upon each of these exhibits having had actuality in its day. It is its authenticity which gives its interest. Why should this collection now lack actuality in *our* day? Why no adequate exhibit of this city in 1900, in 1907? Why not give it this, and add to your Museum of the Past a corresponding exhibit of the Present? How can this be done? Easily. See for instance Booth's "Life and Labour in London" with its great map; see the corresponding surveys of other cities, York, Manchester, Dundee, and the like. Do something of the same for each city now. Obtain more pictures and photographs, of its present beauty, and ugliness; obtain statistics and other particulars from the Town House, the registrars, and so on, so that any and every active citizen shall henceforth find in your Museum the most ready and convenient place for getting up all he wants to know about his city. In this way your Museum will gain a new set of frequenters, each a future friend, for you will soon find that you can count on their support and that increasingly. Nor is this all you can do; besides the few antiquarians and the many more practical men, who are interested in the past and the present respectively, you have a third class, small, yet important and increasing, those who are beginning to dream of the future. These wish to see some progress in their town, some actual betterment, the cleansing of its slums, the erection of new buildings and institutions, the supply of open spaces, and above all, the planning of its future extensions—its practicable Utopia—Eutopia in fact. Add, therefore, to your Galleries of the Past and of the Present a third room, or at least a screen or two for this concrete exhibition of your City's Future, and you will thus bring to the Museum a third and new class of supporters. Hence, even if you do not care for your City, if you do not feel any impulse of citizenship, consider this proposal as at least of a new attraction, a legitimate form of public appeal, and see whether it does not before long reward you to carry it out.

This proposal, almost in so many words, was warmly encouraged by the President of the Congress, and was actively discussed at a special meeting, at which a large number of the Museum Curators of the United Kingdom spoke warmly in its favour, and decided to see what could be done towards carrying this out for their own cities in their Museums. The preceding proposal applies to Libraries and Librarians, no less than to Museums and Curators. How then are we as sociologists to aid in this movement as well as to learn from it? Is it not time that curators and sociologists were joining hands to discuss methods as well as to collect materials, and thus in fact form in and for each particular city, as well as in the greater centres—say the three national capitals at least, and perhaps also the main regional ones—a Cities Survey Committee.

II. Next, since there is to be a section of Social Science in the approaching Franco-British Exhibition 1908, may we not at once widen our proposed co-operation a step farther? Given Museum and Libraries, with collections illustrative of the past

of their cities, of their present, and sometimes even of the incipient future, might they not send the Franco-British Exhibition a characteristic exhibit, condensing this threefold view of their towns? French cities, too, would generously respond, even with a greater wealth of interesting matter than our British industrial cities can as yet supply.

Thus would arise the beginnings of a "Cities Exhibition," the germ of a future "*Towneries*," of great interest in itself and of course provoking innumerable comparisons and suggestions. Representatives of different cities would be curious to come; they would speak and write about this when at home, and thus interest in and knowledge of cities would be popularised.

III. To the "Town Planning Congress," at the Guildhall, on October 25th, 1907, the writer was appointed a delegate of the Society. After the Lord Mayor's initial benediction and the Chairman's official introduction, the opening to the discussion was given by Councillor Nettlefold of Birmingham, a leading authority and impulse among members of British municipalities upon this subject. He opened with a survey of the Acts which have been passed since Lord Shaftesbury's first Housing Improvement Bill in 1851—twenty-eight in little more than half a century.

Being next called on to speak, as a delegate of the Sociological Society, the writer limited himself to urging one point, namely, that if 28 Bills had admittedly been insufficient to meet the evils of our towns, it was surely time that this 29th one should take the geographical and social sciences into its counsels, unless it were to have its insufficiency demonstrated in its turn like its predecessors. Even the Town Planning information from Germany and the like which Mr. Horsfall and others are so admirably supplying is good, but not definite enough. Designs from other cities are convincing in some ways, yet inapplicable; like the diagrams with which Mr. Ebenezer Howard, a few years ago, explained his ideal of a Garden City, but which are now usefully superseded by actual and local plans at Letchworth and Hampstead.

Again, most who speak and write of the planning of our towns have not before them the needful materials, first of all an adequate collection of maps. Let us begin at least with (1) the Reform Bill Atlas of the English towns in 1832 with their Parliamentary boundaries indicated, and with the similar atlas of the Scottish towns. Next, (2) set beside these the maps of those towns a generation later, in 1860—1870, when the industrial expansion was in full swing; and again, (3) maps of towns in our own day. Here, then for each town and city in the land, is an exhibit alike of local and of general interest, which shows the expansion of two generations, the improvement, and still more frequently, the mischief which has been done. Is it not needful that before planning new suburbs, we should have before us a comprehensive survey of this kind?

Again, on what principle are we to plan? It is good to have maps of recent German improvements, but we cannot simply copy these; each city is, or should be, a unique and individual growth, an organic development; its extension is not

simply a mechanical addition, it is not simply a matter of material accretion, however much the last patch be better than the old garment.

Finally, it was suggested that this Town Planning Congress should not disperse without leaving, among its permanent results, an impulse towards the formation of a *Cities Survey Committee*. This would attract and supply Town-Planners with the basis of knowledge which they require, and help towards civic interpretations as well. It would advance positive opinion in every city, and be of great use in London also. Might not only the Sociological Society, but other bodies, Geographical, Statistical, Architectural, &c., all become interested in the formation of such a Committee, in which their particular interests should be duly represented?

These proposals found cordial approval. A large number of the leading workers in the subject put down their names at once as willing to join such a Committee.

IV. In course of further discussion it was agreed to report progress to the Council of the Sociological Society, to ask them to form a Cities Survey Committee and arrange, if possible, for the co-operation of other bodies and the co-optation of individuals likely to be interested. After consideration of the methods required for such a study of Cities, and for arranging these as far as possible in orderly and similar ways, yet with due regard to the many-sided individuality of each, it was suggested that a more general meeting might be held, at which the case for City Surveys might be stated and the suggested methods submitted, the results of existing surveys such as those of Mr. Booth and others might be brought together and set forth, the case for city surveys stated, and the methods discussed. The usefulness and need of such surveys would also become more apparent, and fresh beginnings perhaps made towards extending these, to representative towns and cities throughout the land.

V. This proposed Cities Survey has now been fully discussed by the Council of the Sociological Society, who accordingly resolved at their meeting of December, 1907, to form a "CITIES COMMITTEE to promote the Survey and Investigation of Cities, and the Study of Civics."

This will be concerned with the geographical and historical development of Cities, with their industrial and other present conditions, with their advantages and defects, and with the conditions of their future development.

For this purpose it will endeavour to advance the Study of Cities, in the first place by promoting Civic Exhibitions, of plans, pictures, and other illustrative material dealing with past and present conditions, and prospective betterment. For this purpose it will communicate with the members in other cities including the various constituent cities and boroughs of London, and with curators of museums, librarians, directors of Schools of Art, and others likely to be interested, who may thus act as sub-committees, correspondents, etc.

It will seek to promote the formation of Civic Museums and to advance the teaching of civic history and duties

independently from party politics. It will act with Associations for City Betterment of all kinds, and will also co-operate as far as practicable with the organisers of exhibitions, congresses, pageants and other endeavours having an educative value towards the awakening of civic consciousness.

This "Cities Committee" may be thus taken as entering upon its activities with the present year 1908; and its scheme of work and actual endeavours will be reported from time to time in this Journal. Members of the Sociological Society and others interested, either in the survey of any particular town or city, or in the investigation as a whole, are accordingly invited to communicate with the Convener, Cities Committee, Sociological Society, 24, Buckingham Street, Strand, W.C.

P. GEDDES.

II. THE UNEMPLOYED WORKMEN ACT IN 1906-7.

There has recently been issued by the Local Government Board a report on the administration of the Unemployed Workmen Act during the year ended March 31st, 1907. The report deals with the proceedings of 29 Distress Committees and the Central (Unemployed) Body in London, and 89 Distress Committees in provincial districts. Of the latter, however, thirteen—Cardiff, Coventry, Gateshead, Huddersfield, Merthyr Tydvil, St. Helens, West Hartlepool, Aston Manor, Barnsley, Chatham, Heywood, Stockton-on-Tees, and Rhondda—took no action during the period covered by the return. Three more—Tynemouth, West Bromwich, and Sheffield—though a small part of their activity of the previous winter continued into the beginning of the period, were practically inoperative, and did not open their registers in the winter 1906-7. Others registered men only for emigration—Walsall—or for supply to private employers—Derby, Middlesbrough, Preston, Warrington, Hornsey, Northfleet, Wallasey—or, after registering a very small number of men—Rochdale, Middleton, Gorton, King's Norton, Northfleet, Nottingham, Handsworth—thought it unnecessary to take any special steps for dealing with them or providing them with work. The need for the Act has apparently been felt very unequally in different parts of the country.

The following table shows the number of applications received and entertained :—

	No. of Committees taking Proceedings.	Estimated Population (1906).	No. of Applications received to Mar. 31, 1907.	No. of Applications entertained		Percentage of total columns 4 & 5 to Populati'n.
	1	2	3	4	5	6
London...	29	4,721,217	28,181	13,070	37,656	1'1
Provinces	76	10,528,850	58,820	47,346	115,145	1'5
	105	15,250,067	87,001	60,416	152,801	1'4

The corresponding figures for the year preceding were as follows :

	No. of Committees taking Proceedings.	Estimated Population (1906)	No. of Applications received to Mar. 31, 1906.	No. of Applications entertained.		Percentage of total of columns 4 & 5 to Populati'n.
	1	2	3	4	5	6
London...	29	4,684,794	39,728	23,838	69,038	2'0
Provinces	85	—	71,107	49,979	130,927	1'6
	114	—	110,835	73,817	199,965	1'7

It will be seen that the number of applications, though considerable, is a good deal lower than the estimates of distress sometimes made by applying to the whole working population the "unemployed percentage" calculated by the Labour Department from the returns of certain trade unions. The proportion of unemployed applicants to the occupied male inhabitants of the districts concerned is given at 2'4 per cent. in 1905-6, and 1'9 per cent. in 1906-7. The percentage of unemployed members in all trade unions making returns to the Labour Department was 5'4 in 1905, and 4'1 in 1906, so that the differences would remain very considerable, even if, as should be done, the number of trade unionists receiving unemployed benefit in these districts was deducted from the occupied male population before the comparison was made.

It will be seen also that the total number of applications fell off from 110,835 to 87,001, or 21'5 per cent. Both the diminution, however, and the proportion of applicants to population varied greatly from one district to another. In London the number of applicants for every 1,000 of the population ranged from 2'4 in Hampstead to 11'6 in Bermondsey; outside London, taking only districts which had registers open during the winter 1906-7, it ranged from 0'3 in Gorton to 22'0 in Edmonton. The following table shows the Distress Committees in three groups:—

	No. of Applicants 1905-6.	Percentage of these Applicants provided with work.	No. of Applicants 1906-7.	Applicants per 1000 of Population 1906-7.	Change per cent. of No. in 1905-6.
	1	2	3	4	5
29 Metropolitan Distress Committees	39,728	23'8	28,181	6'0	-29'1
10 Distress Committees in Outer London* ...	13,931	55'2	15,322	12'1	+10'0
All other Distress Com- mittees	57,176	34'0	43,498	4'7	-23'9
	110,835	37'3	87,001	5'7	-21'5

The proportion of applicants to population is twice as high in the London suburbs as in London itself, and more than twice as high as that in the rest of the country. Moreover, while

* Croydon (5'4), West Ham (16'2), East Ham (12'), Hornsey (2'9), Edmonton (22'0), Erith (8'1), Leyton (7'4), Tottenham (20'2), Walthamstow (10'6), Willesden (11'2). The bracketed figures give the number of applicants per 1000 of the population.

applications have in the aggregate diminished between 1905-6 and 1906-7, they have actually increased substantially in these suburban districts. Another remarkable result is that, whereas the improvement of trade and employment which should explain the decrease in applications, has, according to other indications, been less felt in London than in the North and Midlands, the decrease of applications has actually been greater in London (29·1) than in the provinces (23·9).

In this connection column 2 is rather suggestive. The proportion of assisted applicants to total applicants in 1905-6 was, owing presumably to the practice of giving larger spells of work to each individual lowest in London—23·9 per cent.; next came the provincial committees, with 34·0 per cent.; and highest the suburban committees, with 55·2. This is also the order of the three groups according to rapidity of decrease. The group which assisted fewest men in 1905-6 shows the greatest falling off of applicants in 1906-7; the group which spread the benefits of employment relief most widely in 1905-6 shows an actual increase of applicants in the following year. Here is a possible influence to be considered in addition to that continued depression of the building trade which would naturally affect these districts most severely.

In London only three districts—Bermondsey, Poplar, and Woolwich—had as many as 10 applications per 1,000, or 1 per cent. of the population, as opposed to 11 districts in the year before. Outside London there were, in addition to the six suburban areas included in the note to Table C., only five such districts—Brighton (15·6), Great Yarmouth (12·4), Hastings (11·6), Norwich (13·4), and Dartford (12·4). The seasonal character of employment in the first three—each of which was in the same position in 1905-6—is apparent.

The age distribution of the applicants whose cases were entertained is given in the following table:—

	Percentage of Total at all Ages.	
	London.	Provinces.
Under 20	2·3	3·8
20—30	25·1	26·4
30—40	33·6	28·4
40—50	24·9	23·1
50—60	11·3	13·3
60 & over	2·8	5·0

This table shows a very large percentage of the suitable applicants as still under 40. On the other hand, the number of applicants at each age group in relation to the total population in that group obviously increases. The unemployed are constantly recruited from those who fall out of regular work after their first youth.

Of the 87,001 applications 60,416, or nearly 70 per cent., were entertained as those of workmen suitable for assistance under the Act. It is obvious, however, that in coming to decisions on this point the Distress Committees acted on very various principles and that the classification of men as suitable and unsuitable is of little

value. Of those whose cases were entertained 36,280, or 60 per cent., are stated to have been found or provided with work. The work was usually of a rough description, such as making and repairing roads, sewerage work, work on pleasure grounds and open spaces, snow clearing, and street cleaning, laying gas mains and tramway tracks. The Central (Unemployed) Body made an experiment in reclaiming land by the repair of a river wall at Farnbridge, and acquired also, at a cost of about £35,000, a farm at Hollesley Bay, on which men were trained with a view to their settlement on the land. One provincial Distress Committee—West Ham—also established a farm colony, and two or three others rented land on which to employ men in works of cultivation.

As to the output of the men employed, very few exact figures are available. In Birmingham and Portsmouth the value of the work done by the unemployed is estimated at a third of that which would have been done under normal conditions. In Blackburn and West Ham the additional cost of the unemployed is put at about 30 per cent. In a good many others the work is simply stated to have taken longer or been more expensive. The quality of the work is less criticised than the quantity. A good many committees declare the quality to have been quite up to the standard.

The quality of the men may be judged partly from their industrial classification, partly from the remarks upon their work. According to each indication the casual labourer plays a very large part. Over 50 per cent. of all applicants are entered under this heading directly, and a very large proportion of the remainder, appearing under the building trade or "other occupations," are no doubt of substantially the same industrial class. West Ham, out of 3,058 cases, had only 47 skilled and regular artisans, and another 632 irregular artisans or irregular labourers; over 60 per cent. of the whole were casual labourers, and 14 per cent. were vicious or incapable, mentally or physically. At Nottingham "a considerable majority of the men registered never have had, nor are likely to have, regular employment." In London the predominance of the casual labourer is particularly marked. Only in Woolwich do the discharges from the Arsenal appear as an exceptional disturbing factor, which may be most closely paralleled in the provinces by the displacement of boot and shoe operatives through new machinery at Leicester and Kettering.

Nearly everywhere also there is mention of depression in the building trade, exceeding apparently the usual winter slackness. Whether this is due to cyclical fluctuation of trade or must be ranked with the displacements just mentioned as the permanent results of some new process is one of the points most needing determination.

The information contained in the Report suggests the following main conclusions:—

First, in view of the marked localisation of the evil, there is obvious danger of aggravating rather than reducing it by measures of assistance which may tend to retain labour in places where it is no longer needed. There is a consequent

necessity of accompanying any such measures by others facilitating the removal of men from congested areas.

Second, in view of the tendency of districts in which most assistance has been given one year to yield a disproportionate number of applicants next year, it may be doubted whether the operations under the Act have to any large extent the effect contemplated by the Act. Their effect in producing reliance on relief work appears to outweigh their effect in carrying men over an exceptional depression to a new period of regular employment.

Third, a very large part of the problem clearly consists in the prevalence of casual employment, and cannot be profitably treated along the lines of temporary relief work at all.

W. H. BEVERIDGE.

REVIEWS.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF SOCIALISM.

- "PICTURES OF THE SOCIALISTIC FUTURE." By Eugene Richter. Cheap Edition. Swan Sonnenschein and Co.
- "AN EXPOSURE OF SOCIALISM." By Max Hirsch. Livesey and Co. Price 2d.
- "AN ENQUIRY INTO SOCIALISM." By T. Kirkup. Longmans. 4/6 net.
- "CAPITAL." Vol. II., "THE PROCESS OF CIRCULATION OF CAPITAL." By Karl Marx. Swan Sonnenschein and Co. 10/6 net.
- "SOCIALISM AND SOCIETY." By J. R. Macdonald, M.P. 2/- net.

From the Sociologist's point of view the theories of modern Socialism may be regarded as many-sided expressions of a very vital social impulse. This impulse manifests itself in individuals of every class and kind; it takes, therefore, innumerable forms, ranging from crude and selfish discontent with material limitations of enjoyment, up to a pure and lofty spiritual idealism. It finds expression also in innumerable theories, ranging from the simple economic socialism, which aims at more equal distribution of satisfaction, up to a complete social creed, based upon a new moral and spiritual view of all the great issues of social life. But, whatever the form and whatever the expression, it is always an impulse of revolt. To call it progressive is perhaps to beg a big question; but there is at least one progressive attribute common to all people who are deeply moved by it. They are impatiently critical of those obstacles to progress which are inherent in established and accepted conditions, methods and systems,—in an economic system, and the principles underlying it, in a social system and the institutions wrapped up in it, in an authoritative code of social ethics or conventions, in established dogmas of religion, philosophy, or social science, in conventional canons of art or of dress, of medicine or of diet. It is clear also that the impulse is in no sense a new one; it is directly inherited not only from the early socialists of a century ago, such as Godwin, Hall, and Thompson, but also from their more "respectable" opponents, the philosophical radicals of the type of James Mill and Bentham. For it is no more paradoxical to trace back the general Socialism of to-day to atomistic individualists like the latter, than to trace the socialist economics to Adam Smith and Ricardo. But to-day the impulse jostles against new conditions and complexities, and is therefore expressed in new ways. And the difficulty of grasping the drift of the impulse lies in the variety and extent of the criticisms to which it gives rise. Economic criticism is common to all socialists, no doubt; and all insist on the principle of organic social control in the interest of the common good. But by no means all have any real quarrel with the family or with religion; fewer still are revolutionaries in morals; and only a very few have connected their Socialism at all with radical criticism in art, philosophy, or the detailed conduct of life.

Now it is characteristic of such an impulse to be—at first—far more-

destructive than constructive. From this two results follow. First, its strength lies in its attacks and criticisms rather than in its suggested ideals. And this for a simple reason. If we strain the language of Comte a little, we may say that the socialist criticisms belong to the positive stage of thought, because they are detailed, concrete, and real; whereas the ideals, or the formulæ expressing them, are still in the metaphysical stage. This may seem startling to those who imagine that they give a quite positive meaning to such phrases as "social ownership of the means of production," "the right to the whole produce of one's labour," "equality of opportunity," and the like. But it is literally true that such catchwords stand for mere lumps of unanalysed abstraction, and are of comparatively little value for positive and constructive work. In the second place, it follows that the opponents of Socialism,—those who express the force of conservatism in any obvious form, whatever their political label may be,—are driven in their turn to justify their position by counter-attack upon the would-be positive ideals of the Socialist, instead of by defence of the existing order, economic, social, or ethical. And they, too, are exposed to the same criticism as the Socialist. *Their* attacks are detailed, real and concrete; but their defence, when they are forced to make it explicit, rests once more upon unanalysed metaphysical phrases. "Liberty," "Free Competition," "Sanctity of Family and of Property," may pass muster at a political meeting or in the daily press, where rhetoric alone is needed. But for purposes of serious argument they are useless—with the colossal uselessness that results from the metaphysical taint.

Here the anti-Socialist may retort that *his* principles at least are expressed in the positive language of fact, for they are the principles actually at work in the present process of industrial and social life. But the retort is a dangerous one to use, and if insisted upon will compel the user to abandon his catchwords for good and all. Whatever the working principles of our system may be, they are certainly not Liberty nor free competition nor sacred property rights at all, in any intelligible form; but a strange amalgam of privileges, shifting restrictions, and progressive but unprincipled social interference and control. The most effective attack ever made upon a Liberty and Property Defence League came from a thoroughgoing individualist,—Grant Allen; and the pith of it was that such leagues are always false to their titles, so long as existing privileges and limitations of freedom are the real objects defended.

But the Socialist may also complain that *his* ideals have been made positive and real in the hands of a Morris or a Bellamy, a Bebel or a Blatchford. But once again the argument is a dangerous one, for it is just these partly-detailed expressions which give the anti-Socialist his opening. It is the logical analysis of what the metaphysical ideal involves that lands the Socialist in absurdity,—the penalty necessarily paid for the metaphysical statement of a policy.

This weakness of the Socialist ideal may be illustrated by reference to any of the detailed attacks made upon it. Take, for example, Eugene Richter's "Pictures of the Socialistic Future," now published in a cheap English edition. The book is an account, by a clever satirist, of the ordinary concrete happenings which might be expected to follow from the institution of the Socialist ideal as a working system. The argument underlying the satire is somewhat on these lines:—If Socialists really mean what they say by "social ownership of all means of production" and the rest of it, then they must logically mean that the State is to be absolute owner and controller of every productive agent,—from a steam-engine or a

shop to a journalist's pen and brains and a doctor's ability and time. And if "equality" means anything, it must mean not only equal shares of all "quantities" (of incoming satisfaction), but also equal shares of all *qualitative* differences inherent in different satisfactions. Here is room for fun-making with a vengeance! And the writer proceeds with delightful gravity to describe the absurd consequences,—the hopeless attempts to "equalise" satisfactions by incessant lotteries; the ridiculous results of "community" of food and work, of doctrine and of opinion; the rigid limitation of working-hours—which forbids a doctor to save a patient's life after the clock has struck, lest he should be guilty of over-production! It is all excellent fooling,—and quite logical; and the premises chosen are not entirely a caricature of the Socialist doctrines. True, the change "to Socialism" is supposed to happen in a day, Society suddenly taking off an individualist coat and putting on a Socialist one. But this amusing assumption is hardly worth cavilling at, for the book is really one to laugh over; and the Socialist reader will and can laugh with the rest. Indeed, he will laugh far more heartily than some of his humourless opponents; for it is only the latter who can take the satire seriously enough to assert (as some reviewers have done) that it is a complete answer to Socialism! And yet, grotesque as it is, such satire has a real sting in it, and will continue to sting just so long as Socialists continue to use their fine-sounding formulæ without infinite qualification.

A better example of detailed attack is afforded by Mr. Max Hirsch's "Exposure of Socialism,"—a short series of lectures given in Australia three years ago and now being widely circulated in this country. Mr. Hirsch is far more serious than Herr Richter; but the validity of his arguments turns on the same use of the same premises. He takes the proposals of Socialists as they stand, and follows them to a logical conclusion. This furnishes him with a target which it is easy to hit,—namely, a state of society, in which all competition and all markets being abolished, no test of the value of goods or of labour remains; all independent choice of work or way of life being abolished, a bureaucratic tyranny is supreme; all motive (in the sense of differential material rewards) being abolished, nobody cares to produce, invent, or create more than he is compelled; and, finally, absolute equality and community being established, the family goes to pieces and the "dreary raiment" of a drab monotony takes the place of all progressive differences. Who could help riddling such a dummy with the shafts of criticism? It is so easy that one feels sorry that Mr. Hirsch has not done it better. He goes out of his way most unnecessarily to overstate his own case. Like Richter, he makes the specious mistake of regarding Socialism as "a new and untried system"; unlike Richter, he introduces some very peculiar economic views: can he really be serious when he asserts that the value of every worker's day's work is now settled "with unerring certainty by free and equal competition"? And, most foolish mistake of all, he is rash enough to hint at his own alternatives to Socialism; and they are—the total abolition of privilege, equal access for all to the inexhaustible storehouse of nature, and equal rights and opportunities! Truly this adversary has roared so loud that he has forgotten which side he is on: what more can the wildest Socialist ask for than Mr. Hirsch's own ideal?

It is not, however, the inconsistencies of the anti-Socialist proposals with which we are now concerned, but the strength of their attack upon the vague ideals of the Socialist. And, putting exaggeration aside, it is clear that a very strong attack can be made if these ideals are taken as they

stand, and analysed into the consequences logically involved in them. The question then arises—In what way do the exponents of Socialism guard against the attacks? To this question it is very difficult to give a simple answer. Some Socialists, like Blatchford, have tried to make their economic formula a little more exact, but without much real success; others, like H. G. Wells, have elaborated in a Utopian way the possible consequences of some specific economic changes; while others, like many Fabians, are content to point to the Socialism (municipal and other) now existing, and say, "We mean a gradual but indefinite extension of this." But a quite different tendency on the part of many leading Socialists is now very marked. They are inclined to leave the economic Socialism to take care of itself, while they devote their attention to Socialism as a policy of increased social control and supervision,—the necessary outcome of the growing realisation of the organic nature of society. This was the attitude of the late Professor Ritchie; it is also the attitude adopted in Mr. J. R. Macdonald's "Socialism and Society," in which the economic aspects are kept in the background. Possibly also the same attitude explains the policy of the political Socialists, whose aim is more and more the general extension in every direction of social protection and provision,—without any obvious reference to fundamental economic changes. And, finally, there is another group of advanced Socialists (such as most of the writers in the *New Age*), who interpret Socialism as a complete social faith, or a general philosophy of life,—somewhat elusive, certainly, but fascinating and full of magnificent possibilities, yet so wide as hardly to touch the question of detailed economic reconstruction.

But, as we have suggested, it is just round these economic questions that the controversy must rage, for these are the questions to which the ordinary practical mind of a commercial nation is naturally attracted. And they *are* fundamental; the quintessence of Socialism (as Schaeffle long ago saw) is social ownership of means of production. The opportunist Socialism which merely feeds the hungry at the expense of the too well fed, or mitigates poverty without altering the conditions of which poverty is said to be the inevitable outcome, is not worthy of the name of Socialism; and the idealist Socialism which does not trouble to define the economic changes which it assumes is never likely to convert the practical man. For this, if for no other reason, we are glad to welcome a new edition of the "Enquiry into Socialism" of that most sane and fair writer, Mr. T. Kirkup. The book was written twenty years ago; and perhaps that is why it lays even too much emphasis on the fact "that the essence of Socialism is an economic change; everything else is accidental;" or that "the fundamental principle is associated labour with a joint capital," and the final aim is "an equitable system of distributing the fruits of labour." But the writer does honestly attempt to guard against misinterpretation of these principles; above all, he admits frankly that the formulæ cannot be more than weak and insufficient attempts to forecast the future. And yet, just where we most ask for definiteness he fails us. Though emphasising the cardinal doctrine, he leaves the proposal vague. Granting our joint ownership of capital, how is the aim of a better distribution to be attained? And we are merely told that it will be "according to some good and equitable principle"!

One other book recently published serves the same good purpose of bringing us sharply back to the necessity of analysing the economic kernel of Socialism. Possibly few people nowadays except students read Marx's "Capital"; and if they read the first volume they probably fight shy of the

second. But the publication of an English edition of the latter is useful. Critical, negative, and abstract as it is, its analysis of the functions of capital in the productive process compels us to re-state the formulæ of social ownership of capital, in terms which shall explain the distinctions between money capital, capital as a store of goods, and capital as plant and machinery,—with other elementary distinctions too often disregarded. And this is the first step to a more positive definition of the Socialist aim. The book is valuable, too, as an illustration of the close dependence of all modern Socialist revolts upon the economic basis laid down by Marx. The working-man Socialist who reviles (with some reason) the orthodox economics of school and university as an attempt to justify the existing system and processes, is, of course, drawing upon Marx; but no less so the writer who (like Mr. Galsworthy) satirises the spiritual bankruptcy of the great tribe of bourgeois Forsytes. For was it not Marx who showed that the Bourgeois or Capitalist society entailed as one of its categories the class of persons who could only realise their individuality by having property? And, though we may be impatient of the exclusively economic interpretation of all social facts which characterises Marx and his followers, we must admit that his detailed (if faulty) analysis of existing structure points the way to the equally detailed analysis of the Socialist economic system which still remains to be made.

This analysis is really the pressing need of the present day, for it is the condition of the detailed and positive proposals which alone can give an answer to the quite positive and pertinent criticisms of a Richter or a Hirsch. Counter-attack is useless; it is much too easy, and the work has been well enough done already. What is required is the definition, stage by stage, of the processes and methods leading up to and belonging to the proposed re-organisation of industry and society. We have had enough of the vague and general ideals; they may be the logical goal,—but logic is the last thing we want. We want the practical compromise which defies logic. Most certainly we do not want any more loose talk about equality of opportunity or of anything else. Equality is quite the wickedest word in the political vocabulary. Sharply defined by reference to a few of the innumerable attributes and powers of *socii*, it may be given a meaning. Without such sharp definition, it is far worse than useless. And those who would apply it to more than a very few of the powers of *socii* must be reduced, as Richter saw, to the grotesque necessity of attaining their equality by constant use of lotteries.

Most certainly, again, we do not want any more talk about the whole produce of a man's labour and the right to it. There can never be a right to what can never be defined. But in varying degrees certain definable portions of produce or produce-value lose their way at present and stray into wrong hands. The duty of the Socialist is to define these and classify them in the order of their importance, and *then* talk intelligently about rights to some of them.

Equally certainly we want no more talk about social ownership of all the means of production. Arguments about the ownership of my pen may be amusing, but are never profitable. Even the limitation of the formula to means of *material* production, with specification of land, mines, plant, etc., does not carry us much further. Social ownership of certain means already exists; it is growing fast, and must grow, side by side with social control of other means which are not socially owned. Let us have the lines defined along which the increase shall take place: this or that class of monopoly, this or that class of industry of which the products

possess a certain degree of vital importance to the welfare of society, or of which the produce (in a real sense) cannot be measured at all in terms of commercial value or price.

Finally, we may fairly urge that we are heartily sick of the talk about abolishing the family or property,—whichever side is guilty of it. Sensible people do not want to discuss the abolition of a necessary and fundamental social organ, or of a necessary and fundamental factor of individual development. But every sociologist is prepared to discuss this or that progressive modification of these or any other social institutions.

And the task before the Socialist is not really a difficult one. He holds a strong position, and it should not be difficult for him to define a positive policy shorn of metaphysical trimmings, at once destructive and reconstructive. For he is not really advocating anything new or terrible or sudden at all,—any more than his impulse is new or terrible or catalysmic. Whether he takes merely the older ground of increased social ownership of certain productive plants and agents, or adds to this the newer ground of increased social direction of certain activities, he is but building on the by no means contemptible Socialist edifice which already exists. Let him then boldly work out his positive proposals bit by bit, defining and re-defining as criticism suggests. For in proportion as it becomes positive and definite the Socialist impulse becomes what its adversaries may call dangerous, but what the Sociologist is bound to call an effective and true dynamic agent.

E. J. URWICK.

"HISTORY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE FROM THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES."

By C. Janssen. Vols. xi. and xii. Translated by A. M. Christie.
(Kegan Paul, 1907.)

The translation of Janssen's monumental work, which began to appear in 1896, is now within sight of completion. The present instalment makes accessible to English readers the Sixth volume of the original, and leaves only the Seventh and Eighth to grapple with. The greatest credit is due to the translator and publisher for undertaking such a laborious and useful task.

Janssen's work on the Reformation in Germany is not only by far the most important production of Ultramontane historiography since the Vatican Council, but is also one of the small number of books which are literally indispensable to the serious study of modern history. Thirty years before Janssen's volumes began to appear, Döllinger attacked the German Reformation in a work of immense learning which was little read. Janssen, on the contrary, has compelled his Protestant antagonists to read him, and no historical work of the same dimensions has had such a large sale during the last generation. Though its standpoint is frankly Ultramontane and though no impartial student would dream of accepting *en bloc* the view of the Reformation here presented, the book has for ever destroyed the Protestant legend of the Reformation and has compelled honest Protestant historians to reject a good deal of Ranke and still more of lesser men. In addition to this it possesses the further merit of providing a very detailed *Kulturgeschichte* of the German people for 150 years. The present instalment is, indeed, entirely devoted to this branch of the subject, and throws a flood of light on art and music, popular and satirical literature, religious and comic drama. Janssen's contention that the moral

state of the people before the Reformation was far better, and after the Reformation far worse, than is commonly supposed, contains a great deal of truth, though, like other writers who undertake to redress the balance, he departs too widely from the traditional opinion. No critical reader, however, can study these pages without learning a great deal about the life and thought, the morals and superstitions, of the German people in the 16th century that he cannot find elsewhere.

G. P. GOOCH.

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- "THE ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE" By H. Munro Chadwick.
Cambridge University Press. 1907.
- "NATIONAL LIFE IN EARLY ENGLISH LITERATURE." By Edmund Dale.
Cambridge University Press. 1907.

The study of English origins is still in its infancy. Stubbs, Freeman and Green, on whom most of us were brought up, knew but little of Celtic and Roman Britain, and still less of the pre-Celtic period in our island and of our English ancestors in their German home. But during the last generation we have woken up to the need of getting behind the Anglo-Saxon invasions. A mass of information on early man has been collected by Boyd Dawkins and other anthropologists, by Charles Elton, whose admirable work on the evidence of skulls, tombs, articles of handiwork, superstitions, and land tenure lit up the earliest history of our island, and by the researches of Rhys and Arbois de Jubainville on Celtic Britain. The study of Roman Britain has been advanced by the collection of inscriptions in the Roman *Corpus*, by Mommsen's summary in a chapter of his "Provinces," and still more by the comprehensive researches of Professor Haverfield. We are still, however, without any work corresponding to Müllenhoff's *Deutsche Alterthumskunde*.

Mr. Chadwick is already known as a well-equipped and scholarly historian by his "Studies on Anglo-Saxon Institutions," and he has more recently contributed a chapter on our early epics to the Cambridge History of English Literature. In the former work he shewed great skill in reconstructing the social and administrative system of the age from the Wergeld and other clues. In the present volume he carries his investigations further back, and by the light of philology, ethnology, and archæology he provides the fullest account we possess of our Teutonic forefathers before they conquered Britain. Mr. Chadwick adopts the method of working backwards employed with such success by Seebohm and other students of our early institutions, and devotes the first four chapters to the Teutonic invasions. Though there is less that is novel in this part of the book, he shews, by a study of dialects, archæological remains and such indications as the Wergeld that the conquerors of Britain were of two races, the Jutes and Anglo-Saxons, not of three, as commonly believed, the Angles and Saxons having merged before they crossed the sea. The second and larger part of the book deals with these races in their continental home, and Mr. Chadwick deserves the gratitude of students for the large amount of illustrative matter that he has collected from many sources. Starting, like everybody else, from Zeuss, he has made himself master of a great mass of material gathered by Scandinavian scholars during the last few decades, material which is not only of value for its direct contribution to our knowledge of the origins of the invading tribes, but also as rendering possible the comparative study of early Teutonic institutions.

Armed with these weapons, and making skilful use of such well-known sources as *Beowulf*, Mr. Chadwick traces the social and political organisation of our ancestors back from the time of the invasions to the period of Tacitus. He is convinced that the structure of society was highly developed, and he finds no traces of undisciplined and nomadic hordes. Agriculture was thoroughly understood, a definite military organisation was in existence, and the weapons and ornaments point to a high level of wealth and artistic achievement. He also discovers that, as far back as the eye can reach, our forefathers were ruled by kings, though the geographical area of their jurisdiction was often very small, and he finds nothing that can be called a national assembly. In a word, he believes that when we first catch a glimpse of our ancestors the state of society was settled, highly organised and by no means democratic. These results are somewhat contrary to the traditional view, but are supported by wide learning and ingenious argument.

One of the most interesting chapters is that on the cult of Nerthus, or Mother Earth, in reference to which a famous passage in the *Germania* gives so much information in a dozen lines. The cult was connected with ceremonies practised in many ages and countries with a view to the fertilization of the fields. Mr. Chadwick shews the striking resemblance with the festival of Cybele at Rome and in Gaul, in which the procession of a consecrated car reappears, and he points to the survival of a somewhat similar symbolism in the May-day ceremonies in Russia and elsewhere. The earliest recorded religious practices of our race cannot fail to be of interest to students of history and sociology, and a good deal of light is reflected on them in this book from a study of related phenomena.

Mr. Dale has written an interesting and readable volume on the development of English character, habits, and ideals as mirrored in the literature of early and mediæval England. Beginning with the heroic figure of *Beowulf*, we are shewn the refining influence of Christianity in *Caedmon* and *Cynwulf*, the intrusion of the Danish and Norman factors, closing with the resultant type in *Langland* and *Chaucer*. The book makes no pretence to original research, and its novelty consists rather in its arrangement than in its material. It fulfils, however, a useful purpose for those who are ignorant of Anglo-Saxon and Latin, by collecting illustrative passages from little known monuments of our early literature.

G. P. GOOCH.

"THE TOWN CHILD." By Reginald A. Bray, L.C.C. Fisher Unwin. 7/6.

If, as most of us agree, sociology is a science in the making, we shall welcome any serious discussion of great sociological questions, even when the treatment is not complete or adequate and when the net result is rather the raising of problems than their solution. Mr. Bray's book is of this kind. He is a sympathetic observer who has for some years studied the life and character of children in the poorer quarters of a great town, and his book has a twofold purpose; one, to connect the character of these children—as he reads it—with the environment in which they live; the other, to suggest methods of improvement. Of these the second purpose largely predominates. It is mainly a work of social reform, akin to Sir John Gorst's recent book on "The Children of the State," rather

than a work of sociological science, although there are suggestions throughout, and especially in the chapter on "Environment and Man," which show a spirit of discovery, and should open the way to further more exhaustive inquiry.

There are, however, two serious limitations to the value of the general conclusions which Mr. Bray draws with regard to the effect of town and country on the character of children. One is that he approaches the matter primarily from the psychological rather than the physiological standpoint. There is too much of Prof. William James—if one may say so without disrespect to a gifted and deservedly popular writer; and too little about physical conditions, family life, food, air, sleep—the fundamental facts that make up the larger part of our environment. The other limitation is that Mr. Bray idealises too much, and argues from the extremes. The countryman lives in an atmosphere of "repose, silence, beauty, the three characteristics of the nature element" (though others have observed that Nature is 'red in tooth and claw'); the townsman lives in the restless noise and whirl of the machine—"excitement, noise and a kind of forlorn and desperate ugliness, follow in the track of the human element."

It is these things mainly that form the child's character in Mr. Bray's portrait of him, and it would be an easy but not a very profitable task to criticise it in detail. The book deserves notice rather for calling our attention in a striking way to one of the greatest problems in modern life—the nest of evils into which a large proportion of our children are born, and for the number of fine and stimulating sayings which it contains. Two quotations will illustrate these and indicate both Mr. Bray's power of pregnant epigram and the truth of his insight as to the right line of social advance:—"The tragedy of modern life must be sought not in the poverty of its resources, but in the failure to realise the extent of its possessions. . . ." All real progress has been made in the past and will be made in the future by the conversion of passive into active relations; in other words, by adding the warm glow of human sympathy to the passionless and mechanical ties that bind us to our fellow men."

The book is an interesting example of how in any sociological study our ideal of what should be, and our zeal to obtain it, are always likely to obscure the picture of what is. It is clearly of profound importance, as Mr. Bray points out, to realise the effect which the growth of great towns in the last hundred years has had on the physique and character of the child population. Yet of the 333 pp. in this book only the first 50 are devoted to an estimate of these influences and this is largely coloured by the author's idealising tendency and fertile imagination. The rest of the book is concerned with suggestions for reform and discussion of large general principles—the sphere of the Individual and the State in Social Reform, a Minimum Wage, the Family as the "training ground of relationships," the sort of religious teaching suitable to the young, etc.

With much of this many of us will heartily agree; yet one cannot help grudging the space given to it, when the particular problem is of so absorbing an interest. If only Mr. Charles Booth, aided by a National Anthropometric Bureau and led to the spot by Mr. Bray, could give us an exact account of the facts and their causes, we could face Mr. Bray's categories of "shoulds" and "oughts" and "insists" with better hope of a sound judgment. As it is, the race after Mr. Bray's crowd of

ingenious but often fantastic reforms takes one's breath away and carries one off the field of patient and much-needed investigation.

But we welcome the book heartily as pointing out the field and showing its importance and its charms, and we have no doubt that, with the advent of medical inspection of schools and the great accession of public interest in the subject, it will be speedily followed up.

F. S. MARVIN.

"WOMAN IN TRANSITION." By Annette M. B. Meakin. (Methuen & Co., 1907), 6s.

Mrs. Meakin's book is a plea for greater independence, better education and freer scope to individuality for women. It is notable that this plea is made quite as much in the interests of woman, the wife and mother, as in those of the independent professional woman. "Girls tend to be petty, mean and jealous because they are taught to cultivate their emotions instead of controlling them; their success in life depends upon pleasing men." . . . "Even Frenchmen are beginning to see that coquetry demoralises a girl, and that a *coquette* does not invariably turn into a good wife, much less into a good mother" (p. 17). Here we believe Mrs. Meakin sounds an entirely right note, and one which more and more tends to dominate the discussions and claims of the younger people in the Woman's Movement. It was quite inevitable 30 or 40 years ago that that movement should be mainly a plea for independence and "*la carrière ouverte aux talents*." English middle-class women were then under cruel disabilities, almost every career but teaching being closed to them, while they also went often in fear of losing their daily bread, from the fact that provision for daughters neither is nor was so regular a custom in England as in France. Moreover, Thackeray's picture of the poor little ignorant girl, shivering, with red arms, in white muslin and blue sash, always waiting for a partner whether for a dance or for life, probably had considerable effect in goading on the women of that day. They claimed that they could do without marriage if they might have the same chance to learn and work as their brothers. The lapse of a generation or two has shown that this solution of the women's problem is very inadequate. The fact remains that the largest number of women do marry and have children, and that the most important of all questions relate to this side of life. Is the old-fashioned up-bringing (which, for all the talk of new ideas, is still the most widely spread) really a satisfactory one from the point of view of children and the home? The managers of circulating libraries can tell of women who get through two or three volumes of fiction every day. As Mrs. Meakin quite justly points out, these are women who "have been taught to think that men do not like learned women" (p. 35).

With Mrs. Meakin's plea for better education and a healthier activity for women we are in the most complete sympathy. Yet we doubt whether the present volume is a very useful contribution to the movement. So many subjects are touched upon that the reader almost loses breath, and it is by no means easy always to grasp the connecting thread that doubtless exists in the author's own mind. The book shows a wide range of reading, and there are numerous references to authors, but the page is seldom indicated, and not always the work. Quotations are sometimes carelessly given. A comically uncharacteristic statement is ascribed to Mr. Bernard

Shaw (p. 39), but the reader who is sufficiently curious to turn up the "Quintessence of Ibsenism," p. 21, will discover that the words quoted represent, not Mr. Shaw's own sentiments, but a "desperate pretence" of which he accuses other men. Similarly, a very misleading account is given of Frau Lily Braun's views on "Trade Unionism" (p. 213). Does not the "English Women's Federal Association" mentioned on p. 214 stand for the Women's Liberal Federation? We hope that in a future work Mrs. Meakin will turn some of her evidently considerable ability in the direction of revising her text, concentrating her discussion, and correcting inadvertencies such as have crept into the present volume.

B. L. HUTCHINS.

"RAILWAY NATIONALISATION." By Clement Edwards. (Methuen & Co.)

This book is a plea for the transference of the railway system to national ownership by using the power of State acquisition conferred under the Act of 1844, which laid down as a general principle (subject, however, to one or two important limitations), that the public should be allowed to buy out the present owners by paying twenty-five years' purchase of the annual divisible profits of the three years preceding acquisition. Its text is a contrast, drawn by Mr. Lloyd George in a recent speech, between the satisfaction with the railway system felt by traders in Germany with the discontent of the corresponding class in Great Britain. Mr. Edwards argues that neither of the three classes most interested in good management of railways—traders, passengers (i.e., third-class passengers), and employees is content with the system as it exists, and that their discontent is justified. Since Mr. Lloyd George established public machinery for securing collective bargaining, the workers are for the present out of the bill. The heaviest count in the indictment is the complaint of the commercial community that (i.) railway rates are so high as to prevent goods shipped from the inland centres competing successfully in foreign markets; (ii.) that the railways frequently give a preference to foreign shippers which enables them to undersell the British producer in the home market. The evidence adduced by Mr. Edwards is more than sufficient to suggest the need of a new inquiry into the service supplied, an inquiry which is needed because no one but an expert can decide on questions of rates. Particular cases of apparently monstrous charges are misleading, because, like other traders, railways charge their fixed expenses against different goods in different proportions, making some classes of freight, or freight from certain districts, bear a much higher percentage than others. Hence only a comprehensive survey of all rates can show whether the charges as a whole are unreasonable. Moreover, the fault lies partly in want of organisation on the part of the shippers; for example, British farmers would no doubt get better terms if they co-operated to send their stuff to market in bulk.

But Mr. Edwards' contentions (α) that competition between railways in providing a service has meant ridiculous extravagance; (β) that railways exercise semi-monopolistic powers; (γ) that neither the maximum fares fixed by Railway Acts nor the Railway Commission protect the public against unreasonable charges, are fully borne out. The truth is that the public mind has never grasped the essential difference between competition carried on in industries where the weakest producer is quickly eliminated, and the competition of companies employing vast masses of fixed capital which cannot be turned to other uses. Owing to the deadly effects of a

protracted rate war between railway lines, some form of common understanding, either by the pooling of traffic, or the fixing of minimum rates is almost inevitable. Moreover, while the public is thus prevented from getting the advantages of competition, it does not get the economies which come from monopoly. For, though the commercial policy of the railways is unified, their internal management is not. The travelling public and the shippers of goods have to pay for duplicated staffs and offices, and superfluous trains and termini. In short, our railway system resembles in some respects one of the imperfect forms of combination, such as a ring or kartell, which checks competition, but stops short of amalgamation. In the chapter called "Is private ownership hopeless?" Mr. Edwards gives a good account of the difficulty, amounting almost to impossibility, of controlling rates by the mere supervision of a Commission. The expert witnesses and the detailed knowledge needed to establish a case are both in the hands of the companies and of almost no one else. The Select Committee appointed in 1893 to consider the new rates, which had just been established with the object of relieving the trader, discovered that one company "had succeeded in raising the rates of one class of trader by £94,000 a year, in order to recoup themselves for reductions to other traders to the amount of £80,000 a year." Mr. Clement Edwards' account of the present relations between the State and the railways, and his chapter called the rise of State control will certainly repay attention. Though not pretending to be a complete scientific account of the economics of transport (the difficulty of the problem involved in fixing railway rates is hardly sufficiently recognised), the book is fair throughout, and is written in a readable style.

R. H. TAWNEY.

"THE FRANCE OF TO-DAY." By Barrett Wendell, Professor of English at Harvard, first Hyde Lecturer at the Sorbonne, etc. London: Arch. Constable and Co. 6s. net.

In this well-printed volume there is little for the sociologist, and nothing new for any who have seen France intelligently for themselves. Yet it may be of real use to these to hand on to their less sympathetically travelled friends, American or English, who know nothing of French Universities, and who understand still less of French society or of the French temperament. These may learn much from this quiet and sober writer, who has entered France with no more knowledge than most, but simply with the open mind befitting his friendly mission, his inter-academic embassy of thought. He discovered, for instance, not only that people work in Paris, and that harder than elsewhere, but often to more purpose also; so that, not without all due respect to Germany, he sees that "American learning would be greatly strengthened if more of our graduate students came under French influence." In the same way he gently, but firmly corrects the still too common nonsense about the French having no family life, no "home" and so on, and does much towards correcting our prevalent Pharisaisms and ignorances in regard to the French drama, novel, or other work of art. For all these elementary needs of the mass of the British and the American public, Prof. Wendell's book may thus be unhesitatingly recommended; it is a little primer of commonsense approach to France; the more since the writer makes no pretensions to anything further. "The Real France" has still to be written, if indeed it ever can be; but it is at any rate something to have a book which helps to clear away a good many of the crude misunder-

standings, the false impressions, not to speak of the malignant caricatures of France by which the minds of even our own generation are to this day more or less poisoned.

P. G.

"A CONSIDERATION OF THE STATE OF IRELAND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY." By G. Locker Lampson. London: Archibald Constable and Co. Ltd. 18s. net.

The recent history of Ireland abounds in problems of the highest interest to the Sociologist. These are hardly touched in this volume of nearly seven hundred pages. There is no attempt to analyse and still less to trace to their origin the extremely different characteristics of the two nations. The existence of a national consciousness in Ireland in spite of foreign domination is not discussed. The effects of economic changes in the outside world only receive the most cursory notice. Changes in economic theory at home are treated as if they were of little importance. In several chapters devoted to the Land Question, while great stress is laid on the immediate effects of legislation, the radical difference between the English and the Irish conception of the landlord's rights hardly receives due consideration. The result is that while page after page is occupied with the tale of Irish woes, the impression left on the mind is that these are mainly due to the wickedness or the callousness of the rulers of Ireland. Now this is altogether to misunderstand the situation. The English rulers of Ireland have not all been good, and they have usually been ignorant; but the majority of them were average representatives of English public life, and many of them did excellent service in other spheres. We must go deeper if we wish to understand the causes of their failure. Mr. Lampson has got together the materials for an important work on Sociology. He has produced instead a long, an illogical, and an inaccurate political pamphlet.

That it is long, the author himself would hardly deny; but a word or two may be needed to defend the other epithets. After filling several hundred pages with the story of English failures in Ireland, Mr. Lampson neither declares in favour of the Irish being allowed to try their hand, nor attributes the misfortunes to circumstances over which the English had no control; but admitting the full responsibility of the rulers, he yet insists that they should continue to rule, purged of their ancient wickedness by reading this book or other suitable penance, and helped as far as may be in their efforts to undo past evils by the construction of a tunnel from Scotland, the abolition of the Viceroyalty, the reduction of the number of Irish representatives in Parliament, and other such tremendous revolutions. It is obvious that the value of such a book must depend in great part upon its accuracy as a compendium of facts. As to this, it is enough to say that Lord Herschell becomes in the text Lord Chancellor in Mr. Gladstone's last administration three years after he has died in a note, that E. Dwyer Gray is confused with his son, that two different dates are given in the same page for the vacancy due to Archbishop Boulter's death, and that—most amazing mistake of all—Stone, the Primate, a strong supporter of English ascendancy, who died in 1764, is confounded with Hervey, Bishop of Derry and Earl of Bristol, the leader of the Extremists at the time of the Volunteer Convention, who died in 1803.

S. H. SWINNY.

"AN OUTLINE OF ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT." By Edward Jenks.
(Methuen & Co.)

This little book is a reprint, with additions, of the well-known "Outline of English Local Government," which Prof. Jenks published in 1894. A good many changes have intervened since then in the sphere of Local Government, notably, the London Government Act of 1899 and the Education Act of 1902, to make alterations necessary. The chapter on the educational authorities has accordingly been re-written by the Editor of the second edition, Mr. R. C. K. Ensor, who also adds a chapter on "The peculiarities of London Government." As a text-book for those beginning the study of Local Government the book has long been used and valued; its clear classification of local authorities, and its unobtrusive learning making it an ideal introduction to a tangled subject. Prof. Jenks has indeed carried self-suppression almost too far, and his few pages on the development of the borough make the reader wish that the plan of the book had allowed him to give a fuller description of the growth of local institutions. Happily that want, as far as the Parish and County are concerned, has been in great measure supplied by the recently published first volume of Mr. and Mrs. Webb's "History of Local Government." For an account of the concrete problems besetting the local administrator, and of the solutions from time to time attempted, the student must turn to that and other books. But Mr. Jenks supplies in a convenient and non-technical form the indispensable skeleton of law without which historical knowledge cannot be organised into a serviceable shape.

R. H. TAWNEY.

"THE CHILD'S MIND, ITS GROWTH AND TRAINING": Being a short study of some processes of Learning and Teaching. By W. E. Urwick, M.A.
Pp. 269. E. Arnold. 4s. 6d. net.

This is a book on the theory of education for the class teacher. Its aim is to re-state "old truths in a new light"; the new light is there, but it is turned on gradually, and never becomes intense enough to give a shock. The first fifty pages discuss the application of certain fundamental principles derived from biology and physiology, and the last fifty the wider aspects of school education conducive to the making of character, and also the limits placed by social conditions on elementary education. The intervening chapters enter somewhat fully into the psychology of the growth of mental power, and the application of the principles of growth as described by the writer to class-room instruction.

While certainly not approaching a final statement of the methods by which education should seek to develop mental power, this is a statement which at present should prove very valuable. The psychological theory is sound; it is clearly expressed, and the worst offences against it that mark our school instruction are underscored; for instance, "The mistakes made by thinking, and by thinking wrongly, are as nothing compared with the mistakes made by not thinking at all, or not thinking enough."

The practical application of the theory is in the main a modified Herbartianism; it aims at a continuous, careful systematisa-

tion of instruction, and in this effort we wish it all success. But with special reforms we frequently find ourselves in disagreement, and we are inclined to think that the writer's experience has been too narrow to qualify him as adviser. Can we agree, for example, that because mathematics and ancient languages have been longest taught "their methodology is fairly fixed and complete?" In no subjects are reforms more urgent than in the teaching of Arithmetic and Geometry. In fact, while there has been a good deal of rather blind groping about after reforms in many subjects, a well-grounded scientific methodology of any one of them is not yet within sight.

Again, while the aim of the writer—to bring about reforms in class-room instruction—should find a wide sphere of activity, we think that he has unduly neglected the experiments to promote mental growth by freer means that of recent years have been increasing. His exposition dwells mainly on '*receptive activity*,' whereas the efforts of reformers such as Dr. J. Dewey aim at school and class-room organisation that will promote *self-activity*; and while these reforms may not yet have so far developed that they can be generally adopted, their value is acknowledged, and no modern theory of education can afford to neglect them. In these modern schools where self-active methods now prevail it is not found, as Mr. Urwick affirms, that "the youthful mind is 'an inveterate shirk,' and will not use its highest process if it can be helped. It is easy for pupils to wait and watch a teacher do the work for them which they might do for themselves." The activity characteristic of an unspoiled infant continues without serious diminution through the early school stages.

In his last too brief chapter Mr. Urwick draws attention to a reform which must precede any effective organisation of Continuation Schools: that the hours of labour of girls and boys between 14 and 17 years of age must be limited to eight. We are inclined to say this reform should go further, that during the critical period of early adolescence eight hours of hard physical labour are too many, especially when they follow on a childhood mainly passed in sitting on class-room benches. In order that a reserve of power may be available for intellectual ends during the evening, the hours of labour must be reduced to seven, if not to less than seven; and the age of reduction should last until the girl or boy is eighteen.

M. E. FINDLAY.

"THE SANITARY EVOLUTION OF LONDON." By Henry Jephson, L.C.C.
Pp. 440. T. Fisher Unwin. 1907. 6s. net.

This collection of extracts relating to the modern organisation of health is interesting and of no small service to those immediately concerned with health problems, but, like similar works whose chief aim is to detail as many facts as can be ascertained in relation to their subjects, dry if not tiresome reading to those not so concerned. Like the Third Report of the Lords' Committee on Metropolitan Hospitals, it is a valuable summary of influential opinions on certain aspects of the municipalisation of health, and therefore a most desirable addition to sociological literature. As such it tends to throw much light on the methods of inaugurating and helping forward the new movement; it shows how one of the most

important and vital movements of our century has been left to the care of charities, to the spasmodic and confused action of individuals and Corporations; it suggests that the time has arrived for taking in hand seriously the organisation on a national scale of the elementary conditions of health; and it urges the formation of a London Health Authority as an absolute necessity. The diseases of the civic soul, it says, are calculable and within our reach, but it does not say this as clearly as possible. For instance, it contains but one sketch-map as visual aid, instead of a number of maps and charts mapping out the city into health districts, as the Public Health Act of 1872 did in another way. Again its full index might well have been supplemented by a helpful chronological table giving the stages in the gradual evolution by which health is becoming nationalised and internationalised, such as the Royal Commission of 1872, the Infectious Diseases Notification Act, the various Health Congresses, from the International Congress of Hygiene at Brussels in 1876 to the International Congress of Hygiene and Demography in 1891, and the recent Congress in Germany, whereby the reader could see at a glance what has been, is being, and is about to be done to consolidate, unify and stimulate the various movements connected not only with sanitation, but all branches of public health. The book is opportune and may perhaps lead to the production of the one most of us are awaiting, which treated more systematically would afford—(1) a view of the sins of the civic body (classification of sanitary problems); (2) a view of what has been and is being done to remove them (classification of solutions); (3) a view of what ought to be done (classification of possible organisations); (4) a view of the sinless civic body. Such a scheme, worked out with the aid of maps, charts, plans, etc., could not fail to bring the subject of civic therapeutics within the grasp of all.

H. C.

"THE ECONOMICS OF THE HOUSEHOLD." By Louise Creighton. (Longmans, Green & Co.)

In this series of six lectures given at the London School of Economics to the teachers of Domestic Economy under the London County Council, Mrs. Creighton passes in review the various aspects of home life to be taken into account by those responsible for the training of housewives. It is distinguished from other books on the same subject by the breadth of view, embracing as it does within its scope industrial conditions, infantile mortality, alcoholism, gambling, standards of cleanliness, friendly societies, co-operation and municipal government.

Although admirably adapted to their purpose of giving to domestic economy teachers "a background, a setting to their work, to make them feel the greatness, the infinite importance of the problems they touch," these lectures will be found even more useful by members of Education Committees. Indeed, so far as the teachers are concerned, the conclusion to which one is finally led as one shuts the book is that the task assigned them at present is not the right one. Our County Councils are merely feeling their way and have not yet struck the right path. Not that Mrs. Creighton makes any criticism of the methods adopted. But almost every page brings fresh testimony that the child can only receive home training at home, and that it is the mother who should be the student at the classes of the domestic economy teachers:—

"It seems as if there were an increasing number of people who would almost destroy the family altogether and were prepared to take away the children to be trained elsewhere because the parents do it so badly. . . . One great weakness of this view is that it seems hardly likely that we should ever be able to obtain a sufficient number of people able to train other people's children better than their own parents could do it" (p. 7).

Much of Mrs. Creighton's best teaching can only be acted on at once by the mothers. Given to the children it would be mere abstract theory:—

"To spend on things which cause real delight, and so add to the joy of life, is not wasteful. Money spent in making a home beautiful, and even the simplest home can be beautiful, is not wasted, for such a home makes its owners delight to be there and happy when they are there. But a front parlour which is never used, filled with useless knick-knacks, damp and empty, whilst the rest of the house is overcrowded, may add to the vanity and self-satisfaction of its owners, but cannot add to their efficiency" (p. 78).

However gently put, criticism of the best parlour reported by the child to its mother does not conduce to domestic peace. There are passages in this little book which must make the elementary teacher feel that her task is a hopeless one. There is not a page in it which would not promote vigorous discussion in a well-managed mothers' meeting.

C. E. C.

"SUGGESTION IN EDUCATION." By M. W. Keatinge, M.A., Reader in Education in the University of Oxford. (A. & C. Clark, 1907.)

In treating Education from the standpoint of Suggestion, Mr. Keatinge is following good examples, and he has made capital use of the psychological material that has been accumulating during the last twenty years. He first gives us an account of mind regarded from the standpoint of hypnotism and suggestion, and makes clear by ample illustration his view of the processes of consciousness and sub-consciousness; he then applies his conclusions to the situation as presented in the aims and methods of the school. The most original part of the work is concerned with his treatment of the "doctrine of reaction and contrariance." On the basis of this view of mental process he delivers a sharp attack on methods of moral instruction which have recently come into favour at the Board of Education as well as elsewhere.

Mr. Keatinge's style is clear and vigorous, and we believe that this book will be widely welcomed as a sound contribution to pedagogic literature. No doubt in psychology he is a follower of Paulhan, Ribot, and other French writers, rather than an original investigator; but Mr. Keatinge's business is with Education and he has offered an able example of the way in which the newer psychology can throw fresh light upon the work of the school.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. Vol. xxii, No. 3.—Henry R. Seager: *The Attitude of the State towards Trade Unions and Trusts*. Studies the analogy between the trade union and the trust. Both forms of combination should be given free play to the point of conflict with general interest. Beyond that their common evil tendencies should be regulated and controlled.—Frank T. Carlton: *The Working-men's Party of New York City*. The participation of working-men as a party in New York politics in 1829-30 had the effect of passing a mechanics' lien law, of abolishing imprisonment for debt, and of increasing educational appropriations. With the growth of the trade union movement direct political effort ceased.—Ulrich Bonnell Phillips: *The Slave Labor Problem in the Charleston District*. Study of slavery in a special district, showing how it developed under Carolina conditions in colonial times, and setting forth the various phases, liberalist and restrictive, of its history.—Charles Ramsdell Lingley: *The Treatment of Burgoyne's Troops under the Saratoga Convention*. Studies the terms of the Saratoga Convention and the history of the Convention Army. The reasons for the virtual abrogation of the Convention by Congress were the extreme ease of the terms, the trouble over quarters, supplies and discipline and the doubtful faith of Burgoyne.—K. Richard Wallach: *De Facto Office*. Considers practice bearing on the question whether there can be a *de facto* officer if there is no office *de jure*. United States courts follow the English rule of allowing *de facto* office by colour of right, but practice in the various States shows a confusing variety. The difficulty is largely incident to a written constitution.—George H. Haynes: *The Education of Voters*. Discusses the new law in Oregon providing for the official publication and free distribution of political information and argument in connection with the use of the initiative and referendum.—Henry Jones Ford: *The Ethics of Empire*. Reviews the section of Mr. Hobhouse's *Democracy and Reaction*, which deals with the ethical principles involved in imperial extension of authority. Applications to the United States.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY. Vol. xiii, 3.—Lester F. Ward: *Social and Biological Struggles*. Shows the error of sociologists who describe human struggles as social Darwinism. The struggle for existence is a competition of members of the same species or closely related species for means of subsistence, and cannot be placed in the same category with human struggles of the character of war.—Charles A. Ellwood: *Sociology, its Problems and its Relations*. A methodological study dealing with definitions of sociology and of society, the subject-matter and problems of sociology, the relations of sociology to other sciences, and to philosophy.—Charles Richmond Henderson: *Industrial Insurance, VI, Private Insurance Companies*.—Joseph B. Ross: *The Temper of the American*. Makes out the typical American to be a somewhat provincial villager, close to the soil, optimistic, a worshipper of successful toil, a partisan in politics, a believer in privilege, and orthodox in religion.—*The Relations of the Social Sciences, a Symposium*. Contains six letters written in reply to questions, manifesting little concurrence of opinion and little interest in the general relations of sociology as against the specialisms.—Gertrude C. Davenport: *Hereditary Crime*. Summarises an article by Dr. Jörgen, "Die Familie Zero," describing a degenerate family in Switzerland. Important as adding to the special studies of hereditary degeneration.

RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA. Anno xi, Fasc. 4-5.—E. Catellani: *L'Africa nuova e il diritto pubblico africano*.—R. Livi: *Infiltrazioni etnografiche nella popolazione italiana del M.E.*—P. Dorado: *Il trattamento del delinquente secondo la scienza moderna*.—F. Squillace: *Di alcuni problemi della sociologia*.—F. Carli: *Il personalismo e la Chiesa*.

REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE (15:11).—Alfred Fouillée: *Sociologie et Morale*. Application of the doctrine of *idées forces* to ethics. It throws light upon the nature of the moral end, is a mode of identifying individual and universal by exhibiting their real unity in the *idée-force*, and shows that complete realisation of itself by either society or the individual implies, not a limitation, but a corresponding development of the other.—E. Delbet and P. Grimanelli: *Commémoration d'Auguste Comte*.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE.—Wernick: *Der Wirklichkeitsgedanke*. Pikler: *Beschreibung und Einschränkung*.

LA SCIENCE SOCIALE (40e fasc.).—Boyer, Damas d'Anlezy, Deschamps, Demolins: *Les populations forestières du centre de la France*. A study of the districts of Morvand, Bas Nivernais and Puisaye, with reference to the geographical conditions, the occupations, and the social formations of the inhabitants. The Morvand type is especially interesting, as it depends upon the simple occupation of wood-cutting with the slightest possible admixture of agriculture. All the central forest populations and their social products have tended to change and degenerate with the changes in the wood-industry.

ARCHIV FÜR RASSEN UND GESELLSCHAFTS-BIOLOGIE (4 Jahrgang, 5 Heft).—Ehrenfels: *Die konstitutive Verderblichkeit der Monogamie und die Unentbehrlichkeit einer Sexualreform* (1 Teil).—An attempt to estimate the value of the sexual factor in the life of animals and of primitive man, with a special view to determining the biological advantages and disadvantages of monogamy as affecting the virile factor.—Lipps: *Die soziologische Grundfrage*. The author makes use of his principle of "Einfühlung" or sympathetic self-projection as the basis of the social consciousness, and especially those aspects known as altruistic.—Nordenholz: *Soziologie, Psychologie u. Ethik. Einige Bemerkungen zu der vorstehenden Abhandlung des Herrn Prof. Dr. Th. Lipps*. Reply to the foregoing.—Heiderich: *Nordamerikanische Bevölkerungs und Rassenprobleme*. A study of immigration to the United States and of the great variety of peoples participating. The earliest English and Dutch settlers, and the late influx of numerous nationalities, are considered with reference to their social effects. Chief attention is given to the prospect of German culture becoming dominant.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOCIALWISSENSCHAFT (x:11).—O. Auhagen: *Die Zukunft der russischen Landwirtschaft* (i). The extent of Russia's agricultural exports gives it a significant place in the world's market, and is the chief commercial dependence of that country. Study of Russia's agricultural resources; area, soil, fertility, etc., of the various districts.—F. Goldstein: *Die sociale Dreistufen Theorie* (ii). The place of cattle in African life. The cow is chief object of thought, affects names of places, determines the calendar, fixes social standing, and constitutes the price of wives. Cattle are insignia of wealth, and occupy the place of money among Europeans.—H. Stöcker: *Zur Reform der Conventiellen Geschlechtsemoral* (ii). An appeal for reform in sexual ethics in the direction of a more natural and rational attitude, greater economic independence on the part of woman, greater freedom in her selection, and the guiding of sexual energy to its legitimate end in the production of the best possible children.—A Gerson: *Die physiologischen Grundlagen der Arbeitsteilung*. The muscular system has exhibited a passing from the large to the small muscles in the process of evolution. The division of labour which freed the hands assisted to the human level. As between man and woman in primitive life, division depended chiefly on custom, but had a physiological basis in the functional difference between the upper and lower arms.—S. Schilder: *Die monokultur in der Weltwirtschaft*.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

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- Harrison, F. *The Philosophy of Common Sense*. Macmillan & Co., 7s. 6d.
- Moore, J. Howard. *The Universal Kinship*. George Bell & Sons, 4s. 6d.
- Macdonald, G. *The Ethics of Revolt*. Duckworth & Co., 5s.
- Strong, Mrs. Arthur. *Roman Sculpture from Augustus to Constantine*. Duckworth & Co., 10s. net.
- Wrixon, Sir H. *The Pattern Nation*. Macmillan & Co., 3s.
- Swiney, F. *The Cosmic Procession*. Ernest Bell, 3s. 6d.
- De Tourville, H. *The Growth of Modern Nations*. Messrs. Arnold, 12s. 6d. net.
- Edwards, Clement. *Railway Nationalisation*. Methuen & Co.
- Jenks, Edward. *An Outline of English Local Government*. Methuen & Co.
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- Richter, E. *Pictures of the Socialistic Future*. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1s.
- Kirkup, T. *Inquiry into Socialism*. Longmans & Co., 4s. 6d. net.
- Thompson, H. *From the Cotton Field to the Cotton Mill*. Macmillan, 6s. 6d. net.
- Mackenzie, J. S. *Lectures on Humanism*. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 4s. 6d.
- Theal, Dr. G. M. *History and Ethnography in South Africa*. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.
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- Davidson, W. *The Stoic Creed*. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh.
- Short, E. *A History of Sculpture*. Heinemann & Co.
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- Dyer and Hassall. *Modern Europe*, vols. i-vi. George Bell & Sons.
 Bridges, J. H. (the late). *Essays and Addresses*. Chapman & Hall,
 12s. 6d. net.
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 Century*. Constable, 18s. net.
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NOTICES.

The following programme of meetings of the Sociological Society has been arranged for the remainder of the session :—

- Dr. ROBERT HUTCHISON.....Monday, January 20th
 "INFANT MORTALITY"
 (Second of a series on Medico-Sociology).
 Mr. I. GIBBON.....Monday, February 3rd
 "PAST AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS OF HUMAN SOCIETIES."
 Mr. S. K. RATCLIFFE.....Monday, February 17th
 "ASPECTS OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN INDIA."
 Dr. ALBERT WILSON.....Monday, March 9th
 "PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME."
 Principal JEVONS.....Monday, March 23rd
 "MAGIC."
 Professor GRAHAM BROOKS.....Monday, April 6th
 "RECENT PHASES OF RACE CONTACT IN THE UNITED STATES."
 The Hon. Sir C. LEWIS TUPPER.....Monday, May 4th
 "SOCIOLOGY AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS."
 Mr. E. J. URWICK.....Monday, May 11th
 "SOCIOLOGY IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PROGRESS."

The new department of Sociology in the University of London, founded by Mr. J. Martin White, Hon. Treasurer of the Sociological Society, was formally inaugurated at the School of Economics on Tuesday, December 17th. The two new professors gave addresses: Professor Hobhouse, on "The Roots of Sociology," and Professor Westermarck, on "Sociology as a University Study." The meeting was presided over by Sir William Collins, Vice-Chancellor of the University of London.

A new journal of considerable sociological interest and importance has been started by Dr. Rodolphe Broda, under the title of "The International" (Fisher Unwin). It is published simultaneously in English, French and German.

A new Society has been formed in London for the propagation of Eugenics, with the name "Eugenics Education Society." The Hon. Secretary is Mrs. Gotto, 82 Vincent Square, Westminster.

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THE DEFINITION OF MAGIC.

(1) Magic is, at the present day, condemned by science, morality and religion.

By science it is condemned as a means : magic simply does not do what it professes to do.

By morality it is condemned just so far as its ends are morally wrong : whether it is an efficacious means to those ends is a question which does not concern morality ; and if the ends are, as in a minority of cases (those designated sometimes as *White Magic*) they may be, morally inoffensive or even praiseworthy, no moral question arises as to the means ; and magic then is not morally offensive, however silly it may be from the point of view of the intellect.

By religion it is condemned as a means, so far, and only so far, as it has recourse to the aid of evil spirits, or so far as it is practised by those who have communications with them. Its ends also are condemned inasmuch as no permissible ends can be the real intention of evil spirits.

(2) But though magic is now condemned by science, morality and religion, it has in past times succeeded in allying itself with each of them.

Medicine and alchemy or chemistry are sciences which have only comparatively recently disengaged themselves from magic.

Witch-finding and exorcism are processes of a magical nature which the moral sense of the community practising them strongly approves of.

Magic was incorporated, with the minimum of necessary change, into religion in Babylonia, Assyria, Egypt, and elsewhere.

(3) The connection of magic with science is explained by Dr. Frazer (*History of the Kingship*, p. 38) : " Magic is a spurious system of natural law as well as a fallacious guide of conduct, a false science as well as an abortive art." " The views of natural causation embraced by the savage magician no doubt appear to us as manifestly false and absurd ; yet in their day they were legitimate

hypotheses, though they have not stood the test of experience" (p. 91). "Regarded as a system of natural law, that is, as a statement of the rules which determine the sequence of events throughout the world, it (magic) may be called Theoretical Magic : regarded as a set of precepts which human beings observe in order to compass their ends, it may be called Practical Magic " (p. 39). Magic, as a system of natural law, is based on two principles of thought, which in their day were legitimate hypotheses : "first, that like produces like; and, second, that things which have once been in contact continue to act on each other even after the contact has been severed" (p. 37). From this it seems to follow—though I am not sure whether Dr. Frazer would admit the consequence—that magic would not arise until the idea began to dawn on men that these two principles of thought were not legitimate hypotheses. So long as they were believed legitimate and regarded as a system of natural law, there was no magic in them : they were simply a statement of the rules which determine the sequence of events throughout the world. It was when suspicion—well-founded suspicion, as eventually appeared—began to fall upon them, that they began to be illegitimate, and—as illegitimate—magical. On this view, Dr. Frazer's theory shows us the origin of magic by taking us back to a period when the belief in magic did not exist, and points out how, and out of what, it grew up.

Further, on Dr. Frazer's view, magic preceded religion : it was when and because magic did not act successfully, that man concluded there were powers which could not be constrained by magic and which therefore must be supplicated. The belief in such powers was or became religion.

Differing from Dr. Frazer, Mr. L. T. Hobhouse (*Morals in Evolution*, vol. ii. ch. 1 and 2) holds that magic is not prior to religion. Mr. Hobhouse considers that the categories (of substance and attribute, quality and relation, identity and difference) which for primitive thought are "interwoven in wild confusion," are eventually distinguishable and essentially distinct, even if primitive man has not yet distinguished them.

So too, assuming that magic and religion at the outset are interwoven in wild confusion, it follows that magic is not (as Dr. Frazer holds) prior to religion, and either that magic and religion are eventually distinguishable and essentially distinct, or that magic and religion are really to the end and in their essence, indistinguishable. In the latter case then, they are not interwoven by primitive man in wild confusion but are recognised by him for what

they are found (by civilised man) really to be, viz., essentially the same thing. This view, which is contradictory to the assumption that magic and religion are things distinct from one another but confused together by primitive man, is consistent with and implied by the statement that "magic and religion are not in their working fundamentally opposed" (ii. p. 23).

But whether magic and religion are essentially the same thing must (on this view) be settled by consideration of them as they present themselves to the mind of civilised man. The fact (if it is a fact) that they present themselves to the mind of primitive man in wild confusion will not suffice to show that they are really indistinguishable, for to him other things also (substance and attribute, etc.) are wildly confused which to us are quite distinguishable and essentially distinct.

The assumption of an essential and fundamental distinction between magic and religion, which distinction is obscured from the view of primitive man by his wild confusion, is consistent with the view that the two ideas "do not at once emerge into clear consciousness—the mind uses them long before it is clearly aware of them" (Hobhouse, ii. 25).

The real question is whether magic and religion are things distinct and fundamentally opposed or not. We must answer that question one way or the other before we can decide whether primitive man was guilty of wild confusion of thought or not guilty.

If there is a distinct and fundamental opposition, then it may be granted that it did not at once emerge into clear consciousness, and that the mind felt the distinction dimly and obscurely long before it became clearly aware of the distinction. The early history of religion will then be concerned with tracing the way in which the confusion of primitive thought was dissipated.

But if magic is religion and religion is magic, then primitive man saw or felt from the beginning the truth—a truth which, though seen by some modern thinkers, is considered by most to be no truth but a wild confusion. If primitive man, so far from being guilty of confusion of thought on this point, was right in feeling the identity of magic with religion, then the continued struggle of religion to assert a difference between magic and religion has been a movement of error, of retrogression, not of progress: the fundamental identity of magic and religion is a fact—and Dr. Frazer is wrong in maintaining that there is a fundamental opposition between them.

(4) The connection of magic with religion seems, however, in some cases clearly to be that a relation of opposition exists between them. But magic and science, which also come to be opposed to one another, were not originally opposed or even distinguished, if Dr. Frazer's view be correct. It is therefore a possible conjecture that magic and religion, like magic and science, only come to be differentiated from one another in the course of their evolution from a common source. That is the view which seems to be held—or to be intimated—by MM. Hubert and Mauss (in *L' Année Sociologique*, vol. vii., “ Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la Magie ”). The common source from which both magic and religion spring is the notion (to which Dr. Codrington first called the attention of students) which is designated by the Melanesian word *mana*—a word which, it seems, applies in Melanesia both to magic and to religious rites, to spirits both religious and magical.

This conception introduces us at once to two facts which Dr. Frazer's theory of magic tends to ignore. The first is the belief in spirits or demons; the next is that the magician is believed to have power to do magic, whether we call that power *mana*, with the Melanesians, or *orenda* with the Hurons, or whether we seek for its explanation elsewhere. The belief that some persons have the power to do magic—persons with the evil-eye, hunchbacks, one-eyed men, women, strangers, foreigners and enemies—is a belief which at certain stages of social evolution is shared by all members of a society: it is not a freak of some one individual's fancy, nor a belief which, though entertained by the ignorant majority, is seen by an enlightened few to be a spurious system of natural law. It is a collective belief, a sociological fact. It is the collective belief of society as a whole, at a certain period of its growth, that certain persons have the power to do marvellous things—a power which is mysterious, and not the less so because it is usually exercised in secret. Amongst the marvellous things which the magician can do, at times, is to command spirits: demonology to some extent, or in some of its aspects, undoubtedly comes within the province of magic. Demonology is of course quite distinguishable from mimetic and sympathetic magic; but like them, in the opinion of MM. Hubert and Mauss, it has its root in the notion of *mana*, or power which may manifest itself as the power exercised by the magician, as the power appertaining to the rite, or as the power of spirits or demons. The *mana* power manifested in these three ways is rather differentiated than different

from the *mana* which is manifested in religion. The differentiation of *mana* into magic and religion took place so early in the growth of society that MM. Hubert and Mauss do not undertake to give us instances of it; but it is, I presume, similar to the differentiation of magic and science, which in the case of medicine and alchemy was not completely effected until very late times. Finally MM. Hubert and Mauss admit that but few instances of the explicit belief in *mana* are known to us; but that, they say (p. 116) "ought not to make us doubt that it has been universal." Indeed they go so far as to say (p. 118) "we have a right to conclude that everywhere there has existed a notion which includes that of magical power." This conclusion is one, I should say, which yet requires proof.

(5) The connection between magic and religion, which is treated by MM. Hubert and Mauss from the point of view of Sociology, has also recently been examined by Wundt from the point of view of Psychology, in vol. ii. part ii. of his *Völkerpsychologie*. I will approach his theory by making two references to MM. Hubert and Mauss. First, Wundt takes primitive man's conception of the soul as the starting point for his theory of magic; while they, on the other hand, consider the notion of spiritual force as anterior, in magic at least, to the notion of soul (p. 106). This would seem to imply—but I may be wrong—that a belief in magic, in the spiritual force or *mana* of the magician himself, of the rites of mimetic and sympathetic magic, and of spirits or demons, is anterior to the notion of soul. If this interpretation of MM. Hubert and Mauss is correct, then the French view and the German view are diametrically opposed, and we have to choose between them. On the one view the notion of soul is absolutely essential to the origin of the belief in magic; on the other it is essentially irrelevant, for the belief in magic (and in spirits or demons) is anterior to the notion of soul. The other reference I have to make to MM. Hubert and Mauss indicates an important point of agreement between them and the great German psychologist: the magician's belief in his own powers is, MM. Hubert and Mauss say, "the reflex" of the community's belief (p. 96). That is to say, first, the community believes that magic and marvels are done; next, that they are done by someone; then that the someone is this or that person; and finally this or that person himself believes that he had and has the power of doing the thing.

Wundt's theory calls upon us at the start (p. 180, n. 1) to reject Dr. Frazer's view of magic. Dr. Frazer attributes to primitive

man a theory of causation (that like produces like, that things originally connected act on each other even when no longer in contact): magic is based upon "the views of natural causation embraced by the savage magician." But if primitive man has no theory of natural causation and no conception of cause in our sense of the word, Dr. Frazer's view of magic collapses: it proceeds upon an inversion of the actual, historical, order of the facts. Primitive man, in fact, Wundt says, has no notion of natural causation. For him events are familiar or surprising, ordinary or extraordinary, normal or abnormal, expected or unexpected, natural or unnatural, and therefore comprehensible or incomprehensible. Natural, ordinary, common-place events excite no surprise, and do not stimulate thought or attention: they call for no explanation, and are accepted, without any theorising, just as they happen. It is the surprising, unexpected occurrences which attract attention and demand to be accounted for. Now, primitive man has only one way of accounting for things: if something happens, somebody did it. Man has the power to do things. This remarkable thing therefore which has happened was done by some man. What is further remarkable about it is that, whereas in the ordinary course of things a man is seen to do what he does do, in this instance nobody was seen to do it. The man who did it was therefore keeping out of the way and was at a distance. How he did it is mysterious, and the thing itself is disquieting and alarming. What is certain—on a *priori* grounds—is that somebody did it: therefore he had the power to do it, and he did it mysteriously, from a distance. An event thus brought about is a marvel: so long as it is supposed to be brought about by a man, it is a piece of magic; when it is ascribed (as, according to Wundt, in later, but not in primitive times, it is ascribed) to a god, it is a miracle.

It is therefore the marvellous and mysterious things, sudden changes of fortune, especially illness and death, which are ascribed originally to the will and the power of some man at a distance; and in later times to the will and power of a god.

The practical question which was raised by ascribing the marvel to some man was, Who is the man? And Wundt's position is that a man with the evil eye is looked upon with the fear which is quite enough to suggest, He is the man.¹ The soul issues in the

* In this Wundt had been anticipated by Morris Jastrow (*Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*) who says: "this belief may have originated in the abnormal appearance presented by certain individuals in consequence of physical deformities . . . The uncanny impression made by dwarfs, persons with a strange look in their eyes, and, above all, the insane, would give rise to the view that some people possessed peculiar powers."

glance from the eye, and acts directly on the soul of the person on whom the glance alights. That is an instance of the direct or immediate action of soul upon soul which is, according to Wundt, the primary form of magic. In the secondary form of magic the action of soul upon soul tends to disappear from view, leaving only the wholly vague idea of mysterious action from a distance. This idea, however, is reached only by degrees; and we may recognise in indirect magic two such stages leading up to it. The first, Wundt terms symbolic magic, for its essence is symbolism. An enemy is symbolised by something which may, but need not be, an image of him. The symbol, like the person symbolised, is body and soul. The association of the ideas of the symbol and the symbolised is so close that what is done to the symbol is irresistibly believed to be done to the person symbolised. The action then is no longer direct: it acts through the symbol. It is also active from a distance. And it is even more marvellous than such direct action as that of the evil eye. The second stage of indirect magic is reached when the agent no longer knows that the action (say of tying a tree or other object) symbolises anything, but believes that somehow (how exactly, is the marvel) the desired effect is produced. The meaning of the symbol has disappeared, vanished, from memory. The idea that the tree is supposed to be your enemy, body and soul, is no longer present: the action of soul on soul is no longer part of the idea, and is no longer symbolised. What remains is termed by Wundt purely "magischer Zauber": action from a distance in an incomprehensible way.

The origin, then, of the belief in magic, according to Wundt, is to be found in primitive man's *a priori* assumption that man alone does things, that he alone has the power to do things. An event sufficiently striking to arrest attention is accounted for by the satisfactory explanation that somebody did it—unseen, at a distance and mysteriously or marvellously. The power thus to work marvels then differs from the *mana* which MM. Hubert and Mauss invoke, because *mana* resides according to them in spirits or demons and in the magical rites, from the beginning, as well as in man; whereas the power on which Wundt relies is that supposed to reside in the human will, that is, in the human soul, alone.

The question suggests itself: did primitive man believe that man alone does things? Did he not believe that animals and inanimate objects also do things, marvellous things? Wundt's position seems to be that in course of time man came to believe that animals and inanimate objects do things, and marvellous

things; but that he began first with the first fact in this line known to him, viz., that man does things. Is it the first fact however? May not the first fact man realised have been that things are done to him? He is object as soon as he is subject; it may even be argued that the child suffers, and knows it, before he acts consciously or self-consciously.

Even if we might assume that in primitive man's eyes from the beginning animals and inanimate objects (as we regard them) did wonderful things, the question would arise, however, whether we should properly class them as magical: is it not of the essence of the idea of magic that it is something done by a man? that magic is impossible without a magician? If so, then we have a note or a mark whereby to distinguish one class of marvels from other classes with which primitive man is acquainted. Ghosts, for instance, are marvellous and alarming, but they are not magical when they come of their own free will and for their own ends, though there may be magic in the power which enables the witch to raise them for her own purposes. The same may be said of storms and the spirits of the storm, etc.

It may, therefore, be that from the beginning marvels were worked by animals and inanimate objects and not by man alone; and that the marvels ascribed to the action of some man working in secret from a distance were alone what we term magic.

(6) The relation of magic to morality then becomes a question which admits of discussion, if by magic we understand marvels wrought by a man for his private ends. First, this definition of magic allows us to understand the fact that, though not all magic is necessarily the subject of moral condemnation or of the disapproval of public opinion, still in most cases public opinion does condemn it. Sickness and death are the things which are generally first and most usually ascribed to the operation of magic: and the man who causes them naturally does so for his own ends, and so is marked off for general condemnation as well as for general fear. Next, though the man who works magic does it primarily for his own ends, inasmuch as he has the power to do marvels he may be induced to do them for the public benefit. If he does, and so far as he does so, he enjoys public approval and occupies a public office: he may make rain or secure food or do other desirable things; and the rites employed for such purposes may pass, in course of time, definitely over to religion. There they may be continued as rites which when performed in the traditional way are effective in themselves and do not postulate any magical or

special power in the person performing them beyond his official power as priest: his power is no longer personal but *ex officio*, and thus it differs from that of the man who is a magician, that is to say, who has a power personal to himself which ordinary people have not. It differs also in the fact that it can only act for the public good and cannot be used for personal ends. The power is taken up by the community in its religious character or function, and so is deprived of its anti-social and anti-religious quality. Eventually, the rite for making rain may unite with prayer for rain: indeed it does so amongst very undeveloped peoples. And eventually the rite may be dropped and the prayer alone remain.

But, though morality may, on its own terms, tolerate the employment of magic, no one has ever suggested that magic is the source of morality; and it seems equally improbable to suppose that magic is the source of religion because religion has admitted rites which, on admission, have been deprived of their anti-social character, and eventually have been robbed of their original meaning by the development of the mental attitude of prayer. Indeed, neither the English, French, or German theories of magic, which have been discussed above, take magic to be the source of religion, even if magic develops sooner and more rapidly than religion.

(7) There is then an agreement of opinion that—in the words of Dr. Frazer in his preface (p. xvi.) to the second edition of the *Golden Bough*—there is “a fundamental distinction and even opposition of principle between magic and religion.” The next point on which an agreement between experts is required is whether there is or is not a fundamental distinction and even opposition of principle between magic and science. Dr. Frazer sometimes expresses himself in a way which may be interpreted, or misinterpreted, to mean that magic and science both go back to one principle—that of universal causation—and are only slowly and painfully disentangled and dissociated from one another. But, nevertheless, the general trend of his line of thought makes it clear, I think, that he really believes there is a fundamental distinction and opposition of principle between magic and science. In either case, however, what is the fundamental distinction? It lies in this, that the worker of magic is believed to work his magic because he has a mysterious, incomprehensible power to do so. The relation of magic to science and to religion is that magic undertakes to do the work of both, and to do it by mysterious means superior to those at the command of either. The quality

essential to the magician is the belief that he has the power to do wonders—a belief that must be entertained both by the magician and his clientèle.

The magician may pose as a physician or as a chemist or alchemist; and may claim to have secret and wonderful processes which are akin to science but are of a superior kind because they produce superior results. But in due, if slow, course of time, he and his mysteries are ejected from science, whose canon is that a scientific experiment can always be repeated when the necessary conditions are fulfilled, and that the personal qualities of the person performing the experiment are no part, say, of the chemical equation.

In religion also thaumaturgic powers are claimed by or on behalf of persons who are supposed to have received power to do marvels. It may be held that religion must eventually discard miracles as science has purged itself of magic. Whether this be so or not, however, we must not allow ourselves to forget the fundamental difference between the marvels of magic and the miracles of religion, viz., that the magician works his wonders in virtue of a mysterious power personal to himself, whereas the man of God is believed to do miracles in virtue of divine power bestowed upon him.

One aspect of magic, in regard to which there is agreement between Wundt and MM. Hubert and Mauss (who here follow Codrington's view) is that the magician has power to do wonders, and does them in virtue of the power he possesses. Dr. Frazer, on the other hand, though he admits the power, does not formally place it in the forefront of his explanation of magic. But if there is to be a real and explicit agreement between students as to the nature of magic, it is much to be desired that Dr. Frazer should consider whether there is any insuperable difficulty, from his point of view, in assenting to the proposition that a magician to be a magician must possess this personal power.

A second aspect of magic, on which there must be agreement, if we are to have an accepted theory of magic, is that magic is the power to do extraordinary and marvellous things. Dr. Frazer's position is that magic is a system of natural law, spurious, indeed, but nevertheless a system of *natural* law; whereas other investigators seem agreed that magic is the power to do unusual and abnormal things. Now, the fact seems to be that magic constantly seeks to effect, and frequently succeeds in effecting, an alliance with science and religion, but is finally rejected as spurious by both.

If, therefore, Dr. Frazer would allow us, when he defines magic as "a spurious system of natural law," to understand that he emphasizes the word "spurious" in such a way that magic is "a false science" in the sense that, being false and spurious, it is not science at all; then it may turn out that a general agreement even on this point is not impossible. The avowed object of the magician, we might then agree, is not to bring about natural things in the natural way, but to bring about non-natural things in a way and by virtue of a power personal to himself.

We might then, by general agreement, perhaps go even farther and say that this power produces results which, being abnormal and marvellous, are not so much non-natural as supernatural: it is the power—as Dr. Codrington says of the Melanesian *mana*—which is called in to account for "everything which is beyond the power of ordinary men, outside the common processes of nature." But Dr. Codrington goes further and says, "it is the belief in this supernatural power and in the efficacy of the various means by which spirits and ghosts can be induced to exercise it for the benefit of men that is the foundation of the rites and practices which can be called religious; and it is from the same belief that everything which may be called magic and witchcraft draws its origin." If these words of Dr. Codrington's are understood to imply that magic and religion have a common source, are differentiated from one and the same belief, then we must point out that such interpretation of them is exposed to the same difficulties and objections as is the view that magic and science are derived from a common source—differentiated from one and the same belief. Magic poses, and is often accepted, as a superior way of doing what science or religion does; but eventually it is rejected as being, and as having always been, fundamentally unscientific or irreligious. As Dr. Frazer says, there is "a fundamental distinction and even opposition of principle between magic and religion"; and, though Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* is not yet completed, I think it would be safe to say that he inclines to the same view. And I would suggest, as a point for consideration, whether agreement is not more likely to be reached, and fruitful results more likely to be attained, if we recognise a fundamental distinction on the one hand between magic and science and on the other between magic and religion.

(9) We may next note that Wundt's theory of Animism differs from the now classical view of Professor Tylor, in that according to Wundt man first believes he had a soul himself, and only after-

wards came to inject, as it were, souls into things. Wundt's magic—his direct magic, that is the action of soul on soul—belongs to what he considers the first and most primitive period of animism.

MM. Hubert and Mauss, on the other hand, assume that, at the beginning, all things were believed to be animate; and they place the discovery of man's soul later than the belief in magic. Thus they differ principally from Wundt: according to their view, direct magic, the action of soul on soul, could not be the earliest form of the belief in magic.

Now, magic deals with extraordinary events; and is the assumption that somebody did them. According to Wundt, that somebody, in the first instance, must have been a living man, (living, I think), and cannot, in the first instance, have been an animated thing. This view of Wundt's, however, seems to be open to some doubt. Let us, therefore, at present regard it as quite legitimate to hold that, from the first, objects (inanimate for us, but living beings for early man) could be the doers of extraordinary things, could be invoked as a possible explanation of extraordinary things, when they happened. Does it follow that the action of objects presented itself as identical in its way of operation with the action of human beings? Did a ghost or a rock when it acted require magic to enable it to act, as a man does when he causes the illness or death of a foe? The probability, I suggest, is that ghosts and spirits do extraordinary things because "it is their nature to"—they are there for no other reason than to do (or to account for) extraordinary things. But ordinary men do ordinary things: only magicians (and then only on exceptional occasions) do exceptional things.

This line of thought tends to the conclusion that it is misleading to group the power of magicians along with that of ghosts or spirits; and that MM. Hubert and Mauss are on a false scent when pursuing *mana* to this extent. On the other hand, Wundt would seem to assume rather than to prove that belief in the power of the magician originated much earlier than belief in the power, or even the existence, of spirits.

Still the fact remains that men, ghosts and spirits are all persons or (more vaguely) personalities; and that all possess their power simply and solely because they are personalities—or rather they are personalities because power is attributed to them; and power is attributed to them because effects are ascribed to them. The argument in all cases is: this extraordinary thing has been done:

who did it? The answer may be "this rock, that ghost, some unknown man." But, whereas no further explanation is required, if the answer be "this rock or that ghost" (for all objects, regarded as personalities, and all ghosts can do extraordinary things); if the answer be, "some unknown—or yonder known—man," then further explanation is needed, and is found in the fact that the man who can do extraordinary things is an extraordinary man. But the ghost or spirit who can do extraordinary things is not an extraordinary ghost: all ghosts and spirits do marvels—that is what they are there for. A man is a magician who does what ordinary men cannot. Hence the very same marvel, when done by a man is magic; when done by a spirit or ghost, is not. The question then arises whether we are to believe with Wundt that, at the first, marvels were ascribed only to magicians; and that only later were spirits allowed to do, or invoked to account for, wonders. Should we not rather hold with MM. Hubert and Mauss that marvels were put down to the action of ghosts and spirits quite as early as they were to the action of magicians? But though we go so far with MM. Hubert and Mauss, need we go with them further and consider that ghosts and spirits originally did supernatural things only by means of magic, or that magicians originally did their marvels by means of something that was not magic? I trust this will not be regarded as an unfair way of stating their view of *mana*. The only alternative to it that I can see is to say that, from the beginning, ghosts, in order to do their marvels, had no need of magic, whereas man could never work wonders without it. In fine I would suggest that the genius of Wundt has in principle solved the problem of magic by demonstrating that magic is not a later or derived form of some previous conception, whether that of *mana* or that of universal causation, but dates from the earliest time at which man, when astonished or alarmed (say at the illness and death of mother or father) put to himself, or others, the question, Who did it? The answer to that question may carry with it magic, as it does if the answer be "some man, working at a distance and in mystery"; or, if it be that Apollo or Artemis has done this thing, the answer is religious. It is unreasonable to say that because the question is the same there can be no real difference in the answers: even though both answers be wrong, they may be different.

F. B. JEVONS.

THE FAMILY AND THE CITY: THEIR FUNCTIONAL RELATIONS.

I. *The Family as the Growing Point of the Social Structure.*

Leslie Stephen points out that, unlike every other association, the family is fundamental. In whatever special form it may exist, it always has its roots in the same instincts. "The family. . . depends at once upon the most primitive instincts of our nature, which are the direct products of our organic constitution. The love of man and woman or of mother and child constitutes a bond which requires and admits of no further explanation by reference to other emotions. It is, of course, true that other instincts, and indeed every instinct of which we are capable, come to group themselves round this central instinct and strengthen the primitive tie. But that tie is more or less the ground of every other, the antecedent assumption in all human society, and, therefore, not explicable as a product of other modes of association." (*Science of Ethics*, p. 132.) He further adds, after indicating the immense social changes that may follow a change in the family mode, "And thus, from a scientific point of view at least, the family is not in any case the product of the political arrangement, but rather one of the primitive arrangements which determine the nature of the state." (*op. cit.*, p. 133.)

The family thus creates the city; not the city the family. It is a common fallacy to place city and family on the same plane as if they were a larger and a smaller aggregate of the same kind. No mistake can be greater. The internal instincts or external pressures that bring together men into a city, may flow from the primary family instinct; but they are derived from it and do not produce it. It is legitimate to regard the city as a great family; but it is not legitimate to regard the family as merely a reduced city.

The functions of the city are not, as popular belief imagines, antagonistic to the functions of the family or alien to it; on the contrary, they grow out of it. The family instinct is their life-blood, their motive power, their true form, their end.

Our hardened popular conceptions of institutions, as if they were but externally related to each other, will neither serve to unify our social theory, nor justify our social practice. One

cannot help hearing the persistent wail that attends the present rapid transformation of parental responsibility, for example, into a higher form. In the modern world, from before the day when *Social Statics*, appeared, until now, we have not wanted for prophets to explain to us how the bonds of society must loosen and decay when the contemporary ethic of the family proceeds to assimilate new growths. I remember well with what perfect lucidity I seemed to see all Herbert Spencer's final reasons against the incipient movement towards public education, the incipient organisation of life amid the unspeakable welter of city slumdom. Nothing seemed more simple than that school boards were all a mistake, just as sanitary boards and practically all other boards were. The argument, if I remember rightly, went down even to the details of street paving and convinced us how infinitely preferable for the moral good of the individual it would be for him to put down his own part of the pavement rather than accept the same service from himself in his capacity as citizen. And Spencer's clearness of vision, his remorseless pushing of this theory to its limits, did a good service in its day; but, however much he may have affected the individual thinker, he did nothing to stop the movement towards representative institutions and the whole growth of modern local government is, it seems to me, antagonistic to his primary analysis in *Social Statics*. If no logic that admitted his own premises has successfully answered his conclusions, he has nevertheless been answered by the logic of history.

With all that has been said about the importance of the family, its functional service as the infant school of ethics, its primary significance in every society, I have no wish to disagree. Even if I suggest that, at the present moment, the current half-realised conception of the family as an isolated social unit, an atom, has failed, because that conception was itself a fiction, or rather a dissociated hypothesis, I do not, therefore, say that social regeneration from the very same roots is not possible. What has made, will unmake and remake. So long as there is a father, a mother and a child, so long will there be a family capable of creating a new society. So much we may take for granted. Here our point of view is different. What I wish to ask is what the family functionally is in our present civic society.

II. *The immediate end of the Family, and the necessary aggregation of Families in Clan, Village, Town, City.*

The immediate end, or *telos*, of the family as a social molecule is to provide nurture for the child. Whether there be a child or not, it may be an advantage for the man and woman to constitute a unit under the same constancy of obligation as a true family of father, mother and child; but no one can say that the social significance of the obligation is on the same plane of importance in the two cases. Broadly, if there is no child, there is no family. At least, for our purpose, we may take this as the essential point. Broadly, therefore, the immediate end of the family is to provide nurture for the child.

But nurture cannot be provided without adequate mechanism. The primary necessities of the new-born infant are warmth and food. Up to a point, these may both be provided by the mother's person alone; but she in turn demands nurture to keep her fit to be the support of her child. Whatever may have been the case in the early history of mankind, or in tropical climates, there is no question now as to the primary necessities of man as he lives in Western Europe: in order to provide for his child, he must procure food and shelter for the mother. Shelter means housing; food means proteids, carbohydrates, fats, water and salts. The building of a house involves labour; labour involves food-seeking by the labourer; food-seeking in solitude is profitless except where the earth produces adequate food. Where it does not, food-seeking involves the co-operation of other social units. The family of three that can live absolutely alone, unrelated to any other three-group, is rare in the modern world,—so rare that it cannot be regarded as the normal family. As a country fills up with men, the conditions demand greater and greater struggle; food-seeking is more difficult, yet more imperative; labour is less remunerative, yet more essential to success. Gradually, the solitary family must starve or leave the home in order to seek another family that both may survive. The aggregation of families we can see going on to-day as simply and as inevitably as we see it in imagination among primitive men. And if a single child of one father and mother means this necessary fight to wrest food and warmth from nature, a second and third and fourth child only intensify the necessity for struggle. Hence we have the farm, with its labourers; the hamlet, where they dwell and arrange for food; the village, where they develop industries in co-operation; the small

town, where farmer, hamleteer, villager and townsfolk meet at market; the large town, towards which all the others contribute their stream of goods in exchange for the specialised goods of a still greater world; the great cities, which are the thoroughfares of continental civilisations. What may have been the sequence of the past in this locality or that, among this race or that, I am unable to say, because I have not studied the problem; but as one passes through the thinly-populated lands, or the hamlets, or the villages, or the small towns of Scotland, one sees endless indications of how every institution named has its roots in the primary need for food and warmth, or may we say of warmth alone, the primary condition that enables the child to convert food material into growing tissue.

III. *The Structural Basis of the Family Sentiment.*

But if we imagine history producing unending currents each having its origin in a new family of three, we are not long before we notice that, by the inter-relation of families, there comes a greater current absorbing the smaller currents. Some groups are more closely inter-related than others, until one sometimes finds, in isolated localities, a whole village of fathers, mothers, grandfathers, grandmothers, great grandfathers, great grandmothers, brothers, sisters, cousins, first cousins, second cousins, and so on in all the near and far blood relationships. When people are isolated, as in ocean rocks like St. Kilda, we may safely expect to find every inhabitant related by blood to every other. But these social islands are equally to be found in coast villages, or inland villages, so long as they are untouched by the great currents of trade. In the days before transit was easy, the most natural growth in Scotland, for example, was the clan (the English form of the Gaelic word for children), and, apart from the needs of defence, the clan meant essentially the individuals of nearest relationship. So long as transit was difficult, the territory of the clan was limited; the great family kept together; the minor families within it became more integrated in the little society, and the sense of obligation to one another and for one another was based in feelings that every necessity of every day tended to renew. There the memory of one another was renewed at sunrise every morning and passed into the dream-life every night; the meaning of father and mother and brother and sister and child and grandchild and grandfather and grandmother would assume in the feelings a full-bodied significance unknown to the casual and

discrete life of the ages of rapid transit. If you go to the Outer Hebrides, you will find just those conditions as fresh and vivid as they could have been in the early Aryan civilisation. You will find grown men with the emotional habits of children; old men and old women feeling towards them as to their first infant; grandfathers, grandmothers, grandsons and granddaughters living in an atmosphere of family sentiment that knows only spontaneous service, not parental responsibility; only the actions flowing from affection, not the duties required by law; only the delight of common sacrifice, not a grudging assent to the exactions of an alien organisation; only the desire to help where need is, not the fear that help will kill gratitude. And it is out of such an atmosphere of family sentiment that the sacred obligations arise,—the sentiment of responsibility for children, the sentiment of duty to parents, the sacredness of blood relationship, the unconditional obligation of the group to preserve the individual. And not until the family numbers out-grow the family sentiment, and the individuals begin to lose touch, do we find any question raised of the child's duty to the parents or the parents' responsibility for the child. Where the social affections predominate, where love is lord, the question of duty needs no answer, because it is never asked; the child without mother is not motherless, because the great family provides for it; father, mother and child alike are always at home, the mother with her father and mother, the father with *his* mother and father, the child coming and going and tended by all.

IV. *The Family Sentiment as affected by the City.*

But the day comes when the clan ceases to be adequate; for one reason or another, superficially named political, or industrial, or geographical, but fundamentally named the struggle for life, the day comes when the clan necessarily passes away. The individuals scatter up into new attachments. New aggregations form. Among others there comes the city, the modern city, which in the majority of cases grows out of the mass-organisation of modern manufacturing industry. Here comes a social growth almost morbid in the severity of its pressure on individuals. The great families cease to be possible. They break up into their minimal units and once more it is father, mother and child. But now, under the extreme pressure of hunger, they have separated from their closest blood relatives and must accept as their friends other detached units like themselves. But between these isolated units there cannot be

the same intensity of family sentiment. The groups of three must do their best to keep that alive by the love of the one father for the one mother, the love of the two parents for the one child, neither sentiment having the support of the elders of the family group. Naturally, the family sentiment tends to atrophy. As naturally, the efficiency of the family tends to atrophy. What the great family group was able to do in the provision of food, of home, of education, of social service generally, the elemental families of three cannot achieve in the same fashion. And the child of each family must suffer, or a new method of service must be discovered.

But no two strata of society in a city are at the same stage of development. To the industrial family now reduced once more, under pressure of the mass-organisation, to the father, mother and child living in a room, there comes a voice from another stratum where the family sentiment has been kept alive by study and intercourse and an easier struggle for food. In this stratum, lives are longer, labour is easier, culture is higher, and the tradition of the family sentiment has all these to support it. The social worker whose duty it is to preserve the tradition of the elders does not cease to insist on the tradition even where the family has fallen to its minimal unity of three. He places on the physiological father and mother the same obligation for the child as, in the larger social group, he would have placed on the group as a whole. Not noting that the father and mother must work for many hours a day, unrelieved by any other member of the family, he yet demands of the over-burdened father all that only a man of leisure can provide, and of the over-driven mother all that only a woman of leisure can give. And he names the duty of the father and mother parental (not family) responsibility, attaching to it the full wealth of sentiment, the full emotion of obligation that he could legitimately have exacted only from the larger family group. Forgetting that he finds the family in conditions where the primary parental duties are impossible, he yet requires of the parents the impossible duties.

Naturally, the family fails. It can survive only by sacrificing the individual. Let us see how, in the struggle for existence, it creates a new mechanism for its own salvation. This new mechanism is the city.

V. Industrial aggregation of Families compels organisation of City.

Aggregation compels organisation, if the aggregating units

are to survive. A mob of families, as in an ill-organised camp, means so high a death-rate that nearly all the children die. A better organised mob means a decreasing death-rate, a greater capacity for survival of the group, of the family. From the unorganised mob, moved by impulse, to the organised city, moved by law, the process is perfectly continuous. Land is limited. Houses are necessary. There must be streets to move by, space to give air and light, water to make cleaning and cleanliness possible, drains to remove soil, artificial light to reduce the dangers of darkness, and the thousand other mechanisms organic to the city. You can see that everywhere the ultimate object is to preserve the family. The city is the protecting cradle for the new-born child.

VI. *The City as a Protective Social Growth for the Preservation of the Family.*

For the geographically isolated family, the farthest horizon is as far off as a man can go for his day's work and come again. When the horizon expands, families disintegrate for a time, but they create new organs to preserve themselves from extinction. The family is always the growing point of society. The derivative products are often mistaken themselves for independent growths and, when they are attacked, the unthinking person imagines that the whole fabric of society is falling to pieces. He fails to note that systems, institutions, special forms of social activity are but the deposits from an ever-flowing stream. Towns disappear and are built again. Countries are depopulated and filled again. Customs change, laws fall into disuse, but new customs come and new laws are made. It is the same irresistible instinct, the same desire, that creates every new society and will continue to create, to transform and re-create without end.

When, therefore, we talk of the decay of responsibility, we must speak subject to our knowledge of this invincible process of re-growth. The most stable society is a perpetual flux of men and institutions. History is a history of transits. We must, therefore, be prepared for endless transformations of things apparently most fixed; we must detach ourselves from the necessities of the moment if we would see how the affairs of the moment have come to be and if we would foresee what they will become.

Why has the relation of the city to the family been recently so much discussed? To answer this question fully would be to write the history of England since the Boer War began. Of the

many results of the War, one has been the awakening of the people to the need for physical self-examination. For nearly twenty years, I might even say eighty years, the great public health movement has been preparing the public mind for an era of personal hygiene. When the War came, it revealed to millions what only few had suspected—that among the individuals of our race the standard of fitness is, if not too low for national safety, at least lower than it ought to be. The nation was staggered to find so many thousands of recruits rejected as unfit for the healthy, open-air life of the army. A whole train of problems flowed from this fact. It was discovered—what ought to have been common knowledge for fifty years—that the infantile mortality was preposterously high, that the homes were unclean, food unsuitable, preventable diseases largely unchecked; that children at school suffered from defects of senses, chronic diseases, acute diseases, all acting as obstructions to the compelled work of education; that physical deterioration, if not true degeneration, was everywhere so common as to justify more radical investigation; that even the essential fitness of the family as an institution was seriously impugned by large numbers of people. The conviction stole into men's minds that, if society is to be regenerated, the regeneration must begin with the infant. Hence our army of health visitors, the epidemic of milk depôts, the effervescence of charity organisation societies, and the hundred other embodiments of irrepressible social enthusiasm. Mothers are found ignorant of the elementary laws of infant rearing. Fathers are found careless of the primary rituals of nature. Fathers and mothers are found unfit to educate their children, or are found disinclined to concern themselves with the things of the mind. The children, it is found, are ill-nourished. They have too little sleep, too little air, too little house-room, too little clothing, too little attention from parent or friend. The cry at once arises,—Let us feed them. The House of Commons, in a generous fit, echoes, Feed them, and the House of Lords repeats the echo. Hence it is that the English Statutes to-day contain the possibility of a public table everywhere for the school-child and the parent is requested to pay where he can, and, if he cannot pay directly, he will be permitted to pay as a ratepayer.

Curiously, this issue has come as an immediate solution of a supremely difficult question. I am not here concerned with the adequacy of the solution, though grave doubts are justified: nor with the nature of the solution, which seems to have sprung up from nowhere and gripped men's minds with a firm conviction.

I look at the matter merely as an accomplished social fact, just like the other manifestations of the family energy in the social growths flowing from it.

Two lines of thought have converged to produce this curious social result. One set of men keep insisting on the necessity for compelling the parent to attend to his child, to wash him, to feed him, to clothe him. They are, without doubt, asserting a great and primary duty. Another set of people keep insisting that the parent, if he is compelled by the State to perform certain duties, has equally the right to the service that will make his performance of these duties possible—public health service, education service, civic service generally. Here, too, we must admit, there is a certain truth. But while the Parentalists insist on the one aspect too abstractly, the Civicists insist too abstractly on the other. Both sides are committing an equal fallacy. They occupy different standpoints; but they both seem to speak from the same plane. For as the Parentalist insists on one truth—the duty of the parent, he forgets the other truth—the right of a parent; the Civicist equally insists on the one truth—the right of the parent, but forgets the other truth—the duty of the parent. But, in both cases, the parent is the centre of the contest. It is as a father that he claims a right; it is as a father that he has a duty imposed upon him. If, in the conditions of his life, he cannot rear his child as perfectly as a man should, he not unnaturally looks for the instruments that he shall use to help him and he not unnaturally forgets that it is on himself the duty lies to discover these instruments and to use them; it does not lie with the great mythical organisation that to him is the State. If, on the other hand, the Parentalist critic, knowing how much can be done by individual steadiness of character, insists that the father shall do more than he actually does, he not unnaturally presses too far the one aspect of responsibility and unintentionally exacts of the father what no single father can perform. The father and the critic fail to understand each other; they seem to be to each other unpardoning enemies, and hence our English feeding law (not yet our Scottish) has emerged out of a political contest where each side calls the other by foolish names and neither seems to see the end of the movement nor the principle of their own creed.

But if we go back to the primary nature of the family, if we satisfy ourselves that the city in all its specialisation, in all its organs, is after all but the body of which the family instinct is the soul, the enlarged organisation of which the family is the

embryo, we shall find that the father and his critic can easily be reconciled. The father, in going to the public school to find education for his son, is not going to an alien association where he has no right; he is rather going to the office he himself has created, the organ of culture originating at the home but outgrowing the home in largeness of effect and in efficiency. Or when, himself taken by fever or finding that his child through some mischance takes fever, he goes to the public health authority with the intimation, he goes not to an alien authority needing some other impulse to set it in motion; he goes rather to the institution he himself has created just for this contingency and, handing over his child for the time, he has him taken into safe keeping for the necessary season. Neither in education nor in disease can the father do for his child all that a good father wants always to do for his child. A child needs a nurse; but not every father can provide one. The child needs a school-master; but with every will to teach, every father cannot succeed in teaching: Whether it be want of time, or want of energy, or want of knowledge, it matters not: the result is one and the same—the child loses in the race. To keep his child free from disease; to fit his child by education for the work of the complex society he is to live in,—these are two primary duties of the father and, except in the poorest, most insufficient way, he cannot of himself either mentally or physically perform either the one or the other. He is driven by every social force, by every social ambition, by every good impulse, to seek for a means to keep his child alive and to inform his child's mind. To require, without conditions, that every father individually shall provide hospital and school for his child is to throw our society back, to give up an immense privilege without providing any compensation. Any social theory cannot, if it insists on such impossibilities as these, be regarded as of any consequence. It does not do to assume that any single factor in the situation is fixed. The father must go forward or he must go backward; the child must grow or he must starve; disease goes on to a bad issue or to a good issue as it is ill-treated or well-treated; the mind goes on to efficiency or inefficiency as it is well-educated or ill-educated. These are not speculations; these are facts. And I choose the hospital and the school as two typical parental necessities, which the parent practically never can himself provide adequately, and, even when he is a well-paid artisan, he cannot provide them at all. Here he is driven remorselessly to seek the co-operation of the great organisations. The very condi-

tions of his life, whether in a city or in the country, make any other course impossible. If we are to revert to the simple life of the clan, the reversal cannot take place unless we blot out whole stretches of our civilisation and even then the same problems will assert themselves for solution once more. Every age has its own special impossibilities. In our age, two impossibilities for the individual parent are the efficient hospital and the efficient school. Even the areas of individual towns and parishes are often found too small for efficient service of hospitals.

But what he cannot directly and individually provide, the parent provides indirectly through the city. What, however, he must learn to realise is that, whether produced by himself directly or by himself indirectly, the school and the hospital are equally his own; it is equally his duty to use them. By no other course can the physiological father and mother preserve the child from death or inefficiency. To survive functionally at all, the minimal group of three must use not merely the lesser, but also the greater, specialised family out-growths, which, in their aggregate, form the city.

VII. *The Family Sentiment and the Civic Sentiment.*

The organisation of the city does not proceed in a straight line nor does it strike its roots everywhere at once. As Professor Patrick Geddes has shown us in his vivid way, the city has a prolonged growth embodying tens of thousands of various energies. And cities are not all of one cast. Rather they are aggregates of survivals from many civilisations. When, however, under the impulse of some powerful single motive the mass of a city's people are drawn into a certain unity of feeling and thought, we see what the potential organisation of the city is. We see how a people of approximately one stratum will organise more easily and more rapidly than the multi-stratified city so much better known to us. But, even in the "faults" of the multi-stratified city, we trace hints of organisation that leave us in no doubt of the city's origin or of the origin of the composite social group. But whether we contemplate the relatively simple city or the relatively complex city, we find equally that gaps are possible between a city organisation and the minimal family, not to speak of the enormous gaps between the city and the individual. By the illusion of projection, intensified a thousand-fold by the different histories of the various strata of families, the city organisation proceeds as if it were some great objective mechanism, not to be

controlled by any human power. It is too great a thing for the individual man to regard as his own or the expression of himself. To be "a citizen of no mean city" is so high an ethical achievement that only the valiant patriot ever attains to it. And even he attains to it rather in feeling than in intellect. The revolution unmade a king, and made a consul; but he in turn, drawing his power primarily from the people, became the great projection of the people's mind and dominated for a generation his own creators. What we see so strikingly in Napoleon, we see also, but less strikingly, in every city. It is the same unconscious projection of collective power turning to dominate our feelings and imaginations. None the less is it true that the organisation created by multitudes of men, out of millions of individual impulses and ideas, is capable of becoming the imaginative expression of every one man's mind, the instrument of every one man's will. One great problem in our civic education is to teach the individual how to bridge the gap between himself and the city organisation,—between himself, the abstract individual, and himself again, the organised city.

Put in this vaguely abstract way, the educational problem looks fanciful. But take a case. Look to the actual father and mother of a child suddenly smitten with an infectious disease. In a moment, they think of the doctor; then they take his advice. The doctor notifies the case to the municipality, whose officers, in a few minutes, are in attendance. Observations are made; records are taken; a nurse and an ambulance appear and in half an hour the child, under the care of two trained women and a surgeon, lies carefully watched in a dainty cot. Perhaps, within the hour, an operation to save his life has been completed and the immediate urgency is over.

Trace now the sequence of actions. The father and mother, vaguely educated, do not live in the categories of municipal theory; but they know that they can rely on the municipal service and they know what step to take to set the service in motion. They are thus, in a moment of stress, unconsciously united in feeling to the great organisation that makes the salvation of their infant's life possible. When, however, the child passes from the home to the hospital, there at once emerges a feeling of antagonism between the parents and the municipality. They are jealous of its actions; they suspect its motives; they find their child of immeasurably greater value than they had formerly known; they long for its preservation, for its restoration, for its reappearance in the home.

On the other side, the municipal officers, forgetting, for the moment, the existence of the parents, lose themselves in devotion to the child. They bring all the science and skill and tenderness they can to bear on its salvation. They resent the intrusion of the parents; they take official possession of the child as if it belonged primarily to the city; they guard it jealously that no foolish mother shall spoil the treatment by over-indulgence and no foolish father gratify his fatherly sentiment at the expense of the infant's recovery. The parents have invoked a spirit that they cannot control. They have committed their child to it before they know how or when they shall receive their own again. In faith, they make the sacrifice; in faith, they await the result. When at last the infant, restored and healthy, goes home, the municipal officers place him among their statistics and the parents take him to their bosoms. The officers turn to others in more urgent need, carrying to them once more healing and service. The parents, absorbed once more in the lesser family sentiment, forget the city and all the prayers they raised to it in their need.

I have seen so often this sudden light of civic faith and this sudden darkness of civic infidelity, that I cannot but regard them as normal to the great mass of our incipient citizens. Hardly once in a long official experience have I found, among thousands, a parent that sustained, after the recovery and redelivery of his child, a shade of the same intensity of feeling as he showed on the first consciousness of danger. Now and again, out of conventional courtesy, a man has sent gifts to the hospital or to the nurse, associating everything with a person, nothing with the organisation that made the person functionally possible. Once or twice, I have seen a flow of grateful feeling that spread itself over an hospital staff, producing gifts for everybody and kind words that made duty a pleasure. But never have I seen any parent that frankly attributed to himself and his fellow-citizens the virtues that produce the city as an instrument for increasing the power of the family.

It is clear, therefore, that the gap in the mind is both intellectual and ethical. The ordinary man stops at the immediate person; he acts for the immediate person; he is grateful to individual persons; he turns from them to his own the moment the danger is over. On the other hand, the officers of a municipality tend to become official; more and more they imagine themselves individuals when their functional existence rests on a universal; more and more they act as if they held individual power when yet every

activity is conditioned by the system they serve under. It should be possible to bridge the distance between these two extremes,—to carry the father's impulse into a further development; to make the official realise that, through him, father and city are united in the child.

But the organisation of the city on the large scale risks the loss of the family sentiment by reducing the family to its minimum. As we have shown, the family sentiment has difficulty in surviving where only a father and mother and child are found together. The capacity for inter-suggestion is too limited. There is a want of atmosphere. At the same time, the very want of atmosphere generates the impulse to seek outside assistance in its readiest form and this is usually the civic doctor. On the other hand, the family sentiment where the family is large enough to sustain it effectively, asserts its ancient belief in the family capacity to serve all needs and tends to block the way to civic action. Over and over again have I met with obstruction to civic activity when the family sentiment was strong. This is probably the meaning of the long-continued refusal of the well-off classes to enter public hospitals. But everywhere this feeling is giving place to the readier acceptance of civic assistance. And as the readiness of acceptance has been hastened in the industrial areas by the mechanical reduction of the family capacity as the result of labour, so, in the wealthier orders, the family sentiment tends to evaporate with the increase of centrifugal tendencies in the individuals,—ease of transit, separate living, boarding schools and the other mechanisms of functional disintegration. Intellectually, it is commonly accepted that, in a thousand ways, the family home cannot compete with the civic hospital or school; but in feeling, this position is not always accepted quite frankly. There is a remnant of conviction that civic assistance is a last resort and a proof of family failure. Yet even this is passing away and we find in some cities that every class of the community, rich and poor, not merely admit the usefulness of their public institutions, but imperiously demand their use. In Glasgow, for example, it is now not uncommon for the Medical Officer of Health to remove to hospital from 90 to 100 per cent. of persons suffering from certain infectious diseases. This is done without compulsion. It is merely the municipal organisation acting in response to the wish of individual citizens. Infectious disease has always been a great educator and has taught civilisation many intimate truths. It continues to teach us, acting at once as a mechanically integrating

force, and as a revealer of civic duty. More pointedly than any other normally present fact it shows how essential the city is to the realisation and to the safety of the individual. It indicates also how we should bridge the abyss of feeling that lies between family and city.

Many forms of civic administration are the subject of legitimate dispute; but the public health functions of the city everyone, at least in Scotland, now accepts in theory, if not in practice. Hence it is from public health that I have taken a typical illustration. Probably the rooted fear of personal danger has predisposed every community to accept the protection and restrictions of the public health administration; but what began under stress of fear has persisted and developed because of convenience. Fear made the path; cool convenience crowds it. More than once I have known a village thrown into panic by a single infectious case. To-day the same village is to a man ready to hand over a case to the hospital authorities. In the outlying places, terror still destroys the family bond and kills the impulse of neighbourliness; but the public health movement is none the less one of the most striking examples of growth in citizenship.

The accident that the fear of infection is a primary motive in winning men's minds to the movement, need not obscure the movement's inner nature. Were such a fear its only motive, the movement would die locally whenever the panic passes. And in the earlier days of local organisation, this was what occurred. In a minor degree, it still occurs. But the movement has much deeper roots than this apparent fear. The fear only revealed the inadequacy of the home to carry through the salvation of the child. Under stress of fear, the parent creates or discovers a new mechanism and thereafter he is ready always to use it. The home is saved from an impossible duty and the death-rate goes down.

The education movement has, superficially, a very different history; but fundamentally education and the public health movement both arise from the inadequacy of the home.

And so we might draw illustrations from all the great organisations that constitute a municipality. Each organisation could be traced back to some family need that could not be adequately provided for in any other way.

VIII. *Causes of the diremption of Family and City.*

The reasons why the family and the city have fallen apart have been vaguely indicated already. The stages may be briefly

stated as follows :—First, there is the mass-organisation necessary for industrial evolution ; second, there is the consequent disintegration of the family group into minimal families of three, with all the necessary limitations ; third, there arises the necessity for representative administration, since, at an early stage of aggregation, the families become too numerous to act as a single council ; fourth, there is the projection of the representative organisation as if it were an alien power. The representative organisation and its officers become a force controlling the very people that elect them. The electors always find it impossible to maintain in complete activity the belief that the men elected derive their power from the electors and from no other source ; that, in fact, the representative bodies are simply the electors themselves acting in one capacity for a given purpose,—the concrete projection of the electoral mind. But, like all mental projections, sane or insane, the representative projection tends to become a fearsome and hostile obsession, a thing to be criticised, denounced and destroyed. Rarely, if ever, is it recognised as the product of the electoral mind itself. But since the city is worked just by this projected representative body, the elector, in his capacity as head of a family, almost necessarily considers the family and the representative bodies as antagonists to one another. Hence the primary difficulty in civic education is to restore to the citizen the lost sense of identity between the family and the representative body. He sees both family and city in abstraction from one another and accordingly he sees them entirely wrong.

IX. Parental Responsibility as affected by the City.

The common conception of responsibility assumes that the child belongs to his father much as his house and furniture belong to him. The common conception, no doubt, is vague and we need not press it too much ; but the common action and the common insistence on the duties of parents seem to presuppose that, if the child, all through his life, could be left entirely to the parents to bring up, to educate and to place on the world, the result would be the best possible whatever the parent's capacity for this gigantic task may be. This is another way of saying that the whole course of city growth, the whole results of aggregation, are simply an unavoidable social disaster ; not a beneficent opportunity for expansive organisation. But, right or wrong, the city is a social fact and we must take it as it is. We are not

here estimating political results or prospects; we are simply attempting to trace a principle among actual conditions.

But it is surely wholly erroneous to maintain that the child should be the exclusive care of the parents. To begin with, this is hopelessly impossible. At the best, the parents are simply social trustees for the child. They have no final authority to do with him as they choose. They must honour all the obligations they undertake in becoming parents. Among the first of their obligations, they have to learn that the child belongs not exclusively to them, but, through them, to the society they live in. Sooner or later, every parent learns this lesson; because the child grows to manhood or womanhood. Yet the lesson comes to every parent as a surprise and a revelation when the personality of the child first asserts itself. "Woman, wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?" This is what every parent must face. But if he is educated, he foresees it and works towards it. He knows that this assertion of independent personality is at once the sign of manhood and the proclamation that the child, from the beginning, is not simply the son of his individual father, but also the son of Man.

But if the child is not simply and exclusively the property of the individual father, the father must be, from the beginning, under obligation to recognise this aspect of the child's life and to develop it. This, however, he cannot at any time do if he confines the child's environment to the immediate home and family of three. He must, from the beginning, take hold of all the instruments of culture, all the institutions of civilisation, all the organisations that tradition has specialised for the total culture of his child. His responsibility, therefore, is fully discharged to his child only when he does for it all that he individually can, first, immediately by his own powers in his individual home and next by his mediate powers in the school, the hospital, the city as a whole, to secure the nurture and education of his child towards full citizenship.

Here I am not concerned with any practical consequences that flow from the theory. That would lead me into politics, with which a Sociological Society has nothing to do except after the fact. What I have sought here to indicate is that the actualities of our present practice demand something a little more subtle, a little more thorough-going, than the abstract parenthood and the abstract citizenship that have for so many years been filling us with weariness and confusion.

X. Illustration from Recent Edinburgh Investigation.

If it were necessary to give a reason for discussing the family, it would be difficult to find one better than the recent investigation in Edinburgh. The analysed facts are given in the Report by the Edinburgh Charity Organisation Society. So far as I am aware, the central idea of that investigation, which was first proposed and sketched by Mr. Arthur Sherwell, M.P., is new in British social work. Usually, such an investigation starts from the home and radiates to the public institutions. In the present case, the investigation started with the school and sought for the history of the school-child in his home. Every child of a given school was medically examined with the greatest minuteness possible in the circumstances. Equally, his home and the remainder of his family were investigated economically. The child, thus examined, was then fitted into the home system of ascertained facts, which were verified along all the available lines of investigation. Some 781 families, involving approximately 1,400 children of school age, were thus analysed in detail. The resulting wealth of facts is enormous, and will provide problems for many a year to come. In this paper I can deal only with the large generalities suggested by a pretty intimate knowledge of the concrete facts recorded. But I may detail two or three specific impressions that this investigation has made on some minds in the North.

First, there is the obvious fact that the family as we understand it does not carry through the work that we habitually assign to it. Read through the details of any of these family summaries and you will hardly find one where the physiological father and mother are equal to the load of duty placed upon them or, under legitimate impulse, undertaken by them. Even with perfect health, which is rare, with perfect character, which is rarer, and with perfect prudence, which is rarest, the men and women here involved almost all require the support of outside institutions and, when you consider the whole facts, you cannot say that any other course is possible. Let the conditions as they stand be right or let them be wrong; but as they stand, they make it impossible for two people, a father and a mother, to do by themselves more than a fractional share of what is due to the child. If you doubt this, scrutinise for yourselves the multitudinous details. Even when we eliminate drink, incapacity, debauchery, and all such vices of personal character, we are yet faced with the difficulty as to why a great city produces conditions that overwhelm the two most important individuals, the father and mother.

Second, it seems clear that if the family did not seek the assistance of external organisations, it would sink into a lower degree of efficiency than even these investigations reveal. If there were no school, the child would not only be grossly neglected in body, but he would also be robbed of every chance of intellectual or ethical culture. If there were no dispensaries, he would not only suffer from the minor dirt diseases that dispensaries do not tackle, but he would go under in his multitudes to the stress of serious disease. If there were no hospitals, he would not only in sickness have to rely on the overcrowded and foetid room where he was born, but he would also have for nurse the overdriven and uneducated mother. And so we might take him through other relations. In every one of them, but for the outside organisation, he would live only for a little time or, if he lived longer, he would not achieve even the moderate success he now does.

Third, it is not want of intelligence, or want of character, that can account for the failure of the family to do its work. It is not possible here to argue the question fully, but my impression is that this analysis of concrete cases merely reveals the extreme of which every family is an instance. It is only another example to us of the fact that no family of three can live by its own resources; but the example is so striking because the conditions of life are so stringent. In seeking external support for their energies, those families are doing only what every other family in its degree does.

Fourth, we cannot, therefore, simply say that, if the sense of parental responsibility were once restored, those conditions of failure would disappear. The conditions of failure are not peculiar to the poor; they are true of every class. It is only that, among the poor, they become so obvious that none can doubt their existence and none ventures to deny the necessity for help.

Fifth, it may be that, on the extreme view, it were better that no external agency should offer any assistance to these failing families; but simply to say so is to beg the question. The broad fact is that of all these families scarcely one is self-sufficient. Let it be admitted that drink is a potent cause of failure, that thrift, as ordinarily understood, hardly exists, that a different early history might mean a different later history; but let us not suppose that, in offering these minor criticisms, we are altering the central fact, namely, that in this class of society, as in every other, the family cannot do for the child all that the child needs to fit it for citizenship.

XI. *Restoration of the Family Sentiment by the mediation of the City.*

The external alienation of the civic organisation from the family is largely an historical accident or rather an accident of irregular city growth. It is not a final obstacle to the restoration of the true civic feeling, which supervenes on the perception of the identity of city and family.

If we were to use Hegelian terms, we might say that, from the point of view of logic, the minimal family of three is mere Being or the immediate. It expresses itself, however, in the endless variety of appearance, or Existence, coming then under the categories of the ordinary life as it is lived in the city—houses, streets, tramways, shops, banks, stock exchanges, etc., etc. These all proceed as if they were themselves final embodiments of some idea; but they are, after all, if left to themselves, only a passing show. Slowly emerges the organisation of the city as a whole, creating its systems of officials with ever more and more differentiating duties. Then we see that what is here revealed is only what the family had within itself. And we attain to the *Notion* of the city, which is also the "truth" of the family. Perhaps this looks a little fantastic to the present positive-minded generation of science; but it is on the whole as good a way as any other of expressing the essentially organic nature of city and family. What appears merely mechanical, the result of several methods of voting or transit or finance, is fundamentally after all but the external form that some definite mental purpose has taken. The form is only the index of continual synthetic growth. Every new function that the city develops and, on trial, sustains, is but the sign of newly elaborated structures. And as the individuals whose massed activities have generated the great city all pass away, we are continually obsessed with the illusion that the city has come from some other than a personal source.

Is there anything in the functions of the city to check this obsession? I think there is. If only we had time habitually to reflect, we should find on every hand some reminder of the city's origin, some invitation to believe that its growth is one with our own, some stimulus to feel that the city offers a scheme for the highest realisation of the individual's activities. We could give many pointed illustrations. But perhaps those already given, the hospital and the school, are as striking as any. If you total up the functions of a great municipality like Glasgow, you will be amazed to find how many pages the mere enumeration will fill.

And in a nation of cities like London, the civic unit—the family—would be hopelessly lost were it not that at every hand it is reasserted in the functions of the city.

More now than at any other period is it our duty to study the functions of the city in relation to the family. More now than at any other time in this country is the conception of the state as an external alien force passing into the conception of the state as the form of the expression of the general will. The abstract State—the mysterious well-spring, whence all power flows—is slowly expanding into the concrete State—the focus of innumerable centres whence alone it derives its energy. In other words, Central Government and Local Government have in recent years grown up as a differentiating unity, until we hear men speak indifferently of State-feeding when they mean feeding by the parish or the municipality, and of State-maintenance when they mean that the municipality provides work for the unemployed.

In this turmoil of rapidly shifting concepts, it is natural that ancient landmarks should disappear; but it is the landmarks that disappear, not the land. The reality of the family is only becoming a hundred-fold more real as the functions of the family are more and more developed and specialised. For the moment, if the duty of the parent is confused, the duty preparing for him is greater and more exacting. Beyond the narrow horizon of his family of three, he sees, too, a horizon that fades for ever and for ever when he moves. But in the growing organisation, he is ever finding new revelations of what the potentialities are, new ways of increasing his own and their efficiency, new stimuli to active citizenship, new invitations to greater personal effort. All this, it is true, we find only now and then, in moments of social enthusiasm, at local elections, or when some great war excites the people; but none the less it is a reality and has in it the promise of great developments. The hopes and the fears that, in a system of city development, the family will be absorbed and superseded by some monstrous growth that destroys personality, sterilises ambition, and leaves every personal duty to someone else, are ungrounded in fact and incoherent in theory. Things do not happen in that way. It is only that the speculators in woods are lost for the trees. If we but analyse what is happening before our eyes, what is happening within our minds, what is happening in the streets outside, we shall not be long before we grasp the true significance of the city, which is the family grown, and of the family, which is the city growing. To restore the ethical unity of the two is the task of civic education.

W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.

LORD ACTON ON THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM.

The two volumes of essays which have been published under this title serve again to remind us of the great loss which historical science has suffered by Lord Acton's death. These essays illustrate again, and in relation to many new subjects, the breadth of his knowledge and the keen analytical power of his mind. Lord Acton moves with almost equal ease and with just the same kind of critical discrimination in the region of contemporary political events as in those of former times; one or two of these essays, such as those on the Vatican Council, the Mexican Empire, and the Franco-Prussian War, are indeed extremely interesting examples of the treatment of contemporary politics in the manner, and with the analytical power, of the historical scholar. It is hardly necessary to say that these essays exhibit once again that astounding wealth of detailed knowledge which is the admiration and the despair of the humble historical student; there is, indeed, no modern historian who, on the centuries which succeed the mediæval period, has such an intimate knowledge of detail; there is no one whose acquaintance with the incidental literature of history can be put beside his. It is, however, perhaps to be regretted that the editors should have decided to republish all the essays contained in these two volumes, for, though all are learned, not all represent the maturity of Lord Acton's knowledge or critical judgment, and some of them hardly do full justice to his memory.

In this Review we are however not concerned so much with the historical essays in these volumes, as with those which deal with the history of liberty; the editors have rightly, indeed, recognised that many of the essays, while not directly bearing upon the subject, are yet clearly related to it, serve to elucidate or illustrate aspects of the opinions which are set out in the first two essays. And indeed they do this in a very notable fashion—essays such as those on the American Constitution and Civil War, or on the Inquisition serve to bring out very clearly what it was that Lord Acton understood by liberty.

It has been understood that Lord Acton had always contemplated a great work which should serve as a complete guide to the history of freedom; it is very lamentable that he was never able to begin this, and that we have nothing but these few lectures and essays to indicate the general nature of his scheme.

These lectures do, however, present us with a view of the subject which, incomplete as it is, serves to give us some idea of the broad lines upon which his theory of liberty and of the history of the progress of liberty were conceived, and they also indicate very closely his conception of the dangers which threatened the further progress and development of freedom.

Certainly no historian ever set before himself a greater task, or one more worthy of the most strenuous labour. Here, indeed, we have something of the true philosophy of history, the attempt to get behind the mere record of change, to ask whether there are principles which lie behind the constant ebb and flow of historical conditions and relations.

It was indeed necessary that scientific history should shake itself clear of the abstract speculations of some eighteenth and early nineteenth century philosophic historians, or historical philosophers, it was necessary that men should approach the study of human actions and of human institutions without assuming some vast system, into which it was already predetermined that all things must fit. To approach history with a determined and preconceived theory before there was any mass of strictly verified data upon which to work, was indeed to render all progress impossible. It was, therefore, necessary that the founders of modern scientific history, like Ranke in Germany and Stubbs in England, should resolutely refuse to pay any attention to the abstract systems, the abstract speculations, in history. And the incredibly rapid progress of scientific method and actual historic knowledge has more than justified the attitude of these founders of the method. To substitute a reasoned and careful consideration of the political, religious, and social forces out of which the new order of Europe has arisen for vague declamations and ignorant dogmatism, such was the work of Ranke; and to carry out an enquiry into the changes in English institutions, to show how these gradually grew from the simpler to the more complex forms, that has been the greatest achievement of the school of Constitutional historians, of whom, in England, Stubbs has been the leader.

We have now transcended the sceptical attitude in history, or, rather, we can leave that to the intelligent amateur. What we know, we know, and how little it is that we know, we also know, but we have found the clue to the treatment of political and constitutional development, and it is only the amateur or the ignoramus who doubts it. I could wish that I did not feel

some doubt whether some of our historical scholars are not for the moment, it can only be for the moment, tending to fall back into that bog from which Ranke and Stubbs delivered us, into that morass of the method of mere enumeration of historical events. But this relapse can only be momentary, and serious historical scholarship has established itself permanently.

But now that we have so far reached our goal, that we have discovered our method, and that we view historic facts no longer as merely detached points, but as organically related to each other, now, I should venture to say, it is time that we should begin to think of the larger meaning of history, to see that behind the organic growth of constitutions behind the forces which at any given moment determine the nature of political relations, there lie greater principles still. The history of human society, as we read it, is not the history of an endless struggle of competing forces, but rather seems to present to us a slow movement towards the realization of some principles in which human nature finds its true development and expression.

It is very probable that for some time to come many historical scholars will be suspicious of this, will suspect that this is only the old philosophy of history, the old enemy come to life again. We must be prepared for this; every science has its own proper intellectual disease, and the disease of a merely archæological temper always threatens the historical student. And indeed we suffered much and greatly at the hands of the philosophical historian. But the world has changed, there is really no need to be afraid, the most timid historical scholar may lift his head up a little from his spade work, and will return to his labour all the better for having for a moment caught sight of the general plan of the ground on which he is working. And at least the technical scholar may be reassured when he sees that a man whose technical knowledge was superior to that of almost every one, is just the man who had conceived of history in the largest spirit and had set before himself the largest subject.

Lord Acton means by liberty much more than a share in the control of government; in one passage he defines it in the following terms:—

“By liberty I mean the assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes his duty against the influence of authorities and majorities, custom and opinion.”

The definition is, of course, too limited, and indeed it would seem to illustrate a somewhat defective training in the stricter

methods of political philosophy. Lord Acton is evidently thinking of liberty almost entirely under the terms of freedom in moral and religious thought and action. His judgment would have been more complete and adequate had he learned to think of liberty in larger terms, in the terms of the full development of all the capacities and qualities of human nature; but while Lord Acton's phrase is somewhat narrow his meaning is sane and just, for his concern for religious and moral freedom is really a concern for that which seemed to him to be the highest form of self-expression. And even those who may have no special interest in the theological side of Lord Acton's definition, will easily recognise behind these phrases the conviction that the supreme purpose of social organization is to establish such a system of order as will enable a man to will and to live freely.

If Lord Acton's meaning is on this side just, it is also important to observe that he has seized the truth that in order to attain this moral and spiritual freedom man needs the protection of the social order, that though the true freedom is that of the soul, it cannot be attained and preserved except through the external organization of society. It may, perhaps, be doubted whether Lord Acton had attained to a completely organic conception of the relation between the individual and society; he is perhaps thinking mainly of the protection which society can give to the individual, and does not very clearly recognise the organic interrelation of the individual and the common life; while he recognises the need of protection he is perhaps hardly aware of the larger truth that in all the highest aspects of life as well as in the lower, man lives and acts through mutual support and co-operation between himself and his fellows. Perhaps it is the want of some clear conception of all this which renders his treatment of the history of freedom a little incoherent, so that while he treats of the progress of the recognition of the internal liberty of the soul alongside of the progress in political freedom, he does not quite succeed in reducing the history of the two aspects of freedom to a strict unity. But at least Lord Acton is wholly free from that confusion of mind which sets the progress of the freedom of the individual life in opposition to the progress of the organization of society.

The subject which Lord Acton had set before himself is really nothing else than the main subject of all sociological enquiry, the history of the development of the customs and institutions under which man strives to realise his complete personal individuality. For the progress of man is towards the

completion of his own individuality, but this is conditioned by the fact that man is dependent for the possibility of progress on the society of his fellowman, and in order that this society may produce its proper results it must develop customs and institutions which are maintained and modified by its coercive authority.

The history of the progress of human society is therefore the history of the attempt, unconscious or deliberate, to find those institutions which at any given moment represent the highest attainable freedom for the individual, the attempt to provide through the organization of society the adequate basis for the most effective action of the individual.

Such is the subject which Lord Acton set before himself, and it was natural that he should deal with the subject primarily from the point of view of the freedom of religion. For to one who like Lord Acton finds in religion the highest term of a man's individuality and self-expression, anything which has the nature of restraint or coercion in the religious sphere must be specially abhorrent. It was, therefore, natural that, as against the somewhat vacillating judgment of many eminent historians, whose scientific method was not adequately reinforced by a firm grip upon first principles, he should very dogmatically maintain that religious persecution was the deepest crime against humanity and the greatest obstacle to progress. With characteristic freedom from merely traditional prejudice he denounces religious intolerance whether it was exhibited in the principles and practise of the mediæval church, or the reformed churches.

When now we examine Lord Acton's sketch of the progress of freedom we are compelled to recognise that his knowledge and comprehension are not always equally complete. His knowledge of the last four centuries is encyclopædic, and his judgment, if we except his attitude to the French Revolution, is not open to serious criticism, but his summary view of ancient history and thought is neither adequate nor convincing, and his treatment of mediæval history and thought is at best inadequate.

Lord Acton rightly lays great stress on the importance of the doctrine of the law of nature in the Stoics and Cicero and the great jurists of the Digest; he rightly recognises that this doctrine is the form under which these thinkers apprehended the principle that the rights of human nature are not measured by civil laws, but have their foundation in conditions and possibilities which lie beyond the sphere of the sovereign power. But I venture to think that Lord Acton makes a profound mistake

when he thinks that this doctrine is not already the central point both of the Aristotelian and Platonic theory of society. Those who have asked themselves seriously what is meant by the Platonic discussions of the nature of justice, or who have understood the real significance of the Aristotelian test which is to distinguish the good from the bad constitution cannot fail to understand that not only Rousseau in the "General Will," but also the Stoics in the "Natural Law" are reproducing the great principles which were first set out by Plato and Aristotle. When, therefore, Lord Acton says:—"We are seeking out the influences which brought arbitrary government under control, either by the diffusion of power, or by the appeal to an authority which transcends all government, and among these influences the greatest philosophers of Greece have no claim to be reckoned"—it is evident that he had never clearly understood what were the main principles of the great Greek philosophers. It is no doubt true that the later philosophers of the ancient world represent a great advance on the earlier in their conception of personality, and a writer like Cicero represents a great progress in the apprehension of the organic relation of the freedom of the soul to self-government in the political sphere. But that is not the same thing as to say that Plato and Aristotle did not understand the difference between an arbitrary government which acts as it pleases, and a government which represents the supremacy of principles which lie behind political power, or that Aristotle did not understand the practical value of the organisation of government under such forms as would secure the "common control," while they also would tend to check the dangers of popular government.

It is the more strange that Lord Acton should have fallen into this mistake about the great Greek philosophers, for in his treatment of the development of the Athenian constitution he has urged that it is there that we came to that supremely critical moment at which men began to recognise the supremacy of law over arbitrary power, and that it is there also that we find the first beginnings of the progressive development of the machinery of self-government.

If Lord Acton fails to understand the debt which the theory of political freedom owes to the greatest of the ancient thinkers, he does ample justice to the contribution of the Stoics, and to the great jurists who embodied much of the principles of their political philosophy in the Roman jurisprudence. We cannot indeed overestimate the importance, in the history of civilisation,

of the fact that the jurists, following partly the Stoics, partly still older Greek definitions of the nature of law, set out so emphatically the principle that law is not any command of the sovereign but only such commands as are proper deductions from or applications of eternal and immutable principles to the circumstances of a particular time and place. These principles inherited by the civilians and canonists of the Middle Ages and developed by the political thinkers of those times did much to counteract the mischievous tendency to confuse power with authority.

Lord Acton's treatment of the influence of Christianity on the progress of freedom is in the main admirable. It is no doubt true and it is always worth while to restate it, that the separation of religious from secular authority was one of the main elements in the development of a complete conception of human liberty. This was not due so much to the fact that the struggle between the Church and the Temporal power during the middle ages contributed to the development of the constitutional liberties of Europe, but rather to the claim of the Christian conscience that in the highest form of life, that is, in the spiritual sphere, the state cannot legitimately claim any authority at all. This is indeed the reason why to the enquirer into the history of freedom the most memorable documents in the early history of the Church, are the tractate and the epistle of Pope Gelasius, in which he laid down the great principle that while the church and the State are both Divine institutions, neither of them has any authority within the sphere of the other. It is no doubt true that in the great struggle between the Empire and the Papacy it might seem as though men had forgotten this, but the principle survived the struggle and vindicated liberty of conscience at least against the State.

It is possible that Lord Acton overestimated the influence of the great struggle between the church and the secular power in furthering the progress of constitutional freedom. The forces which were making for this were in action before the struggle developed and apart altogether from this. The truth is that the constitutional movement of the Middle Ages represents the normal development of the principles and characteristics of the political organisation of the Teutonic societies, which we can trace clearly from the time when these societies began to assume a definite form. As early as the ninth century we can see that the constitutional movement was in full progress, and even that men were conscious

of this; and it is important to observe that the development of the movement was most rapid and complete in England where the opposition of church and State was least important.

It must also be remembered that the ancient jurisprudence had handed down to the mediæval world the principle that the people are the only ultimate source of political authority. This is the real explanation of the fact that Thomas Aquinas and Marsilius of Padua, the one representing the ecclesiastical tradition, the other the secular, agree in laying down the general principles of constitutional freedom.

The treatment of the development of personal and political freedom in modern times seems to me admirably handled, until Lord Acton comes to the French Revolution and the political theory of Rousseau, but there I must think that sometimes he has been unable to take into account the main features of history and of theory, and has been unduly influenced by certain aspects of the history, and by a mistaken reading of the theory. It is probably true that the French Revolution did not shake off completely the superstition of an absolute sovereign power in the State, and that consequently the constitutional governments of modern Europe have not fully learned the limits of political authority. But to say, as Lord Acton says in his lecture, "I would have wished to show you that the same deliberate rejection of the moral code which smoothed the paths of absolute monarchy and of oligarchy, signalled the advent of the democratic claim to unlimited power"—this is really paradox passing all reasonable limits, and has no claim to be taken as serious historical criticism. And Lord Acton's failure to understand that Rousseau in the "Contrat Social" laid the foundation of the very principle which he is himself striving to express, is almost incomprehensible. For Rousseau in the "Contrat Social" set out once again to lay down the greatest of all political principles, that the authority of the State rests upon a moral basis, and represents the necessary means by which men are to rise from the merely animal to the truly human life, and that the principle which binds men together in the society of the State must combine the highest freedom of the individual with the greatest efficiency of the whole society.

I have seemed to lay stress mainly upon the defects of the essays; and I think that it is necessary to point out their defects, for so great and so justly great is the reputation of Lord Acton as a historian and a moralist that it is to be expected and to be

hoped that these essays will be widely read, and that their influence will be long felt.

But when we have recognised these defects I should hope that the example of the essays, the breadth and dignity of their principles will command the attention of all historical students; and that the task which Lord Acton had set before him may some day be resumed and carried out to its conclusion.

A. J. CARLYLE.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN SOCIAL TRANSMISSION.

Social transmission as implied or expressed in the familiar term "education," is one of the many problems confronting the sociological investigator, which are materially affected by the results of recent Psychology. These results, as applied to education, have served to bring about a shifting of the centre of gravity, so that it no longer rests exclusively upon the material of education, but is increasingly dependent upon the nature of the child. This necessitates a new statement of the problem as affecting the general theory of society. Given the two kinds of transmission, the organic known as heredity, and the historical known as the social heritage, the problem is how at each stage they are related to each other. At the same time the new interest in this set of problems has been in late years of importance in determining the direction of psychological advance. If Society consists of individuals participating in various kinds of association, then it becomes important to know what effect these associations have upon the individual, and the reverse. If the study of the social order is pushed back to the region of social origins, psychological factors become significant as the roots from which social life has arisen. The comparative psychologist is now able to mark with some degree of certainty the stages in the development of mind among the lower animals, and, while the proverbial "missing link" is not available for experiment, still, by applying a sort of psychical homology, he is able to ascertain relatively what amount of advance was accomplished in the period of anthropogenesis. Again, the method of ethnology, which carries social phenomena back to a set of factors as relatively simple as possible, prepares the investigator to see to what a large extent social origins are dependent upon human nature.

The historical method has in our day completed a triumph that even surpasses that of astronomy and physics. It has been applied in every field of thought, from biology up, until now, our characteristic way of thinking things is in terms of how they have come to be. A social fact of baffling complexity, when the attempt is made to deal directly with it, becomes clarified when taken back along its evolutionary path to its simplest form, and the observer

is able to see under just what circumstances it has acquired accretions and complications. Most institutions and customs, the principles of law, morals and religion, even costume and manners, become explicable social facts when seen in historical perspective. Indeed, to have a history is in the opinion of some writers, like Vierkandt, the mark which differentiates 'culture-peoples' from 'nature-peoples'; and certainly, what we mean by 'culture' is the possession of a body of tradition, which passes in the manner of a stream from faint beginnings through generation after generation, sometimes widening, sometimes narrowing, until it reaches the present. In this stream, the historian and ethnologist are able to trace peculiarities and directions of current as if there were innumerable streams within the larger one. But it is possible that this method may be overdone. To establish a historical series is an important step toward understanding, but it may not unassisted be able to give the final word of explanation. The historian is liable to erect his series into a fetish and be led to neglect other factors that may be important. It becomes an easy habit to reduce all social processes into their historical determinations and believe that these can give a sufficient explanation. It should be remembered that the historical series is not a stream but a succession, and that this succession, whether operating to produce a sameness of result, or a variation, passes through succeeding generations of human beings and is in each case to some degree an output of human nature. This is by no means to argue that we have in human nature a constant, but merely that for the tradition to be alive at all, it must enter into this complex organisation of instincts, feelings, interests, and so on, which make up what we term human nature. To illustrate: literary criticism has in late years reached the extreme of the historical method; the Greek dramatists and philosophers are products of well-ascertained historical determinants which can be traced in the development of Greek civilisation. In like manner, the Elizabethans are the product of a particular conspiracy of historical factors. But alongside this is the fact that we to-day, many generations removed from Greek, or even Elizabethan conditions, have a certain amount of pleasure in reading Sophocles, or Shakespeare. In the case of any classic, historical determinants are important as far as they go, but some residue, it may be a small one, exists to give these works a perennial interest.

The fact that so many people of our day rest so complacently within the requirements of convention has perhaps led to a restricted

idea of the possibilities of human nature; but it should be remembered that modern life is so protected that occasions calling forth volcanic tendencies are few and far between. And again, the human nature of ordinary life gives small measure of its potentialities under other possible conditions. But every student of childhood and adolescence is aware that the individual has, or had, unnumbered possibilities which a careful process of selection has submerged, possibly for the whole life-time. Childhood and Youth may be compared with a plant-bed in the open, untouched by cultivation. Of this rank variety of vigorous growths a few are taken and transferred to the hot-house, where instead of unrestricted development, they undergo a continual pruning and training, until in the end our plant-bed has developed into a wall-tree. Biologists and historians alike are puzzled by the fact that the world's great men have come in groups; the biologist is unable to find an adequate time for producing the necessary degree of variation, and the historian, with all his search for historical causes can do little more than record the fact. Perhaps the psychologist of childhood and adolescence may be allowed to suggest that a few tendencies he knows to exist in every child may have taken advantage of the alteration in the choking-process to shoot up into fully formed plants. All of this is merely to emphasize the fact that civilization has by no means exhausted the possibilities of human nature, which may at any time under favourable conditions contribute to the historical succession, or even alter its course.

It being granted that social filiation is inclusive of both historical succession and psychological adjustment, we may, with some degree of profit, examine the details exhibited in the process of adaptation. Comparative psychologists have found it convenient to erect a scaffolding beside the mental tree, the stages of which mark roughly the periods in the development of the mind. These periods are called the instinctive, the intelligent, and the rational. Under the first are included all those mental functions that appear in a stereotyped, hereditarily determined series of reactions to situations met in the environment. By intelligence, the comparative psychologist means a certain plasticity as against the previously stereotyped quality of instincts, an ability to alter behaviour on the basis of individual experience. Practically all the lower animals may be included under these two terms of the scheme, although one is able to find in the more intelligent animals the first few stages of progress toward reason which Mr. Hobhouse covers by the term 'practical judgment.' We are safe in saying

that reason, as the use of fully-formed ideas capable of organisation outside the chain of habits, is the distinctively human possession. The scheme becomes available for our present purpose when we remember that development into a higher stage of mind by no means destroys, or even restricts, the functions of the previous period. Intelligence is only plastic instinct and the motivation of reason is interest ultimately rooted in instinct. Life-values, when read large, appear the same throughout the animal series including man; and the fundamental motive forces in human life are those it possesses in common with that of its animal forbears. The ancient expression that man has reason and no instincts is thus seen to be fallacious. The reason of the logics is a species of dessicated unreality; and to my thinking, the only part of logic worth the reading is that which deals with the sources of fallacy. Men are ruled primarily by inclination and prejudice and by reason in proportion as it gives support to these. With this presentation of the genetic scheme we are prepared to see some of the factors necessarily concerned in social transmission. There will be found in every human being the series of instinct emotions which, in their elaboration, mark out the interests of life. There will be found again a great body of intelligent acquisitions, making up what are commonly termed "habits." These acquisitions come as the result of practice and in dealing with actual things and situations. To what extent life consists in the exercise of these automatisms, the hypnotist and alienist are best aware. But some slight realisation of their importance may be obtained by recalling the statement of Professor James that without habit most of the day would be consumed in the simple and to most of us uninteresting process of making the toilette. Beyond this is what we call reason, for the majority little more than the ability to arrange the order in which automatisms will work themselves out. With the few, it is sufficient to control the course of life in accordance with ideas and ideals. Let us now, as best we can, translate this scheme into social terms. The sociology of mere historical succession is based upon the assumption that man is exclusively a rational creature who receives and transmits and lives in accordance with ideas of varying complexity and importance. But this ideal stream, while without doubt present, does not appear to possess the depth which has been ascribed to it. The bed of the stream seems to consist of a little-examined, but almost unlimited layer of products dependent for their existence upon functions of the mind below the rational and which roughly correspond to what

ethnologists call "folk-products." There has been in late years too distinct a tendency to relegate folk-life to the region of social origins, and think of it as merely the head waters of the historical stream, when, as a matter of fact, to change our form of figure, it is a series of springs re-enforcing and giving vitality at every step to the historical forces. The term "survival" is in some respects unfortunate, leading one to suppose that its presence in the civilized community is equivalent to the possession of useless or vestigial organs. Mr. Gomme, in his most illuminating treatise on folklore, regards this body of custom and story entirely as a series of survivals—the percolations of a buried culture stage through the layers that have been spread above it. We venture to suggest that so far from that being the case, the existence of this folk-product is a necessary condition for the civilisation by which it is supposed to have been submerged. To take so common-place a subject as marriage, its history is by this time very well known, its primitive origins, its stages in attaining to monogamy, its sacramental sanctions, and its acceptance by the highest civilisations as an ethical institution. All of the little eccentricities of ceremony are naturally regarded as survivals which its development has been unable completely to slough off. But we venture to suggest that all of these so-called survivals have a real and living existence in the psychonomy of the participants. That the daughter is somehow the property of her parent is no less the unconscious conviction of the modern father giving her away at the altar than of the primitive one who insists on seeing in her place an adequate number of cattle. The civilised lover, no less than the primitive one, has the impulse to capture and carry away his bride. And the ceremonies attached to this achievement of possession constitute a sort of vaccination treatment which makes the process possible without the exhibition of more disturbing primitive traits. Behind all these methods, as efficient now as at the origin of humanity, stands the primal instinct which makes this aspect of life possible at all.

To return to our genetic scheme, we are suggesting that just as a succession of ideas from the outside depends in the individual on a certain building up of the foundations, instinctive and intelligent, so this generalised to the group, shows the historical succession of ideas dependent upon a constant folk output in the form of custom and even superstition. It is doubtful if the highest religion could survive a generation whose childhood had not been fed on Santa Claus and fairy story and even magic. This is by no means affirming the correspondence of individual and race

supposed by the old culture-epoch theory, although in justice it must be said that the latter has in principle contributed much both to science and to the practical undertakings of education. It merely asserts the psychological fact that race and individual alike progress from bare instinct to reason and that it would be a mistake to suppose that in the individual this progress is unmediated. A kind of succession has been postulated by some modern thinkers, as Tarde and Baldwin, which is intended to exhibit the machinery of transmission, finding this to consist in the principle of imitation. But to my thinking, these writers err on the side of over-emphasis, leaving no room for the true historical continuity of ideas. Imitation does play its part in the higher stages of intelligent learning and transmission that we have attempted to delimit. But if a custom propagates itself by imitation, a scientific idea involves rational receptiveness.

It being clear that transmission cannot be fully described in intellectualistic terms, we are under the necessity of finding to what extent other factors participate. We have, so to speak, two parallel lines of succession; that represented by the biological term "heredity," as well as the line of tradition that has been under consideration. How these are able to interact in the production of a common result is the problem before us. An illustration from the biological field might not be inappropriate. Mr. Hudson has shown that young birds are frightened by any large, strange object, without distinction of kind. Older birds of the same species are frightened by the objects which are the natural enemies of the species. It is not necessary to suppose that the older birds have had an exhaustive experience of hawks in order to have the instinct thus specialised, but through the mediation of warning cries and a frequent repetition of the experience, the reaction is brought to bear only upon those objects where biological utility plays a part. This crude illustration points us to the general principle that hereditary organic equipment, especially as concerns the interests and emotions, is vague and undifferentiated. The function of experience is to draw out and polarise these tendencies with reference to the factors constituting the environment. For human beings this process appears long and exceedingly complicated. The human ability to retain not merely as habits, but in the shape of images, the greater part of experience affords opportunity for psychical organisation on a very large scale. The process has been carefully studied by Mr. Shand and embodied in his doctrine of the 'sentiments.' The leading principle is that the emotional life

becomes in the course of time definitely oriented toward factors of experience. Each of these emotional directions, as they might be called, depends upon a special organisation of almost the whole scale of emotions. The object loved induces joy in its presence, sorrow in its absence, fear for its danger and anger at any interfering object. In this way, the psychical life of the individual grows into definite relations with the world about. Our special applications of this doctrine are of two kinds: (1) the feelings are organically and not socially transmissible. (2) Social transmission involves in each individual a complete new series of adjustments in order to make reception possible. A great part of the social heritage consists of imaginative situations in legend, myth and the arts which make its component parts especially available as objects of emotional adjustment. Again, the fact that any social product commands in the community a common organisation of emotions, or in other words, is the object of a certain sentiment, is largely what gives it vitality as a social product. The love of the old, the love of one's country, or of the good, or of duty, or any other of the multiple forms of tradition,—all of these, organised in the minds of all the individuals concerned, make up the sum of social forces. But these habits of feeling cannot be called into existence merely by the presentation of some factor of tradition; it is necessary for them to grow. An illustration may be found in the most difficult problem that adolescence has to face, that of choosing a career. Where the youth has a free chance unhampered by parental interference, or the prospect of a ready-made career, as the civil service, all the possibilities of life present themselves to him in panoramic series. He pictures himself as occupying one after another the different functions of life, and in each case gives birth to an incipient sentiment which possibly fails of growth because the experience is imaginative, instead of real. He fancies himself as a sailor, as a soldier, an explorer, a barrister, a physician, a clergyman, a scholar, or a man of business. And in turn he tentatively constructs the organisation of emotional experience which the imagined series of situations would call forth. When the choice is made, the sentiment becomes fully grown and is the chief organising factor in the young man's life. This analysis exhibits the method by which so many sets of social factors are perpetuated. The great soldier is undoubtedly created by imaginatively living through the military experiences of past soldiers, and by the formation of self-love directed to a self which is in a measure substituted for the personages of the past. In some such

way careers of all kinds are propagated, and many types of action repeat themselves in successive generations.

While the term 'institution' is sufficiently vague to prevent definite application to specific cases in such a way as to make clear the principle that differentiates various kinds, still, for practical purposes there will be found a certain consensus as to the class of facts that the term covers. The institution possesses *par excellence* an historical continuity; its changes in the course of time are slow; and it manifests a certain compelling power in its contact with successive generations. This authoritative, compelling element has been singled out by Professor Durkheim as the differential mark characterising institutions. The feeling for authority as it manifests its different stages in the development of the child has been studied with care by Miss Darrah. The first period, lasting to the beginning of adolescence, is one of control by authority in the most absolute and arbitrary sense of the term. Reasons for prescribing or prohibiting various actions are not required, or even wanted. A thing is right because of approval by superiors, or wrong because of disapproval; there is no other standard. But the mark of this authority is the personal element without which it possesses no cogency. The basis underlying this attitude seems to be that of intelligent learning, that of gradually stamping in by experience the remembrance of activities with their pleasurable or painful consequences. Incidentally, it may be said that this principle furnishes the ground for Mr. Spencer's whole doctrine of moral education. To it should be added the tendency of childhood to interpret all causation in personal terms.

But the attitude towards authority changes as the child grows older developing into a susceptibility to new kinds of suasion. The period of early adolescence is that of participation in certain crude forms of organised activity. Control is by mates rather than by superiors. The sentiment of the gang, the team, or the school, or the boys' secret society, is most efficient with him now. This *esprit de corps*, or control by the mass of equals probably finds its basis in the principle of imitation. Later on, imitation tends to become discriminating and the personal element in some cases gradually drops out, initiating the age of control by ideas and ideals—the period of reason. It requires to be added that for the majority, sense of authority is arrested at this lower stage. The slight degree of rational responsiveness is supplemented by a certain amount of support by the crowd. The fully developed moral life implies the growth of sentiments whose objects are more

abstract moral qualities or judgments, as duty, justice and right. Let us now apply these results to the case of some institution like the Church. The present sensitiveness on the subject of religious education bears evidence that there is an unconscious recognition of these principles. The religious institution has created a number of minor aids to enable it to meet all requirements. Absolute personal control, the corporate feeling of the church-community are just as necessary as the body of doctrine. Besides this directly compelling power, there are other modes of meeting natural interests as they appear in the course of development. It will be noted that every great religion contains a mythology, a number of hero-legends, a body of doctrine, a concrete embodiment in buildings and fixtures, a ritual, and a priesthood. If we should look for the essence of the institution, it would be found in none of these singly, but in all together. Each exists because of the necessity of meeting human nature in its various aspects. Children in early years have little interest in the New Testament, but the lack is more than met by the mythology of the Old Testament. Again, in the story of the life of Jesus, it will be noted that incidents are included which range through the whole gamut of emotions, making New Testament religion peculiarly adaptable to the stage of adolescence. Then, the example of all the saints, each of them an *imitatio Christi*, furnishes the necessary set of personal ideals. This is far from saying that deliberate design has ever played a part in selecting these important elements; but it is that species of folk and historical selection necessary for the efficiency of an institution.

The intention of this paper has been to indicate facts sufficiently well-known in themselves, but certain of whose relations to each other have been disregarded. It was desired to point out certain limitations of the historical method. We require to be reminded that history is a human affair and that its forces exist because they are derived from human nature. Historical succession might be thought of as having the character of a curve, used in graphic representation to connect points, the value of each of which depends only partly upon the position of previous ones.

Our study further prepares us to consider the so-called recapitulation of racial development by the individual. There appears no sufficient ground for believing in the mind of the race, and it is a frequent source of fallacy to regard the race in this semi-personified way. The race consists of successive generations of individuals and mental development probably has the same stages throughout;

and a further advance in the way of mental acquisition implies only that the forces of development are hereditary in that individual and have met conditions favouring their fuller manifestation, these conditions consisting largely of the acquisitions of previous generations.

We have attempted to make clear the meaning of survival in folk-lore or custom, as finding its reason for continued existence in the satisfaction of needs actual and present. This illustrates the general type of transmission which must be understood not as the mere passing on of ideas, but as a re-creation with every new individual. To this process of reconstituting the body of culture, the whole period of individual growth is devoted.

J. W. SLAUGHTER.

THE TUTELAGE OF RACES.

There are two current views, one old, conventional and uncritical, but still common, the other modern and relatively scientific, on the moral tendency of the *imperium* of a dominant over a subject race. The first view may be represented in the words of the historian of the Roman wall¹ :

"The Romans were not only great conquerors but they were wise and politic governors. They brought all the nations of the then known world into unity, and spread the blessings of order and civilisation to the very ends of the earth. The people of England are in this respect the successors of the Romans. Through their instrumentality vast continents, of the existence of which Cæsar never dreamt, have obtained the advantage of a well organised government; their rude inhabitants have been induced to engage in the pursuits of peaceful industry; and the blessings of Christianity have been pressed upon their attention."

There is here no hint of a suspicion that the Roman rule was otherwise than wholesome for the people of ancient Britain, Gaul, Greece or Egypt. There is no glance at the fact that Gaul, Britain, Spain, Egypt and North Africa were left by Rome less capable of self-maintenance and self-defence than she found them. The simple fact of orderly dominion is held to be its own complete vindication.

The other and more critical view may be well indicated by a passage in Sir John Seeley's *Expansion of England* :

"Subjection for a long time to a foreign yoke is one of the most potent causes of national deterioration. And the few facts we know about the ancient Hindus confirm what we should conjecture about the moral effects produced upon them by their misfortunes. We have in the Greek writer Arrian a description of the Indian character, which we read with surprise. He says, 'they are remarkably brave, superior in war to all Asiatics; they are remarkable for simplicity and integrity; so reasonable as never to have recourse to law-suit and so honest as neither to require locks to their doors nor writings to bind their agreements. No Indian was ever known to tell an untruth.' This description has no doubt an air of exaggeration about it; but, as Elphinstone remarks, it shows that an extraordinary change has passed over the Hindu character since it was written. Exaggeration consists in exhibiting the real features larger than they ought to be. But this description exhibits on an

1. Dr. J. Collingwood Bruce, *Handbook of the Roman Wall*, preface to second edition.

unnatural scale precisely the features that are wanting in the modern Hindu character. Modern travellers, therefore, are found to exaggerate the very opposite features. They accuse the Hindu of want of veracity, want of valour, and extreme litigiousness. But the change is precisely such as might naturally be produced by a long period of submission to the foreigner."

The conception here set forth is diametrically opposed to the other. By what proportion of British citizens the two views are respectively held it seems impossible even to guess; but it is certain that Seeley's book was widely read and approved of; and I doubt whether the passage quoted would not now receive the entire assent of a majority of educated and thoughtful men everywhere if it were put to them. On the other hand, it seems quite certain that the popular and the official attitude in this country to the facts of British rule over India and Egypt are in terms of the other view. For it would be hard to discover any sign that any of the thousands who have read Seeley's book with general assent have been at all moved by it to call for any radical change in our methods of governing the two countries named. Many professed imperialists are known to approve highly of Seeley's general way of thinking: none of them, I think, has ever proposed that we should alter our policy in recognition of the truth of the teaching under notice.

Without professing such general approval, I find this particular proposition unchallengeable, and I shall here take it for granted. The most remarkable thing about it is that Seeley himself makes no attempt to relate the rest of his exposition to his avowal. It stands forth in his text isolated and as it were forgotten, a minatory finger-post which he himself no more regards. By his own explicit statement, "submission to the foreigner" tends to demoralise a race as nothing else does; and—though without seeming to realise the force of that confession—he allows in so many words that the empire in India is to be ranked¹—

"at best as a good specimen of a bad political system. We are not disposed to be proud of the succession of the Great Mogul. We doubt whether with all the merits of our administration the subjects of it are happy. We may even doubt whether our rule is preparing them for a happier condition, whether it may not be sinking them lower in misery; and we have our misgivings that perhaps a genuine Asiatic Government, and still more a national Government springing up out

1. Pages 236-7.

of the Hindu population itself, might in the long run be more beneficial because more congenial, though perhaps less civilised, than such a foreign unsympathetic government as our own."

On the other hand, he avows¹ emphatically that

"A population that rebels is a population that is looking up, that has begun to hope and to feel its strength. . . . If this feeling ever does spring up, if India does begin to breathe as a single national whole—and our rule is perhaps doing more than ever was done by former Governments to make this possible—then no such explosion of despair, even if there were cause for it, would be needed. For in that case the feeling would soon gain the native army, and on the native army ultimately we depend. We could subdue the mutiny of 1857, formidable as it was, because it spread through only a part of the army, because the people did not actively sympathise with it, and because it was possible to find native Indian races who would fight on our side. But the moment a mutiny is threatened which shall be no mere mutiny, but the expression of a universal feeling of nationality, at that moment all hope is at an end, as all desire ought to be at an end, of preserving our Empire. For we are not really conquerors of India, and we cannot rule her as conquerors; if we undertook to do so, it is not necessary to inquire whether we could succeed, for we should assuredly be ruined financially by the mere attempt."

Putting two and two together, we get so far the proposition that the submission to the foreigner is ruinous to Indian character; and that the general emergence of self-respect would mean the humiliating expulsion of the British. Going further afield, we find qualifying suggestions suggesting grounds of good hope which his previous words negate; and there is no solution of the problem. To close the matter, we ask whether our lecturer believes that the "raising" process which he posits as necessary is going on; and we find a virtual admission that it is not. "If India is really to be enlightened," admits Seeley, "evidently it must be through the medium neither of Sanskrit nor of English, but of the vernaculars." The context has been a confession of the "strange oversight" of the acceptance of Macaulay's decision that the choice of a teaching medium lay between Sanskrit or Arabic on the one hand and English on the other. Then we have this triumph of counter-sense:—

"But though this great oversight was made—it has since been remarked and, since the education dispatch of Sir Charles Wood in 1854, in some measure repaired—the decision to which Macaulay's minute led remains the great landmark in

the history of our Empire considered as an institute of civilisation. It marks the moment when we deliberately recognised that a function had devolved on us in Asia similar to that which Rome fulfilled in Europe, the greatest function which any Government can ever be called upon to discharge."

The average practitioner of the "bombastic" school at which Seeley has so many characteristic flings in his book, might at least retort that his bombast is normally the peroration to an account of something important alleged to be done, not to a record of how the one thing declared to be needful was not done. The reference to Rome is made with the same oblivion of Roman decadence as is exhibited by the historian of the Roman Wall. It is worded as if Rome had given a regenerating culture to the peoples over which she held sway; as if her own civilisation had not steadily sunk with that of the rest of the Mediterranean world which she held in tutelage; as if Seeley himself had not summed up the decay of the whole empire as a failure of the crop of men.

The "oversight" of which Seeley speaks has not been tolerably repaired to this day. Vernacular education in India can hardly be said yet to exist as an imperial concern. I take the testimonies of Sir Henry Cotton and Sir F. S. P. Lely:—

"The total expenditure on primary education from the funds of the State at the present time," says the former, "does not exceed £200,000. There is no free education: still less is it compulsory. Not more than one-sixth of the number of boys of school-going age are attending school, and there is only one primary school to five villages."¹

Sir Philip Lely at some points hotly denounces Sir Henry Cotton's view of things; but he too tacitly confesses to the destitution of the Indian peoples in the matter of vernacular schools:—

"The great task which lies at the doors of every provincial Administration is that of universal education. The people are getting ready for it. Government are committed to it. The only real difficulty is the cost. The local Boards, with their inelastic revenues, can go no further, and with all the other demands upon the provincial funds it will be a serious strain on them if they have to supply the balance even with occasional grants."²

The natives, Sir Philip remarks, "are eager to educate their boys"; and he is sure they would readily co-operate if, instead

1. *New India*, ed. 1907, page 126.

2. *Suggestions for the Better Government of India*, 1906, page 59.

of insisting upon a handsome bungalow or nothing, the Government would allow the provision of cheap and simple shelters, suited to native ways. But whatever the Government may be "committed to," the facts remain as stated by Sir Henry Cotton. And all the while, the Government never fails to provide for an enormous amount of expenditure upon the military department—an expenditure increased in 1906 on the ground, according to Lord Minto, that a great nation like Russia is more dangerous when badly defeated than at any other time. In fulfilment of the official formula, the peoples of India are carefully protected against a Russian invasion, which, in terms of the Budget, is inferribly the greatest calamity that could happen to them. But to give more than a fraction of them even a smattering of vernacular education is more than the protecting Government can achieve.

It is inexpedient to ask whether or not the bureaucracy in general, or the upper authorities in particular, desire to see the masses in India schooled. Taking simply the inductive method that would be followed in any judicial enquiry as to home administration, we are however forced to conclude that no such ideal guides our Indian administration as is supposed to govern the policy of most European Governments. In home politics, all parties profess to applaud the maxim that "where there is no light the people perish." It is acclaimed as a religious truth alike by those who maintain the Nonconformist ideal of religious education and by those who insist upon the Anglican. And that section of our Labour party whom our Minister of Education in 1906 apostrophised, when quoting the maxim as a plea for religious training in the schools, are at least as much concerned as he to create popular light by way of secular schooling. But no party in this country is concerned to note that under our rule in India the measure of such light supplied to the vast mass of the people is what would pass here for darkness visible.

No doubt the authorities are in some cases honestly satisfied that Hindus are better without schools than with them, and will reason to that effect. Such views have often been put forward in good faith as against demands for compulsory or free schooling in Europe, and they are at least as likely to be honestly held by Europeans in regard to Asiatics. But the general European practice must be held to indicate the general European conviction. For scientific purposes, at least, we are forced to note that our tutelage of subject races, as regards India, involves a minimum of culture for them, and this after Japan has had a compulsory

school law for a generation, with some approach to efficient working.

To this destitution there is an offset in the work actually done upon Macaulay's lines, to wit, the building up of an English-speaking class among the educated section in most parts of India. In this way our rule has created a factor of nationalisation which could not conceivably have arisen otherwise in a population speaking so many different tongues. And if this factor were consciously fostered by our administration, it would be a thing for which Hindu patriots would have cause to be thankful. But as soon as it is seen to work vigorously, the attitude of the ruling class, instead of testifying to satisfaction, becomes one of apprehension and hostility. The creation of a national sentiment, in terms of Seeley's generalisation, nay, in terms of Macaulay's ideal, would be the greatest service that England could render to India. But it is perhaps unnecessary to say that the growth of national sentiment in India is the very last thing which the average official, high or low, wants to see; and that not a gleam of official recognition has ever been given to the organisation which best expresses the aspirations of educated Hindus—the Indian National Congress.

II.

Still keeping to the educational test, let us consider the effects of our tutelage of alien races elsewhere than in India, beginning with the course followed towards the coloured races of South Africa by our colonists. In Natal, in 1897-98, there were 182 State-aided schools for natives with a total attendance of 10,248, out of a native population of 787,000; the Government grants in aid amounting to £5,569, while the native hut tax yielded £129,596. In 1904-5, the figures were: 165 State-aided schools, with a total attendance of 10,150; the grants in aid amounting to £6,334. Thus the attendance is stationary; the schools are fewer, though the grant is slightly increased; while the native population has increased within the years named from 787,000 to 910,000. And those who have sojourned in Natal are well aware that the policy thus indicated stands for the balance of opinion among the colonists, many of whom vehemently argue that to educate the native is to give the white notice to quit.

In Cape Colony in 1891, out of a native population of 753,824, described in the census return as of "no religion," with 316,152 children between 5 and 14, some 34,000 were taught in Government schools. In 1904, out of a native population of over

1,500,000, with nearly 500,000 children between 5 and 14, 73,000 were taught in Government schools. Here the results are conspicuously better than in Natal; and the fact that in Cape Colony alone have the natives any parliamentary representation tells the whole story of the differentiation. He would be a confident optimist who should predict that with a rapidly increasing native population the superiority in Cape Colony will be steadily maintained; but if it should be, the difference will still be attributable not to tutelage pure and simple but to the element of self-government for natives in the Cape constitution.

But the most dramatic illustration of the effect of foreign rule on subject races on the side of culture is supplied by Egypt. In 1883, under the Khedive Tewfik, £103,000 was allotted to the Egyptian education department; but the bond-holders of Europe obtained a reduction of the sum by £35,000, which was appropriated to meeting their claims. Here the whole weight of Europe was thrown in the scale against the Egyptian schooling; and the sum left, in proportion to the population, was of the nature of an alms. There is, therefore, nothing specially English in the policy in question. But our administration of Egypt in the period of our control shows us in our tutelary capacity to have wrought worse for Egyptian culture than France had done in a non-tutelary relation. The most startling of all contrasts in the relation of forward and backward races is that between the military dominion of France over Algeria and her purely ancillary relation to Egypt. The former is from every point of view one of the worst cases of coercion in history; the latter one of the best instances of beneficent moral influence. Called in as instructors, as legists, as engineers, as administrators, Frenchmen were from the time of Mehemet Ali the guides and friends of Egyptian civilisation; and it was rather the folly of Ismail than any sinister influence of his European instruments that led to the enormous debt which ultimately put his country under European tutelage. And up to the time of the English control the effects on Egyptian culture were distinctly promising. French had become the language of society, and the youth of the official class learned it accurately by daily converse. At the same time, while elementary schooling was very scanty, provision was made for the higher education by sending annually to Europe—chiefly to France—a number of students in law, medicine, and other branches, who went through a university course. The arrangement was known as the French Mission. There was thus provided for Egypt an educated class,

abreast of contemporary European science, and capable of communicating that science to their countrymen in the native tongue. It did not mean any wide diffusion of science, but it meant the creation of possibilities for Arab-speaking youth. And any one who will consult the catalogue of the Khedivial Library at Cairo will find some hundreds of works in Arabic, from the time of Mehemet Ali onwards, consisting of translations or adaptations of European treatises in each and all of the sciences, as well as in history, logic and philosophy. In some cases the work is essentially original, yet scientific. Thus the work of enlightenment was actually going on in the period before direct tutelage began.

Under the British control, however, all this is changed. The French Mission was abandoned as soon as possible; and, apart from any changes quite recently made, nothing has been systematically substituted for it beyond the despatch of a few Egyptian teachers to an English normal school. At the same time the former teaching of the sciences in Arabic has been abolished. Law is still taught in French and to some extent in Arabic—the latter for ecclesiastical purposes—but the physical sciences are with hardly any exception taught solely in English; and in the secondary schools botany, biology, and physiology are not taught at all. In the school of agriculture, all the teachers use English. Thus in Egypt, preeminently an agricultural country, no native can obtain scientific instruction even in agriculture in his own tongue. But the other sciences are in the same case. After three generations in which the physical sciences were taught in Arabic by natives who had been trained at European universities, the exclusion of all save bi-lingual Egyptians from the means of scientific instruction is officially justified on the pretext that there do not exist in Arabic the technical terms required to teach the modern sciences.

It seems necessary to pause over this ingenious proposition, because many educated people seem to be impressed by it, and the present Foreign Secretary repeats it in all good faith without the slightest misgiving. It would be hard, however, to formulate a more futile sophism. Students are aware that fresh scientific terms are framed from year to year out of the two absolutely dead languages, Latin and Greek. These terms are either transliterated or translated into the various living tongues. When transliterated they are defined, and have technical currency. In the case of certain languages, however, notably in German, many

such terms are vernacularised, as: *Sauerstoff* (sour-stuff) for oxygen; *Wasserstoff* (water-stuff) for hydrogen; *eiweisshaltig* (white-of-egg-holding) for albuminous; and so on. Now, both of those procedures are as open to Arabic-speaking peoples as to any other; and in point of fact the modern sciences have been put in Arabic, and taught in Arabic, for whole generations. There are in Egypt still a number of scientific and otherwise cultured natives who can so teach them. If the Anglo-Egyptian excuse for teaching the sciences only in English were valid, it would follow that the record of the assimilation and diffusion of Greek science and philosophy by the Saracens in the Dark Ages is a myth. The historic fact is that both the philosophy and the science of the Greeks reached Christendom substantially through the Arabic; and that the beginnings of chemistry and the first modern advances of astronomy were made by the Arabs, using their own language, as many of our chemical terms plainly testify. Arabic is in point of fact, as any Orientalist will tell, one of the richest languages in existence. And not the slightest pretence has been made of showing that the sciences were fallaciously taught either in the schools or in the Arabic books before the period of the English control, by reason of difficulties about turning scientific terms into Arabic or expressing scientific ideas in that tongue.

The official pretext is in fact beneath serious discussion. On one occasion when I asked the Foreign Secretary whether the existence of scores of modern scientific works, written in Arabic by Egyptian teachers and professors certified for competence by European universities, was not a proof that the difficulty of terminology was imaginary, he quite seriously answered that we could not tell unless we read the books in question. Now, when a previous query had been put as to why the sciences are not taught in Arabic to Egyptians, the answer was that the books did not exist. Thus the demand for rational justice is by our bureaucracy in Egypt dodged from pillar from post. The whole procedure is one of evasion—I do not mean on the part of the Foreign Secretary, who simply puts forward the case given him by the Egyptian autocracy—but on the part of that autocracy. The British control has lasted for over twenty years: and the French *entente*, which gave the Consul-General a free hand, has lasted for four years. If then it were desired to convey scientific knowledge in Arabic, new books could have been produced ten times over. The only remaining pretext is the implicit proposition that the Arabic language is incapable of evolving scientific terms; and that is flat absurdity.

We are left then with the fact that under our control no Egyptian can obtain instruction in science in his own language. Here again there is an ostensibly well-meaning pretext—the pretext, namely, that by making English almost the sole vehicle of the higher education in Egypt we secure the instruction of the pupils of the secondary schools in English. Now, in the case of India, as we have seen, English has played and may play an important part as a factor of unification among races speaking different tongues. But in Egypt there exists no such difficulty; and the policy of forcing English as a medium of instruction must find another justification. What justification is there, apart from the untenable pretences we have already discussed? Simply this, that native officials capable of speaking English are required for the public service. But obviously the proper way to teach English to students destined for the civil service is not to force them to limit their instruction in science or even in history or geography to the English medium. In no country in the world are foreign languages taught on that principle. Common-sense suggests that if in order to teach our children French or German, we gave them in those languages all the higher education they received, they would miss proper culture in their mother tongue, whether or not they mastered the others.

And this is what has happened in Egypt. Whatever be the official origination of the policy of teaching the sciences in English, there is an abundance of private testimony from English civil-servants in Egypt to the effect that under the present system the Egyptian youth master neither English nor science; and, I may add, they are prevented from mastering Arabic. Here we have another object lesson in the problem of race tutelage. While the French were the helpers and chosen instructors of Egypt, French was mastered by numbers of the educated natives, who spoke it in their homes and in society, and so brought up their children to speak it. Meantime, however, the boys were being fully instructed in Arabic in their schools. What they knew of history, geography, mathematics, and the sciences, was learned in their own tongue. Those who were destined to give instruction in the law or medical schools, or in the training colleges, were sent to France: and there, on a basis of colloquially acquired French, they mastered the higher French, and thereby the matter of their studies, during a period of five years. Thereafter, returning home, they could and did convey in their native tongue the knowledge they had acquired in another.

Contrast this with what happens to-day. As soon as the boy reaches the secondary school his instruction is almost wholly limited to English, a language which he does not speak at home, and which he acquires academically. He is most conscientiously trained, whether by English or native teachers, to parse and analyse; and he does this with surprising accuracy; yet all the while, as I personally ascertained by visiting a number of the schools in Cairo and elsewhere, he is in the dark on points of idiom which to an English boy would present no difficulty. Thus he studies the unknown—science—through an imperfectly known medium. Meanwhile, receiving none of his higher culture in Arabic, he never properly develops the command of his own tongue. The higher vocabulary remains strange to him. What he hears at home, while he is a boy, is the limited and unliterary Arabic of the harem. For him, his native speech is never the vehicle of the higher forms of thought and knowledge; at best he knows it in the sacrosanct form of the Koran, which he can never handle with scholarly mastery precisely because he has been kept on an unscholarly plane in all other use of Arabic. Thus he is deliberately withheld from the scientific application of his language by those supervisors who plead as their excuse that his language has not been scientifically applied. The policy is a mere vicious circle, and the outcome, naturally, is failure, even from the tutelary point of view.

Meanwhile, a native project for a modern university has been effectively discouraged by the British control on the score that it is "premature"; and, as we have seen, the whole system of secondary education is calculated to paralyse the higher culture, and to arrest the growth of that national self-knowledge and self-respect which is the proper outcome of every system of education. Whatever the mass may learn in kuttabs—and it is sadly little thus far—the native youth of the class ostensibly destined to do the work of public administration are as it were deracinated and deracialised.

This system, be it observed, is forced on the Egyptian people, not as a result of any deliberation either by trained educationists or by responsible legislators, but as the expression of the individual will of a Consul-General, to whom the home Government on principle has allowed a "free hand." In educational science he has had no training or competence whatever. His plan, then, is not to be taken as an average illustration of the tutelage of subject races by dominant races: it is indeed inconceivable that

any European legislature could enact it. But the plan, such as it is, is framed in the interests of a tutelary system; and it is approved of by a number of irresponsible Anglo-Egyptians as tending to facilitate the process of Anglicising the administration of Egypt. How so inadequate a method of English instruction can satisfy the English bureaucracy in general is hard to see; but the idea seems to be that the first requisite is a supply of inferior and other officials who shall know English enough to be possible assistants for English officials who do not know Arabic.

For the Anglicisation of the Egyptian civil service proceeds apace: the number of English officials in nearly every department constantly increases, despite the ostensible policy of giving an English education to the natives; and there is no perceptible progress whatever towards that ideal of autonomy which has all along been proclaimed by the British control as its guiding motive. This fact brings us to the consideration of the final crux of the régime of tutelage—an anomaly more glaring in Egypt than in any dependency proper of the British Crown, inasmuch as there is in that case not only no pretence of right to empire but an avowed purpose of ultimately ceasing from occupation.

III.

The constitutional situation in Egypt is broadly as follows:—Two Chambers without legislative powers, indirectly elected, were established by Lord Dufferin in 1883. They still remain without legislative function, their sole form of power being the capacity vested in one of them to veto a new tax. As the increasing revenue from existing sources affords the Government the means of increased outlay, this power counts for nothing. The country is ruled under a system of ministers who are nominally appointed by the Khedive, but really by the British Consul-General, and who are further practically subordinate to British “advisers,” who see that they carry out in every detail the Consul-General’s orders. Under some of the forms of independence there is really a more complete system of tutelage, as regards all native administration, than obtains in India, where a certain number of natives hold comparatively responsible positions. Thus all the evils recognised to follow in India from alien domination tend to arise in Egypt, where, to begin with, a past of oriental despotism and Turkish intervention had created a sufficiently unhealthy socio-political atmosphere. It has been, accordingly, a maxim of Lord Cromer’s that “what is needed in Egypt is

character"; and here at least the sociological onlooker can cordially agree with him.

But how is national and social "character" to be created? What are the political and other conditions fitted to evoke it, whether in the east or west? Is there any case in the whole history of mankind in which the quality desiderated is found to have been produced in a people under an alien rule? Not once has Lord Cromer or any one of his English eulogists hinted at any instance or any possibility of the kind. According to one of his chief administrators, Captain Machell, the "prosperity" of the Egyptian fellaheen is bringing about a serious increase in crime. "Where there is no light the people perish." All the while it is for promoting this very prosperity that our imperialists take credit and demand gratitude. *Crux upon crux.* Our service to Egypt is a disservice, by official testimony; our demand for character is a demand that can be met only by a gradual but systematic evocation of the faculty of self-rule. In other words, a gradual preparation for our own withdrawal. For twenty years Lord Cromer has been more or less explicitly indicating such a view of the situation; and all the while has taken not one measurable step in the direction indicated. His successor is reported to have officially proclaimed the same ideal in plain terms. Meantime the British Government, with whom the decision is supposed to rest, appear to give no instructions; and the British press, which is supposed to prelude or prepare the policies of British Governments, is for the most part either strictly neutral or acridly contemptuous of Egyptian aspirations for even the smallest measure of self-rule. When the question was raised last year in the House of Commons Sir Edward Grey replied, truly enough, that the art of government is something you cannot teach; adding that at the same time he did not wish to discourage the ultimate ideal of developing the habits of self-government in the people. Most readers presumably will agree to the proposition that "the art of self-government is something you cannot teach," and would proceed to conclude that it is accordingly something you must be content to let people learn for themselves, as they learn to swim, taking precautions simply that the experiment is duly gradual, and is begun in shallow water. Nothing of the sort is being done. What has been done is to refuse, under the name of statesmanlike caution, to let the Egyptians have any share whatever in the government of their country, and to put them off with circular platitudes. It is quite clear that no move-

ment will be made by the British Government save in response to energetic agitation by the Egyptian people; and all the while any such agitation is viewed with apprehension or bitterness, which many imperialists are eager to translate into active repression. The cue is given as regards Egypt by the policy latterly pursued in India. There, too, we have the cry for "character"; and the solutions of nescience and impotence have been categorically propounded. "We must," says one writer, "wearily retrace our steps and devote our energies to educating the Indians in character and common-sense. Then, and not till then, can we put them out into the polytechnic of self-government." We must wait "until generations of really educated Indians have come and gone."¹ That is to say, while we cannot "teach government" we can teach "character," and this by giving so-called education without power or possibility of self-governing action for many generations. Meantime we are not procuring even the elements of education for 90 per cent. of the people: and our reactionary officials are complaining that what we give in the way of higher education tends to produce Babus and lawyers.

Students of Indian life know that in many provinces the common people were in "the polytechnic of local self-government" before we came, and we have taken them out of it. They had their system of village self-government, which was as important a school of political education as any gone through by our race; and that system we have swept away. Conceive a similar procedure on the part of imperial Rome in ancient Germany; conceive it justified by the plea that what was needed among the primitives was "character," and that "we" must wait for the passage of many generations of educated Teutons before they could be allowed to try experiments in self-governing—and you would have a tolerable parallel to the spectacle presented by our bureaucrats, who point to the demoralisation they create as a decisive reason for continuing to create it.

The first symptoms of that racial self-respect which it should be our pleasure to see arising as one of the natural factors of "character," are made the pretext for new repression, and we witness in India, in the words of Sir Henry Cotton,

"Legislation designed to curtail the liberty of the press and speech; the crusade against so-called sedition; the attempt to abolish trial by jury; the forcible introduction of harsh plague

1. Quoted by Sir Henry Cotton, *New India*, ed. 1907, page 203.

regulations, subsequently withdrawn; the blows that have been dealt at local self-government, especially in Calcutta; the systematic discouragement of popular institutions; the deliberate encouragement of provincial segregation; the substitution of a system of nomination to government service in the place of competitive examination; the practical declaration of race-disqualification for public offices; the hampering and fettering of unaided colleges and schools, and the general sinister drift in favour of officialising all branches of education; and above all, the recent partition of Bengal, which was not only carried out in direct opposition to the wishes of the people, and in spite of their most vigorous protests, but was enforced with a degree of harshness and want of sympathy which are fortunately rare in the annals of Indian administration."¹

That which at home we call "popular demand for reform," in India we call "sedition"; and the average Briton to-day stands in that regard where most reactionary Tories stood in British politics a hundred years ago. The one thing that neither press nor public will attempt is to do in relation to the claims of subject races as it would be done by. The circle seems hopeless, so far as British initiative is concerned. To proclaim ideals which we helplessly falsify by our action; to demand gratitude which is not conceded; to claim to protect and elevate backward races while steadily lowering them in the scale of manhood—such appears to be our tutelary destiny. If we do otherwise it will apparently not be of our own will.

IV.

Putting aside practical problems, and seeking only to reach a sociological conclusion, we seem constrained to infer that in so far as any race or nation has to be under the tutelage of another, the slighter the tutelage the better for both. A complete control tends to abuse the ruled and to demoralise the ruler. The good that may be done by simple culture-contact, by the voluntarily undergone influence of the more civilised race, apart from any species of coercion, is incalculable. The evil that is done by a complete and arbitrary domination, on the other hand, is such as apparently to outweigh any of the benefits it conveys. By the admissions of Sir Philip Lely and of many another Anglo-Indian ex-official, "there is as much content and prosperity, because more knowledge, under the go-as-you-please orders of a native state as under a 'policy' thrice tried in the Secretariate fire and carried

1. Work cited, pages 6-7.

out by departmental battalions."¹ The planning of the Secretariate, he admits, is very able; but those able and well-intentioned gentlemen, as we might put it here, have studied everything except sociology. And indeed they are hardly to be blamed, for it was never taught to them. Macpherson² declared that his success in putting down human sacrifice among the Khonds was due to his study of Guizot; but it is not on such studies that our youth are prepared for the Indian civil service. And, indeed, no mere study will prepare a multitude of average young men, of whom only a few are likely to be gifted with humane political genius, to manage successfully the affairs of a vast congeries of alien races held in tutelage. Let us not finally ascribe our countrymen's failure to their idiosyncrasy; it is incident to their task and to their normality.

But so long as hope remains, we must continue to demand, as the first condition of any betterment, the effort to do as we would be done by. It is an experienced official who, earnestly pleading for more sympathy in Indian administration, thus suggests an exercise in the psychics of reciprocity.

"Suppose that in England foreigners were ruling, say the Japanese, who committed the province to one of their statesmen who had never been in Europe before, and surrounded him with a group of men of his own race who got their knowledge of the country chiefly from books and papers from Whitehall, who for the most part could not talk the English language, whose unreserved intercourse with Englishmen was limited to a few Japanese-speaking callers in London, and who, when not in London, divided their time between the Scottish Highlands and the Riviera. What sort of Government would it be? It might seem admirable to the people in Tokio, but would it to the men of Yorkshire and Cornwall? How long would it last?"³

A change of heart in an entire bureaucracy, it is true, is not to be proposed as a practicable policy or a likely achievement; but those who can see the need for it may also see the need for altering the bureaucrats' equation from without.

And only such a change, be it added, seems sufficient to save from progressive abasement the Zulu population of Natal, where the relation of White to Black appears to be rapidly approximating to the worst of all forms—that of an equal degree of hate and fear on the part of the ruling race, with no upward outlook

1. Work cited, page 47.

2. *Memorials of Service in India*, 1865, page 351.

3. Sir F. S. P. Lely, as cited, page 39.

whatever for the inferior. As I write these lines I have before me two extracts from the Natal press of 12th December.

"Apart from Dinizulu's guilt or innocence of the criminal charges," says the *Times of Natal*, "political reasons necessitate his deportation; otherwise there will be danger of a periodical recrudescence of unrest. If the imperial Government refuses this, the onus of taking adequate measures to ensure the protection of whites in Zululand devolves upon the imperial Government."

And the *Natal Mercury* expounds the same ethic:—

"Even should Dinizulu establish his innocence, we must still consider whether it is desirable to permit his continued presence in the country."

These edifying utterances serve to remind us of the fate of the Redskins of North America during three centuries. For a primitive race there is no security whatever save in a segregation which shall leave them free to profit by the example of their neighbours without coming under their power. On this principle the Basutos of Cape Colony were entirely withdrawn from the provocative control of the Colonial Government and set apart under an imperial protection which means a minimum of tutelage, giving them thus some prospect of comparatively healthy evolution. This is one of the few cases in which imperial tutelage of a backward race may relatively avail for good as against mere exploitation by a frontier colony. But inasmuch as the advantage is by way of substituting simple protection for habitual interference, it makes good our conclusion that thus far all administrative tutelage of one race by another is noxious to the higher life of both.

JOHN M. ROBERTSON.

DISCUSSIONS.

I. SOCIOLOGY AND ETHICS.¹

The relation of Sociology to Ethics, is perhaps the most difficult issue which confronts that embryonic science. It is sometimes urged that Sociology, like any other Science, is concerned only with facts and their relations; and that it has nothing to do with values except as psychological data. And this no doubt is the simplest point of view. If it were consistently adopted, it would do for Sociology what Bentham and his followers did for Jurisprudence, and what the later Economists have tried to do for their science. It would eliminate a disconcerting subjective factor, though at the cost of eliminating also a great part of the interest and importance of the study. From this standpoint Sociology might be able to discover the laws of the development of social ideals; in any case it would be its business to give a historical account of their sequence; and this, in fact, mainly, is what Sociologists now profess to attempt. On the other hand, the great founders of the science, Turgot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Comte, Spencer, had it clearly as their main inspiration to define the goal towards which society ought to move. And this other purpose is constantly peeping out even in treatises which formally disavow it. That the *Later* is also the *Better* is a preconception so inveterate in modern thought that it is not commonly recognised as such; and authors who imagine themselves to be severely descriptive in their method would be amazed if they could realise how completely their chain of reasoning would fall to pieces if this secret thread of connection were cut. To abstract from valuations in dealing with human society is more difficult than is commonly realised. Perhaps, however, Sociology ought to do so; at any rate, if it did, it would be an easier though a less attractive and exciting pursuit.

If, on the other hand, Sociology purposes to be a normative, as well as a descriptive science, it becomes implicated at once in all the difficulties which attach to the study of Ethics. For the short cuts which it has sometimes attempted are mere misdirections. There comes up, for instance, again and again the assumption, explicit or implicit, that that conduct must be good which enables a society to survive. This is to beg the whole question. A pessimist holds, on the contrary, that only that conduct is good which tends to destroy the society. He may be wrong, but he cannot be proved to be wrong; and a Sociology which simply sets him aside is no longer a science, it is a creed. This point need not be laboured, partly because it is obvious, partly because pessimism does not practically interest most western men. But, even if we neglect the pessimist, what may be called "survival-ethics" does not really take us far. Mr. Leslie Stephen, for

1. "The Science of Ethics." by Leslie Stephen. 2nd Edition. Smith Elder and Co.

example, attempts to show that the qualities which we in the West call virtues are identical with those which make for survival. But are they? That they are not incompatible with survival is sufficiently obvious, since, for good or evil, those who do possess them have survived. But the Indians, and in particular the Bengalees, have survived too, and show no intention of disappearing. Have they our virtues? Are they, for instance, what we call courageous, or energetic, or efficient, or truthful? Most Englishmen who know them emphatically deny it. On the other hand, the Bengalees have, no doubt, quite other virtues which we do not possess. Yet both we and they are here, and show every intention of continuing to be here. What reason have we then, on the hypothesis of survival-ethics, to think we have proved our code to be the true one?

At this point the ground will probably be changed. We shall be told that our virtues have made us the conquering race, and theirs have made them our subjects. Excellent! But then, the ground is changed. The survival-criterion is abandoned, and we are now asserting that the good conduct is that which enables one to be a conqueror, not a subject. The vanquished survive as much as the victors, the slaves as much as, or perhaps more than the masters. But what we are meaning now by Virtue is the quality that makes for power. This, however, is a dogma. No doubt, when we have once assumed it, we can proceed to illustrate from history what kind of moral code is the code of power. But our dogma underlies the whole investigation, whether we are aware of it or not; and we are no longer simply pursuing a science, we are also developing the implications of a creed.

But another method may be suggested; that which, if I understand him rightly, is adopted by Mr. Hobhouse in his recent work "Morals in Evolution." We may pursue two parallel lines of enquiry. On the one hand we may trace the growth of customs, institutions, manners and morals; on the other hand, that of ethical theory. We might be able then to find that the two lines coincide. But what are we to conclude? Mr. Hobhouse, I think, would reply that we have now an objective ethical basis; that the direction in which both fact and thought have spontaneously moved may be inferred to be the right one. And in this argument I should admit there is a kind of psychological compulsion. If everybody is moving in a given direction, and everybody is maintaining it to be the right one, it is only natural to fall in with the crowd, especially if one is already on that side, as most people are. But Mr. Hobhouse would probably admit a logical lacuna. What about the man who says "you're all wrong," and acts accordingly? Have you any kind of argument, other than the hangman's noose, to apply to him? You will of course call him a decadent, a lunatic, or a criminal, and I do not dispute your right to do so. But, once more, it is then the dogmatist, not the sociologist who speaks. Nietzsche is a classical case in point. We may or may not agree with him; for my own part I disagree profoundly, at any rate with his social philosophy. But it would never occur to me that I could refute him, or that Mr. Hobhouse, or any sociologist, could refute him. Here is a man who looks back calmly on the history of the world and instead of calling it, as our fashion is,

a process of improvement, denounces it as a process of decadence. Everything that to Mr. Leslie Stephen or to Mr. Hobhouse is a sign of advance, is to him a sign of retrogression. The weakening of social barriers, the fusion of classes, the equalisation of the sexes, the restriction of the area, duration, and brutality of war, all in short, that is involved in what we call "Democracy," is, to him, pure unadulterated Evil. All the "virtues" it presupposes and fosters he regards as vices. Life, he maintains, is going downhill as hard as it can, and has been going downhill for an indefinite period. It will never be on the up-grade until there arises a set of men who will seize upon power, reduce all other men to be their slaves, and govern the world in their own interest. When these propositions are laid before a modern man, whether he be an ethical philosopher, a Sociologist, or the man in the street, he dismisses them with an irritation or contempt proportional to his interest in the subject. And no one can complain of that. My point is that against such a man as Nietzsche—a man of genius, as all honourable opponents must admit—the armoury of any possible Sociologist is powerless. The course of history, the consensus of mankind, for all that he does not care a rush. "This is how I see it," he says, "this is my Good. It is nothing to me that you have numbers on your side; numbers are always on the wrong side. It is nothing to me that you plead your doctrine of survival. If it were true it would be irrelevant; but it is not true. Societies based on slavery have survived far longer than those which you call free, and may quite well come up and survive again. A fig for your arguments! We are here to fight! Kill me, if you can!" Now in Ethics I believe that to be the last word. We may buttress up our beliefs with every kind of extraneous aid; we may show that history is with us, that common-sense is with us; and these, no doubt, are comforting reflections. But at bottom what we are resting upon is our own conviction, the dogma of our personality. The dogma is worth as much as that is worth. And the ultimate service done by a man like Nietzsche is to make us realise this truth. But, if that be so, there can never be a science of Ethics, in the sense of a basing of this ultimate judgment upon something else. It itself is always there, supporting the other arguments. And my conclusion is that if Sociology is going to include Ethics it will be something that is not and cannot be a science, if science be a statement of the laws of what happens, or if it have any logical cogency to compel assent. In all this there is, of course, nothing new. I am not sure that it is not a series of tedious platitudes. But Sociologists, so far as I know their works, seem often to confuse two radically different attitudes, that of the man of science and that of the ethical dogmatist. I think it desirable that this confusion should stop. And that must be my excuse for publishing this review.

G. LOWES DICKINSON.

II. THE CHILD CRIMINAL.

The *Children's Bill*, introduced by Mr. Herbert Samuel, M.P., the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, opens a new chapter in an important branch of the history of English jurisprudence. "The law," as Mr. Herbert Samuel has said, "relating to the punishment and restraint of child offenders is spread over a number of statutes and is in a state of some confusion. In certain points it is out of harmony with the more rational and more humane ideas, which have become general in recent times, on the degree of criminality which properly attaches to a wrongful act done by a child, and on the right way of dealing with it."

How has the child come to be considered a criminal? Under the Roman law it was responsible only to its father or guardian. When did it become responsible to the State and when did the State assume responsibility for the child?

Under a system found among primitive peoples, possession of the Child is the function of the mother's group known to anthropologists as mother-right. This is changed by transition to father-right. The *Cowade* or "hatching" process is among primitive tribes the pretence of the father to have given birth himself to his new-born child and is an explanation of the father's personal right to the possession of his children.

The Hindu Code of Manu compared the mother to the field bringing forth the plant according to whatever seed is sown in it. The plea of Orestes was that he was not of kin to his mother, Klytemnestra, and the Gods decided that she who bears the child is but as a nurse to it. Swedenborg declared that the soul which is spiritual and is the real man, is from the father while the body which is natural, as it were the clothing of the soul, is from the mother. The assimilation of the wife as a chattel or property of the husband gave the father even still closer guardianship over his child.

The Patriarchal possession and complete jurisdiction over the child was the same as the more primitive; the intention of Abraham to sacrifice Isaac is an instance. The Romans also recognised this right, until offering a child in sacrifice was made a capital offence by Valentinian, Valens and Gratian. But the killing was in certain cases justified; the power of life and death belonged to the paterfamilias and was especially mentioned in the XII. Tables. For minor offences imprisonment and flogging to any degree of severity were permitted. Seneca called the paterfamilias *Judex domesticus* or *magistratus domesticus*. The right to kill his offspring undoubtedly belonged to the Roman father. Previous to the reign of Constantine fathers had been rebuked for cruelty, but not until his reign was infanticide declared murder. In the time of Trajan, Hadrian and Alexander, fathers were liable for excessive punishment of their children and provisions were made against the sale of children. Instead of despots and owners, fathers became the natural protectors and guardians of their children, under the Roman law, but it never went so far as to give independence to the child.

Full age in Roman law was 25, and minors were subdivided

into adults, who had attained to puberty, and pupils, males under 14 and females under 12, all children under 7 being called infants. As a general rule, legitimate children were *alieni juris* under the power of their father; illegitimate children were *sui juris*, the law admitting no relationship to the father and recognising only the mother, which is the English law of to-day.

The *patria potestas* and the "family" in the Indo-Germanic races were on a broader basis, and the maternal side was an important portion of the family. Emancipation of the child was achieved merely by coming of age, not through the formalities required by the Roman law. The duty of the German father was to represent his child before the Courts, prosecute for injuries done to the child and amend injuries done by it. The "family" in the early Societies of the Indo-Germanic race down to, and into, Saxon England was the most important institution of "Private Law," originating, as some think, both "the State" and "the Law," and standing at the bottom of the whole police and criminal system. A type of the "family," or "clan," in a somewhat wider sense may be seen in the Commune of France, the German petty principalities, the Indian Village Communities, and also the local Courts of the shire and hundred in Saxon England, which were found by the Norman Conquerors but strengthened by them under the jurisdiction of the King's Court as in England to-day. Here we find the Tribunals somewhat varied and yet very similar, before which so vast a multitude of criminals, minors as well as adults, of both sexes, have been arraigned in the full blaze of mediæval "justice" from early days to the present. Many causes and complicated circumstances must be reviewed in order to reach any very clear or definite idea as to how the State assumed its more parental guardianship over minors.

In France there remains a most valued part of the legal system of the State, jealously protected since early times—the *Conseil de Famille*, arising out of an elaborate code of domestic legislation, the development of mediæval or even earlier customs. The oldest documents relating to it are of the 15th century. The presiding Judge heard the testimony of syndics, (rural or municipal functionaries replaced in 1789 by State-paid *Juges de Paix*), as well as that of the children's relatives. The origin of this Patriarchal system is traceable to Roman law and to the Gallic "family." It can be described as that of a guardian of guardians, an assemblage of next of kin, called together and presided over by the *Juge de Paix*, on behalf of minors, orphans, those mentally incapacitated, or incorrigible. French law constitutes the *Juge de Paix* the natural protector of the minors; the sittings are considered private and no publicity is given. Here we have what might represent the now much advocated "Children's Court," except that the *Conseil de Famille* holds aloof from criminal cases, concerning itself only with the civil affairs of minors.

In England no vestige of any similar tribunal appears; the jurisdiction of the English Court alone seems to have been sought at all times in family disputes, and in the cases of minors. The subject must here be considered from two points of view: (1) The law as it has effected the guardianship of minors with property, and (2) The law as it has effected pauper minors. The former

came, in course of time, under the guardianship of the State, through the Court of Chancery, the latter under the guardianship of the State, through the Poor Law, administered at first through the magistrates, and at all times in close relationship with the Criminal Law and the Criminal Courts. The State, therefore, began to assert its guardianship over vast numbers of the children and youth of the country through the Criminal Law, the Poor Laws, and later by the Education Acts. That this right of the State which it has so largely assumed, was ever legal or justified at Common Law, might be successfully disputed even now. A father is by law entitled to the guardianship of his legitimate children and a Court of Common Law has no jurisdiction to deprive him of that right. This seems always to have been the law. The Court of Chancery, however, representing the King, as *parens patriæ*, has been held to have the right to control the father's right to the possession of his child. This final decision in the earlier part of the 19th century, after many conflicting decisions, received much public attention and disapproval. The City of London claims some immemorial right to the care of orphans of freemen; and as late as 1873 and 1891 special acts; the Judicature Act, the Infants Custody Act, and the Custody of Children Act, give the State the right of *Habeas Corpus* over infants and young persons, which seems to show that there was some uncertainty regarding the question.

The process by which the State assumed guardianship over its pauper children, which is by far its larger responsibility, is much more complicated, and has been reached through many changes and incidents in the history of the English people. For these changes and for this greater interference of the State, in assuming the paternal care of its youth, we must look to many causes, economic and industrial, to the abolition of the Religious and Craft Guilds, to the enactment of the first and subsequent Statutes of Labourers, which sent to prison large numbers, bond and free, who were not serving some person at wages fixed by the law. The later ones provided against idleness and begging, and refer to mendicancy as though it was a recognised profession, which it had apparently become after the flow of monastic charity had ceased, and included villeins, pilgrims and even poor scholars of the universities. By an early Vagrancy Act (1547) the children of beggars could be taken from them and put to some calling.

The apprentice system, an excellent substitute for parental care, gradually disappeared, especially that of apprentices living under the roof and care of their master. Various causes brought about an immense amount of hitherto unknown lawlessness, crime and misery, which the State felt bound to suppress rather than alleviate. A great deal that could have been dealt with under a better Poor Law or an Education System, was left almost entirely to be dealt with by the magistrates under the Criminal Law. This undoubtedly gave rise to the "Criminal Child," for there was little disposition to regulate habits and vices except through the Criminal Law. Crime and immorality increased, and the multiplication of the criminal population was the constant complaint during the two last centuries. This increase in London, Henry Fielding (the novelist) and his brother Sir John, the two

first Bow Street magistrates, strove to suppress by a better police system. The Criminal Justices Act (1855) gave the magistrates power to try cases more expeditiously; excessive and frequent punishments and floggings were largely resorted to, and a constant endeavour was made to inspire "awe" in the administration of justice. "Do you know I am a Judge?" asked a Scotch magistrate; "What's that?" replied the shrill voice of a small child offender. Juvenile crime increased by leaps and bounds. In 1852 in Newcastle, juvenile crime increased four times as fast as the population, and in England it doubled in thirteen years and increased faster than the adult criminal population. Private effort, voluntary and religious philanthropy struggled valiantly with this so-called "Child Criminality"; the Government did little or nothing to help except through the administration of the Criminal Law. Education received little or no encouragement by legislation. Secular national education belongs to the 19th century, although five hundred years before, Richard II. had rejected a proposition that villeins should be forbidden to send their children to learn "Clergie" or scholarship (Stubbs' Constitutional History). That education would unfit the poor for the life allotted them was the prevailing doctrine, until Scotland, Ireland and New England had its Government education, and Wales for a time its "circulating schools." With the advent in England of general education, crime of all kinds perceptibly diminished. Previous, however, to the Elementary Education and other Acts, attempts were made to establish a more paternal guardianship over the young. Jonas Hanway by his writings and efforts established a system of separate nurseries for workhouse children and obliged every London parish to keep a register of its "parish infants." Churchwardens and overseers could hire out pauper children under the Parishes Apprentices Acts. An Act gave mothers the custody of their children until seven years old, but only in 1886 was the guardianship of her lawful children given to the mother on the death of her husband, and she could for the first time appoint guardians herself. Conferences were held on the subject of juvenile delinquents; Preventive and Reformatory Schools were established. "Educational Imprisonment" it was called. In the great cities reforming influences were created by Shaftesbury in England, and Chalmers in Scotland. The Reformatory Schools Act and the Industrial Schools Act came in 1866, the Elementary Education Acts, Factory Acts and other Acts followed in quick succession.

Alongside all these efforts, the still ponderous waggon, loaded with the old Criminal Law has rolled on. The wording of statutes has been of more consequence than the want of physical stature; individual propensity has been more considered than contaminating influences, punishment more than reform.

Children under seven years cannot incur the guilt of felony; those under fourteen are presumed to have no guilty knowledge, unless the contrary is proved; those over fourteen take the full responsibility of all criminal acts. Sir James Fitz-James Stephen would have had the legal age of complete responsibility raised. (Stephen's "History of the Criminal Law.") In 1716 a mother-

and her daughter, aged nine, were condemned to death. In 1816 a boy of ten years was sentenced to death.

The 20th century opens with attention awake to the whole subject. In 1901 the Youthful Offenders Act was passed giving magistrates power to avoid sending children or young persons to prison. In 1905 a circular was issued by the State Children's Association recommending Special Courts for the hearing of all cases against juvenile offenders. Mr. J. Courtenay Lord opened the Birmingham "Children's Court," with a system of probation officers and non-recording of convictions. The Home Office issued a circular to magistrates, embodying similar suggestions, and in some large cities similar courts have been established. Recently a remarkable document has been issued by the House of Commons through Mr. F. C. Wedgwood, M.P., showing the disposal of children and young persons under sixteen charged with offences, in regard to whom the opinion of the magistrates was asked (1) as to the value of a probation system, (2) as to what steps are taken to keep children and young persons from adults, the answers to which questions show some striking differences of opinion. The Probation of Offenders Act (1908) came into operation on January 1st of this year.

An attempt has been made in this paper, obviously incomplete, to show how the "Child Criminal" came to be a factor in English Jurisprudence. Future legislation and thought will doubtless decide that no child or young offender can be considered a criminal at law when under the age of sixteen; some Continental nations have already so decided. Many will advocate eighteen as the age limit, some twenty-one; all will recognise the importance of the subject. While "crime is what the Law decides to be crime," the future will not rest contented with what the lawyers in the long past declared crime to be. Scientists recognise a process of development in each individual similar to that of the whole of human society, the same upward progression, from the primitive type to the highest mental, moral and physical being. In the process of the individual life is to be found "the young human being, having a strong tendency to the lawless instincts of its savage ancestors." Should the laws for its higher development be still those adopted in the earlier development of human society, or are these as Mr. Herbert Samuel has said, "out of harmony with the more rational and more humane ideas, which have become general in recent years?" It is for the present century and Parliament to decide.

THOMAS RAWLING BRIDGWATER.

THE CONGRESS OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS.

It is now more than a generation since the late Prof. Max Müller lectured in 1870 at the Royal Institution on "The Science of Religion." In the following year the foundation of the English school of Anthropology was laid by Dr. Tylor in the publication of "Primitive Culture." Every student knows how vast and varied have been the labours of a long line of distinguished scholars during the subsequent decades. Wide is the panorama of beliefs, rites, customs, institutions, which the continuous investigation of the past, checked by careful comparison with the living present, has revealed. Whole civilisations have been recovered by the simple use of the spade; and the dim libraries of the East have yielded up the earliest records of religions which have won the faith and swayed the life of hundreds of millions. In the enormous mass of new material which poured in upon European investigators, the first task was to secure the actual record of the facts. Cuneiform tablets, Egyptian papyri, the inscriptions of Greece and Rome, the sacred texts of the religions and philosophies of India, China and Japan, must be collected and published. Much, indeed, had been already done, but much more yet remained to do. In the meantime, the attempt to found a Science of Religion fell into the background, and the Historical Method rose into prominence. At the same time attention was called to fresh elements in religion which had hitherto received but scanty notice. The spectacle which had first awakened comparative interest was the mythology of the Rig Veda; stress fell upon the forms of belief, the parallels of the imaginative interpretation of nature, and identities of name binding remote peoples into one great family. But the significance of religion lies less in its intellectual forms than in its social and moral influences: and new aspects came into view as the rules of sacred action were investigated, and the meaning of ritual and the control of custom were examined. The immense part played by religion in social evolution became more and more clear; travellers, administrators, missionaries, studied its living force among obscure tribes, or in communities of immemorial antiquity, and agreed in assigning to it a leading place among the chief factors of human development.

The need for organising this wide and far-reaching study was

first felt in France. When the Republic was gathering its forces together after the great *débacle*, M. Jules Ferry and M. Jules Simon resolved to found a chair for the History of Religions in the Collège de France. They appointed the distinguished French scholar, M. Albert Réville, whose brilliant series of lectures brought the labours of specialists within reach of the general public, and aroused wide-spread interest in the subject. By his side was his no less distinguished son, M. Jean Réville (who now so worthily occupies his father's chair), the editor of the first journal devoted to the new study, the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*; and M. Guimet, the generous founder of the splendid *Musée Guimet*, and originator of the long series of *Annales* which bear its name. On occasion of the great exhibition with which France closed the nineteenth century, a number of Congresses assembled on the north bank of the Seine. At the initiative of these *savants* the Congress Hall was reserved during the first week of September for the meeting of the first Congress of the History of Religions.

It was a memorable gathering, less notable, perhaps, for the actual papers that were read, than for the conceptions that animated it, and the striking personalities who took part in it. Some of these have already passed away. Albert Réville, who filled the president's chair with so much dignity and grace, Auguste Sabatier, the philosophic theologian, Léon Marillier, the skilled interpreter of the lower culture, were among the chief promoters, and impressed on the Congress the breadth and sympathy of their own genius. The second meeting was held at Basle four years later, under the presidency of Prof. von Orelli, the author of a well-known *Religionsgeschichte*. Representatives were sent by several foreign governments, and a number of European and American Universities, while the total membership exceeded 300. At the close of the sessions the International Committee charged with the duty of arranging for the next place of meeting suggested that the Congress should be held at Oxford in 1908.

For this purpose a Committee of members of the University was early formed, the late President of Trinity, the lamented Prof. Pelham, taking a leading part. The Council of the University having, on the suggestion of the Vice-Chancellor, kindly reserved suitable rooms in the Examination Schools, the Local Committee, under the Chairmanship of Prof. Percy Gardner, have announced that the Congress will be held at Oxford from September 15th to 18th next. On the evening of the 14th, Prof. Gardner and Dr.

A. J. Evans will receive the members and their friends in the spacious galleries of the Ashmolean Museum. The representatives of British and Foreign Universities and Academies will be welcomed at the opening proceedings on the morning of the 15th, when the Hon. President, Prof. E. B. Tylor, will introduce the President of the Congress, the Rt. Hon. Sir A. C. Lyall, K.C.B. Following the precedents of previous Congresses, the sessions will be of two kinds. Addresses or lectures of wider import will be delivered at General Meetings, while papers of more technical character will be reserved for separate sections where they can be followed by discussion. As at Paris and Basle the Sections will be eight in number : i. Religions of the Lower Culture (including Mexico and Peru); ii. Religions of the Chinese and Japanese; iii. Religion of the Egyptians; iv. Religions of the Semites; v. Religions of India and Iran; vi. Religions of the Greeks and Romans; vii. Religions of the Germans, Celts, and Slavs; viii. The Christian Religion. This distribution is obviously mainly formed upon race-distinctions, and does not easily lend itself to special sociological treatment. But it may be hoped that the Committee engaged in providing for the General Addresses will not ignore this aspect of the subject; while Section i., which practically coincides with religious anthropology, will afford an ample field for its recognition.

It need only be added that Members' tickets, entitling to admission to all Meetings and Receptions, and to a copy of the Transactions, may be obtained from Messrs. Barclay & Co., Old Bank, Oxford (by cheque or postal order, £1. each). Ladies' tickets, entitling the holder to all similar privileges at the Meeting, but not to the Transactions, may be procured in the same way (10s. each). Offers of papers may be sent to either of the Hon. Secretaries, Dr. J. E. Carpenter, 109, Banbury Road, Oxford, or Dr. L. R. Farnell, 191, Woodstock Road, Oxford. It will greatly facilitate the work of the Committee if Members desiring to read papers will inform the Hon. Secretaries by May 31st. All papers should be sent in not later than August 1st. In arranging the business of the Congress it is obvious that the Committee must reserve the final decision concerning the reading and printing of papers, under the inevitable limits of time and space.

The Congress will adhere to the fundamental Rule adopted in Paris in 1900 : *Les travaux et les discussions du Congrès auront essentiellement un caractère historique. Les polémiques d'ordre confessionnel ou dogmatique sont interdites.*

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

REVIEWS.

A DISCIPLE OF LE PLAY.

"The Growth of Modern Nations: A History of the Particularist Form of Society." Translated from the French of HENRI DE TOURVILLE, by M. G. LOCH. London: Edward Arnold. 12s. 6d. net.

THIS work of the late M. de Tourville, besides its intrinsic merits, is noticeable as the first of the many writings of the school of Leplay to be translated into English—an honour which has not yet fallen to the Master himself. M. de Tourville, however, is by no means a typical example of the school. It is the great merit of Leplay and of most of his followers to ground their theories on an extensive and careful collection of facts, and by a discriminating choice of typical instances, submitted to a minute but rationally conducted investigation, to unite the accuracy of the statistical method with the informing result of actual observation, to breathe the breath of life into the statistician's figures, and make his dry bones live. But in this method, there lurks a great danger. The foundation tends to become the goal. Facts are sought for themselves. Monograph follows monograph. The formulation of general laws is indefinitely postponed. And in the end, the enquirer is choked and smothered by the overwhelming mass of unconnected observations. The great truth is forgotten that Sociology like other sciences must advance by a series of hypotheses, each approximating more nearly to the truth, and every one in its turn serving to connect and co-ordinate the observations on which it is based. Now M. de Tourville is equally free from the merits and the dangers which are found in most of the writers of his school. He has a keen eye to general relations, an adventurous scientific imagination, and no inclination to particular enquiries. Accepting the general principles of social structure as dependent on industrial organisation put forward by Leplay, and carefully noting the effects of geographical environment, he proceeds in a single volume of less than five-hundred pages to sketch the whole history of Western Europe and the United States of America from the times of the Roman Empire to the present day, in what he considers the fundamental aspects of our civilisation. One characteristic of his method must be particularly noted. He quotes few authorities in support of his contentions. As he himself puts it: "The proof of my statements about the great social phenomenon which I am going to trace throughout its development will lie in the well known character of the facts, in their strict scientific sequence, and in the reader's own experiences, which will come to confirm them on all points." Such references as he gives, relate chiefly to apparent exceptions and social anomalies, or to cases in which he considers that the prejudices of previous writers have falsified the record. He thus follows the sound rule that the generalisations of Sociology should be drawn from the whole range of undoubted history, particular investigations being undertaken to confirm, invalidate or limit the theories formed on a wider basis. To this rule M. de Tourville has adhered throughout with the result that he has produced a book of surpassing interest which will supply matter for many careful investigations; but on some of the theories the book con-

tains, and especially on the great theory of all, the superiority and permanence of the particularist form of society, it is necessary still to maintain an attitude of reserve.

Briefly, his account of the rise of the Particularist Family is this. The Celtic shepherds made their way from East to West along the valley of the Danube. The Germans took a more northern route, and as the steppe narrows to the west of Berlin and the fertile lands meet, they were forced or persuaded to a life of agriculture. Thence, some went northward along the eastern shore of the Danish peninsula and settled in Southern Sweden and the adjacent islands. So far their migration had been in bodies and they had retained the patriarchal family and their other old institutions. But "among shepherds who have become intensive farmers the patriarchal system gradually weakens; a breach is made in the community by the capable members still more than by the others; instead of a swarm going forth at rare intervals, a constant emigration of capable individuals takes place." From Eastern Scandinavia, the more energetic members of a patriarchal society shaken by its own progress, passed to the Western slope, and exposed to the peculiar geographical environment of Norway, gave birth to that form of the family which still exists in England.

At first, they were fishermen; but fishing cannot supply all the wants of life. Passing along the sheltered channel which skirts the Norwegian coasts, the fisherman entered the still more sheltered waters of the fiords, and there gained "one of those corners of land fit for cultivation which are found far apart." On this, he established his isolated home, and reared his children apart from all other families and connected with the outer world only by his wherry. But from this situation two developments arose. The narrow estate which the cleft in the rock formed and which could not be extended, left no place for his sons. One might remain, who would in the end inherit the paternal homestead; the others must seek along the fiords for new homes for themselves. The paternal estate was necessarily indivisible. And as regards the daughters, they could receive no dowry. Their marriage would be no affair of the family. Each would marry of her own free choice and live in practical isolation in her husband's home. Hence we have the distinctive marks of the Particularist Family, the indivisible estate inherited by one son only, the other sons going forth to seek new fortunes outside the paternal home, and the normal family consisting of a single pair, united by free choice, and surrounded by their children only so long as those children were not of an age to form homes for themselves. It is the family as it still exists in this country.

This bald summary of the effects of the Norwegian environment on the Gothic stock gives little idea of the care and ingenuity with which M. de Tourville traces each element—the conformation of the coasts and the fiords, the habits of the fish, the products of the soil—and shows its effect in changing the original civilisation which the settlers brought with them from the eastern slope of the Scandinavian peninsula. It is a most brilliant and triumphant application of the geographical method to a fundamental problem of Sociology. And the next stage in the process by which this form of the family became so widely spread, is explained with almost equal success. As the sites for new homesteads along the fiords became exhausted, the more adventurous sought a new outlet. Passing down the west coast of the Danish peninsula, they reached the Saxon plain, which stretching far inland, forced those who had been sea-coast fishermen for

many ages to turn away from the sea. On islands of fertile soil rising above the floods, on banks of mud painfully won for agriculture from sea and marsh, these colonists formed their homes, as well fitted to preserve their type of family as the fords were to produce it. They found the country almost uninhabited, and they were already in possession when Tacitus wrote. "They live," said he, "in isolated and scattered dwellings, which they erect wherever a spring or field or wood takes their fancy." From them came the Franks and the Saxons who carried the particularist family into Gaul and Britain.

Here at once a difficulty presents itself. It is admitted that the Franks and the Saxons came, not as the individual offshoots of the particularist family but as large organised bands. At the head of the Franks were the Merovingians and their trusts; at the head of the Saxons, the founders of the Anglo-Saxon Kingdoms. These were surely no products of the petty landowners of the Saxon plain. M. de Tourville admits this, and falls back on the Odinid theory expounded in *La Science Sociale* by M. Champault, a Leplayan sociologist with a still more adventurous scientific imagination. According to this theory, Europe was in early times traversed by caravan routes from East to West. The spread of civilisation around the Mediterranean, made these routes run from South to North; and the Roman conquests still further diminished their importance. The leaders of the caravans would form associations similar to those of the traders of the Sahara in our own time. One leader is identified with Odin, afterwards deified as the God of Commerce, whose name is still borne among us by the fourth day of week. He had his seat in a great city near the Don, and in addition exploited mines in Pontus. Harassed by the victories of the Romans over Mithradates, he removed his business headquarters to the other end of his caravan route, and began to work the Swedish mines. The invasions of the barbarians were really directed by the Odinids—the successors of the caravan leaders, who sought to make up for the decay of commerce by the profits of pillage and exploitation. It was from the Odinids that Cerdic and Clovis and the Merovingian trusts sprung. Insufficient as may seem the evidence on which this amazing theory is founded, it certainly is in harmony with the account of the rise of civilisation in Scandinavia contained in Norse poetry. With regard to one point, Mr. H. Munro Chadwick whose work on "The Origin of the English Nation" was noticed in the January number of this Review, and whose method is entirely different from that of M. de Tourville, says: "Quite possibly even the families which eventually succeeded in establishing Kingdoms may not all have been of English blood"; and he insists that the Saxons were not "leaderless hordes united only by bonds of consanguinity."

The Frank carving out an estate for himself in Gaul was in a very different position to the petty farmer of the Saxon plain; but he had brought with him the same constitution of the family. With this, the method employed by the Romans in working their estates by gangs of slaves under the direction of a steward did not at all harmonise. On the contrary, the Franks originated the Manor, with its division into two parts, the Lord's domain and the holdings of the serfs, the one supplying produce to the Lord, the other labour. This in M. de Tourville's view was the central institution of feudalism, which triumphed under Charlemagne, the typical owner of great manorial estates. These estates were self-contained and isolated, each self-supporting with its own industries and its own government—the apotheosis of the particularist family,

involving the subordination of public to private life. But excellent as this organisation seems to M. de Tourville, it did not last. The peasants grew rich and commuted their services for fixed dues. The towns bought their emancipation. The Lords of the Manor sunk from directors of industry to receivers of fixed rents. Deprived of their local functions, and with their fixed incomes becoming less and less in purchasing power, they became crusaders and knight-errants and set up in Jerusalem and elsewhere formal copies of decaying feudalism. Such was the sordid origin of the great deeds of chivalry. But in this partial view, in this concentration on the industrial shell of society, we have one of the dangerous errors of the Leplayan school. A passing mention of the usefulness of the Feudal system as a means of defence against further inroads of the barbarians would really, if followed up, give the key to its rise and its decay. Nor is it possible to appraise medieval civilisation and leave the Catholic Church out of account. In M. de Tourville's work, there is one difficulty that is not met. No indication is given as to the relation between the Manor and the Village Community. The isolated estate with its Frankish Lord might represent a development of the particularist family. It is almost suggested that such a family in its isolation would be found also in the hut of the serf. But we know that over a great part of the territory occupied by the Franks, as over a large part of England, the serfs of the manor lived in a village, a tenement in which gave a right to a share of the strips in the common fields, and that isolated farmers and farmhouses were unknown. In spite of M. de Tourville's banter directed against the venerable M. Fustel de Coulanges and his fondness for Roman origins, is it not possible that though the Frank's own family was particularist and though to him the political isolation of the estate was due, yet he only imposed himself on a political organisation already existing? May not this account for the ease with which the particularist family was overthrown in France, and the French Monarchy erected on the ruins of Feudalism?

In his account of English civilisation, M. de Tourville distinguishes between the particularist Saxons and the patriarchal Angles; but unfortunately there is considerable evidence, marshalled by Mr. Chadwick in the work already mentioned, to show that the Angles and the Saxons had become one people before they ever reached England. The attempt to deduce the differences between the course of history in France and England from the greater strength of the particularist family in the latter must be pronounced unsuccessful. For instance, the failure of the French to rival the English at sea is surely more adequately explained by the existence of a land frontier in France which needed guarding than by the wickedness of that evil institution, the French Monarchy. It is true that the geographical environment has less influence on an established civilisation than on one that is undeveloped or decaying; but it is strange to find a follower of Leplay disregarding it altogether. No nation in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had sufficient resources to be strong at once on sea and land. La Hogue and Trafalgar alone rendered possible the campaigns of Marlborough and Wellington. Again, the greater prosperity of English agriculture during many centuries is attributed entirely to the superiority of English institutions, and not at all to the greater security of England's insular position in the ages immediately preceding. In this matter, time has not dealt kindly with M. de Tourville's argument. The particularist family still maintains its

position in England, but it would require some audacity to assert that English agriculture is more prosperous than French at the present time.

A general view of the whole book cannot fail to impress the reader with the boldness and extent of M. de Tourville's powers of generalisation and the perspicacity and insight which he shows in the application of his method; but it raises two fundamental doubts, one concerning his conclusions, the other concerning his principles. The first is evoked by his assertion of the permanent superiority of the particularist family, and the inferiority of a social system based on personal relations to one based on landed property. A consideration of M. de Tourville's own work suggests rather that the former system was temporary, and could only exist in its plenitude under circumstances such as those of Europe generally in the middle ages or of the still more peculiar circumstances which perpetuated the rule of the landed classes in England. Here is an illuminating passage:—

"Whatever slight variations there may have been, it nevertheless came about that from one end of France to the other the whole of the new population which the development of manufacture had caused to spring up in the towns escaped from the control of the domain and the control of the lord which the Franks had established. The strength that had been based on the estate was there replaced by a strength based on personal bonds, or the community."

In other words the Leplayan ideal of the subordination of public to private life proved then—and has proved more and more ever since—incompatible with the developments of modern industry. And in regard to the second point, is the key to modern progress to be found in changes of social structure due to changes in industrial organisation? That such a correlation exists, there can be no doubt; nor is it the least fruitful province of Sociological investigation. But in modern times at least the passage from one social phase to another has not been due solely to the slow decay of the industrial system characteristic of the earlier phase. There has been a continuous growth of modern science, precipitating and controlling the revolutions of industry. M. de Tourville himself says:—

"It is also easy to understand with what eagerness these manufacturers, who possessed all the Saxon fighting instincts, took up all the new mechanical and steam inventions which began to appear owing to the progress made by science."

Surely, then, "the progress made by science" is a vital element in determining the general evolution, even if it be not the very element which initiates the passage from one stage of civilisation to another. And surely this intellectual development should have a very much greater place in the study of Sociology than that assigned to it by the school of Leplay.

S. H. SWINNY.

EUGENICS.

- "NOTEWORTHY FAMILIES." By Francis Galton and Edgar Schuster. John Murray.
- "SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND POPULATION." By Alvan A. Tenney, Ph.D. Columbia University Press, New York.
- "THE SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE TO THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF NATIONAL EUGENICS." Robert Boyle Lecture, 1907. By Karl Pearson. Henry Frowde.
- "PROBABILITY: THE FOUNDATION OF EUGENICS." Herbert Spencer Lecture, 1907. By Francis Galton. Clarendon Press.
- "AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF MENTAL AND SOCIAL MEASUREMENTS." By Edward L. Thorndike. The Science Press, New York.

Since Eugenics as a branch of scientific investigation was placed definitely before the public by Mr. Galton's Huxley Lecture, and his subsequent Memoirs given before the Sociological Society, publication in this department has been somewhat limited. This does not signify, however, that the energies of those interested in the subject have in any degree relaxed. Mr. Galton's first utterances, though based on many years of study, pretended to be no more than the outline sketch of a science; it was necessary that it should be filled in by detailed researches, this, not merely with reference to the immediate subject-matter of Eugenics, but with reference to the general application of biological principles to human beings. This preliminary work has been carried on largely by Professor Karl Pearson and his students, and the results have appeared from time to time in the pages of "*Biometrika*." The intimate relation of these studies to Eugenics proper has been emphasized by the fact that the Eugenics Foundation in the University of London has been placed under the supervision of Professor Karl Pearson.

The volume on "*Noteworthy Families*" is the first product of the University of London Research Fellowship in Eugenics. It consists of a study of sixty members of the Royal Society living in 1904 who possessed as many as three noteworthy kinsmen. The arrangement is alphabetical, and exhibits the various family relationships which are considered noteworthy. The surprising fact is made apparent that the scientific ability of the country, of the F.R.S. grade, comes from comparatively few family stocks, while the kinship of men able in other directions is no less pronounced. But perhaps the most valuable part of the book is the long preface contributed by Mr. Galton, which is in many respects the most comprehensive and lucid exposition he has yet given. He not only analyses the facts that come out of the study in hand, but provides the general background of principle. In the last few years many objections have been raised to the Eugenic proposals, but in view of the large and impartial exposition given in this preface, most of them seem trivial. The sections devoted to noteworthiness are especially to be commended, as also that dealing with the correlation of ability with environment.

Dr. Tenney's short treatise deserves mention in this connection as being the first attempt to relate the Eugenic principle to the general theory of society. The problem is a difficult one, and the book makes no pretension to have satisfied its requirements. Apart from the large gaps in our knowledge, the difficulty of correlating somewhat incongruous sets of results is so pronounced that no one can undertake more than a

preliminary triangulation of the field. Dr. Tenney's view of social democracy appears too limited and too much a reading from contemporary conditions in the United States. There is too much of flux in the social conditions of that country to bring them in close relation with relatively permanent biological laws. The value of the book lies then in its intent rather than its achievement. It states the problem of the relation of society to biology in such a way as to form a useful guide for investigators.

Professor Karl Pearson's Robert Boyle Lecture is a skilful propagandist presentation intended to affect opinion in that centre which originates the larger number of determining influences in national life, namely, Oxford University. For his purposes, Professor Pearson frankly treats Oxford as a Technical School whose objective is not the training of engineers or physicians, but statesmen. The question naturally arises as to what in the curriculum can most efficiently give preparation in statecraft. Philosophy, political economy, even anthropology, fail to be of great value in connection with the practical issues which determine the course and destiny of a nation. Prominent in a school of statecraft should be the study of those biological factors which affect races and which form, as Professor Weldon says, "the only legitimate basis for speculations as to their past history and future fate."

The lecturer proceeds to justify this contention by presenting in general outline some of the results already attained by the laboratory of national Eugenics. Examples of family history are given to show the hereditary character of ability on the one hand, and the forms of degeneracy on the other. But the full understanding and interpretation of such pedigrees require the use of a scientific instrument, hitherto only slightly applied in biological and human science. This method is the metrical, or statistical. It is not only important to know that human beings tend to retain certain characteristics through heredity, it is even more important to know the exact degree of this retention, and correspondingly of variation. Modern statistical methods are able to give the exact quantitative measure of likeness, or unlikeness, as between parents and children and between children of the same family. With coefficients of correlation established for the important physical and psychological characters, it is possible to apply these in an interpretation of rates of changes in the various divisions of the population. Attention is first given to the degenerate section. As a practical problem, the question is an old one, and the various expedients, from Plato's method of purgation of the State, described in the "Laws," down to recent times, have had the same character, namely, that of permitting the more or less efficient operation of natural selection. The stringent methods of dealing with the criminal and insane classes tended to save the community from corruption through perpetuating their kind, but in recent years these methods have radically changed and are now largely controlled by sympathy, itself an important acquisition of civilization, with the result that the degenerate section of the community is allowed to propagate practically without restriction. The consequences of these conditions are shown definitely by statistical studies already made. It has been proved by Messrs. Schuster and Heron and Professor Pearson that deaf-mutism, insanity and pulmonary tuberculosis are highly inheritable, the parental coefficient of correlation being in each case at or above .5. The significance of this fact appears when it is compared with the birth-rate among these classes, which is distinctly higher than that of normal persons. The only restriction of the character of natural selection is the death-rate, but since

only from half to three-quarters of the whole number of deaths are of a selective character, this does not compensate for the fertility of the unfit, and, moreover, it is not clear that the selective death-rate has less effect upon normal than upon abnormal sections. The result is that the heritage of degeneracy is constantly increasing, and the time must come when its proportion will be so overwhelming that the State could hardly survive a crisis.

But, while Eugenics brings this realization of danger to the national destiny, it equally suggests the mode of salvation. The inheritability of ability, physical and mental, is as well proved as that of degeneracy. It, therefore, becomes an ethical obligation to those inspired with an idea of national greatness to follow the method which Eugenic investigation has so abundantly proved, and contribute to the nation a stock, sound in body and in mind, if possible with its germinal quality and quantity increased, in order to make a race that can meet the emergencies which the future course of history may present.

In his *Probability: The Foundation of Eugenics*, Mr. Galton gives an outline of the theory of probability, and shows its simplest methods of application to Eugenics. It is his belief that the principles on which problems of probability are based can be taught in such a way as to be grasped by one ignorant of mathematics. To do this, he outlines a scheme of five lessons. The first lesson would explain variability of size, weight, number, etc., by presenting arrays of variates and showing how they fall into a continuous series. The second lesson would treat the idea of an array with more precision, by showing schemes of distribution and centesimal graduation of the base. The third lesson would proceed from variates to deviates and show the genesis of the theoretical normal curve and the use of the quartile. The fourth lesson would show the different forms of the curve of normal distribution, and the meaning of the curve of frequency, and its unit of variability, the standard deviation. The last lesson would deal with the measurement of correlation and the determination of the index of correlation. The last section of the lecture is concerned with the influence of collective opinion upon individual conduct. The individual is shown to be largely at the mercy of a series of customs, prejudices and other influences. Illustrations are given of how this body of controlling sentiment has changed in the past, and the probability is indicated that when Eugenics is sufficiently established on its basis of evidence it will alter the attitude of man toward matters affecting the quality of the race.

In connection with Mr. Galton's attempt to make available for non-mathematical students the more simple of the statistical methods used in Eugenic investigation, should be mentioned a book not yet well-known in this country, Professor Thorndike's "Theory of Mental and Social Measurements." For the inadequately trained student who desires to make use of statistical methods, this is one of the best introductory treatises in existence.

J. W. S.

"THE RISE OF THE GREEK EPIC." By Gilbert Murray. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"LIFE IN THE HOMERIC AGE." By Thomas Day Seymour. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Whatever else the term Sociology may connote, it stands at least for Science as applied to the phenomena of society; whilst Science in its turn

stands at least for Method. Now here are two opposite methods of studying Homer: Dr. Murray's evolutionary, dynamic; Prof. Seymour's classificatory, static. Which of the two methods is the sounder? If the point of view taken be that of Sociology and Science, there can, I venture to think, be little doubt as to the answer. But this is, apparently, not the only point of view from which Homer and the Homeric Age may be studied. Prof. Seymour openly declares that his interest in the matter is not so much archaeological as philological.

Let anyone who wishes to compare the two methods place side by side Prof. Seymour's and Dr. Murray's chapters on Homeric arms and armour. Both authors have got hold of substantially the same facts. But what a difference in the use made of them! Not but what Prof. Seymour is forced by the facts themselves to recognise discrepancies; on the strength of which, as he is not unaware, problems of development suggest themselves as inevitably as when fossils of different epochs appear one below the other in the riven side of a Colorado cañon. But he is not interested in problems of development. Philology carefully collects the fossils, and proceeds to decorate a rockery with them. For Dr. Murray, on the other hand, the facts are something more than curious or pretty. They are full of infinite meaning; only make them speak, and what a tale might they unfold. It is a little hard, no doubt, on Prof. Seymour to pillory his work as an example of misguided method. This drawback allowed for, the work might be described as excellent of its kind—conscientious, thorough, and lucid. Here, however, where Sociology is our *parti pris*, no allowance of the sort can be made. Sociology is before all else a critique of methods, and is based on, nay, may almost be said to consist in, the methodological principle that man and his works must be studied in the light of, and for the sake of, the Whole.

Now no one dare accuse Dr. Murray of being in any way untrue to philology. His is primarily a literary interest; he is, in fact, giving us a first instalment of a history of Greek literature. But he is anxious to consider Greek literature from a new standpoint, which he explains, and, I think, successfully justifies, in his first lecture. He wishes to concern himself with it as it bears on "the service of man." For him to be classical is not to be dead, but to be alive. Hellenism is a form of the spiritual effort whereby man transcends mere animalism. "Allowing for indefinite differences of detail, there seems to be a certain primitive effortless level of human life, much the same all the world over, below which society would cease to be; a kind of world-wide swamp above which few nations have built what seems like permanent and well-weathered dwellings. Others make transient refuges which sink back into the slough. *La nostalgie de la boue*—'home-sickness for the mud'—is a strong emotion in the human race." We need not pause to enquire whether it is strictly true that savagery is always so spiritually effortless as Dr. Murray thinks; whether, in other words, he does not forget that seed may oftentimes lack the support of soil, soul the support of body, generous ideals the support of numbers, an abundant food-supply, defensible boundaries, and, above all, luck. Broadly and, perhaps, rhetorically speaking, however, we may say with Dr. Murray that there are only two kinds of man—man natural and man spiritual; and that Greece, notably by means of her literature, made spiritual man possible for Europe. Even by the time our 'Homer' came into existence the choice had already been made, the rights of man were declared, spirituality, civilization, *σωφροσύνη*, salvation—whatever we call it, the thing had come to stay.

To get his contrast, to show what the Hellenism of Homer negates, Dr. Murray next proceeds to describe what he effectively terms "the Dark Age"—the Age of the Migrations. I cannot pretend to judge whether his ethnological speculations are in accordance with the latest expert findings. For the immediate purpose in view it is enough, with him, to conceive 'Mycenean' civilization, such as it was—something at any rate non-Greek, since Greece in one sense was not yet born—going down, less perhaps by cataclysm than by gradual dissolution, before wave on wave of barbarian Northerners. Thereafter were the days of the Iron race deplored of Hesiod: "Their righteousness in their fists! And a man shall sack his brother's walled city." Before these Iron Men, according to Hesiod, flourished "the divine generation of the Heroes." According to Dr. Murray, the Seven against Thebes were Northerners turning back from Argos to destroy a stronghold of Orientals (Cadmus—the man from the East) that menaced their rear, whilst the fight for Troy was a struggle between an earlier and later set of Northern immigrants for a toll-gate commanding the traffic that was borne overland to avoid the currents round Sigeum. Suppose, then, Mycenaean culture "sunk back into the slough," with barbarism in possession, dealing in nought but rude feats of arms and equally rude saga-songs about the fighting, and how is it that some centuries later Homer and Hellenism are in full-blown existence?

Dr. Murray asks us to imagine—the whole argument from first to last is addressed to the imagination, and rightly—the book of early times. It was not a thing to be given to the public. It was rather the private stock-in-trade of a professional story-teller who lived by his book. The great book of Michael Scott, the magician, was read by no man but one, and was buried in its master's grave. But conceive the book of a bard, instead of suffering so untimely a fate, handed on to a disciple who has learnt to interpret the difficult letter-marks. Behold it an heirloom, jealously guarded, and with each successive owner, with each successive great event in the history of the community, changed, expanded, expurgated. That, in a few words, is Dr. Murray's theory of Homer. The rest of this book consists in a detailed presentation of the proofs of such a progressive re-editing. Throughout a very suggestive analogy is employed, of which one has hitherto heard too little in this connection, namely, that of the growth of the Pentateuch. Here, too, it is plain, generations of revisers have been at work excising, contaminating, incorporating, and what not. As regards Homer the individual poet, he may apparently be identified with the author either of an earlier Aeolic or of a later Ionian version of the *Iliad* (not to complicate matters by introducing the question of the authorship of the *Odyssey*, a subject in which Dr. Murray appears to be somewhat less interested). In any case Ionia seems responsible for the final Hellenizing of the Epos. Dr. Murray believes that it was put together in its present form to be recited at some great Pan-Ionian festival. "One feels in the *Iliad* the high tension and lift of a great occasion—a public occasion, which insists on a tone of dignity and correctness in the poems, banishing all that is furtive or unseemly, all that could move derision in strangers or hurt the feelings of other Ionian States; inevitably, at the same time, somewhat blighting that profounder and more intimate venturesomeness of poetry which cannot quite utter itself before a crowd."

Enough, perhaps, has been said to illustrate the truly sociological and synthetic method of this live book. No doubt the specialists will detect slips here and there. One might, for instance, pick holes in some of the

anthropological suggestions that are put forward by the way. It is not given to any one man to bring all the specialisms into focus. But, as long as the informing principle is sound, the details will take care of themselves. One feels inclined to say that, even suppose a good part of its facts and hypotheses to be in course of time upset, Dr. Murray's work will remain well-nigh as stimulating as before, simply because it has Science.

R. R. MARETT.

"THE STOIC CREED." By William L. Davidson, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen, etc. Pp. xxiii., 274. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

This work appears in a series published by Messrs. T. and T. Clark under the general title of "Religion in Literature and Life." Professor Davidson has given an account, for the most part clear and trustworthy, of the history of Stoicism and its logical, physical, moral and religious doctrines. He illustrates his exposition by abundant quotations from Diogenes Laertius, Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, which bring the reader into direct contact with Stoic ideas. In general, the book may be described as suitable to the purpose of spreading a popular knowledge of Stoicism amongst serious and intelligent families.

Some inaccuracies or negligencies occur: the most serious, perhaps, in the account of the *consensus gentium*. The practical test of preconceptions or common notions, was, says Prof. Davidson, the general consent of mankind; and thereupon he appropriately quotes from Seneca: "For we are wont to lay much stress on the conception (*præsumptioni*) of all men, and among us it is regarded as an index of its truth, that a thing seems so to all: as, for example, that there are gods we infer, among other things, from this, that a belief in God is implanted in all men; nor is there any people so far outside the range of laws and morals as not to believe in some gods" (p. 69). Yet, at p. 81, he writes: "But by 'universal consent' the Stoics did not mean the consent of everybody throughout the world and throughout the ages, without exception. They quite well knew that there are people who will deny anything; and of such people they had ample experience in their own day. What they meant was that preconceptions are everywhere accepted when the mind is calm, clear, and unprejudiced—when, therefore, it is in the state that characterises the wise man." Is not this an unjustifiable gloss?

Our author's style is usually clear and intelligible, but not always by any means. Commenting, for example, on the failure of the Stoics to reconcile the fact of evil with their optimism, he says (p. 226): "There is no due appreciation in Stoicism of the fact that, as each individual is essentially a social being, the sufferings that he is called upon to endure are in great measure *vicarious*; and in cases where he suffers through others' faults or sins, his sufferings are of the nature of *atonement*, thereby reacting for good upon those whose wrong-doing entailed them. This is the philosophy of suffering that is implicated in the great truth of the solidarity of mankind, and that illumines much." For me, in spite of the italics, it only deepens the obscurity.

The sixth chapter, *The Epicurean Contrast*, gives an account of Epicureanism, which is commendably sympathetic. It may still be a popular notion that Stoicism and Epicureanism were the chief mutual opponents in later Greek Philosophy, but it seems better to consider them as complementary, offering alternative schemes for the rationalisation of life to men of different temperaments. The great opponent of both,

before whom both at last succumbed, was Scepticism; and it is a serious oversight on Prof. Davidson's part to have given hardly a reference to this powerful school. He thinks it necessary to refute the Stoics at many points, thereby giving his work almost an apologetic character; he criticises the sublimities and extravagances of Chrysippus or Seneca as if they were still in need of correction, much as Milton requires the doctrines of ancient moralists to be reduced "under the determinate sentence of David, or Solomon, or the Evangelists and Apostolic Scriptures." But how much more interesting it would have been to give the Sceptics' objections to Stoicism, that we might see how that philosophy appeared to contemporaries amidst the actual conditions, social and literary, of its existence at Athens or Rome, than it can be to tell us what it now looks like when its fossils are examined at Aberdeen!

What a student of Sociology most misses in this book is a just sense of the relation of Stoicism to history and anthropology; in fact, he finds this sort of shortcoming in nearly all histories of Philosophy. From some of them you might come away with the impression that Socrates had invented the immortality of the soul. In a perfunctory half-page (p. 60) Prof. Davidson assigns three causes of the growing importance of the idea of cosmopolitanism amongst the later Stoics: the spectacle of the Roman Empire, the growth of the theistic conception, and the corruption of the times. The first is a commonplace; the second and third themselves need explanation. But to these causes with others is due not merely the idea of cosmopolitanism, but the whole Stoic Philosophy, and the subject deserves a chapter. The history of Philosophy is an inseparable strand of universal history: treated in abstraction it is quite unintelligible. We know that in our own case problems are forced upon us, and the solutions we arrive at are greatly influenced, by the general movement of events, by institutions, by the sentiments of our neighbours. It was always so. The record of a thin line of greybeards repeating or contradicting one another, hides from students the actual conditions of thought and the great difference there is in the meaning of the same proposition as it was uttered 2,000 years ago, and as we understand it to-day. The history of Philosophy needs to be written with wider knowledge than the barren region of dialectic can supply, and quite as much as wide knowledge it needs imagination.

Prof. Davidson is puzzled by the Stoic acceptance of divination; it is, he thinks, "if divination be regarded in its purely superstitious aspect," irreconcilable with Fate, or "the conception of God as absolute law or order" (p. 230). But, on the contrary, Fate may be considered as a generalisation of the beliefs on which divination is founded, that there are such fixed relations amongst events that one is an infallible sign of another, though we may not be able to see any connection between them. Such beliefs are held by the most primitive folk, even such as have no religion, that is, no gods; and this greater antiquity of Fate may be the reason why, when gods came to be imagined, it is still superior to them. The Stoic acceptance of divination is characteristic of their conservatism in all such matters, in contrast with the Epicurean *Aufklärung*. The reconciliation of Fate with their doctrine of Providence is more difficult. Bacon notes it as a weakness of princes that they are apt to desire contradictories; and so it is in a measure with philosophers. And to explain the connections of all their doctrines we have to fall back upon Ribot's position, that the logic of sentiment does not recognise the principle of contradiction.

CARVETH READ.

"BRITISH FREEWOMEN: THEIR HISTORICAL PRIVILEGE." By C. C. Stopes.
Sonnenschein, 1907.

Into the heated atmosphere of controversy Mrs. Stopes' work comes with something of the effect of a cold douche. Here is to be found no sentiment about what is, or is not, ideally fit, suitable, or becoming for a woman to do; no discussion about abstract rights or the theoretical equality of the sexes. Mrs. Stopes asks what, in history, the position of women actually has been, what is our ancestral heritage of right?

Her argument, briefly and inadequately summarised, runs as follows: According to old tradition and the law of the land, under the Feudal system, sex in itself did not disqualify a woman from anything. There was no excusing a woman a duty, and consequently no denying her a privilege. The advantage granted her of "sending a deputy" she was allowed in common with men who were too old or infirm to bear arms. In ancient times even a married woman could be "free," both as an inheritor and as an earner; free to contract, to sign, to seal, to act as a *feme sole* (p. 20). "Through different principles of inheritance there have always been fewer heiresses than heirs; through the success of various devices protecting male professional and trade industries against female competition there have been fewer female owners of earned property"; thus representative freewomen have been always in a small minority. But there can be no doubt that women could be, and were, freeholders in towns by inheritance or by purchase; they could be free of companies, by patrimony, service, or payment; or by being widows of freemen. The rules varied, but in almost all the companies, at least in London, some women could be free. They could be free in other boroughs under the same conditions as men by paying brotherhood money, and by sharing in the common duties of burgesses; free in regard to the Corporation, and free as regards voting for members of Parliament. Of the causes that led to the lapse of women's privileges in these matters I must leave Mrs. Stopes to speak for herself; she notes that the process did not go on without protest (p. 135). And it was not till 1832 that any Act of Parliament had explicitly excluded women as such from the franchise, "freeholders" or "persons" being always indicated in "Representation of the People" Acts, without any reference to sex. In the Reform Bill of 1832 the word "male" was interpolated before "persons" in the newly-created boroughs. "Never before and never since has the phrase 'male person' appeared in any statute of the Realm." Thus for the first time in the history of the English Constitution women were technically disfranchised, though not as regards the older boroughs. In 1867 the Bill for the extension of the franchise made use of the word man instead of "male person." As, according to an Act of 1850, it had been declared that words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed to include females, except where otherwise stated, it would seem that the Act of 1867 did actually enfranchise the women who came within its scope. In Manchester over 5,000 women got themselves placed upon the register, and great uncertainty prevailed how to treat them. In most cases the revising barrister threw them out, but it would appear that in several cases women exercised their vote. In a law case, *Chorlton v. Lings*, which was instituted to ascertain the legal position of the women voters, the argument was used that no statute had taken their right away from

women, because they never had any. Judgment was given against the women on the ground that the right, not having been asserted for centuries, was a strong presumption against its ever having legally existed (p. 173). Mrs. Stopes' book is devoted to showing that this judgment was based on an inadequate knowledge of history and fact. It cannot be overlooked by those who desire to see the woman question in a true perspective. Mrs. Stopes has at least made it evident that the appeal to custom, history and tradition, is not all on one side.

B. L. HUTCHINS.

"AN INTRODUCTION TO CHILD STUDY." By W. B. Drummond, M.B., Assistant Physician to the Royal Hospital for Sick Children, Edinburgh. Author of "The Child: His Nature and Nurture." Pp. 344. Edward Arnold. 6s. net.

Child study, beginning with the teacher, soon spreads to the physician; to-day students of Sociology and of politics are turning to it for help in understanding the conditions and laws of human life and development. Also "the philologist turns to baby linguistics," and "the anthropologist, unable to discover a living specimen of primitive man, turns to the child as his nearest representative." Hence this book should find a welcome in many quarters.

The title describes very truly the aim and scope of the book, it lays a foundation for a science of 'genetic psychology,' rather than provides a manual of the material already collected by child studies to quote the writer: "We must begin with the simplest things, and make sure our knowledge of foundations before seeking to understand the more complex phenomena which grow from them." The first ninety pages form a propædæutic to child study generally, discussing such subjects as "Biology and Child Study," "Caution in Child Study," "Methods of Child Study." The next hundred are given to physiological questions concerning babies and the growth and health of children; "Instincts," "Habits," "Forms of Expression" and "Moral Characteristics" take another hundred; then come two brief chapters on "Religion and the Child," and on "Peculiar and Exceptional Children."

The treatment of the subject is eminently sane and well balanced, statistics and facts are supplied where they are required, but details and instances more attractive to the general reader are not excluded. The following is an example of the writer's style: "All mental phenomena develop through an ascending series of stages, and on the capitalisation of our acquisitions by habit depends the possibility of the passage from stage to stage. The development of feeling in the form of sense-perception brings the child to a knowledge of the outside world, to the formation of ideas and so to his intellect. . . . Acts which have been reflex and instinctive are learned, understood, chosen deliberately, and, it may be, forged by frequent repetition into habits—habits which may be performed as automatically as instincts, yet carry with them the moral value of acts of will."

M. E. FINDLAY.

"WHAT IS RELIGION?" By Wilhelm Bousset, Professor in the University of Göttingen. Translated by F. B. Low. London: T. Fisher Unwin, Adelphi Terrace, 1907.

A series of popular, historical lectures on the Religion of Savages, National Religions, the Religion of the Prophets, of the Law (Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Islamism) and of Redemption (Buddhism, Platonism and Christianity).

The treatment of Buddhism is particularly admirable for the simplicity and the directness with which its fundamental ideas are expressed. In the final lecture, on the Future of Christianity, it is declared that the Pauline-Lutheran conception of Christianity with its belief in Special Inspiration, Divinity of Christ, Atonement, Miracles, is doomed, but that Christianity will survive in a form no longer antagonistic to modern culture, namely, the Christianity of Christ himself.

J. H. LEUBA.

PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.

COST OF LIVING OF THE WORKING CLASSES.

(Cd. 3864, 1908.)

This inquiry was undertaken in order to supplement the two well-known "Fiscal Blue Books," cd. 1761 (1903) and cd. 2337 (1904), and is partially based on returns there given as to working-class expenditure on rent, food and fuel, and the proportion which that expenditure bears to the total income. Two similar reports are in preparation, dealing with France and Germany, and the data, when completed, will serve (1) as a basis for a comparison of working-class conditions in the various districts of the United Kingdom, and for the study of local variations in wages and in the cost of living; (2) as a standard for comparison with foreign countries; (3) as a standard for comparison over a period of years for the same localities and countries, should such enquiries be repeated.

The 1904 report showed that, in spite of a rise in rent, fuel and light, between 1880—1900, the whole cost of living during the period fell, as shown in the following table:—

COST OF LIVING OF WORKING CLASSES.

(The year 1900=100.)

Period.						Index number of cost of living.	
Average of Quinquennial period of which the middle year is 1880						...	120·5
"	"	"	"	"	"	1885	108·2
"	"	"	"	"	"	1890	100·9
"	"	"	"	"	"	1895	95·5
"	"	"	"	"	"	1900	99·7

The chief advantage of the 1908 over the 1904 report, is, that the later investigation covers 73 large towns in England and Wales instead of only 20, and that the standard adopted is now definite, the index numbers being calculated on the basis of the middle zone of London (excluding the outer suburbs and the business portion of the town) as 100.

With regard to prices it is shown that there are 9 towns above London (100) and 63 below. The total range lies between Dover (106) and Stockport and Wigan (88).

Geographically, the lowest mean index number for groceries, coal and meat combined, is Lancashire and Cheshire (92), the highest is the Southern Counties (102). Broadly speaking prices are high in the north, lower in Yorkshire, Lancashire and the Midlands, and rise again in the South and East.

To obtain the resultant cost of living the index numbers of rents and prices are combined.* Rent is given a weight of 1 and prices of 4. London (100) is at the head of the list because of its high rents, Croydon (99) is high because of its proximity to London, Dover (96) is third because of its high prices (106, while its rent is 56). The broad result is to show that there is very little difference between the majority of towns with regard to the cost of living. Thirty-eight of the seventy-three towns are included in the range between 85 and 90, and fifty-two between that of 84 and 92.

* The cost of clothing, which was included in the 1904 table given above, is not mentioned.

In order to compare the weekly rates of wages, four trades were chosen which are represented in nearly all of the towns—building, engineering, printing (hand compositors only), and furnishing. In the case of bricklayers there is seen to be great variation as only 37 out of the 72 towns selected came within the “predominant range” of wages (i.e., from 37s. 6d. to 40s. 6d., whilst in the furnishing trade (French polishers) 33 out of 35 towns were included in the range. Taking London as 100, the index numbers for skilled labour are seen to vary between Croydon (105) and Bedford and Dover (84). Unskilled labour varies between Croydon (110) and Swindon (74).

An attempt is made to discover the approximate level of real wages by obtaining a ratio between money wages and cost of living. This is done by taking the mean of the index numbers of the groups of wages in each district and dividing it by the combined index number of rents and prices. The result does not indicate any general law of connection between local variation of wages and of the cost of living, indeed, in the two districts where wages are the highest—Lancashire and Cheshire 104, and the Midlands 100—the rents and prices combined are respectively 84 and 85, which are the lowest of all. It must, however, be remembered that the selected trades were few in number, and that only the standard rate of wages has been given.

D. SERNA POTTER.

Sixty-ninth Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Marriages and Deaths in England and Wales (1906), Cd. 3833.

This Report is of course one of the indispensable documents for the student of contemporary sociological changes. From its masses of information we extract one or two salient items. The chief of these is the continued fall in the birthrate. This rate reached its highest recorded point, viz., 36·3 per 1000 living in 1876; since then it has fallen by successive stages to 27·1 in 1906. The fall is general. Reckoning the proportion of legitimate births to 1,000 wives, aged between 15 and 45, we get the following changes in the 20 years 1880—2 to 1900—02.

The Netherlands	-9·3	Spain	+0·4
Norway	-3·7	Belgium	-19·8
Prussia	-7·1	England and Wales	-17·7
Ireland	+2·3	France	-19·7
German Empire	-8·4	Queensland	-23·2
Austria	+0·8	Western Australia	-23·9
Scotland	-12·7	South Australia	-28·0
Italy	-2·5	N. S. Wales	-30·6
Sweden	-8·2	Victoria	-24·2
Switzerland	-6·4	New Zealand... ..	-24·5
Denmark	-9·8		

Taking the proportion of illegitimate births to unmarried women of the same ages the ratio has fallen by 44 per cent. in England and Wales since 1876.

The death-rate showed a rise of 0·2 per 1,000 on 1905, the lowest recorded, but was 1·4 below the mean of 1896—1905.

The following abbreviated table shows the movement :—

Mean Annual Death-rate per 1,000 living.												
1876—80	20·79
1881—85	19·40
1886—90	18·89
1891—95	18·71
1896—1900	17·69
1900—05	16·00
1906	15·38

In the forty years ending in 1900, though the death-rate for all ages fell by about 15 per cent., “no such corresponding reduction could be recorded” in the deaths of children under 12 months. Since the beginning of the century there has been a change for the better, which the Report holds “may fairly be ascribed” in part to the effect of an awakened public opinion. The rate is subject to wide fluctuations, “mainly caused by variations of summer temperature and rainfall.” For the years 1896—1900 it was 156 per 1,000 births; for 1900—05 it was 138, for 1906 it was 132. The variation according to countries is great, ranging from 84 per 1,000 in Wiltshire to 157 in Lancashire.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL. Vol. xviii, No. 69.—W. H. Beveridge : *Public Labour Exchanges in Germany*. Labour Exchanges have multiplied rapidly in the last four years. The number of situations filled by them increases and now bears a considerable proportion to the whole population. But they are still only at the beginning of their development. Professor T. N. Carver : *A Suggestion for a new Economic Arithmetic*. Edgar Harper : *Will the Rating of Land Values increase urban congestion?* Combats views of Major Darwin and Dr. Cannan. The proposed system would stimulate building on the outskirts of towns, not in the centre. It would also stimulate agriculture. Professor E. C. K. Gonner : *Some Considerations about Interest*. The motives and methods of provision for the future are various and it is not clear that interest is socially essential to stimulate the adequate provision of capital for industry. Professor S. J. Chapman : *Laws of Increasing and Decreasing Returns in Production and Consumption*.

THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS. Vol. xxii, No. 2.—T. N. Carver : *Machinery and the Labourer*. The labourer has gained something in wages through the introduction of machinery, but less than other classes. On the other hand in the nature of his work he has probably gained more. A. P. Andrew : *Hoarding in the Panic of 1907*. Between August and December more than 230 millions of currency disappeared from the banks. No such general suspension of payments has occurred in England since the Napoleonic wars.

THE YALE REVIEW. Vol. xvi, No. 4.—Henry C. Emery : *Some Lessons on the Panic*. Discusses causes of financial crisis, indicates modifications of accepted opinions. Increased power of clearing house associations, provision of adequate means for contraction and redemption in bank issues are suggested as preventive methods before emergency.—Maurice H. Robinson : *The Legal, Economic, and Accounting Principles involved in the Judicial Determination of Railway Passenger Rates*.

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI E DISCIPLINE AUSILIARIE. L. Mietta : *Il contratto collettivo di lavoro et le associazione operaie*.—A survey of the growth of collective bargaining in England, the United States, Germany, and France. E. Vercesi : *Verso un ordine cristiano sociale*. An account of the efforts of the Marquis La Tour-du-Pin to promote Christian Socialism. The French Revolution engendered a ruthless Individualism. A Counter-Revolution is needed to re-establish corporate action, in the spirit of "Christian justice." P. A. Palmieri : *La questione rutena nella Galizia*. M. Chiri : *Il lavoro dei fanciulli nell' industria in Italia*.—Statistics as to child-labour.

REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE. Vol. xvi, No. 1.—Victor Paraf : *Les hôtels pour la classe ouvrière*. An account of the Rowton Houses, and of similar institutions in Birmingham, Liverpool, Glasgow, New York and Milan. The writer concludes with the aspiration that some philanthropist may endow France with similar institutions.—René Maunier : *Vie religieuse et vie économique*. Specialisation in industries arises from the clan organisation. The clan on losing its family character becomes a caste. The first organised profession is the priesthood, from which others arise by differentiation. In the civilised world differentiation increases while exclusiveness diminishes.—Société de Sociologie de Paris. Paper by Dr. Paul Hartenberg : *Les types professionnels: le boursier*. Study of the moral atmosphere of the Bourse. Its frequenters are good "fathers of families," easy going and generous, but essentially gamblers and in public matters unscrupulous.

xvi:2.—G. Aslan : *Le problème moral au XIXe siècle*. How the question of re-establishing morality on rational foundations was conceived by Comte and other thinkers of the last century.—René Maunier : *Vie religieuse et vie économique* (concluded). Primitive specialisation is based not on the natural choice of individuals but on religious conceptions of the nature of things; in these conceptions there is a collective tradition which is the really operative force.—Société de Sociologie de Paris. Paper by Maurice Wolf : *Les types professionnels : l'instituteur*. A sketch of the changes in the position of the teacher from the *ancien régime* to the present day; a short discussion of the present attitude of the profession.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. Vol. xvi, 1.—Emile Boutroux : *William James et l'expérience religieuse*. Questions the possibility of detaching religious experience from concrete beliefs and institutions. M. Winter : *Sur la Logique du Droit*. P. Bureau : *Le droit de grève et la liberté du travail*.

LA LECTURA. REVISTA DE CIENCIAS Y DE ARTES. Vol. viii, No. 86.—Adolfo Posada : *Sobre la definición de la Sociología*.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE. Vol. xxxi, No. 4.—Paul Barth : *Die Soziologie Albert Schäffles*. An appreciation of Schäffle's position in Sociology. Society is a spiritual organism, and it is a fundamental error in Schäffle to have included the material environment and forms of property within the sphere of Sociology. Nevertheless, he has done valuable service to the idea of a sociology grounded on history.

RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA. Anno xi, Fasc. vi.—G. Sergi : *Intorno alla monogenesi del linguaggio* : Combats Prof. Trombetti's theory of an "Ursprache." He rejects the specific unity of mankind on anthropological grounds, and argues that linguistic affinities, far from implying a common origin, are the result of endless mixing and combination between different forms of speech.—F. Tönnies : *La scienza economica e la filosofia*. Asserts that the tendency of the day is to treat economic problems in a more philosophic spirit, i.e., the postulates of Economic Science are critically examined; its problems are brought into relation with those of the other branches of Sociology; and the direction of future advance is thought out in the light of an ideal.—A. Vago : *L'amministrazione finanziaria nella repubblica di Venezia*.

ANTHROPOS. INTERNATIONALE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VÖLKER—U. SPRACHKUNDE. F. G. A. Morice : *The Great Déné Race*. Their dress and personal habits. Mental and moral characteristics. Contrast between the ferocious Apaches and the "Hares" or Chepewyans. P. J. Caius : *In the land of caste* (Bibliography). C. von Coll : *Marriage among the natives of Turinam*. Fr. Aeg. Müller : *Soothsaying among the Kaffirs*. The witch-doctor's dance. How far soothsayers believe in their own powers. P. E. Rougier : *Maladies and Remedies in Fiji, formerly and to-day*.—Demonolatry, Ancestor-worship, Animal-worship, Fetishism. P. M. Friedrich : *Description of the burial of a chief at Ibonzo* (Niger). P. V. M. Egidi : *The Kuni Tribe* (New Guinea). L. Cadiéri : *Popular Philosophy in Annam*. Dr. Casartelli : *Hindu Mythology*. L. Levistre : *Dolmens in Algeria*.

MAN. Vol. viii, No. 2.—Dr. J. G. Frazer : *The Australian Marriage Laws*. Professor Westermarck : *The Killing of the Divine King*. In Morocco it is not the spirit of the king, but his holiness which passes to his successor. It may be that the killing of an old or failing king has the object of transferring his holiness unpoluted. R. H. Matthews : *Social Organisation of the Ngeumba Tribe, New South Wales*. Marriage cycles and genealogical tables. No. 3. A von Gennep : *Questions Australiennes*. Dr. A. C. Haddon : *Regulations for obtaining a Diploma of Anthropology in the University of Cambridge*.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- Brown, H. F. *Studies in Venetian History*. Murray.
- Simmel, G. *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*.
- Breysig, Karl. *Aufgaben u. Massstäbe einer allgemeinen Geschichtsschreibung*. Georg Bondi, Berlin.
- Acton, Lord (the late). *History of Freedom and Other Essays*. Macmillan, 10s. net.
- Acton, Lord (the late). *Historical Essays and Studies*. Macmillan, 10s. net.
- Simmel, G. *Philosophie des Geldes*.
- Breysig, Karl. *Altherthum und Mittelalter*. Georg Bondi, Berlin.
- Howarth, E. G. *West Ham. Study in Social and Industrial Problems*.
- Bauer, Arthur. *Essai sur les Revolutions*. Giard & Brière.
- Reibmayr, Dr. Albert. *Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Talentes und Genies*. Lehmanns, Munich.
- Thomas, Northcote W. *Bibliography of Anthropology and Folklore*. David Nutt, 2s. net.
- Fastrez, A. *Ce que l'Armée peut être pour la Nation. Travaux de l'Institut de Sociologie*. Misch & Thron.
- The Need of the Nations: an International Parliament*. Watts & Co., London.
- Arnold-Forster, M.P., Rt. Hon. H. O. *English Socialism of To-day*. Smith, Elder & Co., 2s. 6d. net.
- Bousset, Professor Wilhelm. *What is Religion?* Fisher Unwin, 5s. net.
- Oman, J. Campbell. *The Brahmins, Theists and Muslims of India*. Fisher Unwin, 14s. net.
- Macrosty, H. W. *The Trust Movement in British Industry*. Longmans, Green & Co., 9s. net.
- Rathgen, Prof. Dr. Karl. *Staat und Kultur der Japaner*. Velhagen & Klasing, 4 mark.
- Commons, John R. *Proportional Representation*. Macmillan, 5s. net.
- Stopes, Charlotte C. *British Freewomen*. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 2s. 6d.
- Kropotkin, Prince. *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 6s.
- Castberg, P. H. *Production: a Study in Economics*. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 10s. 6d.
- Pollard, A. F. *Factors in Modern History*. Constable & Co., 7s. 6d. net.
- Wellmann, Dr. Erich. *Abstammung Beruf und Heeresersatz*. Duncker & Humblot.
- Guyot, Yves. *La Démocratie Individualiste*. Giard & Brière, 3 fr.

- Ellett, Jones Ross. *Malaria*. Macmillan & Bowes, 2s. 6d. net.
- Jebb, Eglantyne. *Cambridge: a Brief Study in Social Questions*. Macmillan & Bowes, 4s. 6d. net.
- Chapman, Sydney J. *Work and Wages. II. Wages and Employment*. Longmans, Green & Co., 10s. 6d. net.
- Howard-Flanders, William. *A Thousand Years of Empire. Vol. I.* Gay & Bird, 6s. net.
- Dowd, Jerome. *The Negro Races. A Sociological Study. Vol. I.* The Macmillan Co. 10s. 6d. net.
- Hunt, Edmond J. *The Evolution of Faith*. Watts & Co., 6d.
- Barnard, J. L. *Factory Legislation in Pennsylvania: its History and Administration*. John C. Winston Co., Philadelphia.
- Thorndike, Edward L. *An Introduction to the Theory of Mental and Social Measurements*. The Science Press, New York.
- Forrest, J. Dorsey. *The Development of Western Civilisation*. University of Chicago Press.
- Morgan, Lewis H. *Ancient Society*. Henry Holt & Co., New York.
- Report on the National Conference on Sweated Industries*. Scottish Council for Women's Trades, 1s.
- Kidd, Benjamin. *Principles of Western Civilisation*. Macmillan, 5s. net.
- Fordham, Montague. *Mother Earth. A proposal for the permanent reconstruction of our country life*. Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 5s. net.
- Urwick, E. J. *Luxury and Waste of Life*. J. M. Dent & Co., 4s. 6d. net.
- Burrows, Herbert, & Hobson, John A. *William Clarke: a Collection of His Writings*. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 7s. 6d.
- Persona. *A New Gospel*. Privately printed, New York, 75 cts.
- Sutherland, William. *Old Age Pensions: In Theory and Practice, with some Foreign Examples*. Methuen, 3s. 6d. net.
- Hobson, John A. *The Problem of the Unemployed: an Enquiry and an Economic Policy*. Methuen, 2s. 6d.
- Money, L. G. Chiozza. *Riches and Poverty*. Methuen, 1s. net.
- Gomme, George Laurence. *Folklore as an Historical Science*. Methuen, 7s. 6d. net.

NOTICES.

At the Annual General Meeting of the Sociological Society held at 24 Buckingham Street, Strand, on Monday, April 6th, Sir Edward Brabrook, C.B., was elected President of the Society for the coming year and Mr. S. H. Swinny, Chairman of Council. The vacancies on the Council were filled by Sir C. Lewis Tupper, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Mr. P. J. Hartog, Mr. George Montagu, Mr. R. H. Tawney, and Mr. G. A. Touche.

The following papers have been read at meetings of the Society during the past quarter :—Dr. Robert Hutchison on "Infant Mortality" (the second of a series on Medico-Sociology), January 20th; Mr. I. Gibbon on "Past and Future Developments of Human Societies," February 3rd; Mr. S. K. Ratcliffe on "Aspects of the Social Movement in India," February 17th; Dr. Albert Wilson on "Psychology of Crime," March 9th; Principal Jevons on "Magic," March 23rd; and Professor Graham Brooks on "Recent Phases of Race Contact in the United States," April 6th.

The following meetings have been arranged for the remainder of the session : Sir C. Lewis Tupper, "Sociology and Comparative Politics," on Monday, May 4th, and Mr. E. J. Urwick, "Sociology in Relation to Social Progress," on Monday, May 11th.

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SOCIOLOGY AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS.

Those of us who had the good fortune to hear the inaugural lectures of Professors Hobhouse and Westermarck on the 17th December last will probably remember how wisely cautious both Professors were in the matter of offering definitions of Sociology. Professor Hobhouse indeed implied that Sociology is a science which has the whole social life of man as its sphere; and Professor Westermarck went so far as to say that Sociology might be regarded as the science of social phenomena; but I recollect very well that Professor Hobhouse suggested—at any rate as regards any more elaborate definition—that there might be at least as many definitions as there were sociologists in the room. Later, in the *Editorial* with which the first number of our “Sociological Review” opens, Professor Hobhouse gave us another compact formula, namely that Sociology is the science of society. The social life, he explained, constitutes a distinct field for investigation in the scientific spirit.

To such a terse formula as the science of social phenomena I take no exception. It is analogous to the definition of jurisprudence as the science of positive law. But though fully conscious of the difficulties and dangers of definitions—more especially of such as may be premature—I have found it necessary, for the purposes of the present paper, to attempt a somewhat more detailed definition—or, if you will—description of Sociology. I have noted as very weighty the remarks of Professor L. Stein of the University of Berne that “definitions do not anticipate sciences, but they succeed them,” and that “what Sociology is in need of to-day is not a definition but a programme.” It is, however, the main object of the present paper to suggest that the study of Comparative Politics should be admitted as part of the programme of this Society. It seems, therefore, inevitable that I should explain with, I hope, sufficient clearness what meaning I attach to the term Sociology; but I hope it will be understood that the definition I am about to suggest is devised

for the purposes of this paper only and is, of course, open to continuous revision as the science of Sociology extends.

Amongst the steps which I have taken to enable me to arrive at some conclusion which I could venture to lay before this Society was an examination of the three volumes of our papers published for 1904, 1905 and 1906. I have found there a rather amusing confirmation of what Professor Hobhouse told us in his inaugural lecture about the great diversity of opinions entertained as to the meaning of Sociology. In these three volumes I marked no less than sixty-one passages containing either a definition of Sociology or a description of its aim. It is true that in a few of these cases a writer or speaker either repeats himself or expresses concurrence with some one else; but speaking generally there are different shades, at least, of meaning in almost every passage and in many cases the views expressed are widely divergent and wholly irreconcilable. I have attempted to group them under various heads but an account of this attempt is not really necessary for my present purpose. I will only say that the definition I would ask you to adopt—tentatively and for the matter in hand only—is derived, with certain differences, from one framed by Professor J. Arthur Thomson, of the University of Aberdeen, on the basis of the definition of biology. It is this:—*Sociology is the scientific study of the origin, development, structure, functions, and decay of the ideas and institutions of mankind in successive stages of society.*

With the exception of those who may regard Sociology as the systematic elaboration of social and political ideals, I suppose almost every one would admit that this definition is sufficiently wide. It is, I think, consistent—except that it does not include the future as to which I shall have more to say below—with a description of Sociology given by Professor Hobhouse on the occasion of the able address by the late Dr. J. H. Bridges; and it seems to me quite in harmony with the official prospectus of this Society.

On several points it goes beyond the definition of Professor Thomson. *First*, I include *decay*—noticed in our official prospectus—which his definition omits. Not to speak of survivals—of customs or institutions which outlast their purposes or are applied to purposes for which they were not designed, the whole course of history is strewn with the wrecks of republics, kingdoms and empires. Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, the kingdom of the Hebrews, Greece, great Rome herself, the empire of Charlemagne, the feudal

and absolute monarchies of Western Europe, Mexico, Peru, the Delhi empire, the empire of Napoleon I.; with every one of these names is linked a fall or a decline and fall, a dissolution accomplished before our day, but leaving in every case some message, often a most pregnant one, for the students of the evolution of humanity. *Secondly*, I have added ideas to institutions, not merely because every institution has its subjective side, but mainly because the rudiments of social growth are first discernible in myth no less than in custom; in custom because it is the mother of all institutions; in myth because it is the wild imaginings and childish guesses and tales of primitive folk which later on are superseded by religion and philosophy. If we omit ideas we omit imagination, we omit religion and philosophy themselves, we close our doors to the theory of a dynamic psychology of the race. *Thirdly*, I refer expressly to the successive stages of society because the doctrine of evolution—I do not mean biological evolution in particular, but evolution in the widest sense of the term—seems to me to be the mainspring of Sociology, and we study the progress, and, as I have said, the decay, of phases of society in the hope that in the examination of their history the laws of their evolution will be disclosed.

After this somewhat elaborate explanation of a definition of Sociology it would be unconscionable to weary you with a definition of politics. I need hardly say that the politics of which I have to speak are not those of the daily press and the House of Commons. We have not to discuss the Licensing and Education Bills, the problem of unemployment, or old age pensions, or even matters of foreign policy—the Anglo-Russian agreement, the treatment of Macedonia or the Congo State. I am far from saying that none of these matters have sociological aspects; the contrary is true of every one of them. As Professor Hobhouse, in his *Editorial*, reminded us, the muse of Sociology never ceases to murmur: "*Homo sum, nihil humani alienum a me puto.*" But my concern to-night is with the politics not of the politician but of the philosopher. There was no passage in Professor Hobhouse's singularly able and fruitful *Editorial* that I read with greater satisfaction than that in which he said that our Journal will approach questions of living interest without party bias, and will endeavour to show that they can be approached in a scientific spirit. Were party to invade the discussions of this Society the first result would be that it would put science to flight. To what extent I may depart from the accepted signification of the term politics in political

philosophy, or—if you will—political science, will sufficiently appear as I go on. Here I will only say that I agree with Prof. Hobhouse in his remark made in the *Editorial* to which I have several times referred, that hitherto political philosophy closely resembles general philosophy in its method. The particular branch of politics with which I am now concerned—Comparative Politics—demands another method: the method of science. If we seek the guidance of Comparative Politics we do not enter on the direct quest of any ideal. We do not aim at determining the ends of civil society. We do not assume states of nature which never existed except in the imagination of philosophers and of those who accepted for a gospel the superstitions which they were taught; we do not invent social contracts which never were and never could have been made. In this study ours is the humbler, but as I at least believe, more promising, task of investigating with laborious conscientiousness the actual facts of political evolution.

The origin of Comparative Politics in one sense of the expression, is the same as the origin of Comparative Jurisprudence. In 1871, in the first of his lectures on *Village Communities in the East and West*, Maine observed:—"The enquiry upon which we are engaged can only be said to belong to Comparative Jurisprudence if the word 'Comparative' be used as it is used in such expressions as 'Comparative Philology' and 'Comparative Mythology.' We shall examine a number of parallel phenomena with the view of establishing, if possible, that some of them are related to one another in the order of historical succession. I think," he continued, "I may venture to affirm that the Comparative Method which has already been fruitful of such wonderful results, is not distinguishable in some of its applications from the Historical Method. We take a number of contemporary facts, ideas, and customs," (note, please, that Maine includes ideas) "and we infer the past form of those facts, ideas, and customs not only from historical records of that past form, but from examples of it which have not yet died out of the world, and are still to be found in it." Two and a half years later Freeman, in his valuable book on Comparative Politics, referring, as Maine had done, to Comparative Philology and Comparative Mythology, noted the birth of a third science, the offspring, he asserted, of the two earlier sciences, which applied the Comparative Method directly to the growth of culture itself, the object of research being the nature and origin of the customs, the social institutions, the religious ceremonies of the different nations of the earth. This third science,

he said, still lacked a name, and he added: "Let us hope that a name may be found for it, if not—which may be hopeless—within the stores of our own mother-tongue, yet at least within the range of the foreign words which have been already coined. It would be a pity if a line of inquiry which has brought to light so much, and from which so much more may be looked for, should end by cumbering the dictionary with some fresh word of new and barbarous formation." It appears from a note appended to the text that the barbarism of which he had so acute a fear was the now well-known and generally accepted term Sociology.

Freeman held that the establishment of the Comparative Method was the greatest achievement of his time, marking one of the great stages in the development of the human mind—a stage at least as great and memorable as the revival of Greek and Latin learning. He acknowledges his obligations to Max Müller, Maine, G. H. Waitz and—very particularly—Mr. Tylor; but I cannot find in his Comparative Politics any trace of acquaintance with Comte, Darwin, Huxley or Spenser. I agree with Freeman that there was an immense intellectual advance in the last half of last century—an advance which, in those subjects at least with which I am concerned as a member of this Society, I should say was without parallel. But I do not think that anyone would now single out the discovery or use of the Comparative Method as the preponderating impetus in that advance. That Method has been a part only of a more general process traceable from an earlier date. The new light has spread somewhat gradually so that in the early seventies there was many a man of eminence who had not felt its glow. For my part, I would ascribe the dawn now perceptible in our mental sky—not indeed to the doctrine of evolution itself, for that was not new, but first to the vastly extended application of that doctrine under the stimulus of Darwinism, and, secondly, to the application—advocated already by Comte in the thirties—of the methods of science to the interpretation of the social and political history of mankind.

It is not only in their origin that there is a resemblance between Comparative Politics and Comparative Jurisprudence. Many points of similarity are to be expected because the field of Comparative Politics, though wide enough to include outlying regions of primitive custom where no state has yet been formed, and despotic states possessing, in the popular sense, no constitution, still in what I may call its inmost ring, coincides with the field of constitutional law. In the term Comparative Politics I must distinguish three separate meanings, related to each other in

historical order, and all significant for the purposes of Sociology. Each of these distinctions is equally applicable to Comparative Jurisprudence, and in that science also their historical order is the same. When we compare the political institutions of various nations, races and times, what is the immediate object which we propose to ourselves and, in order to attain that object how do we limit the range of our inquiries? You will remember that Austin identifies Comparative Jurisprudence with general jurisprudence which he contrasts with merely national bodies of law and practically limits to a philosophy dealing with the various legal principles common to the ample and mature systems of refined, that is, of highly civilised, communities. Similarly Mr. Bryce says of one form of Comparative Jurisprudence that it has "a palpably practical aim. It sets out by ascertaining and examining the rules actually in force in modern civilised countries, and proceeds to show by what means these rules deal with problems substantially the same in those countries." A very large part of the work of the Society of Comparative Legislation has the same object—the comparison of the laws of civilised countries at the present time. Now Comparative Politics may be treated in precisely the same way. In sociological discussion we may call this method statical. It is statical as applied to modern civilised communities though, of course, the statical method may be applied to any community or set of communities at any stage of development that may be selected. The application of this method in Comparative Politics to civilised communities may or may not be purely scientific. If it is purely scientific it possesses some conspicuous advantages. The evidence which may be examined is extraordinarily abundant, a great deal of it is readily accessible; doubts can be cleared up by communication with the living men who know. Modern civilised countries alone have reached what is as yet the last chapter in the natural history of mankind; and we may reasonably turn to them if we desire light on the actual or probable contents of the preceding pages. Those communities which have passed through the greatest number of stages, including the latest stages, in the long journey from savagery through barbarism to civilisation will assuredly still bear in their living frames many survivals of their past. Moreover their records will be found to state the essential problem of Sociology which is, How did the modern institutions of our time and civilisation come to be what they are? The examination of modern societies with excursions, I admit, into historical

research, has much scientific value; but it is most difficult to keep such an inquiry within the bounds of science. To say nothing of the bias which is almost inseparable from the estimate of any current facts, there is naturally a nearly irrepressible eagerness to seize upon the results of such an inquiry for philosophical, ethical and practical purposes and to make the immediate purpose not to discover facts, and to settle their classification and causes and relation to evolutionary processes, but, by the elaboration of general theories, new or old, or even by direct imitation, to improve our own political institutions or those of our neighbours or those of the world at large.

The other two forms of Comparative Politics of which I wish to speak may both be described as dynamic, but one of them is primarily limited to the affiliation of institutions, while the other, though it does not neglect affiliation, has a far wider horizon embracing not only political institutions which are derived by what I may call direct descent from rudiments common to the group, but all the political institutions of mankind whatever their origin, whatever the course of their development. As in biology we may examine the growth of a particular species or, on the examination of many species, arrive at biological laws, so one dynamic form of Comparative Politics investigates the political institutions of a group of races, say the Greeks, the Romans and the Teutons, while the other dynamic form, restricted in its operation only by the amount and character of the evidence available, searches alike in the historic and the prehistoric record and in the facts of modern life for indications of those laws of growth which, if we are right in holding that human society is no exception in the system of nature, must, with the advance of science, become more and more clearly discernible as the laws originating, transforming and completing throughout the ages the mass of political phenomena at large.

I have referred to these three forms of Comparative Politics, the statical limited to civilised communities, the first dynamic or affiliative form, and the second dynamic or purely evolutionary form, in order to remind you in a summary way of the contents and range of the science. But it would be inconsistent with past practice, and, much worse than that, a piece of useless pedantry, to insist on the rigid separation of these forms or methods in the practical work of investigation. Take, for instance, such a book as that of Professor John W. Burgess, of Columbia College, on Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law. On the

whole, it is an illustration of the statical method limited in the way I have described. In treating Comparative Constitutional Law he selects the constitutions of Great Britain, the United States, Germany and France, and limits himself to these, and includes in his reasons for this course that these are the most important States in the world and that their constitutions represent substantially all the species of constitutions which have as yet been developed. His aim is an ethical one—to lay down principles of public law; and—quite unscientifically, though not necessarily unphilosophically—he excludes the less perfect systems, disregards the less important States, and passes by those which, in his opinion, are not typical. Nevertheless, his examination of the several constitutions to which he confines his book is largely historical; and this for the obvious reason that it is practically impossible to give an intelligible account of the present condition of such complex organisations as the constitutions of great countries without some reference to their past.

The well-known work of Bluntschli—*The Theory of the State*—marks the transition—in his case, I think, an unconscious transition—between the old political philosophy—very justly described by Professor Hobhouse as one of the roots of Sociology—and Comparative Politics in the scientific sense of the term. Bluntschli regards Political Science as the science of the conditions, nature and development of the State. But what is the State? Comparative Politics considered as a branch of Sociology, is concerned not with any ideal conception of the State, but with the political institutions of all times and races upon which the searchlight of modern inquiry can be brought to bear. Bluntschli says that General Political Science rests upon a universal conception of the State: but he adds on the very next page “Universal history shews us the different stages of development which mankind has lived through since its infancy; each stage has its own peculiar views of the State, its own political formation.” True indeed; but if this is true, where is the universal conception of the State? The Comparative method, he tells us, considers the most important states alongside of one another. He marks off the periods and races which are, in his opinion, significant—the Greeks and Romans in antiquity, the Teutons in the Middle Ages, the English, French and Prussians in modern times,—and then observes “General Political Science has thus to do with the common political consciousness of civilised mankind at the present time, and the fundamental ideas and essentially common institutions which appear in

various ways in different states." Evidently we have here a close analogy to—almost an identity with Austin's conception of Comparative Jurisprudence. Later on Bluntschli strikes a deeper note. "The actual State," he affirms, "is that in which we live and work. Political Science has to do with that alone, and such a State is to be completely explained from a consideration of human nature." Comparative Politics as a branch of Sociology certainly is not limited to modern states; but one method—and an important one—of verifying sociological conclusions is to prove their consistency with a true psychology.

There is much in the writings of Burgess and Bluntschli which leads me to say that, consciously or unconsciously, they are Platonists. They seem to be a search of an ideal political system which has never yet existed on this earth but which is discoverable—perhaps *in nubibus* or *in gremio philosophorum*. They differ from Plato and submit to the influence of modern ideas in their method of search. They collate and compare all that seems best or seems inevitable in certain existing systems. I have pointed out that Burgess cannot dispense with history. The same is true of Bluntschli. When he comes to discuss the forms of the State he is naturally led on to indicate the general character of their development. He traces monarchy—not it will be noted in Africa or in the East—but in Homeric Greece and Ancient Rome, in the forests of the Germany of Tacitus, in the Roman Empire, in the Frankish and Feudal States, in the absolutisms of France and Spain and the threatened but averted absolutism of England, and in the rise and spread of its constitutional form over nearly the whole of Europe. He deals similarly with aristocracy—or to be more accurate nobility—in ancient and modern times, as also with democratic forms of the State. Generally it may be said that he presents a sketch of political development in Western civilisation; and to this part of his work at least Sociology may lay claim.

If Bluntschli is in transition, Freeman—so far as I am aware—was the first English writer to use the term Comparative Politics in a sense in which Sociology would desire to annex it. His immediate aim was strictly scientific. "For our present purpose," he said, "we must throw ourselves into a state of mind to which political constitutions seem as absolutely colourless as grammatical forms—a state of mind to which the change from monarchy to democracy or from democracy to monarchy seems as little a matter of moral praise or blame as the process by which the Latin language

changed into the French or the process by which the High German parted off from the Low. For the purposes then of the study of Comparative Politics, a political constitution is a specimen to be studied, classified, and labelled, as a building or an animal is studied, classified, and labelled by those to whom buildings or animals are objects of study." Of course, when we consider the great part often taken by conspicuous men in effecting changes of political institutions, it is impossible to eliminate moral factors: but here we leave the domain of science for that of history. For scientific as distinguished from historical inquiry the mental attitude described by Freeman appears to me to be correct. But he at once proceeds to limit the range of the Comparative Method in precisely the same way in which it was limited by Maine in his well-known controversy with the McLennans on the subject of the Patriarchal Theory. Freeman distinguishes likenesses between any two political institutions as they may result from direct transmission—such as often occurs in the case of conquered provinces or of colonies—from simple imitation, from similar causes producing similar effects, or from derivation from a common source. It is with this last class of likenesses only that, according to his view, the study of Comparative Politics is concerned. He accepts the theory, taken mainly from the science of language, that the now parted nations once formed one nation, and holds that at the dispersion each band took with it not only a common tongue, a common mythology, a common store of the arts of life but also certain principles and traditions of political life common to the whole family. These offshoots of a common stock, and these alone are the object of Comparative Politics as he expounds the matter: likenesses not due to derivation from a common source he almost entirely disregards. He does not question—indeed he actually asserts—the strong probability that "much that is common to the various branches of the Aryan family comes from sources common to the Aryans along with other divisions of mankind." But he confines himself in the ancient world to Greeks and Romans, and in the ancient, mediæval and modern worlds to Teutons, leaving wider inquiries to others, and contented to be sure of his footing on his own ground. He deals with the State itself, the head of the State, the King, and its body, the Assembly; and finds in Hellenic, Italian and Teutonic antiquity alike, the germs alike of the monarchic, the aristocratic, and the democratic principles of government. Everywhere he puts the tribe before civic or national institutions; he contrasts the Hellenic and Italian

conception of the State as a city with the modern conception of a national State and asserts broadly that "the Teutons passed from the tribal stage into the national stage without ever going through the city stage at all." He traces the idea of kingship from the Homeric king, Zeus-born and Zeus nourished, down to the constitutional monarchies of modern times. He distinguishes between primary and representative assemblies and in primary assemblies finds everywhere a general assembly of the people, a smaller council of hereditary nobles, of elders serving for life, or of magistrates or senators clothed with temporary authority. He recognises of course the comparatively modern device of representation, and contends that the functions of legislator, judge, juror and witness, now so distinct, were originally intermingled, and that all grew out of the Assembly, which being itself the people exercised every kind of political power.

I do not think it is to be regretted that Freeman limited himself to the affiliation of institutions. At the time when he wrote the idea of evolution had not been widely recognised as sweeping over a far greater range than the idea of derivation. Nor had the anthropological data been then collected and collated in their present abundance, enabling us to move in every direction far beyond the centre of Western civilisation, even although from that civilisation light beams wherever else we may be led by the spirit of reason and inquiry. There is this great advantage in the study of Greek, Roman and Teuton institutions that we are at any rate on historical ground, and on ground thoroughly explored by generations of able scholars. The value under modern conditions of classical education is no part of my present theme; but even if we are to suppose that a mediæval system has now outlasted its original purposes, it is at all events a most important and sociologically a most valuable result of its survival that the labours of scholars have kept alive, as part of our common intellectual heritage, a vivid and lasting memory of the only two civilisations which have ever existed that are really comparable with our own. It is as a starting point that such a work as Freeman's helps us in Sociology. The affiliation of institutions traced by a competent scholar in one part of the world suggests numerous points for evolutionary inquiry and its results based upon sound, if not all-embracing, historical investigation may serve as a standard with which to compare conclusions already suggested or to be suggested by the examination of further evidence.

Passing now from Freeman to Herbert Spencer, who, whatever

view may be held of him as a metaphysician, was certainly a great apostle of evolution, we are no longer concerned with the fortunes of a part only of one great race in one continent; we are called to the survey of all races in all continents, indeed in all parts of the globe.

Both with Freeman and with Spencer we are in a climate of science. Spencer is as emphatic as Freeman in insisting on a scientific medium for our vision. In pursuing sociological inquiries into political institutions "we must," he says, "as much as possible, exclude whatever emotions the facts are calculated to excite, and attend solely to the interpretation of the facts." In this pursuit he is untrammelled by the limits of time or space or race voluntarily accepted by others whom I have mentioned. He does not confine himself to mature political systems; he does not deal with Aryan institutions either alone or primarily. A characteristic illustration of his method may be taken from his account of the militant type of society. He expounds certain conditions, manifestly *à priori*, which "have to be fulfilled by a society fitted for preserving itself in presence of antagonist societies." Then he goes on to say "on inspecting sundry societies, past and present, large and small, which are, or have been, characterized in a high degree by militancy, we are shewn, *à posteriori*, that amid the differences due to race, to circumstances, and to degrees of development, there are fundamental similarities of the kinds above inferred *à priori*." And in exemplification he instances modern Dahomey, Russia, ancient Peru, Egypt, Sparta, imperial Rome, imperial Germany, and—as he puts it—England itself "since its late aggressive activities."

I am afraid that Herbert Spencer, when on his favourite theme of the contrast between industrial and military societies, does not always maintain that scientific detachment of mind which he regards as essential to the right interpretation of political phenomena. At any rate his description of the industrial type of society seems open to the criticisms that it is a description of a state of society which has never yet existed and appears unlikely to come into existence in the near future; and that it omits to note that predatory instincts are not destroyed by the discovery of new methods of depredation, and that gambling, and commercial speculation, nay, even certain forms of commerce itself may be as ruthlessly callous to social and domestic misery as ever the military spirit was to mutilation and slaughter.

At the end of his discussion of political institutions Herbert Spencer goes even further and abandoning science for guesswork

asks "through what phases political evolution is likely hereafter to pass." I mention his admiration for industrialism with its implication of the political doctrine of *laissez faire*, because it appears to me to disclose a bias which colours a great deal of his political philosophy. There are other difficulties, both general and special, in estimating the true value of that philosophy. A general difficulty is the deductive character of his system as a whole, supplemented though it be by inductive illustrations. The doubt frequently occurs whether induction has been carried far enough. The special difficulties are explained by Herbert Spencer himself. He was not able to spare more than two years for the investigation of political organisations generally. The task would need a lifetime and he felt that his results would be imperfect. But he found himself compelled to deal with political evolution as part of the general theory of evolution; and hoped for justification from the stability of his leading conclusions after inevitable errors had been knocked away. He utilised, in addition to other materials, those gathered during fourteen years in the *Descriptive Sociology* compiled by his assistants; so that, besides other doubts, when we come across a seemingly dogmatic assertion with nothing better than *à priori* support, there is the uncertainty whether, after all, sufficient proof may not be buried somewhere or other in the ponderous tomes of the *Descriptive Sociology*.

Apart from the theory, on which I have already touched, that industrialism tends to supplant militarism, the leading conclusions are that primarily political development is a process of integration, and that as small, incoherent, social aggregates gain in mass, become integrated and pass from uniformity to multiformity, political organisation becomes more and more defined. The biological analogy, which Herbert Spencer presses so far in the portion of his work which he entitles "Inductions of Sociology," thus remains supreme; as indeed was necessary; for the transformation from homogeneity to heterogeneity, with certain accompanying consequences, is the dominant principle in the Spencerian philosophy.

Nowadays it might perhaps be said that it is superfluous to take trouble to prove such obvious facts as those of political integration and differentiation. The wandering bands supported by the chase, the shepherds and herdsmen moving over wide pastures, the tribes settled down in village communities to till the soil, the villages coalescing to form cities, and the tribes being gradually transformed into nations or states,—the stuff that great Empires or

federations are made of—all this is matter of common knowledge; so too are the formation of castes, and guilds, the classification of society into ruling houses, nobility, freemen, serfs or other dependants, and in ancient times, slaves, or later into royal families, nobles, citizens or the middle classes, and the people or the proletariat, the severance of legislative, judicial and executive functions, and of the official bodies which exercise them. If some such description of political integration and differentiation were now to be regarded as almost too trite to need justification, it must be remembered that in making it I have only very partially followed Spencer, though I have, I believe, adhered to his leading conclusions; that in the past forty years the spread of Darwinism and the integration of Germany and Italy have strongly emphasised the biological analogy; and that Spencerian ideas, more or less amalgamated with other metal, have long been part of the current coin of periodical literature. Even if it be granted that political integration and differentiation were before Spencer's day already patent to some historical observers Spencer deserves the credit of showing their connection with the general theory of evolution as he stated it.

It is no part of my present intention to offer a criticism of Spencer's political philosophy. I have alluded to him merely in illustration of the evolutionary aspect of comparative politics. But I may perhaps be permitted to offer an illustration, not by way of criticism, but by way of confirmation of the view that specialisation of function is a concomitant of political progress. So far as I can recall a mental process which occurred now some thirty years ago, the extremely rapid severance between different government departments in India generally and more particularly in my own Province, the Punjab,—a severance which I then took, as I take it now, to be covered by Spencer's formula—was one of the chief circumstances which induced me to say in a law-book, which I wrote about that time, that “the doctrine of evolution has overstepped the domain of merely physical science, and has asserted its authority, not only in the realm of law, but in the whole territory of social existence.” In the Punjab political differentiation has been quite strikingly exhibited. After the second Sikh war the government of the country was entrusted to a Board of Administration consisting of Henry Lawrence, John Lawrence, and Mr. Mansel. Lord Dalhousie's despatch constituting the Board declared that “every civil functionary from the Board to the *Kardar*”—the *Kardar* was the Sikh local official whose place has been taken by the *Tahsildar*

or sub-collector—" will be vested with judicial, fiscal, and magisterial powers." When I came to the Punjab in 1871 patriarchal rule was already on the wane, the Board had been severed into a Lieutenant Governor, a chief court then of three, now of five judges, and a so-called Financial Commissioner who was really the Revenue minister for the Province. The District Officer was not so much of a king in his own district as he had been some years before: and he now sometimes complains that he is the servant not only of the Local Government, as no doubt he should be, but of some fifteen separate Government Departments. This multiplication of official functionaries is called the growth of departmentalism. Observe that I do not say whether it is a good thing or a bad thing. I merely note its consistency with the laws of political development.

I mentioned early in this paper that my main object this evening was to suggest that Comparative Politics should be admitted as part of the programme of our Society. I have put forward a tentative definition of Sociology—subject to amendment with the advance of the science—and I have described at some length the science of Comparative Politics, as I understand it, in its statical, affiliative and evolutionary aspects. The tentative definition includes the scientific study of the institutions of mankind in successive stages of society. I hope that by putting the definition and the description together I may have succeeded in my aim; and may have convinced you that the scientific examination of political evolution on the basis of ascertained facts ought to be one of the objects of Sociology.

I must, however, add the caution that we must avoid oversanguine anticipations of the results to be obtained by the application of the Comparative Method in politics. We may indicate broadly successive stages of political growth—tribal, præ-feudal, feudal, monarchic, constitutional, democratic—but the process of evolution itself is not perfect, and we must not allow ourselves to suppose that every society has necessarily in the past gone through every stage which, on a generalised survey of political evolution as a whole, would be regarded as earlier than the stage in which we find it. More easily could we maintain the converse proposition that every mature society has, in its progress, at one time or another, overleapt some recognised stage.* But it is a great gain if

* The passage in the text was suggested by the following excellent remarks of Sir Frederick Pollock and the late Professor F. W. Maitland. They are copied from Sir Frederick Pollock's *Commentary on Maine's Ancient Law*, pp. 22 and 178.

Sir Frederick Pollock writes: "We constantly speak of one rule or custom as belonging to a more advanced stage of ideas than another; but this does not mean that in every society where it is found it must have been preceded in fact by a less advanced institution belonging to the next lower grade of culture. Imitation of neighbours or conquerors, or peculiar local conditions may materially shorten a given stage in the normal development or even cut it out altogether. What we do mean is that the order is not found reversed. Chalk is not everywhere in England, nor red sandstone; but where red sandstone is we know that chalk is not below it. Iron was known in Africa so early that Africa may be said not to have had a bronze age; but this does not make it more credible that any tribe should ever have abandoned iron for bronze. In like manner there may have been tribes that had law-givers almost or quite as soon as they had judges. But no one has heard of a nation which, having acquired a body of legislation, reverted to customary law."

Professor Maitland said: "Even had our anthropologists at their command material that would justify them in prescribing a normal programme for the human race, and in decreeing that every independent portion of mankind must, if it is to move at all, move through one fated series of stages, which may be designated as Stage A, Stage B, Stage C, and so forth, we should still have to face the fact that the rapidly progressive groups have been just those which have not been independent, which have not worked out their own salvation, but have appropriated alien ideas, and have thus been enabled, for anything that we can tell, to leap from Stage A to Stage X without passing through any intermediate stages. Our Anglo-Saxon ancestors did not arrive at the alphabet, or at the Nicene Creed, by traversing a long series of stages; they leapt to the one and to the other."—*Domesday Book and Beyond*, p. 345.

we know for certain that particular stages are earlier than others, and if we give that knowledge practical effect. With societies, as with individuals, mental progress—and therefore the progress of institutions corresponding to ideas—proceeds at extraordinarily different rates of speed. Not only do direct transmission and imitation transform normal growth but like conditions leading to like functions are found at very different stages of culture. The conception, however, of a normal political growth, which must be carefully handled if the results are not to be noxious and dangerous, has a deep political importance in such an Empire as ours, comprising, as it does, races in very various stages—perhaps in every stage—of political development. In proportion as we grasp and apply the principles to be gathered from Comparative Politics we shall be likely to avoid the perilous anachronism of imposing on the less advanced societies political institutions for which they are not prepared.

That is at least one ethical and political consequence which may follow from the study advocated; and there may be others. I have dwelt on the necessity of treating Comparative Politics in a

purely scientific spirit but I would guard against the possible misapprehension that the study, as I conceive of it, is without ethical import. As with the whole field of Sociology so also is it with this part of it. Scientific inquiry, as such, has no practical aim; it seeks truth and truth alone; but its practical results are enormous. Faith in Sociology means faith in scientific method, and I have faith in the application of scientific methods to politics. Whatever we may discover to have been the tendencies of the past, whatever we may suppose to be the tendencies of the present, we are the lords and masters, not the slaves, of the laws of nature. To know them aright is to be able to command them; and it is here that we see the ethical import of scientific political inquiries. Your ideal may be monarchical, aristocratic, democratic, what you will, but science declares that you must measure your ideal against facts; and, for any practical and lasting realisations, must utilise the laws which it points out: unless indeed by ignoring those laws you bring on greater mischief where you seek amelioration. In politics, as in our relations with physical nature, suffering is the penalty of ignorance.

We must admit, of course, that the moral and political world does not stand still. Unceasing change is one of the laws not merely of organic evolution but of the universe. The earth did not pause upon its axis or in its course around the sun while Newton was identifying terrestrial and celestial mechanics. We cannot put off dealing with the evils of the day until we have before us the scientific conclusions of Sociology. The dangers of vicious systems of education, of poverty rebelling against its miseries, of class interests driven to fierce rivalry by the desire or possession of wealth, of crushing monopolies, of armaments designed for the slaughter of thousands of men in the prime of life by war between civilised countries,—these must be faced with the time-worn weapons of *à priori* doctrines and empirical conclusions drawn from statistics and imperfect observation of current affairs; and also—not to overstate the case—from the consolidated experience of social and political necessities which is part of the social heritage of civilisation. But granting that this experience, amassed but not yet fully organised, is, in some degree, a means of deliverance, is it too much to hope that at last, after groping our way with many stumblings through the blindness and the darkness of the ages, we perceive, I will not say daylight but the far-off glimmer of a dawn promising an eventual illumination to enable us to see, with some approach to certitude, what are the true lines of advance? And if

these true lines can be ascertained will it not be the duty of ourselves or of posterity to make them practically serviceable by the conversion and use of popular sentiment—the strongest force in the world, a force stronger than ironclads or repeating rifles or machine guns because it is ultimately that force itself which forbids or commands, ratifies or reprobates their use for destruction and massacre? I for one will not abandon the hope to which I have referred until it is conclusively demonstrated that Sociology is merely one more of the mind-begotten phantoms which have deluded philosophers and misled the crowd. Until that demonstration is forced upon me I shall continue to believe that the application of scientific methods to the interpretation of social and political facts will increase the strength of humanity in its unceasing contest with the giant evils which oppress mankind.

C. L. TUPPER.

HERD INSTINCT AND ITS BEARING ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CIVILISED MAN.

I. INTRODUCTION.

Few subjects have led to discussion so animated and prolonged as has the definition of the science of sociology. It is therefore necessary, as it is hoped that this essay may be capable of sociological applications, that the writer should define the sense in which he uses the term. By calling it a science is of course denoted the view that sociology is a body of knowledge derived from experience of its material and co-ordinated so that it shall be useful in forecasting and, if possible, directing the future behaviour of that material. This material is man in society or associated man.

Sociology, therefore, is obviously but another name for psychology in the widest sense, for, that is to say, a psychology which can include all the phenomena of the mind without the exception even of the most complex, and is essentially practical in a fuller sense than any orthodox psychology which has yet appeared.

Sociology has, of course, often been described as social psychology and has been regarded as differing from ordinary psychology in being concerned with those forms of mental activity which man displays in his social relations, the assumption being made that society brings to light a special series of mental aptitudes with which ordinary psychology, dealing as it does essentially with the individual, is not mainly concerned. It may be stated at once that it is a principal thesis of this essay that this attitude is a fallacious one and has been responsible for the comparative sterility of the psychological method in sociology. The two fields—the social and the individual—are regarded here as absolutely continuous; all human psychology it is contended must be the psychology of associated man since man as a solitary animal is unknown to us, and every individual must present the characteristic reactions of the social animal if such exist. The only difference between the two branches of the science lies in the fact that ordinary psychology makes no claim to be practical in the sense of conferring useful foresight; whereas sociology does profess to deal with the complex unsimplified problems of ordinary life, ordinary life being by a biological necessity social life. If,

therefore, sociology is to be defined as psychology it would be better to call it practical or applied psychology than social psychology.

The first effect of the complete acceptance of this point of view is to render very obvious the difficulty and immensity of the task of sociology; indeed the possibility of such a science is sometimes denied. For example at an early meeting of the Sociological Society Professor Karl Pearson expressed the opinion that the birth of a science of sociology must await the obstetrical genius of some one man of the calibre of Darwin or Pasteur. At a later meeting Mr. H. G. Wells went further and maintained that as a science sociology not only does not but cannot exist.

Such scepticism appears in general to be based upon the idea that a practical psychology in the sense already defined is impossible. According to some this is because the human will introduces into conduct an element necessarily incommensurable, which will always render the behaviour of man subject to the occurrence of true variety and therefore beyond the reach of scientific generalisation; according to another and a more deterministic school, human conduct while not theoretically liable to true variety in the philosophic sense or to the intrusion of the will as a first cause, is in fact so complex that no reduction of it to a complete system of generalisations will be possible until science in general has made very great progress beyond its present position. Both views lead in practice to attitudes of equal pessimism towards sociology.

The observable complexity of human conduct is, undoubtedly, very great and discouraging. The problem of generalising from it presents however one important peculiarity which is not very evident at first sight. It is that as observers we are constantly pursued by man's own account of his behaviour; that of a given act our observation is always more or less mixed with a knowledge, derived from our own feelings, of how it seems to the author of the act, and it is much more difficult than is often supposed to disentangle and allow for the influence of this factor. Each of us has the strongest conviction that his conduct and beliefs are fundamentally individual and reasonable and in essence independent of external causation, and each is ready to furnish a series of explanations of his conduct consistent with these principles. These explanations, moreover, are the ones which will occur spontaneously to the observer watching the conduct of his fellows.

It is suggested here that the sense of the unimaginable

complexity and variability of human affairs is derived less than is generally supposed from direct observation and more from this second factor of introspectual interpretation which may be called a kind of anthropomorphism. A reaction against this in human psychology is no less necessary therefore than was in comparative psychology the similar movement the extremer developments of which are associated with the names of Bethe, Beer, Uexküll and Nuel. It is contended that it is this anthropomorphism in the general attitude of psychologists, which, by disguising the observable uniformities of human conduct has rendered so slow the establishment of a really practical psychology. Little as the subject has been studied from the point of view of a thorough-going objectivism, yet even now certain generalisations summarising some of the ranges of human belief and conduct might already be formulated. Such an enquiry, however, is not the purpose of this essay and these considerations have been advanced, in the first place, to suggest that theory indicates that the problem of sociology is not so hopelessly difficult as it at first appears, and secondly, as a justification for an examination of certain aspects of human conduct by the deductive method. The writer would contend that while that method is admittedly dangerous when used as a substitute for a kind of investigation in which deductive processes are reduced to a minimum, yet it has its special field of usefulness in cases where the significance of previously accumulated facts has been misinterpreted, or where the exacter methods have proved unavailing through the investigator having been without indications of precisely what facts were likely to be the most fruitful subject for measurement. This essay, then, will be an attempt to obtain by a deductive consideration of conduct some guidance for the application of those methods of measurement and co-ordination of facts upon which all true science is based.

A very little consideration of the problem of conduct makes it plain that it is in the region of feeling, using the term in its broadest sense, that the key is to be sought. Feeling has relations to instinct as obvious and fundamental as are the analogies between intellectual processes and reflex action; it is with the consideration of instinct, therefore, that this paper must now be occupied.

II. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF INSTINCT.

Many years ago in a famous chapter of his Text Book of Psychology, William James analysed and established with a quite

final delicacy and precision the way in which instinct appears to introspection. He shewed that the impulse of an instinct reveals itself as an axiomatically obvious proposition, as something which is so clearly "sense" that any idea of discussing its basis is foolish or wicked.*

When we recognise that decisions due to instinct come into the mind in a form so characteristic and easily identifiable we are encouraged at once to ask whether all decisions having this form must be looked upon as essentially of instinctive origin. Enquiry, however, reveals the fact that the bulk of opinion based upon assumptions having these introspectual characters is so vast that any answer but a negative one would seem totally incompatible with current conceptions of the nature of human thought.†

Many attempts have been made to explain the behaviour of man as dictated by instinct. He is in fact moved by the promptings of such obvious instincts as self-preservation, nutrition and sex enough to render the enterprise hopeful and its early spoils enticing. So much can so easily be generalised under these three impulses that the temptation to declare that all human behaviour could be resumed under them was irresistible. These early triumphs of materialism soon however began to be troubled by

* "Not one man in a billion, when taking his dinner, ever thinks of utility. He eats because the food tastes good and makes him want more. If you ask him why he should want to eat more of what tastes like that, instead of revering you as a philosopher he will probably laugh at you for a fool. The connexion between the savoury sensation and the act it awakens is for him absolute and *selbstverständlich*, an 'a priori synthesis' of the most perfect sort needing no proof but its own evidence. . . . To the metaphysician alone can such questions occur as: Why do we smile, when pleased, and not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd as to a single friend? Why does a particular maiden turn our wits so upside down? The common man can only say, "*Of course* we smile, *of course* our heart palpitates at the sight of the crowd, *of course* we love the maiden, that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form, so palpably and flagrantly made from all eternity to be loved."—W. James, "Principles of Psychology," vol. xi, p. 386. The chapter was first impulses of instinct.

† This introspectual quality of the "a priori synthesis of the most perfect sort" is found, for example, in the assumptions upon which is based the bulk of opinion in matters of church and state, the family, justice, probity, honour, purity, crime and so forth. Yet clearly we cannot say that there is a specific instinct concerned with each of these subjects, for that, to say the least, would be to postulate an unimaginable multiplicity of instincts, for the most part wholly without any conceivable biological usefulness. For example, there are considerable difficulties in imagining an instinct for making people Wesleyans or Roman Catholics, or an instinct for making people regard British family life as the highest product of civilisation, yet there can be no question that these positions are based upon assumptions having all the characters described by James as belonging to the impulses of instinct.

doubt. Man, in spite of his obvious duty to the contrary, would continue so often not to preserve himself, not to nourish himself and to prove resistant to the blandishments of sex, that the attempt to squeeze his behaviour into these three categories began to involve an increasingly obvious and finally intolerable amount of pushing and pulling, as well as so much pretence that he was altogether 'in,' when, quite plainly, so large a part of him remained 'out,' that the enterprise had to be given up and it was once more discovered that man escaped and must always escape any complete generalisation by science.

A more obvious inference would have been that there was some other instinct which had not been taken into account, some impulse, perhaps, which would have no very evident object as regarded the individual but would chiefly appear as modifying the other instincts and leading to new combinations in which the primitive instinctive impulse was unrecognisable as such. A mechanism such as this very evidently would produce a series of actions in which uniformity might be very difficult to recognise by direct observation, but in which it would be very obvious if the characters of this unknown 'x' were available.

Now it is a striking fact that amongst animals there are some whose conduct can be generalised very readily in the categories of self-preservation, nutrition and sex, while there are others whose conduct cannot be thus summarised. The behaviour of the tiger and the cat is simple, and easily comprehensible, presenting no unassimilable anomalies, whereas that of the dog with his conscience, his humour, his terror of loneliness, his capacity for devotion to a brutal master, or that of the bee with her selfless devotion to the hive furnishes phenomena which no sophistry can assimilate without the aid of a fourth instinct. But little examination will shew that the animals whose conduct it is difficult to generalise under the three primitive instinctive categories are gregarious. If then it can be shewn that gregariousness is of a biological significance approaching in importance that of the other instincts we may expect to find in it the source of these anomalies of conduct, and if we can also shew that man is gregarious we may look to it for the definition of the unknown 'x' which might account for the complexity of human behaviour.

III. BIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF GREGARIOUSNESS.

The animal kingdom presents two relatively sudden and very striking advances in complexity and in the size of the unit upon

which natural selection acts unmodified. These advances consist in the aggregation of units which were previously independent and exposed to the full normal action of natural selection, and the two instances are, of course, the passage from the unicellular to the multicellular and from the solitary to the social.

It is obvious that in the multicellular organism individual cells lose some of the capacities of the unicellular—reproductive capacity is regulated and limited, nutrition is no longer possible in the old simple way and response to stimuli comes only in certain channels. In return for these sacrifices we may say, metaphorically, that the action of natural selection is withdrawn from within the commune. Unfitness of a given cell or group of cells can only be eliminated through its effect upon the whole organism. The latter is less sensitive to the vagaries of a single cell than is the organism of which the single cell is the whole. It would seem, therefore, that there is now allowed a greater range of variability for the individual cells, and perhaps, therefore, an increased richness of the material to be selected from. Variations, moreover, which were not immediately favourable, would now have a chance of surviving.

Looked at in this way multicellularity presents itself as an escape from the rigour of natural selection which for the unicellular organism had narrowed competition to so desperate a struggle that any variation outside the straitest limits was fatal, for even though it might be favourable in one respect it would, in so small a kingdom, involve a loss in another. The only way, therefore, for further advantageous elaboration to occur was by the enlargement of the competing unit. Various species of multicellular organisms might in time be supposed in turn to reach the limit of their powers. Competition would be at its maximum, smaller and smaller variations would be capable of producing serious results. In the species where these conditions prevail an enlargement of the unit is imminent if progress is to occur. It is no longer possible by increases of physical complexity and the apparently inevitable sequence is the appearance of gregariousness. The necessity and inevitableness of the change are shewn by its scattered development in very widely separated regions (for example, in insects and in mammals) just as, we may suspect, multicellularity appeared.

Gregariousness seems frequently to be regarded as a somewhat superficial character, scarcely deserving, as it were, the name of an instinct, advantageous it is true, but not of fundamental im-

portance or likely to be deeply ingrained in the inheritance of the species. This attitude may be due to the fact that among mammals at any rate the appearance of gregariousness has not been accompanied by any very gross physical changes which are obviously associated with it.*

To whatever it may be due, this method of regarding the social habit is, in the opinion of the present writer, not justified by the facts and prevents the attainment of conclusions of considerable fruitfulness.

A study of bees and ants shews at once how fundamental the importance of gregariousness may become. The individual in such communities is completely incapable, often physically, of existing apart from the community and this fact at once gives rise to the suspicion that even in communities less closely knit than those of the ant and the bee the individual may in fact be more dependent on communal life than appears at first sight.

Another very striking piece of general evidence of the significance of gregariousness as no mere late acquirement is the remarkable coincidence of its occurrence with that of exceptional grades of intelligence or the possibility of very complex reactions to environment. It can scarcely be regarded as an unmeaning accident that the dog, the horse, the ape, the elephant and man are all social animals. The instances of the bee and the ant are perhaps the most amazing. Here the advantages of gregariousness seem actually to outweigh the most prodigious differences of structure, and we find a condition which is often thought of as a mere habit, capable of enabling the insect nervous system to compete in the complexity of its power of adaptation with that of the higher vertebrates.

If it be granted that gregariousness is a phenomenon of profound biological significance and one likely therefore to be responsible for an important group of instinctive impulses, the next step in our argument is the discussion of the question as to whether man is to be regarded as gregarious in the full sense of the word, whether, that is to say, the social habit may be expected to furnish him with a mass of instinctive impulse as mysteriously potent as the impulses of self-preservation, nutrition and sex. Can we look to the social instinct for an explanation of some of the "*a priori* syntheses of the most perfect sort needing no proof but their own evidence" which are not explained by

* Among gregarious insects there are of course physical changes arising out of and closely dependent on the social organisation.

the three primitive categories of instinct, and remain stumbling blocks in the way of generalising the conduct of man.

The conception of man as a gregarious animal is, of course, extremely familiar; one frequently meets with it in the writings of psychologists and sociologists and it has obtained a respectable currency with the lay public. It has indeed become so hackneyed that it is the first duty of a writer who maintains the thesis that its significance is not even yet fully understood, to shew that the popular conception of it has been far from exhaustive. As used hitherto the idea seems to have had a certain vagueness which greatly impaired its practical value. It furnished an interesting analogy for some of the behaviour of man, or was enunciated as a half serious illustration by a writer who felt himself to be in an exceptionally sardonic vein, but it was not at all widely looked upon as a definite fact of biology which must have consequences as precise and a significance as ascertainable as the secretion of the gastric juice or the refracting apparatus of the eye. One of the most familiar attitudes was that which regarded the social instinct as a late development. The family was looked upon as the primitive unit; from it developed the tribe and by the spread of family feeling to the tribe the social instinct arose. It is interesting that the psychological attack upon this position has been anticipated by sociologists and anthropologists, and that it is already being recognised that an undifferentiated horde rather than the family must be regarded as the primitive basis of human society.

The most important consequence of this vague way of regarding the social habit of man has been that no exhaustive investigation of its psychological corollaries has been carried out. When we see the enormous effect in determining conduct that the gregarious inheritance has in the bee, the ant, the horse or the dog, it is quite plain that if the gregariousness of man had been seriously regarded as a definite fact a great amount of work would have been done in determining precisely what reactive tendencies it had marked out in man's mind. Unfortunately, the amount of precise work of this kind has been very small.

From the biological standpoint the probability of gregariousness being a primitive and fundamental quality in man seems to be considerable. As already pointed out, like the other great enlargement of the biological unit, but in a much more easily recognisable degree, it would appear to have the effect of enlarging the advantages of variation. Varieties not immediately favourable,

varieties departing widely from the standard, varieties even unfavourable to the individual may be supposed to be given by it a chance of survival. Now the course of the development of man seems to present many features incompatible with its having proceeded amongst isolated individuals exposed to the unmodified action of natural selection. Changes so serious as the assumption of the upright posture, the reduction in the jaw and its musculature, the reduction in the acuity of smell and hearing, demand, if the species is to survive, either a delicacy of adjustment with the compensatingly developing intelligence so minute as to be almost inconceivable, or the existence of some kind of protective enclosure, however imperfect, in which the varying individuals may be sheltered from the direct influence of natural selection. The existence of such a mechanism would compensate losses of physical strength in the individual by the greatly increased strength of the larger unit, of the unit, that is to say, upon which natural selection still acts unmodified.

A realisation, therefore, of this function of gregariousness relieves us from the necessity of supposing that the double variations of diminishing physical and increasing mental capacity always occurred *pari passu*. The case for the primitiveness of the social habit would seem to be still further strengthened by a consideration of such widely aberrant developments as speech and the æsthetic activities but a discussion of them here would involve an unnecessary indulgence of biological speculation.

IV. MENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GREGARIOUS ANIMAL.

(a) *Current Views in Sociology and Psychology.*

If we now assume that gregariousness may be regarded as a fundamental quality of man, it remains to discuss the effects we may expect it to have produced upon the structure of his mind. It would be well, however, first, to attempt to form some idea of how far investigation has already gone in this direction. It is of course clear that no complete review of all that has been said concerning a conception so familiar can be attempted here, and, even if it were possible, it would not be a profitable enterprise, as the great bulk of writers have not seen in the idea anything to justify a fundamental examination of it. What will be done here, therefore, will be to mention a few representative writers who have dealt with the subject, and to give in a summary way the characteristic features of their exposition.

As far as I am aware, the first person to point out any of

the less obvious biological significance of gregariousness was Professor Karl Pearson.*

He called attention to the enlargement of the selective unit affected by the appearance of gregariousness, and to the fact that therefore within the group the action of natural selection becomes modified. This conception had, as is well known, escaped the insight of Haeckel, of Spencer and of Huxley, and Pearson shewed into what confusions in their treatment of the problems of society these three had been led by the oversight.† For example may be mentioned the famous antithesis of the "cosmical" and the "ethical" processes expounded in Huxley's Romanes Lecture. It was quite definitely indicated by Pearson that the so-called ethical process, the appearance, that is to say, of altruism, is to be regarded as a directly instinctive product of gregariousness, and as natural, therefore, as any other instinct.

These very clear and valuable conceptions do not seem, however, to have received from biologists the attention they deserved, and as far as I am aware their author has not continued further the examination of the structure of the gregarious mind, which would undoubtedly have yielded in his hands further conclusions of equal value.

We may next examine the attitude of a modern sociologist. I have chosen for this purpose the work of an American sociologist, Lester Ward, and propose briefly to indicate his position as it may be gathered from his book entitled "Pure Sociology."‡

The task of summarising the views of any sociologist seems to me to be rendered difficult by a certain vagueness in outline of the positions laid down, a certain tendency for a description of fact to run into an analogy, and an analogy to fade into an illustration. It would be discourteous to doubt that these tendencies are necessary to the fruitful treatment of the material of sociology, but, as they are very prominent in connection with

* Many references to the subject will be found in his published works, for example in "The Grammar of Science," in "National Life from the Standpoint of Science," and in "The Chances of Death." In the collection of Essays last named, the essay entitled "Socialism and Natural Selection" deals most fully with the subject.

† "Socialism and Natural Selection" in "The Chances of Death."

‡ Lester F. Ward. "Pure Sociology: a Treatise on the Origin and Spontaneous development of Society." New York. The Macmillan Co. 1903. I do not venture to decide whether this work may be regarded as representative of orthodox sociology, if there be such a thing; I have made the choice because of the author's capacity for fresh and ingenious speculation, and his obviously wide knowledge of sociological literature.

the subject of gregariousness, it is necessary to say that one is fully conscious of the difficulties they give rise to, and feels that they may have led one into unintentional misrepresentation.

With this proviso it may be stated that the writings of Ward produce the feeling that he regards gregariousness as furnishing but few precise and primitive characteristics of the human mind. The mechanisms through which group "instinct" acts would seem to be to him largely rational processes, and group instinct itself is regarded as a relatively late development more or less closely associated with a rational knowledge that it "pays." For example, he says, "For want of a better name, I have characterised this social instinct, or instinct of race safety, as religion, but not without clearly perceiving that it constitutes the primordial undifferentiated plasm out of which have subsequently developed all the more important human institutions. This . . . if it be not an instinct, is at least the human homologue of animal instinct, and served the same purpose *after the instincts had chiefly disappeared*, and when the egotistic reason would otherwise have rapidly carried the race to destruction in its mad pursuit of pleasure for its own sake."*

That gregariousness has to be considered amongst the factors shaping the tendencies of the human mind has long been recognised by the more empirical psychologists. In the main, however, it has been regarded as a quality perceptible only in the characteristics of actual crowds, that is to say, assemblies of persons being and acting in association. This conception has served to evoke a certain amount of valuable work in the observation of the behaviour of crowds.†

Owing, however, to the failure to investigate as the more essential question the effects of gregariousness in the mind of the normal individual man, the theoretical side of crowd psychology has remained incomplete and relatively sterile.

There is, however, one exception, in the case of the work of Boris Sidis. In a book entitled "The Psychology of Suggestion" ‡ he has described certain psychical qualities as necessarily

* "Pure Sociology," p. 134. Italics not in original. Passages of a similar tendency will be found on pp. 200 and 556.

† For example, the excellent little book of Gustave Le Bon—"Psychologie des Foules," Paris: Felix Alcan—in which are formulated many generalisations of great usefulness.

‡ "The Psychology of Suggestion: a Research into the subconscious nature of Man and Society," by Boris Sidis, with an Introduction by Prof. Wm. James. New York. 1903.

associated with the social habit in the individual as in the crowd. His position, therefore, demands some discussion. The fundamental element in it is the conception of the normal existence in the mind of a subconscious self. This subconscious or subwaking self is regarded as embodying the "lower" and more obviously brutal qualities of man. It is irrational, imitative, credulous, cowardly, cruel, and lacks all individuality, will and self control.* This personality takes the place of the normal personality during hypnosis and when the individual is one of an active crowd, as, for example, in riots, panics, lynchings, revivals, and so forth.

Of the two personalities—the subconscious and the normal—the former alone is suggestible; the successful operation of suggestion implies the recurrence, however transient, of a disaggregation of personality, and the emergence of the subwaking self as the controlling mind (pp. 89 and 90). It is this suggestibility of the subwaking self which enables man to be a social animal. "Suggestibility is the cement of the herd, the very soul of the primitive social group Man is a social animal, no doubt, but he is social because he is suggestible. Suggestibility, however, requires disaggregation of consciousness, hence society presupposes a cleavage of the mind. Society and mental epidemics are intimately related; for the social gregarious self is the suggestible subconscious self" (p. 310).

Judged from our present standpoint, the most valuable feature of Sidis' book is that it calls attention to the undoubtedly intimate relation between gregariousness and suggestibility. The mechanism, however, by which he supposes suggestibility to come into action is more open to criticism. The conception of a permanent subconscious self is one to which it is doubtful whether the evidence compels assent.† The essential difference, however, which Sidis' views present from those to be developed below, lies in his regarding suggestibility as being something which is liable to intrude upon the normal mind as the result of a disaggregation of consciousness, instead of as a necessary quality of every normal mind, continually present, and an inalienable accompaniment of human thought. A careful reading of his book gives a very clear

* "Psychology of Suggestion," p. 295.

† In this connexion the "Symposium on the Subconscious" in the "Journal of Abnormal Psychology," vol. ii, Nos. 1 and 2, is of much interest. The discussion is contributed to by Münsterberg, Ribot, Jastrow, Pierre Janet and Morton Prince.

impression that he looks upon suggestibility as a disreputable and disastrous legacy of the brute and the savage, undesirable in civilised life, opposed to the satisfactory development of the normal individuality, and certainly in no way associated at its origin with a quality so valuable as altruism. Moreover, one gets the impression that he regards suggestibility as being manifested chiefly, if not solely, in crowds, in panics, revivals, and in conditions generally in which the element of close association is well marked.

(b) *Deductive Considerations.*

The functions of the gregarious habit in a species may broadly be defined as offensive or defensive, or both. Whichever of these modes it has assumed in the animal under consideration, it will be correlated with effects which will be divisible into two classes—the general characteristics of the social animal, and the special characteristics of the form of social habit possessed by the given animal. The dog and the sheep illustrate well the characteristics of the two simple forms of gregariousness—offensive and defensive.

I. *Special Characteristics of the Gregarious Animal.*

These need not be dealt with here, as they are the qualities which for the most part have been treated of by psychologists in such work as has been done on the corollaries of gregariousness in man. This is because they are qualities which are most evident in man's behaviour when he acts in crowds, and are then evident as something temporarily superadded to the possibilities of the isolated individual. Hence it has come about that they have been taken for the most part as constituting the whole of man's gregarious inheritance, while the possibility that that inheritance might have equally important consequences for the individual has been relatively neglected.

II. *General Characteristics of the Gregarious Animal.*

The cardinal quality of the herd is homogeneity. It is clear that the great advantage of the social habit is to enable large numbers to act as one, whereby in the case of the hunting gregarious animal strength in pursuit and attack is at once increased to beyond that of the creatures preyed upon,* and in

*The wolf pack forms an organism, it is interesting to note, stronger than the lion or the tiger; capable of compensating for the loss of members; inexhaustible in pursuit, and therefore capable by sheer strength of hunting down without wile or artifice the fleetest animals; capable finally of consuming all the food it kills, and thus possessing another considerable advantage over the large solitary carnivora in not tending uselessly to exhaust its food supply. The advantages of the social habit in carnivora is well shown by the survival of wolves in civilized countries even to-day.

protective socialism the sensitiveness of the new unit to alarms is greatly in excess of that of the individual member of the flock.

To secure these advantages of homogeneity, it is evident that the members of the herd must possess sensitiveness to the behaviour of their fellows. The individual isolated will be of no meaning, the individual as part of the herd will be capable of transmitting the most potent impulses. Each member of the flock tending to follow his neighbour, and in turn to be followed, each is in some sense capable of leadership; but no lead will be followed that departs widely from normal behaviour. A lead will only be followed from its resemblance to the normal. If the leader go so far ahead as definitely to cease to be in the herd, he will necessarily be ignored.

The original in conduct, that is to say resistiveness to the voice of the herd, will be suppressed by natural selection; the wolf which does not follow the impulses of the herd will be starved; the sheep which does not respond to the flock will be eaten.

Again, not only will the individual be responsive to impulses coming from the herd, but he will treat the herd as his normal environment. The impulse to be in and always to remain with the herd will have the strongest instinctive weight. Anything which tends to separate him from his fellows, as soon as it becomes perceptible as such, will be strongly resisted.

So far, we have regarded the gregarious animal objectively. We have seen that he behaves as if the herd were the only environment in which he can live, that he is especially sensitive to impulses coming from the herd, and quite differently affected by the behaviour of animals not in the herd. Let us now try to estimate the mental aspects of these impulses. Suppose a species in possession of precisely the instinctive endowments which we have been considering to be also self-conscious, and let us ask what will be the forms under which these phenomena will present themselves in its mind. In the first place, it is quite evident that impulses derived from herd feeling will enter the mind with the value of instincts—they will present themselves as “*a priori* syntheses of the most perfect sort needing no proof but their own evidence.” They will not, however, it is important to remember, necessarily always give this quality to the same specific acts, but will shew this great distinguishing characteristic that they may give to *any opinion whatever* the characters of instinctive belief, making it into an “*a priori synthesis*,” so that we shall expect to find acts which it would be absurd to look

upon as the results of specific instincts carried out with all the enthusiasm of instinct, and displaying all the marks of instinctive behaviour. The failure to recognise this appearance of herd impulse as a tendency, as a power which can confer instinctive sanctions on any part of the field of belief or action, has prevented the social habit of man from attracting as much of the attention of psychologists as it might profitably have done.

In interpreting into mental terms the consequences of gregariousness, we may conveniently begin with the simplest. The conscious individual will feel an unanalysable primary sense of comfort in the actual presence of his fellows, and a similar sense of discomfort in their absence. It will be obvious truth to him that it is not good for the man to be alone. Loneliness will be a real terror, insurmountable by reason.

Again, certain conditions will become secondarily associated with presence with, or absence from, the herd. For example, take the sensations of heat and cold. The latter is prevented in gregarious animals by close crowding, and experienced in the reverse condition; hence it comes to be connected in the mind with separation, and so acquires altogether unreasonable associations of harmfulness. Similarly, the sensation of warmth is associated with feelings of the secure and salutary. It has taken medicine many thousands of years to begin to doubt the validity of the popular conception of the harmfulness of cold; yet to the psychologist such a doubt is immediately obvious.*

Slightly more complex manifestations of the same tendency to homogeneity are seen in the desire for identification with the herd in matters of opinion. Here we find the biological explanation of the ineradicable impulse mankind has always displayed towards segregation into classes. Each one of us in his opinions and his conduct, in matters of dress, amusement, religion and politics, is compelled to obtain the support of a class, of a herd within the herd. The most eccentric in opinion or conduct is, we may be sure, supported by the agreement of a class, the smallness of which accounts for his apparent eccentricity, and the preciousness of which accounts for his fortitude in defying general opinion. Again, anything which tends to emphasise difference from the

*Anyone who has watched the behaviour of the dog and the cat towards warmth and cold cannot have failed to notice the effect of the gregarious habit on the former. The cat displays a moderate liking for warmth, but also a decided indifference to cold, and will quietly sit in the snow in a way which would be impossible to the dog.

herd is unpleasant. In the individual mind there will be an unanalysable dislike of the novel in action or thought. It will be 'wrong,' 'wicked,' 'foolish,' 'undesirable,' or as we say 'bad form,' according to varying circumstances which we can already to some extent define.

Manifestations relatively more simple are shewn in the dislike of being conspicuous, in shyness and in stage fright. It is, however, sensitiveness to the behaviour of the herd which has the most important effects upon the structure of the mind of the gregarious animal. This sensitiveness is, as Sidis has clearly seen, closely associated with the suggestibility of the gregarious animal, and therefore with that of man. The effect of it will clearly be to make acceptable those suggestions which come from the herd, and those only. It is of especial importance to note that this suggestibility is not general, and that it is only herd suggestions which are rendered acceptable by the action of instinct. Man is, for example, notoriously insensitive to the suggestions of experience. The history of what is rather grandiosely called human progress everywhere illustrates this. If we look back upon the development of some such thing as the steam-engine, we cannot fail to be struck by the extreme obviousness of each advance, and how obstinately it was refused assimilation until the machine almost invented itself.

Again, of two suggestions, that which the more perfectly embodies the voice of the herd is the more acceptable. The chances an affirmation has of being accepted could therefore be most satisfactorily expressed in terms of the bulk of the herd by which it is backed.

It follows from the foregoing that anything which dissociates a suggestion from the herd will tend to ensure such a suggestion being rejected. For example, an imperious command from an individual known to be without authority is necessarily disregarded, whereas the same person making the same suggestion in an indirect way so as to link it up with the voice of the herd will meet with success.

It is unfortunate that in discussing these facts it has been necessary to use the word suggestibility, which has so thorough an implication of the abnormal. If the biological explanation of suggestibility here set forth be accepted, the latter must necessarily be a normal quality of the human mind. To believe must be an ineradicable natural bias of man, or in other words an affirmation, positive or negative, is more readily accepted than rejected,

unless its source is definitely dissociated from the herd. Man is not, therefore, suggestible by fits and starts, not merely in panics and in mobs, under hypnosis, and so forth, but always, everywhere, and under any circumstances. The capricious way in which man reacts to different suggestions has been attributed to variations in his suggestibility. This in the opinion of the present writer is an incorrect interpretation of the facts which are more satisfactorily explained by regarding the variations as due to the differing extent to which suggestions are identified with the voice of the herd.

Man's resistiveness to certain suggestions, and especially to experience, as is seen so well in his attitude to the new, becomes therefore but another evidence of his suggestibility, since the new has always to encounter the opposition of herd tradition.

The apparent diminution in direct suggestibility with advancing years, such as was demonstrated in children by Binet, is in the case of the adult familiar to all, and is there usually regarded as evidence of a gradually advancing organic change in the brain. It can be regarded, at least plausibly, as being due to the fact that increase of years must bring an increase in the accumulations of herd suggestion, and so tend progressively to fix opinion.

In the early days of the human race, the appearance of the faculty of speech must have led to an immediate increase in the extent to which the decrees of the herd could be promulgated, and the field to which they applied. Now the desire for certitude is one of profound depth in the human mind, and possibly a necessary property of any mind, and it is very plausible to suppose that it led in these early days to the whole field of life being covered by pronouncements backed by the instinctive sanction of the herd. The life of the individual would be completely surrounded by sanctions of the most tremendous kind. He would know what he might and might not do, and what would happen if he disobeyed. It would be immaterial if experience confirmed these beliefs or not, because it would have incomparably less weight than the voice of the herd. Such a period is the only trace perceptible by the biologist of the Golden Age fabled by the poet, when the things happened as they ought, and hard facts had not begun to vex the soul of man. In some such condition we still find the Central Australian native. His whole life, to its minutest detail, is ordained for him by the voice of the herd, and he must not, under the most dreadful sanctions,

step outside its elaborate order. It does not matter to him that an infringement of the code under his very eyes is not followed by judgment, for with tribal suggestion so compactly organised, such cases are in fact no difficulty, and do not trouble his belief, just as in more civilised countries apparent instances of malignity in the reigning deity are not found to be inconsistent with his benevolence.

Such must everywhere have been primitive human conditions, and upon them reason intrudes as an alien and hostile power, disturbing the perfection of life, and causing an unending series of conflicts.

Experience, as is shewn by the whole history of man, is met by resistance because it invariably encounters decisions based upon instinctive belief, and nowhere is this fact more clearly to be seen than in the way in which the progress of science has been made.

In matters that really interest him, man cannot support the suspense of judgment which science so often has to enjoin. He is too anxious to feel certain to have time to know. So that we see of the sciences, mathematics appearing first, then astronomy, then physics, then chemistry, then biology, then psychology, then sociology—but always the new field was grudged to the new method, and we still have the denial to sociology of the name of science. Nowadays, matters of national defence, of politics, of religion, are still too important for knowledge, and remain subjects for certitude, that is to say, in them we still prefer the comfort of instinctive belief, because we have not learnt adequately to value the capacity to foretell.

Direct observation of man reveals at once the fact that a very considerable proportion of his beliefs are non-rational to a degree which is immediately obvious without any special examination, and with no special resources other than common knowledge. If we examine the mental furniture of the average man, we shall find it made up of a vast number of judgments of a very precise kind upon subjects of very great variety, complexity and difficulty. He will have fairly settled views upon the origin and nature of the universe, and upon what he will probably call its meaning; he will have conclusions as to what is to happen to him at death and after, as to what is and what should be the basis of conduct. He will know how the country should be governed, and why it is going to the dogs, why this piece of legislation is good, and that bad. He will have strong views upon military

and naval strategy, the principles of taxation, the use of alcohol and vaccination, the treatment of influenza, the prevention of hydrophobia, upon municipal trading, the teaching of Greek, upon what is permissible in art, satisfactory in literature, and hopeful in science.

The bulk of such opinions must necessarily be without rational basis, since many of them are concerned with problems admitted by the expert to be still unsolved, while as to the rest it is clear that the training and experience of no average man can qualify him to have any opinion upon them at all. The rational method adequately used would have told him that on the great majority of these questions there could be for him but one attitude—that of suspended judgment.

In view of the considerations that have been discussed above, this wholesale acceptance of non-rational belief must be looked upon as normal. The mechanism by which it is effected demands some examination, since it cannot be denied that the facts conflict noticeably with popularly current views as to the part taken by reason in the formation of opinion.

It is clear at the outset that these beliefs are invariably regarded by the holder as rational, and defended as such, while the position of one who holds contrary views is held to be obviously unreasonable. The religious man accuses the atheist of being shallow and irrational, and is met by a similar reply; to the Conservative, the amazing thing about the Liberal is his incapacity to see reason and accept the only possible solution of public problems. Examination reveals the fact that the differences are not due to the commission of the mere mechanical fallacies of logic, since these are easily avoided, even by the politician, and since there is no reason to suppose that one party in such controversies is less logical than the other. The difference is due rather to the fundamental assumptions of the antagonists being hostile, and these assumptions are derived from herd suggestion; to the Liberal, certain basal conceptions have acquired the quality of instinctive truth, have become "*a priori* syntheses," because of the accumulated suggestions to which he has been exposed, and a similar explanation applies to the atheist, the Christian and the Conservative. Each, it is important to remember, finds in consequence the rationality of his position flawless, and is quite incapable of detecting in it the fallacies which are obvious to his opponent, to whom that particular series of assumptions has not been rendered acceptable by herd suggestion.

To continue further the analysis of non-rational opinion, it should be observed that the mind rarely leaves uncriticised the assumptions which are forced on it by herd suggestion, the tendency being for it to find more or less elaborately rationalised justifications of them. This is in accordance with the enormously exaggerated weight which is always ascribed to reason in the formation of opinion and conduct, as is very well seen, for example, in the explanation of the existence of altruism as being due to man seeing that it "pays."

It is of cardinal importance to recognise that in this process of the rationalisation of instinctive belief, it is the belief which is the primary thing, while the explanation, although masquerading as the cause of the belief, as the chain of rational evidence on which the belief is founded, is entirely secondary, and but for the belief would never have been thought of. Such rationalisations are often, in the case of intelligent people, of extreme ingenuity, and may be very misleading unless the true instinctive basis of the given opinion or action is thoroughly understood.

This mechanism enables the English lady, who, to escape the stigma of having normal feet, subjects them to a formidable degree of lateral compression, to be aware of no logical inconsequence when she subscribes to missions to teach the Chinese lady how absurd it is to compress her feet longitudinally; it enables the European lady who wears rings in her ears to smile at the barbarism of the coloured lady who wears *her* rings in her nose; it enables the Englishman who is amused by the African chieftain's regard for the top hat as an essential piece of the furniture of state to ignore the identity of his own behaviour when he goes to church beneath the same tremendous ensign.

The objectivist finds himself compelled to regard these and similar correspondences between the behaviour of civilised and barbarous man as no mere interesting coincidences, but as phenomena actually and in the grossest way identical, but such an attitude is only possible when the mechanism is understood by which rationalisation of these customs is effected.

The process of rationalisation which has just been illustrated by some of its simpler varieties is best seen on the largest scale, and in the most elaborate form, in the pseudosciences of political economy and ethics. Both of these are occupied in deriving from eternal principles justifications for masses of non-rational belief which are assumed to be permanent merely because they exist.

Hence the notorious acrobatic feats of both in the face of any considerable variation in herd belief.

It would seem that the obstacles to rational thought which have been pointed out in the foregoing discussion have received much less attention than should have been directed towards them. To maintain an attitude of mind which could be called scientific in any complete sense, it is of cardinal importance to recognise that belief of affirmations sanctioned by the herd is a normal mechanism of the human mind, and goes on however much such affirmations may be opposed by evidence, that reason cannot enforce belief against herd suggestion, and finally that totally false opinions may appear to the holder of them to possess all the characters of rationally verifiable truth, and may be justified by secondary processes of rationalisation which it may be impossible directly to combat by argument.

It should be noticed, however, that verifiable truths may acquire the potency of herd suggestion, so that the suggestibility of man does not necessarily or always act against the advancement of knowledge. For example, to the student of biology the principles of Darwinism may acquire the force of herd suggestion through being held by the class which he most respects, is most in contact with, and the class which has therefore acquired suggestionising power with him. Propositions consistent with these principles will now necessarily be more acceptable to him, whatever the evidence by which they are supported, than they would be to one who had not been exposed to the same influences. The opinion in fact may be hazarded that the acceptance of any proposition is invariably the resultant of suggestive influences, whether the proposition be true or false, and that the balance of suggestion is usually on the side of the false, because, education being what it is, the scientific method—the method, that is to say, of experience has so little chance of acquiring suggestionising force.

Thus far sensitiveness to the herd has been discussed in relation to its effect upon intellectual processes. Equally important effects are traceable in feeling.

It is obvious that when free communication is possible by speech, the expressed approval or disapproval of the herd will acquire the qualities of identity or dissociation from the herd respectively. To know that he is doing what would arouse the disapproval of the herd will bring to the individual the same profound sense of discomfort which would accompany actual

physical separation, while to know that he is doing what the herd would approve will give him the sense of rightness, of gusto and of stimulus which would accompany physical presence in the herd and response to its mandates. In both cases it is clear that no actual expression by the herd is necessary to arouse the appropriate feelings, which would come from within and have, in fact, the qualities which we recognise in the dictates of conscience. Conscience then and the feelings of guilt and of duty are the peculiar possessions of the gregarious animal. A dog and a cat caught in the commission of an offence will both recognise that punishment is coming; but the dog moreover knows that he has done *wrong*, and he will come to be punished, unwillingly it is true, and as if dragged along by some power outside him, while the cat's sole impulse is to escape. The rational recognition of the sequence of act and punishment is equally clear to the gregarious and to the solitary animal, but it is the former only who understands that he has committed a *crime*, who has in fact the *sense of sin*. That this is the origin of what we call conscience is confirmed by the characteristics of the latter which are accessible to observation. Any detailed examination of the phenomena of conscience would lead too far to be admissible here. Two facts, however, should be noticed. First, the judgments of conscience vary in different circles, and are dependent on local environments; secondly, they are not advantageous to the species to the slightest degree beyond the dicta of the morals current in the circle in which they originate. These facts—stated here in an extremely summary way—demonstrate that conscience is an indirect result of the gregarious instinct, and is in no sense derived from a special instinct forcing men to consider the good of the race rather than individual desires.

W. TROTTER.

POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ISLAM.

Pre-Islamic Arabia was divided into various tribes continually at war with one another. Each tribe had its own chief, its own god and its own poet, whose tribal patriotism manifested itself chiefly in the glorification of the virtues of his own tribe. Though these primitive social groups recognised, to a certain extent, their kinship with one another, yet it was mainly the authority of Muhammad and the cosmopolitan character of his teaching which shattered the aristocratic ideals of individual tribes, and welded the dwellers of tents into one common ever-expanding nationality. For our purposes, however, it is necessary to notice, in the outset, the features of the Arabian system of tribal succession, and the procedure followed by the members of the tribe on the death of their chief. When the Chief or Shaikh of an Arab tribe died all the elders of the tribe met together, and, sitting in a circle, discussed the matter of succession. Any member of the tribe could hold the chieftainship if he were unanimously elected by the elders and heads of great families. The idea of hereditary monarchy, as Von Kremer has pointed out, was quite foreign to the Arab mind; though the principle of seniority which, since Ahmad I., has received legal recognition in the constitution of modern Turkey, did certainly influence the election. When the tribe was equally divided between two leaders, the rival sections separated from each other until one of the candidates relinquished his claim; otherwise the sword was appealed to. The Chief thus elected could be deposed by the tribe if his conduct necessitated deposition. With the expansion of the Arab conquest, and the consequent enlargement of mental outlook, this primitive custom gradually developed into a Political Theory carefully constructed, as we shall see, by the constitutional lawyers of Islam through reflective criticism on the revelations of political experience.

True to this custom the Prophet of Arabia left no instructions with regard to the matter of his succession. There is a tradition that the old Amir, son of Tufail, came to the Prophet and said, "If I embrace Islam what would my rank be? Willst thou give me the command after thee?" "It does not belong to me," said the Prophet, "to dispose of the command after me." Abu

Bakr—the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his chief companions—therefore, in consequence of the danger of internal disruption, was rather hurriedly and irregularly elected. He then rose and addressed the people thus:—

“ Oh people! Now I am ruler over you, albeit not the best amongst you. If I do well, support me; if ill, then set me right. Follow the true wherein is faithfulness, eschew the false wherein is treachery. The weaker amongst you shall be as the stronger with me, until, that I shall have redressed his wrong; and the stronger shall be as the weaker until, if the Lord will, I shall have taken from him that which he hath wrested. Leave not off to fight in the ways of the Lord; whosoever leaveth off, him verily shall the Lord abase. Obey me as I obey the Lord and his Prophet, wherein I disobey, obey me not.”

Omar, however, afterwards held that the hurried election of Abu Bakr, though very happy in its consequences and justified by the need of the time, should not form a precedent in Islam; for, as he is reported to have said (Dozy, I. p. 121), an election which is only a partial expression of the people's will is null and void. It was, therefore, early understood that Political Sovereignty *de facto* resides in the people; and that the electorate by their free act of unanimous choice embody it in a determinate personality in which the collective will is, so to speak, individualised, without investing this concrete seat of power with any privilege in the eye of the law except legal control over the individual wills of which it is an expression. The idea of universal agreement is, in fact, the fundamental principle of Muslim constitutional theory. “What the Muslim community considers good,” says the Prophet, “God also considers good.” It is probably on the authority of this saying of the Prophet that Al-Ash‘arī developed his political dogma—“That error is impossible in the united deliberations of the whole community.” After the death of Abu Bakr, Omar, who acted as Chief Judge during his predecessor's Caliphate, was universally elected by the people. In 644 A.D. he was mortally wounded by a Persian slave, and committed his trust, before he died, to seven electors—one of them being his own son—to nominate his successor, with the condition that their choice must be unanimous, and that none of them must stand as a candidate for the Caliphate. It will be seen, from Omar's exclusion of his own son from the candidature, how remote was the idea of hereditary monarchy from the Arabian political consciousness. The choice of this council, however, fell upon one

of the councillors, Uthman, who was consequently nominated, and the nomination afterwards confirmed by the people. The Caliphate of Uthman is really the source of the three great religio-political parties with their respective political theories which each party, finding itself in power, attempted to realise in one or other of the provinces of the Arab Empire. Before, however, I proceed to describe these theories, I want to draw your attention to the following two points:—

(1) That the Muslim Commonwealth is based on the absolute equality of all Muslims in the eye of the law. There is no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste system. In his latter days the Prophet once ascended the pulpit and said to the people :

“ Muslims: If I have struck any one of you, here is my back that he may strike me. If anyone has been wronged by me, let him return injury for injury. If I have taken anybody's goods, all that I have is at his disposal.” A man arose and claimed a debt of three dirhams (about three shillings). “ I would much rather,” said the Prophet, “ have the shame in this world than in the next.” And he paid him on the spot.

The law of Islam does not recognise the apparently natural differences of race, nor the historical differences of nationality. The political ideal of Islam consists in the creation of a people born of a free fusion of all races and nationalities. Nationality with Islam is not the highest limit of political development; for the general principles of the law of Islam rest on human nature, not on the peculiarities of a particular people. The inner cohesion of such a nation would consist not in ethnic or geographic unity, not in the unity of language or social tradition, but in the unity of the religious and political ideal; or, in the psychological fact of “ likemindedness,” as St. Paul would say. The membership of this nation, consequently, would not be determined by birth, marriage, domicile or naturalisation. It would be determined by a public declaration of “ likemindedness,” and would terminate when the individual has ceased to be likeminded with others. The ideal territory for such a nation would be the whole earth. The Arabs, like the Greeks and the Romans, endeavoured to create such a nation or the world-state by conquest, but failed to actualise their ideal. The realisation of this ideal, however, is not impossible; for the ideal nation does already exist in germ. The life of modern political communities finds expression, to a great extent, in common institutions, Law and

Government; and the various sociological circles, so to speak, are continually expanding to touch one another. Further it is not incompatible with the sovereignty of individual States; since its structure will be determined, not by physical force, but by the spiritual force of a common ideal.

(2) That according to the law of Islam there is no distinction between the Church and the State. The State with us is not a combination of religious and secular authority, but it is a unity in which no such distinction exists. The Caliph is not necessarily the high-priest of Islam; he is not the representative of God on earth. He is fallible like other men, and is subject, like every Muslim, to the impersonal authority of the same law. The Prophet himself is not regarded as absolutely infallible by many Muhammadan theologians (*e.g.*, Abu Ishaq, Tabari). In fact the idea of personal authority is quite contrary to the spirit of Islam. The Prophet of Arabia succeeded in commanding the absolute submission of an entire people; yet no man has depreciated his own authority more than he. "I am," he says, "a man like you; like you my forgiveness also depends on the mercy of God." Once in a moment of spiritual exaltation, he is reported to have said to one of his companions, "Go and tell the people—he who says—"There is only one God—will enter the paradise," studiously omitting the second half of the Muslim creed—"And Muhammed is his Prophet." The ethical importance of this attitude is great. The whole system of Islamic ethics is based on the idea of individuality; anything which tends to repress the healthy development of individuality is quite inconsistent with the spirit of Islamic Law and Ethics. A Muslim is free to do anything he likes, provided he does not violate the law. The general principles of this law are believed to have been revealed; the details, in order to cover the relatively secular cases, are left to the interpretation of professional lawyers. It is, therefore, true to say that the entire fabric of Islamic Law, actually administered, is really judge made law, so that the lawyer performs the legislative function in the Muslim constitution. If, however, an absolutely new case arise which is not provided for in the law of Islam, the will of the whole Muslim community becomes a further source of law. But I do not know whether a general council of the whole Muslim community was ever held for this purpose.

I shall now describe the three great Political Theories to which I have alluded above. I shall first take up the Sunni view.

I. ELECTIVE MONARCHY.

A. *The Caliph and the People.*

During the days of the early Caliphate things were extremely simple. The Caliphs were like private individuals, sometimes doing the work of an ordinary constable. In obedience to the Quranic verse—"And consult them in all matters," they always consulted the more influential companions of the Prophet, in judicial and executive matters, but no formal ministers existed to assist the Caliph in his administrative work. It was not until the time of the House of Abbas that the Caliphate became the subject of scientific treatment. In my description of the Sunni view I shall mainly follow Al-Māwardy—the earliest Muslim constitutional lawyer who flourished during the reign of the Abbasi Caliph Al-Qādir.

Al-Māwardy divides the whole Muslim community into two classes (1) the electors, (2) the candidates for election. The qualifications absolutely necessary for a candidate are thus enumerated by him :

1. Spotless character.
2. Freedom from physical and mental infirmity. The predecessor of the present Sultan of Turkey was deposed under this condition.
3. Necessary legal and theological knowledge in order to be able to decide various cases. This is true in theory; in practice the power of the Caliph, especially in later times, was divided.
4. Insight necessary for a ruler.
5. Courage to defend the empire.
6. Relationship with the family of the Quarish. This qualification is not regarded as indispensable by modern Sunni lawyers, on the ground that the Prophet never nominated any person as his successor.
7. Full age (Al-Ghazālī). It was on this ground that the chief judge refused to elect Al-Muqtadir.
8. Male sex (Al-Baidāwī). This is denied by the Khawarij who hold that a woman can be elected as Caliph.

If the candidate satisfies these conditions, the representatives of all influential families, doctors of law, high officials of the State, and commanders of the army meet together and nominate him to the Caliphate. The whole assembly then proceeds to the mosque where the nomination is duly confirmed by the people.

In distant places representatives of the elected Caliph are permitted to receive homage on behalf of the Caliph. In the matter of election the people of the capital, however, have no precedence over other people—though, in practice, they have a certain amount of precedence, since they are naturally the first to hear of the Caliph's death. After the election, the Caliph usually makes a speech, promising to rule according to the law of Islam. Most of these speeches are preserved. It will be seen that the principle of representation is, to a certain extent, permitted in practical politics; in the law of property, however, it is expressly denied. For instance, if B. dies in the lifetime of his father A. and his brother C., leaving issue, the whole property of A. goes to C. The children of B. have no claim; they cannot represent their father, or "stand in his shoes."

From a legal standpoint, the Caliph does not occupy any privileged position. In theory, he is like other members of the Commonwealth. He can be directly sued in an ordinary law court. The second Caliph was once accused of appropriating a larger share in the spoils of war, and he had to clear his conduct before the people, by production of evidence according to the law of Islam. In his judicial capacity he is open to the criticism of every Muslim. Omar I. was severely reprimanded by an old woman who pointed out to him that his interpretation of a certain Quranic verse was absolutely wrong. The Caliph listened to her argument, and decided the case according to her views.

The Caliph may indicate his successor who may be his son; but the nomination is invalid until confirmed by the people. Out of the fourteen Caliphs of the House of Umayya only four succeeded in securing their sons as their successors. The Caliph cannot secure the election of his successor during his own lifetime. Ibn Athir tells us that Abdul Malik—the Umayya Caliph—endeavoured to do so, but Ibn Musayyib, the great Mekkan lawyer, strongly protested against the Caliph's behaviour. The Abbasi Caliph Hadi, however, succeeded in securing the election of his son Ja'far, but after his death the majority declared for Harun. In such a case, when the people declare for another Caliph, the one previously elected must, on penalty of death, immediately renounce his right in public.

If the Caliph does not rule according to the law of Islam, or suffers from physical or mental infirmity, the Caliphate is forfeited. Usually one influential Muhammadan stands up in the mosque

after the prayer, and speaks to the congregation giving reasons for the proposed deposition. He declares deposition to be the interest of Islam, and ends his speech by throwing away his finger-ring with the remark—"I reject the Caliph as I throw away this ring." The people then signify their assent in various ways, and the deposition is complete.

The question whether two or more rival Caliphates can exist simultaneously is discussed by Muslim lawyers. Ibn Jama' holds that only one Caliphate is possible. Ibn Khaldun holds that there is nothing illegal in the co-existence of two or more Caliphates, provided they are in different countries. Ibn Khaldun's view is certainly contrary to the old Arabian idea, yet in so far as the Muslim Commonwealth is governed by an impersonal authority, *i.e.*, law, his position seems to me to be quite a tenable one. Moreover, as a matter of fact, two rival Caliphates have existed in Islam for a long time and still exist.

Just as a candidate for the Caliphate must have certain qualifications, so, according to Al-Māwardy, the elector also must be qualified. He must possess—

- (1) Good reputation as an honest man.
- (2) Necessary knowledge of State affairs.
- (3) Necessary insight and judgment.

In theory all Muslims, men and women, possess the right of election. There is no property qualification. In practice, however, women and slaves did not exercise this right. Some of the early lawyers seem to have recognised the danger of mass-elections, as they endeavour to show that the right of election resides only in the tribe of the Prophet. Whether the seclusion of women grew up in order to make women incapable of exercising a right which in theory could not be denied to them, I cannot say.

The elector has the right to demand the deposition of the Caliph, or the dismissal of his officials if he can show that their conduct is not in accordance with the law of Islam. He can, on the subject, address the Muslim congregation in the mosque after the prayer. The mosque, it must be remembered, is the Muslim Forum, and the institution of daily prayer is closely connected with the political life of Muslim communities. Apart from its spiritual and social functions, the institution is meant to serve as a ready means of constant criticism on the State. If, however, the elector does not intend to address the congregation, he can issue a judicial inquiry concerning the conduct of any State official, or any other matter which affects the community as a whole. The judicial inquiry as a

rule, does not mention the name of any individual. I quote an illustration in order to give you an idea of this procedure:—

“ In the name of God, most merciful and clement. What is the opinion of the doctors of law, the guides of the people, on the encouragement of the Zimmis, and on the assistance we can demand from them, whether as clerks to the Amirs entrusted with the administration of the country, or as collectors of taxes? . . . Explain the above by solid proofs. establish the orthodox belief by sound arguments, and give your reasons. God will reward you.”

Such judicial inquiries are issued by the State as well, and when the lawyers give conflicting decisions, the majority prevails.

Forced election is quite illegal. Ibn Jama', an Egyptian lawyer, however, holds that forced election is legal in times of political unrest. This opportunist view has no support in the law of Islam; though, undoubtedly, it is based on historical facts. Tartushi—a Spanish lawyer—would probably hold the same view; for he says: “ Forty years of tyranny are better than one hour of anarchy.”

Let us now consider the relation between the elected and the elector. Al-Māwardy defines this relation as “ Aqd ”—binding together, contract. The State therefore is a contractual organism, and implies rights and duties. He does not mean, like Rousseau, to explain the origin of society by an original social contract; he holds that the actual fact of election is a contract in consequence of which the Caliph has to do certain duties, *e.g.*, to defend the religion, to enforce the law of Islam, to levy customs and taxes according to the law of Islam, to pay annual salaries and properly to direct the State treasury. If he fulfils these conditions, the people have mainly two duties in relation to him, *e.g.*, to obey him, and to assist him in his work. Apart from this contract, however, Muslim lawyers have also enumerated certain cases in which obedience to the Caliph is not necessary.

The origin of the State then, according to Al-Māwardy, is not force, but free consent of individuals who unite to form a brotherhood, based upon legal equality, in order that each member of the brotherhood may work out the potentialities of his individuality under the law of Islam. Government, with him, is an artificial arrangement, and is divine only in the sense that the law of Islam—believed to have been revealed—demands peace and security.

B. Ministers and other Officials.

The Caliph, after his election, appoints the principal officials of the State, or confirms those previously in office. The following are the principal State officials with their duties defined by the law :—

(1) The Wazir—the Prime Minister—either with limited or unlimited powers. The Wazir with unlimited powers must possess the same qualifications as the Caliph, except that, according to Al-Māwardy, he need not necessarily belong to the Quraish tribe. He must be thoroughly educated especially in Mathematics, History, and the Art of speaking. He can perform all the functions of the Caliph, except that he cannot nominate the Caliph's successor. He can, without previous sanction of the Caliph, appoint officers of the various departments of the State. The Wazir with limited powers cannot do so. The dismissal of the Wazir with unlimited powers means the dismissal of all officials appointed by him; while the dismissal of the Wazir with limited powers does not lead to the dismissal of the officials appointed by him. More than one Wazir with unlimited powers cannot be appointed. The governors of various provinces can appoint their own Wazirs. A non-Muhamadan may be appointed Wazir with limited powers. The Shi'ah dynasty of the Obaidies appointed a Jew to this position. An Egyptian poet expresses their sentiments as follows :—"The Jews of our time have reached the goal of their ambition—Theirs is all honour, theirs is all gold—O people of Egypt I advise you to become Jews; God himself has become a Jew."

(2) Next to the Wazir the most important executive officers of the State were governors of various provinces. They were appointed by the Caliph with limited or unlimited powers. The governor with unlimited powers could appoint sub-governors to adjoining smaller provinces. For instance the sub-governor of Sicily was appointed by the Governor of Spain and that of Scind by the Governor of Bassora. This was really an attempt to create self-governing Muslim colonies. The officer in charge was, so to speak, a miniature caliph of his province; he appointed his own Wazir, Chief Judge, and other state officers. Where a special commander of the provincial army was not appointed, the Governor, *ex officio*, acted as the commander. This, however, was an error, since the governors become gradually powerful and frequently asserted their independence. But in his capacity of the commander, the governor had no right to raise the salaries of his

soldiers except in very special circumstances. It was his duty to send all the money to the central treasury after defraying the necessary state expenses. If the provincial income fell short of the expenses, he could claim a contribution from the central treasury. If he is appointed by the Caliph, the death of the latter is not followed by his dismissal; but if he is appointed by the Wazir, the death of the Wazir means the dismissal of all governors appointed by him, provided they are not newly confirmed in their respective posts.

The governor with limited powers was a purely executive officer. He had nothing to do with judicial matters, and in criminal matters too his authority was very much limited.

Muslim lawyers, however, recognise a third kind of governorship, *i.e.*, by usurpation. But the usurper must fulfil certain conditions before his claim is legally justified.

(3) Commanders of armies. Here too the distinction of limited and unlimited powers is made, and the duties of commanders, subordinate officers, and soldiers are clearly defined.

(4) The Chief Judge. The Chief Judge could be appointed by the Caliph or the Wazir. According to Abu Hanifa in some cases, and according to Abu Jarir Tabary, a non-Muslim can be appointed to administer the law of his co-religionists. The Chief Judge, as representative of the law of Islam, can depose the Caliph—he can kill his own creator. His death means the dismissal of his staff; but the death of the sovereign is not followed by the dismissal of the judges appointed by him. During an interregnum a judge can be elected by the people of a town, but not during the sovereign's lifetime.

(5) President of the Highest Court of Appeal and general control. The object of this institution was to hear appeals and to exercise a general supervision over all the departments of the state. Abdul Malik—the Umayya Caliph and the founder of this court—personally acted as the president, though more difficult cases he transferred to Qazi Abu Idris. In later times the president was appointed by the Caliph. During the reign of the Abbasi Caliph Al-Muqtadir, his mother was appointed President, and she used to hear appeals, on Fridays, surrounded by judges, priests and other notables. In one respect, the President of this court differed from the Chief Judge. He was not bound by the letter of the law like the Qazi; his decisions were based on general principles of natural justice, so that the President was something like the keeper of the Caliph's conscience. He was assisted by a

council of judges and lawyers whose duty was to discuss every aspect of the case before the President announced his decision. The importance of this institution may be judged from the fact that it was among the few Muslim institutions which the Normans retained after their conquest of Sicily in the 11th century.

II. THE SHI'AH VIEW.

According to the Shi'ah view the State is of divine origin, and the Caliph or, as they call Imam, governs by divine right. This view arose among an obscure Arabian sect known as the Saba'ites whose founder Abdulla ibn Saba was a Jew of San'a in Yemen. In the time of Uthman he became a convert to Islam, and finally settled in Egypt where he preached his doctrine. This doctrine harmonised with the pre-Islamic habits of political thought in Persia, and soon found a permanent home in that country. The Imam, according to the Persians, is not elected (the Shi'ahs of Oman, however, adopted the elective principle and held that the Imam might be deposed) but appointed by God. He is the re-incarnation of Universal Reason, he is endowed with all perfections, his wisdom is superhuman and his decisions are absolute and final. The first Imam Ali was appointed by Muhammad; Ali's direct descendants are his divinely ordained successors. The world is never without a living Imam whether visible or invisible. The 12th Imam, according to the Shi'ahs, suddenly disappeared near Kufa, but he will come again and fill the world with peace and prosperity. In the meantime he communicates his will, from time to time, through certain favoured individuals—called Gates—who hold mysterious intercourse with him. Now this doctrine of the absence of the Imam has a very important political aspect which few students of Islam have fully appreciated. Whether the Imam really disappeared or not, I do not know; but it is obvious that the dogma is a clever way of separating the Church and the State. The absent Imam, as I have pointed out above, is absolute authority on all matters; the present executive authorities are, therefore, only guardians of the estate which really belongs to the Imam, who, as such, inherits the property of deceased intestates in case they leave no heirs. It will therefore be seen that the authority of the Shah of Persia is limited by the authority of the Mullas—the representatives of the absent Imam. As a mere guardian of the estate he is subject to the religious authority of the Mullas,—though, as the chief executive authority he is free to

adopt any measure for the good of the estate. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Mullas took an active part in the recent constitutional reform in Persia.

III. THE KHAWARIJ—REPUBLICANISM.

I shall be very brief in my account of the Khawarij, since the history of their opinion is yet to be worked out. The first Muslims who were so called were the notorious 12,000 who revolted against Ali after they had fought under him at the battle of Siffin. They were offended at his submitting the decision of his right to the Caliphate to the arbitration of men when, in their opinion, it ought to have been submitted to the law of God—the Koran. "The nation," they said to Ali, "calls us to the book of God; you call us to the sword." Shahrastani divides them into twenty-four sects, differing slightly from one another in legal and constitutional opinion, *e.g.*, that the ignorance of the law is a valid excuse; that the adulterer should not be stoned, for the Quran nowhere mentions this punishment; that the hiding of one's religious opinions is illegal; that the Caliph should not be called the commander of the faithful; that there is nothing illegal in having two or more Caliphs in one and the same time. In East Africa and Mazab—South Algeria—they still maintain the simplicity of their republican ideal. Broadly speaking the Khawarij can be divided into three classes:—

- (1) Those who hold that there must be an elected Caliph, but it is not necessary that he should belong to a particular family or tribe. A woman or even a slave could be elected as Caliph provided he or she is a good Muslim ruler. Whenever they found themselves in power, they purposely elected their Caliph from among the socially lowest members of their community.
- (2) Those who hold that there is no need of a Caliph, the Muslim congregation can govern themselves.
- (3) Those who do not believe in Government at all—the anarchists of Islam. To them Caliph Ali is reported to have said: "You do not believe in any Government, but there must be some Government good or bad."

Such are, briefly the main lines of Political Thought in Islam. It is clear that the fundamental principle laid down in the Quran is the principle of election; the details or rather the translation of this principle into a workable scheme of Government is left to be

determined by other considerations. Unfortunately, however, the idea of election did not develop on strictly democratic lines, and the Muslim conquerors consequently failed to do anything for the political improvement of Asia. The form of election was certainly maintained in Baghdad and Spain, but no regular political institutions could grow to vitalise the people at large. It seems to me that there were principally two reasons for this want of political activity in Muslim countries :—

- (1) In the first place the idea of election was not at all suited to the genius of the Persians and the Mongols—the two principal races which accepted Islam as their religion. Dozy tells us that the Persians were even determined to worship the Caliph as a divinity, and on being told that worship belonged to God alone, they attempted to rebel against the Caliph who would not be the centre of their religious emotion .
- (2) The life of early Muslims was a life of conquest. Their whole energy was devoted to political expansion which tends to concentrate political power in fewer hands, and thus serves as an unconscious handmaid of despotism. Democracy does not seem to be quite willing to get on with Empire—a lesson which the modern English Imperialist might well take to heart.

In modern times—thanks to the influence of western political ideas—Muslim countries have exhibited signs of political life. England has vitalised Egypt; Persia has received a constitution from the Shah, and the gifted people of this country will, I hope, gradually work out their transformation if the flood of western economic enterprise does not sweep away their political individuality. The Young Turkish Party too have been struggling, scheming, and plotting to achieve their object. But it is absolutely necessary for these political reformers to make a thorough study of Islamic constitutional principles, and not to shock the naturally suspicious conservatism of their people by appearing as prophets of a new culture. They would certainly impress them more if they could show that their seemingly borrowed ideal of political freedom is really the ideal of Islam, and is, as such, the rightful demand of free Muslim conscience.

S. M. IQBAL.

THE LAW OF THE THREE STAGES.

Comte's Law of the Three Stages has often been affirmed, often denied or contemptuously ignored. It has very seldom been critically examined. Yet it should repay examination. Those who would pass it by as an exploded hypothesis forget that the general notions on which it rests have passed into ordinary thought and common language. The theological stage of a conception, the metaphysical way of looking at things, the positive method of science and of practice are familiar expressions which mean something for us, and it is well that we should know what they mean with more exactitude. On the other hand it is hardly reasonable to suppose that a hypothesis advanced 80 years ago in the infancy of anthropology, and before all the modern development of science and philosophy, should stand to-day precisely where it stood then. Acceptance of such a miracle would in fact be more suited to the theological than to the positive stage. I propose here to treat the theory itself in the Positive spirit, examining its various parts so far as space allows in relation to the facts of anthropology and the actual development of thought.

The outline of the theory is so well-known that a very brief recapitulation of Comte's original statement* will suffice here. Comte tells us at the outset of the Positive Philosophy that he believes himself to have discovered a great fundamental law to which the human intelligence is subjected by an invariable necessity. It may be established both by rational proofs furnished by the knowledge of our organisation, and by historical verifications. It is that each of our principal conceptions, each branch of our knowledge, passes successively through three different states—the theological or that of fiction (*fictif*), the metaphysical or abstract, the scientific or positive. In the first stage the mind aims at the discovery of the intimate nature of beings, the primary and final causes of all the effects that strike it, and represents phenomena as produced by the direct and continuous action of supernatural agents greater or less in number, whose arbitrary intervention explains all apparent anomalies. In the metaphysical

*I do not here attempt to deal either with the genesis of the theory (on which see Barth, *Phil. der Geschichte als Sociologie*, p. 20—57) nor with subsequent statements by Comte himself.

stage the supernatural agents are replaced by abstract forces, real entities, personified abstractions inherent in things. To explain anything is now to assign it to the corresponding entity. This stage is transitional and leads up to the third or positive stage in which the mind recognising the impossibility of attaining absolute ideas renounces the investigation of the origin and destiny of the universe and the knowledge of the intimate causes of phenomena, for the discovery of their actual laws, that is, their invariable relations of similitude and succession. Its method in this stage is the combination of reasoning and observation, and the explanation which it now aims at is simply the connection which science establishes between particular phenomena and general laws. The theological stage begins with many deities and rises to the conception of one, to whom all things are due. Similarly the metaphysical stage rises from many different entities to the single supreme entity of Nature, and the positive stage approaches, though it may not attain, the conception of a single all embracing law. The action of a sleeping draught to take the familiar example, is referred by the theological mind to the god of sleep, by the metaphysical to a soporific virtue inherent in the drug, and by the positive is considered as a sequence of events in which a regular order has been observed.

In the first two stages there is an attempt to get at the inner working of the thing, at the real cause and how it operates. But in the first stage the method is frankly that of the imagination and the thing is supposed to be, or to be worked by, a being like ourselves. In the second stage the imaginary characters of this being are refined away and it is reduced to nothing more than a barren duplication of the facts observed. The soporific virtue which seems to explain everything is in reality nothing more or less than a solemn re-statement of the very fact to be explained—that sleep follows the administration of the drug. In the third stage these attempts at ultimate explanation are frankly abandoned. We give up the effort to know what there is in the drug which causes sleep. We aim at the precise description of the circumstances under which sleep follows on the administration of the drug,—the exact quantity and quality of the dose for example. It is assumed that if these circumstances are accurately known the sequence which has been observed in certain cases may be expected in others. That is to say, the observed relation is generalised and becomes a law. Lastly the law is explained when it is brought under a more general law and this means in the last resort that it is compared with other sequences which are found to be generally similar.

I do not think that anyone can follow this account without feeling that it at least expresses certain aspects of the movement of thought. How far it is adequate or accurate is another matter and on these questions without attempting to be exhaustive I propose to offer a few notes.

1. *The Theological Stage.*

In Comte's view the lowest form of religion, speaking generally, is Fetichism which, as he uses the term, corresponds to what is now called Animism; above this is Polytheism, whose spirits no longer dwell in individual objects but are anthropomorphic deities controlling large groups of objects or classes of phenomena; while the single god of Monotheism may be regarded in the crudest form of this religion as a further generalisation or unification of the polytheistic deities. This account would not be accepted by all anthropologists, but neither would it, as a rough summary, lack supporters. We may perhaps get a stage nearer to agreement if we make the character of spiritual beings the basis of our classification and trace an ascent from the dim, half-material, imperfectly personified "spirit" to the distinctly-imaged anthropomorphic god, and from this again to the supreme Deity whose "personality" is held to be something more than the personality of man. In any case two further modifications of importance must be introduced into Comte's account if we are to square it with the results of Comparative Religion. In the first place the study of Brahminism and Buddhism indicates a different line of advance from Polytheism. In the former Polytheism merges into a mystic Pantheism wherein there is certainly an appreciation of the unity of all that is, but the form of unity is widely different from that of the creative controlling Providence. In the latter the whole theistic element tends to fall into the background. The gods remain, but they are of subordinate importance and interest is concentrated on purity of life and the laws real or supposed that regulate the life of sentient beings. There is indeed in early Buddhism more than a touch of the positive spirit in the turning from ultimate problems to the finding of perfection and bliss in a mode of life to which men may attain here on earth, and in the sense of universal fellowship as the medium wherein that life is to be led.

Without dwelling further on this line of development, which was perhaps a sidetrack in human evolution, let us turn to the second point of criticism. Recent anthropology has shown that the

theory of spirits is not the only mode by which primitive man accounts for his experiences, nor is it the only theoretical basis of his cults, his observances, or his rules of conduct. Magic plays as large a part in primitive life as Animism. Which of the two is the more primitive there is not sufficient evidence to determine. Both are found intermingled and blended among the rudest peoples and both gradually assume a subordinate place in higher modes of thought. We must regard magic as at least coeval with Animism, and what is interesting to the unprejudiced student of the three stages is that the mode of thought which is thus equated to the lowest form of the theological stage recalls many features of the metaphysical stage. For the powers of magic, like the abstractions of "metaphysics," are often entities, sometimes half-material, sometimes quasi-spiritual, often very much like spirits, if the expression be allowed, with the spiritual taken out of them. A disease, for example, can be extracted from a man in the form of a stone, an evil influence can be brushed off him, an impurity can be transferred to a scapegoat and driven into the wilderness, a toothache can be nailed into a tree. Often the boundary between the magical conception and the spiritual is so thin that they seem to pass into one another. The Erinyes in Homer is an actual influence which may be set in motion by the appropriate person under appropriate conditions. But is it at bottom a spirit on whom the avenger calls, or is it an automatically working agency which the avenger controls? It is not so easy to say. Different passages give us different views, and sometimes in a single passage we find both views contending for the mastery.

There is no evidence in such cases to show that the magical entity is necessarily an attenuated spirit, or that the spirit is necessarily a developed and more clearly personified entity. The very fact that the one mode of conception passes so easily into the other militates against any sharp demarcation which would set the one before the other as a more primitive mode of thought. The evidence of primitive magic tends, in fact, to show that what is characteristic of rude thought is not a peculiar and quite inexplicable tendency to personify, but rather precisely that crude blending of distinct categories and that loose application of unsifted generalisations which distinguish all rudimentary processes of thinking, whether among ourselves or other people. The magical quality that you can, as it were, pick out of one thing and transfer to another is imperfectly distinguished from the material object. The very idea of transferring sins and misfortunes may be regarded

as a crude generalisation from qualities like heat and cold, which do admit of such transference.¹ The indwelling spirit of Animism is similarly in part a crude inference, in part a blending of ideas that belong to distinct categories. As an inference it extends to the behaviour of material things, a conception which we all hold to be true in relation to our fellow men, and, in a measure, of the lower animals.² This is a readily intelligible fancy the basis of which is merely a natural, but an insufficiently founded inference, which further experience converts. But the "spirit" which primitive fancy constructs is not very "spiritual" in our sense of the term. On the contrary, it is for many purposes treated as being itself of the nature of a thinner, more attenuated vapourous material—it can be beaten off, wiped away, tied fast with string, or corked up in a bottle. It is at once too solid for our notion of spirit, and in another sense too fluid and changeable for our notion of a material thing. It is a blend of incompatible ideas.

I conclude that the primitive stage of thought which Comte characterises as *théologique ou fictif* is to be described generically by the second epithet rather than the first. It is pre-eminently the stage of uncontrolled fiction. General ideas are the distinctive product of human intelligence, and their function is to correlate experience and direct action. But in the early stages of their development they grow up by processes which are unconscious in the sense of lacking method and self-criticism. Their meaning, their validity, their function are no subjects for enquiry. Hence the elements which are fused into one conception are brought together as the chance current of cerebral energy, the accidents of experience, the play of emotions may happen to direct, and the result when formed is so indistinctly held as to admit the fusion of what may be to us the most glaring incongruities. Not only is there no test of truth, but the bare conception of truth itself is wavering and dim, for sheer make-believe plays a large part, and the fictions of magic and Animism, if they give little guidance in

1. Sympathetic and imitative magic, though differing from the class of concepts discussed here, are equally dependent upon a confusion of categories. (See *Morals in Evolution*, ii., pp. 15-23.)

2. At bottom the interpretation of the behaviour of others as determined by thought and feeling must rest on our consciousness of our own thoughts and feelings. This I take to be the core around which our idea of personality grows. But it grows not by conscious inferences but by numberless interactions in which the behaviour of others and the emotions they call forth are as important as anything that we are aware of in ourselves.

action, may yield some fruit in the shape of mental comfort and assurance. In a word, the complex psychological forces, social and individual, which shape ideas are not themselves guided by principles. Such is the lowest form of the stage of fiction or imagination. It has a somewhat higher form, but this I pass over for the present. I will also defer what I have to say about the metaphysical stage, as it will be convenient first to consider the positive method.

Three points may be distinguished in Comte's account of the positive stage in his first lecture. Two are negative. Thought (1) renounces the enquiry into the origin and destiny of the universe; (2) renounces the enquiry into the intimate causes of phenomena; but (3) confines itself to studying the relations of succession and resemblance between phenomena.

All these characteristics have their *primâ facie* justification in the elements of meaning which the term positive suggests. Positive is an epithet which may be given to what is certain as opposed to what is doubtful, to what is observed as opposed to what is inferred, and so in a more general and somewhat looser sense to what is fact as opposed to what is theory. Now, if experience is the name for the totality of observed facts our positive knowledge will be knowledge founded on and concerning experience. But when we speak of thus confining knowledge to experience we may mean one of two things. We may mean that we know nothing beyond the actual range of our observation, and this at first sight is what the strict use of the term would suggest. A moment's consideration, however, shows us that such a limitation, far from establishing science, would destroy it. It would indeed land us in an extreme form of scepticism. My experience, taken in this more rigid sense, is what I now see and feel together with what I have seen and felt. If I draw any inference, use any conception that binds elements of experience together in general relations, or even rely on your testimony to your experience, I am going beyond that which I know from my own observation. The same remark holds for you and for everybody. Clearly this is not the experience which is intended. What is thought of is rather experience in a second and wider sense. There is a world or range of experience and positive knowledge is based on that portion which has actually fallen within the observation of men—actual experience we may call it,—but refers to further portions, indeed to the whole field of possible experience wherein its predictions are from time to time verified or corrected. What has been found becomes a premiss from which,

properly treated, we may derive a knowledge of what will be found. We must, as Comte himself states at the outset, combine reasoning with observation, we must recognise certain connections, or at least certain general relations between the parts of experience which will enable us to use the observed as the basis for dealing with what is not observed as yet. At this point we come to the first and simplest definition of positive method, that given in the preface to the Course, where it is said to have for its object the "co-ordination of observed facts." This, if I may duplicate the epithet, is a positive definition of the positive method to which we may provisionally adhere, remarking only that it already imports into the method something beyond actual observation whereby the co-ordination is to be carried on.

The definition is amplified in the first lecture itself by the statement already quoted that the positive method deals with the "effective laws" of phenomena "that is their invariable relations of succession and resemblance." But the point of this further definition lies mainly in the negations which it involves. The positive method is distinguished from its two predecessors by its abandonment of the search for the ultimate origin and purpose of things and for the intimate causes of phenomena. The implication here is plain. The "facts" with which we deal are "phenomena." Behind them lies the Forbidden City of the real world, wherein reside alike the intimate causes of all that happens and its ultimate origin and purpose. The older stages were filled with endless conjectures about this real world—fruitlessly. Our task is more modest. We seek to know what concerns us as men, secure in our faith in universal and unchanging law, but we obtain this knowledge by concentrating on what is practicable and recognising that the fundamental problems are forever insoluble.

This conception of the limitation of all genuine knowledge strongly coloured the whole of Comte's philosophy. It influenced his definition of philosophy itself as the synthesis of the sciences. It determined the direction of his scientific interests and his valuation of progress. In particular it led to the erection of a "subjective synthesis" in place of an objective synthesis as the ideal of effort. Experience was to be organised with a view, not to the discovery of the secrets of the universe, but rather to the furtherance of human welfare. In a word, the philosophy, ethics, religious and historical judgments of Comte are all in one relation or another influenced by this conception. But, it will be observed, the definition of the positive method itself rests upon certain

conclusions of what is in ordinary, if not in Comtean, usage metaphysics. The distinction between phenomena and reality is a metaphysical distinction: the denial that we can know the intimate causes of phenomena a metaphysical denial: the abandonment of speculation as to the ultimate origin or purpose of things the result of a metaphysical scepticism. It represents the joint effect of Hume and Kant on the mind of the writer. Suppose now that we drop all this metaphysics and start afresh with the notion of the positive method given above and the implications shown to be involved. Suppose we keep to the conception of method, and let the method itself work out the results for us. What then is our position? Our data are found, as we have admitted, in experience. But whether this experience is an experience of phenomena only, and indeed whether there is any valid and general distinction between phenomena and a reality beyond them does not yet appear. If it is to appear at all it must be as a result of the application of our method, that is, as an inference from experience itself as scientifically treated. The restriction to phenomena, which in Comte is made a basis of sound method, is not in fact a first principle on which method depends, but if true a result to which sound method brings us, and if false one which it disproves. If then we are to characterise the positive stage by its method as a method we must not begin by attributing to it a certain theory of the limitation of our knowledge. Until the method has been carried through we cannot tell whether the ultimate problems are insoluble or the intimate processes of things hidden from us.

The argument contemplates an application of the positive method to the problems of metaphysics itself.¹ If such an application is possible, it follows that the distinction between the "metaphysical" and "positive" stages of thought, if such distinction there be, must turn on a difference, not in subject matter, but in method. Can such a distinction be pointed out as marking a real advance in the history of thought? Any answer to the question must be tentative, but following up the hints contained in Comte's classification, and keeping to the simple leading conceptions of positive method as a clue, I think we can find an intermediate stage corresponding in many of its features to the metaphysical stage of Comte, distinguished from the stages of fiction as being systematic

1. I must not be taken as meaning that metaphysics is wholly positive in content. Under one aspect, as a valuation of thought, it may be regarded as normative. I am dealing here only with such aspects of philosophy as are necessary for my immediate purpose.

and logical, and from the positive in its attitude to experience and to truth.

According to the assumptions of the positive method the business of thought is to correlate or systematise experience. But this systematisation involves a good deal of reconstruction, for the empirical world often impresses us as being incoherent and disorderly, and to overcome these incoherencies and find an order upon which we can rely we are forced within the plane of common sense itself, and without any deep philosophical designs to allow a difference between appearance and reality. Reality for this purpose may be thought of, not as a world beyond experience, but as the world of experience reduced to order and harmony. But the conceptions formed in this process of reduction, though educed from experience, will not be mere reproductions of what is observed like so many photographs. They will rather be reconstructions in which the data, as originally presented to our minds, are analysed and combined in various ways. The further this process goes the more the conception ceases to be something which we can recognise without difficulty as a datum of common observation. In this respect there is a vast difference between one concept and another. "Chair" or "table" is as much a concept as constitutionalism or liberty; all four alike, according to our assumptions, are drawn ultimately from our experience, and, what is more important, have validity and meaning by reference to our experience, and are ultimately to be defined and tested by being equated to a mass of experience, greater or less, complex or simple. But, whereas a chair can be tested by sitting upon it, the meaning and value of such a concept as constitutionalism may require the histories of several nations for several generations to determine. In a sense then it will be seen that the "higher" conceptions, to distinguish them provisionally by that convenient epithet, are relatively remote from direct, immediate and easy observation. They spring from experiences and relate to experiences, but the relation is so indirect as to be easily left out of sight.

Now as soon as the relation disappears the concepts tend to form a world of their own. They may be held to constitute the true reality, of which experience is the imperfect copy, or the confused presentation.¹ More generally they are treated not indeed as independently real, but as independently valid. One or

1. Reversely but by a fundamentally similar method of thinking they may be excluded from the order of existence and yet retain their truth and value.

more conceptions are taken as self-evident. Reasoning consists in deducing further conceptions from these without applying the test of experience and conceivability, that is, our power of forming a conception which will interpret a connection, is freely used as a test of truth. The conceptual order is not regarded as one that has for its function and justification the illuminating of the world of experience, but rather as one to which the world of experience must conform on pain of being pronounced unreal. To apply a recognised concept to an experience is to explain it though the concept may contain nothing to show what are the observable conditions under which the given experience is found. Throughout the value if not the very reality of the concept resides in the concept itself. Such appear to be the points of method which Comte had in mind as distinguishing the "metaphysical" stage. All of them are reversed in the positive way of thinking. The positive concept must be equated to experience. Its value lies in the inter-relation of distinct parts of the empirical order which it effects. As an explanation it has no import except in so far as it at least specifies the conditions under which an experience will occur. The empirical order cannot be deduced from conceptions except in so far as they themselves are valid generalisations derived ultimately from the empirical order. What is conceivable depends upon what has been experienced and the reaction thereto of the human mind in accordance with the idiosyncrasies of its constitution and the special conditions under which it has developed. No conception has absolute validity independently of all reference to experience, and the reality attributed to conceptions either means their mere existence within the mind, or the real character of the empirically given order to which they relate.

Something like this I apprehend to be the general nature of the contrast between the positive method and that which Comte calls metaphysical. Its essence seems to be in the point that to the "metaphysical" mind the concept has a certain value, validity or reality in itself, to the positive it has this value only as relating to an order of reality given in experience.¹

Two or three examples may illustrate the contrast. Comte's first specimen of a typically positive conception is the law of gravitation. This example is the more interesting because the same law is taken by Hegel as typical of the law which becomes

1. If it be objected that reality is a wider conception than experience whether actual or possible, it may be replied that the basis and meaning of any conception of such reality are on the positive theory found in experience alone.

void in becoming general.¹ The very charge of nullity which positive method makes against the metaphysicians is urged by the great metaphysician against the chosen type of the positive method. Now Comte is well aware of the limits of the conception. To say that the law of gravitation explains the facts of gravitation he holds to be a fallacy. The law does not explain the facts. It is the accurate statement of the totality of the facts regarded as consisting in certain invariable relations. Partial truths may indeed be said to be explained in so far as they are referred to their places in the totality, for this reference to a place in a systematic totality is for the positive method the only explanation. The widest generalisation is not an empty universal standing above the facts. It expresses the hierarchy of relations, from the most general to the most specific which the facts themselves under thorough investigation reveal.

" In ethics and ethico-political theory, natural rights and all conceptions based on Nature are—not unjustly in view of their history—taken by Comte as metaphysical. It will be well to follow up this instance because it will lead to some limitations of the positive method which ought not to be overlooked. The term "natural" is clearly enough an expression, in the first instance, for some sort of experience; what is common, what conforms to a type, what is permanent or recurrent, what is deep-rooted and real—all such notions, and perhaps others, go to compound it. It also tends to carry with it, which is important, a suggestion of approval and desirability except to those for whom the natural is the vile, to whom it carries the opposite suggestion. Now this notion so variously compounded becomes metaphysical in our sense when it is set up as a principle of which the application is perfectly clear without need of criticism, as if it required no proof and were subject to no test from our actual experience. Contrast it in these respects with the Utilitarian formula which, rightly or wrongly, is put forward as an expression of our actual moral consciousness, and avowedly stands or falls by the correctness of the analysis. It is easy to recognise what is meant by the metaphysical character of the one and the positive character of the other.

" But it may be said neither the doctrine of natural rights nor the Utilitarian formula state facts, but rather in the last analysis issue commands. They profess to say not what we think or do, but what we ought to think or do. They are judgments of value, not

1. *Phaenomenologie des Geistes*, pp. 114, 115.

positive but normative. This is true and important. First principles of ethics and logic are normative. They seek to declare what is reasonable and lay down the rules which are to justify thought or action. In this sense moral philosophy is never wholly positive; yet, in so far as it acquires scientific character, it involves methods of genuinely positive character, for example, the analysis and comparison of moral judgments, and its first principle stands the test of experience, viz., in the practical consistency with which it is capable of being applied and the working harmony which it can give to personal and social life. What more a normative discipline involves is too large a question for incidental discussion. But it may be remarked that not the least condition of "positivity" in moral enquiries is the very fact that the positive and normative are distinguished, and not fused as they are in the conception of the "natural."

The rise of the positive spirit involves something more than a change of method. In so far as the mind moves between conception and conception rather than between conception and experience, not only its way of reasoning but its attitude to truth is hardly yet that of science. They might rather be called dialectical. Truth at this stage consists in a clearly expressed and internally consistent conceptual order. Hence any revision of an important conception will be looked at from the point of view of the whole system, and if suspected of a heresy which will disturb the reigning ideas it will be in danger of excommunication. I do not mean that all dialecticians are uncandid, but rather that before the truly scientific stage is reached, while all opinions are in the flux of controversy or in the state of unreal hardness which comes from a premature crystallisation, a solution suggested for any given problem is apt to be judged by its convenience for the whole system which the critic has in his mind rather than on its own merits. Provisional truth is scarcely admitted as a possibility. In these respects the positive method reverses the procedure. The first question it asks about each concept is whether it is an adequate formulation of some experience. If so it should have some value, and it remains to fit it in with other conceptions. Even if two conceptions are contradictory it does not follow that either can be summarily dismissed. It may be that both contain some deposit of truth, and the problem is to reconcile them, or to find out where lies the exaggeration, distortion, or one-sidedness that is probably responsible for the conflict. Thus the positive method constantly sends back the inadequate conception to the facts, the dialectical seeks to kill it, and to do so

will go a long way about to discover means of proving some contradictory consequences that can be deduced from it. Thus it is easy to see how dialectics degenerate into verbal controversy wherein the subtle extensions or contractions of a disputant's meaning beyond the original intention, the production of clever verbal combinations leading to new and unthought of deductions and all the other means of trapping the unwary become the principal instruments for exposing error and establishing truth. The rise of a study to positive rank is seen in the decay of the controversial interest, the diminished importance of definitions, the readiness to amend verbal slips and overcome differences of expression by a return to the real intention of words, the inclination to suspend judgment on doubtful points, the breaking up of problems and even whole sciences into specialities and the disinterested study of each special question for its own sake. Detachment of attitude, the piecemeal advance, the recognised necessity for correction are among the characteristics which seem to distinguish the scientific from the dialectical attitude, and, taken as a whole, they suggest not merely a change of method but of the attitude towards truth.¹ There is no ultimate reason in the nature of things why the study of metaphysics should not become a science in this sense. It is at bottom a question of bringing to the study of fundamental questions the same qualities of detachment and intellectual self-restraint that are universally demanded in the historian or the laboratory worker.

The positive method is sometimes confounded with one which may be called the materialistic or mechanical. This method avoids the mystical and even obscurantist tendency of some forms of metaphysics by seeking to keep very close to experience and by insisting on very clear-cut and well-defined conceptions. But in so doing it is liable to certain special errors, and in particular does not, as I shall show, escape one of the most serious fallacies of

1. In the sciences the dialectical method lingers longest in connection with the use of hypothesis. Hypothesis as a provisional arrangement of empirical data in a conceptual order, is indeed an absolute necessity for the advance of science. But the hypotheses which cause controversy are usually of another kind. They suggest some force, cause, or principle of connection which is to be proved not by being exhibited as a generalised statement of the observable relations of facts but by being used as the premiss of a deduction wherein conclusions can be drawn with which the facts agree. A type of the first kind of hypothesis is the Newtonian law of gravitation, and when Newton said that he did not invent hypotheses he meant hypotheses of the second kind—of the kind which loom large in popular science and give rise to more dialectical acuteness than detached reasoning in the controversies which they excite.

dialectic itself. In the first place, the natural tendency of a reaction from conceptual vagueness is to find validity only in the concepts which are most easily verifiable in experience—which in general will be those in which there is the least of that “work of the mind” which was described above. This is the source of the tendency of empiricists towards materialism. Similarly in the very demand for definiteness there lurks a danger. Experience is continuous, concrete, individual. Thought is discrete. From a mass of experience certain concepts are, as it were, precipitated. Taken one after another, they express the truth bit by bit. The first mistake of the mechanical mind is to seize one of these bits of truth which impresses itself as luminous and illuminating and set it up for the whole. This mistake is soon countered by a rival error which does the same with another fragment. But there is no improvement, for even when it is seen that both fragments have to be allowed for, the mechanical mind is not aware that they are fragments, but treats each concept quite in the dialectical spirit as an independent quasi-entity, and thinks that they may be combined and separated and re-combined all without internal modification, quite on the mechanical model. Now there are departments, I presume, in which this method is valid. Quantities may be added up and subtracted, forces may be compounded or divided without any regard to the possibility that in adding or compounding we are altering the nature of the quantity of the force so treated. In fact, so far as reality can be taken to bits and put together piece by piece, the mechanical system works. But as soon as it gets to pieces, the very nature of which is affected by other pieces, the method falls into fallacies. Distinguishable elements are taken as operating separately when in reality they determine and modify each other. The fallacy appears equally in the materialistic explanations which seek to resolve the higher categories into the lower, and in the ordinary “metaphysical” correctives thereof. For example, organic processes are resolved into A, B, C, separate mechanical processes. When the inadequacy of the explanation is felt a controlling force D—some vital force or other—is invented and added to them. But this is merely a new force acting upon the rest, just like another bit of mechanism, only with less precise conditions of operation. The true corrective, if corrective is here required, to the mechanical view is the conception of the organism as a totality wherein all elements and all life processes modify one

another and lose that independence which, as genuinely mechanical processes, would be attributed to them.¹

Thus, following Comte's clue, though not always adhering to his results, we may, if I am right, distinguish two forms of that transitional stage to which he gave the name of metaphysical. In the one the test of experience is unduly neglected. In the other it is applied with a certain narrowness and hardness of view which defeats its own ends. The one corresponds to what Comte called metaphysics, the other is closely allied to what he called materialism. The common point in both is that behind them, if not explicitly stated in them, lies the way of taking the concept as a self-contained, self-supported entity. Openly avowed in some metaphysical systems, this principle haunts as we have seen very various applications of the dialectic method as used by thinkers who in principle would certainly repudiate it. Mechanical empiricism thinks that it has finally laid the ghost, but in reality it too often invokes it from the realm below.

In this account it will be seen nothing is said or implied as to the results of the positive method or the scope of its application. There is in particular nothing to show that it is debarred from dealing with ultimate questions, or is concerned with a subjective synthesis. Its limitations, if any, are to be discovered by the working of the method not by the principles involved in it. To the student of development it is readily intelligible that what has appeared first as a myth and afterwards as a metaphysical theory should yet later be expressible as a positive truth. What is at one time a command of God may at another be recognised as a condition of a healthy and happy life. The positive method is often unexpectedly re-constructive.²

1. It is by an analogous correction that the most careful social thinkers seek to restate, if not to solve, the controversies engendered by a mechanical conception of the state and the individual.

2. It has been urged above that the restriction of positive method to phenomena involved a metaphysical theory. Similarly it may be added that the restriction to relations of similitude and succession involves a mechanical theory. These relations do not supply an adequate general formula for those which we find in experience. They represent no doubt an attempt to analyse the common categories of substance and attribute, structure and function, etc., into their ultimate elements. But they have all the failings of the forced, mechanical, definition. The truer conception of the positive method as applied to the foundations of science and the theory of knowledge is that it seeks to reconstruct on its own lines the familiar categories which have grown up half unconsciously in the progress of thought, by asking of each without prejudice what form of experience it expresses. So far as metaphysicians follow this method they are and always have been positive thinkers.

If the above account is correct—and at no point is it more than tentative—considerable modifications have to be introduced into Comte's fundamental law. The first stage is not purely theological, but involves imaginary entities more nearly resembling those which he called metaphysical. For us it is the stage of imagination or fiction. The second stage can hardly retain the name metaphysical as we are not prepared to debar metaphysical questions from the field of positive science. Looking at its method, we may perhaps call it the stage of dialectic, and we find its characteristic weaknesses underlying the two otherwise opposed methods of metaphysical idealism on the one side, and mechanical materialism on the other. For the third stage we keep the name of positive and adhere to Comte's primary definition of its object as a co-ordination of experience, but without allowing as an axiom the contrast between phenomena and reality, or the resolution of all the structure of experience into relations of similitude and succession. Taking the process as a whole, I would divide it fundamentally into two parts, each admitting of sub-divisions. The first of these sees the evolution of the definite universal, the second its critical reconstruction. Ideas arise in us as unconsciously as any other function, and we combine or disunite them in accordance with the play of fancy and feeling, and everything, however irrelevant, that creates a tension acting this way or that within the mind. This is the first or imaginative stage. The highest products of this stage are the living concrete images of the plastic fancy. By critical definition, limitation, and generalisation the image becomes a concept, and the systematic analysis and co-ordination of concepts yields the stage of thought which we have called dialectical, a stage which has its value as well as its fallacies. Beyond it lies the development of science which is in essentials a return from the concept to experience, a criticism of the thought which has grown up unconsciously in the light of the conditions of its growth. Men begin the search for truth, one might say, with fancy; after that they argue, and at length they try to find out.

The positive method does not come into being fully equipped at a definite date. On the contrary, as Comte himself contended, it has always been in use from the days of primitive man to our own. Similarly in the sphere of philosophy the positive method is no new invention. Nor is it yet a complete and perfect organon. From the days of the earliest thinkers the method of testing conceptions by experience has been applied side by side with the methods of dialectics. All we have to say here is that in proportion as the

treatment of a subject becomes scientific its method ceases to be dialectical and becomes positive.¹

What would be the consequences to sociology if this reconstruction is admitted? Comte's law is the foundation of an entire scheme of social development. As society passed from the theological to the positive stage so militarism decayed and industrialism grew. The order of government changed. Sociocracy was substituted for theocracy. The thoughts of men became concentrated on the improvement of human life. The higher social development of humanity became the foundation of true religion and the supreme purpose which gives meaning to effort and supplies a motive for morality. The more restricted sense here given to the law of development can hardly of itself justify such large deductions. But two things may be said. In the first place, Comte's conception of intellectual development as a social process is implied throughout. There is no suggestion anywhere of the rise in humanity of a new faculty to which improved method is due. On the contrary, the employment of observation and legitimate inference therefrom is manifestly attributable to the lowest known savage, if not to the higher animal intelligence. The use of a higher method preponderates over that of others, as in the process of tradition and interaction conceptions are developed and experience widens and becomes more organised.

In the second place, the effort to give positive meaning to moral and social ideals must tend to bring them nearer to the actual working of human experience, and this prepares us for the view which is but an extension of Comte's, and which I believe the actual working out of the positive method to justify, that the supreme purposes of religion and morals are to be found in the living process of evolution. It is not indeed possible to understand fully the emergence of the positive method itself except by reference to the stages through which this growth has passed hitherto. Nor can sociological, ethical and philosophical principles be properly criticised until they are seen to be products of a development, nor can ideals for the future be framed to regulate our

1. The rise of the positive method so considered has its place in a more general law of mental evolution. The lower stages of this evolution, in which the animal world remains, do not employ general conceptions. The rise of these conceptions and their advance in definiteness and comprehension constitutes the first great stage of human advance. So far the growth of thought is still spontaneous and uncritical. The second stage, regarded from the point of view of method, is that of the self criticism of thought, and of this the positive method (of reducing all conceptions to the experience which they express) is the basis.

present conduct unless regard is had to the conditions under which progress is possible. That we are creatures of a development which has been unconscious and stand at the point at which it begins to understand itself and so to become self-directing is the central conception of Comte's sociology which the criticism of method only serves to confirm and extend.

L. T. HOBHOUSE.

SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF IRELAND.

Western civilisation, if it presents many national diversities, has also some fundamental characteristics, overriding national differences. The people of Western Europe have a common heritage derived from the early civilisation of their Aryan forefathers; they are the sociological heirs of Greek intellect, of Roman civic order, of the Catholic and Feudal life of the medieval period, of the great revolution of the last five centuries, out of which has sprung the world of modern science and industry. In other words, the West has had a continuous and common life in which its constituent parts have had their share, each in its degree, in accordance with its situation and its powers, aiding in the general evolution. Therefore, in order to study the history of any particular nation to the best advantage, it is necessary to keep this evolution in mind, so as to separate what is common to all or to most from what is peculiar to any one or any group. This is the first simplification which the study of history from the sociological standpoint allows; and without this simplification history becomes a chaos. If a movement such as feudalism for instance, is found in many countries, its antecedents must be sought in characteristics common to all, in the general development of Western Europe, and not in the special circumstances of any one nation. Those special circumstances can only explain differences of time at which a particular stage of development was reached, or differences in the details of organisation. Each nation of Western Europe is a unit in the general life of the West, an organ of that body, partaking in and subordinate to the general life, but also living its own life, affecting and being affected by its fellow members, subject to its own diseases, and specially occupied with those functions for which it is best fitted or which are most necessary to its own existence. There are, indeed, some marked differences between Sociological and Biological organisms—the connection of parts and specialisation of functions being carried much further in the latter. But each nation of the West partakes in the common civilisation of the whole, acts on its fellow nations and is acted on by them, and performs with different degrees of specialisation and intensity the various functions of the common life. In the same way the West has its part in the general civilisation of mankind, and is an organ

of that greater but still more loosely organised body which is made up of all the nations and races of men.

It is in the light of this simplification that the history of Ireland must be viewed; and so viewed, it will like all extreme cases, like all crucial instances, be found peculiarly rich in sociological material. It is, in its earlier history, a nation from its geographical position less affected by the movements of its neighbours or the general course of development than any other. It thus retained to an unusual extent the characteristics of the ancient Aryan civilisation, once common to all Europe, and was peculiarly homogeneous in itself, and markedly separate from its neighbours. This distinction was maintained, in spite of one serious breach, the introduction of Christianity—till the first invasion from the island larger, richer, and closer to the centres of Western civilisation, which lay between it and the continent of Europe. And if the earlier history of Ireland is of interest as the case of a Western people growing up in comparative isolation, the later history has an even stronger interest. It is that of a people peculiarly homogeneous and distinctive in their civilisation exposed to a continuous pressure from a country possessing far greater resources and in some respects much further developed, an era of isolation followed by an era of domination, a civilisation of peculiar strength subjected to an external pressure of peculiar intensity and continuance. And just as the physician eagerly examines some case of bodily disease unexampled in intensity, so may the Sociologist find that it will repay him to examine this conflict between a strongly marked civilisation and the outside forces arrayed against it.

Ireland, safe in isolation, was never conquered by Rome: it therefore never experienced the compulsion of Roman order, nor did it even inherit, like medieval England, such material legacies as the Roman roads, which long survived the power of their creators. There was, no doubt, even in Roman times, some trade with the outer world; and in Mrs. Hutton's version of the famous Irish epic, the *Táin Bó Cúailnge*, we read of exiles from Ulster taking refuge on the neighbouring coasts of Scotland, and of young warriors sent for training still further afield—perhaps even to Greece and Scythia. Later on, missionaries converted the Irish to Christianity, the main influence by which Ireland was kept in touch with the rest of the Western world; but even the great conversion affected the old civilisation very slowly. Tradition declares that the new teachers respected the old law—the Law of Nature—save where it directly conflicted with the Law of the Letter,

the new gospel. The exemption of women from military service is attributed to as late a date as the year 697. The Saxons never reached Ireland, and the main force of the Danish invasions was spent before they reached the Irish coast. Thus while England underwent a Roman occupation of several centuries, a Saxon settlement, continual Danish invasions, and finally a conquest by the Normans, who had already assimilated the Roman civilisation of France, all in addition to the introduction of Christianity, Ireland was free from foreign influence except such as was involved in the change of religion and in a few Danish settlements confined to the coasts. In the years immediately succeeding the Norman Conquest, the closeness of the connection between England and the Continent immensely increased. The English kings had large continental dominions and they reorganised the land tenure of England on a new feudal pattern, while Ireland retained almost unbroken its old institutions. When Lanfrance was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury, it was said that he was called to be primate of another world. But great as were the differences between England and the Continent, they were as nothing to those which separated Ireland from England.

There was, however, another geographical feature of the country, besides its isolation, which profoundly affected its future destiny. Ireland consists of a great central plain almost surrounded by ranges of mountains, which in general closely approach the coast. The result was that the Northmen who swarmed over the Eastern parts of England, and made their way up the great rivers of France, did not venture in Ireland to settle where the mountains would cut them off from the sea. They left the interior plain almost undisturbed, and contented themselves with establishing settlements on the coasts.

These geographical conditions affected the course of Irish civilisation in other ways. The development was slow. Had the human race consisted of a single tribe confined to a single island, there would have been some progress, for there would have been some accumulations of wealth and knowledge; but deprived of the compelling or stimulating effect of contact with other civilisations, which has been a main cause of the rapid progress of Europe, the advance would have been very slow, and it would have been very difficult to pass from one stage of civilisation to another. Ireland was not in this position. But it approached more nearly to it than any other part of Western Europe, and therefore its development in some important respects was much behind its neigh-

bours. This will be seen if we consider (1) the land question, and (2) the progress towards a single national government. As regards the first, it is sufficient to note that when in the seventeenth century an English lawyer, Sir John Davies, examined the old Irish tenures, still surviving in some parts of the country, he found what we can see was not merely something representing an earlier state than existed in England, but even earlier than that which existed in Wales, when we first get a glimpse of the Welsh tenures, themselves archaic compared with those of the richer part of the island. Mr. Frederick Seebohm puts it thus in the chapters of his "English Village Community" in which he has sought light from Ireland (p. 229):—

"Returning now to the main object of the inquiry we seem in the perhaps to some extent superficial and too simple view taken by Sir John Davies of the Irish tribal arrangements, to have found what we sought—to have got a glimpse in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of an earlier stage in the working of the tribal system than we got in Wales nearly a thousand years earlier. In this stage the land in theory was still in tribal ownership, its redistribution among the tribesmen was still frequent, and arable agriculture was still subordinate to pasture. Lastly, the arithmetical clustering of the homesteads was the natural method by which the frequent redistributions of the land were made easy; while the run-rig form of the open field system was the natural mode of conducting a co-operative and shifting agriculture."

From the failure of the Irish to form a central government with real power, for the Kingship of Ireland represented an aspiration rather than a fact, inferences very derogatory to the Irish have been drawn. But it is easily explained. The slow growth of the centralised states of Europe has been assisted by outward pressure. The border states or those most exposed to foreign aggression have grown strong and warlike out of all proportion to those of their neighbours who had less fighting to do. The Kings of Wessex only made their over-lordship a reality, when they had saved England from the Danes; and it is no accident that in our own time the unification of Germany has fallen to the representatives of the Margraves of Brandenburg. Now in Ireland there were no marches, the sea and mountains protected all alike. The settlements of the Danes were not sufficiently formidable and were too

scattered, to give any one of the Irish Kingdoms that constant training in arms and that prestige of victory which would have enabled it to subdue the others. In any case, these invasions ceased before the unification was accomplished, and Ireland was left divided to meet a still more dangerous enemy.

But even if some outward appearance of unity had arisen it could not have been a unity of the kind existing in England. As we have seen in considering the land tenure of Ireland, the organisation of society was still tribal, and any Irish Kingdom which might have been formed could only have been a collection of tribes.

Irish history is full of apparent contradictions, and not the least of these is found in the contrast between the backwardness of temporal organisation as regards government and the tenure of land and on the other hand the advanced state of learning during many centuries. A comparison with the case of Greek intellectual development as explained by Comte may help us to understand the somewhat similar case of Ireland. In communities organised for war, where that was the main activity of free citizens, the best intellect of the country was devoted to supporting the state in its career of conquest. But in Greece, the formation of a great empire was impossible; for in early times such an empire must arise from continuous accretions to a nucleus, and the physical features of the country rendered this impossible. It was difficult for small states separated by sea and mountain to conquer, easy to avoid being conquered, and even when conquest took place, complete incorporation was impossible. War, therefore, became, not a career of conquest, but a series of barren contests. There was mental stimulus without complete absorption in military pursuits. Military civilisation prevented the rise of theocracy, and gave opportunity for personal initiative. It allowed freedom. But it did not absorb all energies as in early Rome. And thus men were found to devote themselves to intellectual pursuits. The civilisation of Ireland, whether we regard the varied elements within, or the variety of stimuli from without, was far inferior to that of early Greece; but the main condition was the same—a people in a war-like state, yet denied the possibility of conquest. Even before the introduction of Christianity there had been much poetry and the poet had been held in honour. The new religion gave a new turn to men's thoughts. To the petty local contests which had so little result was opposed the conception of a life devoted to learning and piety and consecrated by the Church Universal. The influence of

Christian literature and philosophy gave the required stimulus; and Ireland free by her position from the necessity of defence or the hopes of conquest, undisturbed by the barbarian, became the refuge of Christian learning. If the balanced power and the tribal organisation of Ireland prevented the formation of a strong Irish kingdom, so much the more readily did the best minds in Ireland devote themselves to the building up of the Universal Church, whether as scholars in their own Abbeys or as missionaries beyond the sea. Ireland became the school of Christendom.

This period of intellectual splendour had been already somewhat dimmed by the Danish invasions, when the beginning of English interference gave a new turn to Irish life. Henceforward, the conflict between the two civilisations, the one so rich and powerful, the other so strongly marked as a result of its long isolation, concentrated all energies in the country that was to be the battleground. The stage was set for one of the great tragedies of human history.

This diversity of civilisation was not the only cause of the failure of Feudalism to take root in Ireland after the English invasion. Something was also due to the stage of development or of decay which feudal institutions had reached in the twelfth century; for it is difficult to transplant to a new social environment an institution which has already lost its power in its original home. At the beginning of the eleventh century, feudalism was still full of life. Though, in Northern France, where it had reigned longest, the commutation of services for money, which was eventually to reduce the feudal lords to mere rent-receivers had begun, their extreme political independence seemed the great danger. It was, therefore, possible for Saint Stephen of Hungary to introduce an improved Feudalism into his kingdom, in which this abuse should be remedied: and it was possible for William the Conqueror to follow in the same way fifty years later. But the Crusaders could only set up in Jerusalem, the perfect but lifeless form of a feudal monarchy. Ireland came later still; and there the institutions of feudalism, already in decay, found themselves face to face with the deeply-rooted tribal institutions of the Irish. When and where the Anglo-Norman Barons were supported by the English government, they made some show of retaining English manners and laws; when and where they were left to themselves, they found it much easier to govern by Irish methods. In that case the people were prepared to give them the same loyalty as they had given to their old tribal chiefs. The Anglo-Norman lords became, as the

saying was, "More Irish than the Irish," and Irish civilisation gained its first victory.

Here, indeed, was one of the standing difficulties of the English task. Feudal governments could only work through feudal institutions. The more centralised monarchies that grew up in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were at first an almost insupportable weight to the countries they ruled and could spare little for the conquest or management of distant dependencies. Individual or collective emigration had to be resorted to; and as soon as the settlers were left to themselves, they found themselves in presence of a civilisation far more primitive, but far more deeply rooted than their own. To become Irish was the line of least resistance. In the fourteenth century, we find a distinction made between the English by blood and the English by birth, and the former excluded from office like the mere Irish. Later on the same process was found to have been at work with the adventurers under the Tudors, at least those who made Ireland their home, and with men of a different class, the more popular element who formed the plantations under James I. If any settlers could have remained unaffected, it would have been the Puritan officers and soldiers who received confiscated lands in Ireland in payment for their services; yet by the eighteenth century, the descendants of the rank and file were scarcely distinguishable from their neighbours, while the families of many Cromwellian officers took a prominent part with the other Protestant landowners in securing the temporary independence of the Irish Parliament.

The Reformation added a new difference to the many differences already existing between England and Ireland. The latter adhered to the old religion, in contradiction to the general course followed by the Northern nations. Those who affirm that Protestantism was an outcome of superior enlightenment will find that the proposition involves great difficulties. They will have to prove that Germany and Scotland were intellectually in advance of the Italy of the Renaissance. Those on the other hand who insist that the Reformation sprung from material considerations only, such as the drain of wealth to Rome, are met by the difficulty that these material disadvantages were of old standing. The causes were much more complex. Generally speaking, Protestantism was only successful in those countries which had never been thoroughly incorporated in the Roman Empire, and where as a consequence the spirit of discipline and subordination was less marked. This was the necessary condition of a successful religious revolt. But

to set the revolt going it was also necessary that there should be some material advantage to be gained either for the people as a whole or for particular classes—stoppage of the drain of wealth to Rome, confiscation of the estates of the clergy. And as this was justified by an appeal from the authority of the Church to the records of primitive Christianity, it was necessary that there should be a considerable diffusion of knowledge and intellectual interest, but not too much—not so much as to take the mind away from theological enquiries to the classical revival, and the study of Greek science and art. All these conditions were found throughout Northern Europe, and the North became Protestant. They were absent in Southern Europe, and the South remained Catholic.

Now to this rule, Ireland is an exception—the only important one if we leave Poland out of account, the extreme post of medieval Europe, always face to face with the non-Catholic population of Russia. In Ireland a new condition was present. The absence of a centralised state, and later the presence of a foreign power gave the Church an importance and an influence which it did not possess elsewhere. For many ages it reigned without a rival. And as it had existed before the English invasion, it could claim to be exempt from the suspicion attaching to institutions introduced from England. But this was not all. One of the strongest incitements to a breach with Rome was absent. It was not the drain to Rome but the drain to England that affected Ireland; and as the Irish saw all the richest ecclesiastical preferments given to Englishmen, it was of no consequence to them if this English monopoly was occasionally infringed for the benefit of a Papal nominee. Above all, when England changed her religion, there was a new reason for Ireland to keep in the old ways. Ireland remained Catholic because England was Protestant. The particular relations between the two countries determined the attitude of the weaker to the general European movement. It has, indeed, been asserted by enthusiastic Catholics that there is a peculiar harmony between the Irish national character—considered as some eternal and unchanging entity—and the Catholic faith. The Irish character, for reasons already mentioned has an unusual fixity; but the old Gaelic poems show that in many respects, notably as regards chastity and the ideal of womanhood, the Irish of the days before St. Patrick held very different views to those of their descendants. The harmony between the Catholic Irish and their religion is due to the position of the Church during many ages; to the weakness of the State in the old times, and still more to the independence of

the Church in the last three centuries. Since the Reformation, a new difference has been added to those already existing between the two nations, and the Catholic Church has been cherished with a new fervour as the one institution out of the conqueror's power. It is from that time that we may date the occasional appeal from England's authority to the world outside. Previous to the Reformation, though an appeal to Rome was open to the Irish, it was open to the English as well, and the English of the Pale on one occasion unsuccessfully appealed to the Pope to proclaim a crusade against the native Irishry who were described as worse than the Saracens. But after the Reformation, the English had no place in the Catholic Church; and the Catholic religion was endeared all the more to the Irish because it had to be loved in suffering and sacrifice. Whether this adherence to Catholicism was ultimately beneficial to the Irish, is another question. It made the assimilation of English settlers more difficult, and in later times opened a way for the policy of "Divide et impera" by means of the Protestant minority. But it rendered all attempts at assimilating Ireland to England still more certain of failure.

Nor did the English succeed in assimilating the Irish land system to their own. As we saw, in the view of Mr. Seebohm, the Irish land tenure at the beginning of the seventeenth century was more than a thousand years behind that of Wales, which in turn was more primitive than that of England. "Booleying," or the migration of the family and their cattle to the hills in summer—for the analogue of which in modern times we must go to the utmost bounds of civilisation, to the semi-nomads described by Leplay on the border-lands between Europe and Asia—still existed. To Edmund Spenser, Sir John Davies, and other English observers, the whole system of native law seemed, as they said of that special iniquity, the fine for murder, "contrary to God's law and man's." They did not know that the punishing of murder by a fine had once been universal in the West, and was a part of the old common law which had survived in Ireland alone. The great aim of the English lawyers in Ireland was to substitute English law and English land-tenures for the Irish. On paper, they succeeded. But the Irish never accepted the English laws relating to land. They never recognised the unlimited property of the landlord. And in our times, painfully and with many experiments, we have had to set up other tenures which, if they no longer, in face of the complete disappearance of tribal organisation, restored the old tribal ownership, at least gave that interest in the land and that

security of unexhausted improvements to the cultivator which had been a part of the old system. In the slow development of human institutions, it is not necessary that the more backward peoples should repeat every step of the pioneers. On the contrary, it is often possible when the goal is perceived, to benefit by the experience of others and reach by it a shorter way or at least to lose less on the road. Is it fanciful to suggest that the success of the Irish farmers in co-operative agriculture may be due to the retention of some of those qualities which distinguish the period of tribal organisation, and which have been largely lost by those nations that have been trained under a system of industrial individualism?

Ireland presents a series of extraordinary contradictions, at once Catholic and yet as a result of its opposition to English rule revolutionary, backward in industrial organisation and yet a pioneer in agricultural co-operation; but the greatest contradiction of all is the persistence of national life amidst all discouragements in a people that never reached national unity under an independent government. Such a government would have arisen, though slowly, if foreign interference had been absent. By the English invasions every possible nucleus of such unity was destroyed. But the civilisation of Ireland was so persistent, so homogeneous, was the product of such an unbroken evolution, that it could neither be supplanted or assimilated by the civilisation of England, more advanced, but drawn from varied sources, and with its varied strands still imperfectly harmonised. On the contrary, the successive waves of English settlement were assimilated by the Irish; and there grew up an Ireland—no longer of pure Irish blood—but yet with strongly marked national characteristics which were not those of England. The typical Irishman of literature has not been derived from the Catholic peasant, with his life of hard toil, and his sense of injustice, but rather from the Protestant squireen of the eighteenth century—before the evangelical movement had made Irish Protestants serious—jovial and careless, who had as forcible methods for dealing with process-servers, debt-collectors, and other obnoxious representatives of law and order, as have ever been resorted to by the tenants of his more respectable successors.

The persistence of the national consciousness of Ireland in face of the more powerful nationality of England is a remarkable sociological fact. Nor is its significance in any way diminished by the existence in a part of Ulster of an industrial and Protestant population who profess some political hostility to their fellow-countrymen. The protection afforded to the linen-trade, when other Irish industries

were destroyed, has indeed given that part of Ireland some peculiar features, which may long remain, but the distinction of religions as a consequence of the general course of the evolution of human thought in the intellectual sphere, and the growth of religious equality and tolerance in the political and moral, is becoming of less and less importance. Ulster cannot claim—nor even the North-East portion of Ulster—to be considered a separate nation. Protestant Ulster has no separate territory, no distinctive national consciousness of long duration. Little more than three generations ago Belfast was the strongest centre of the United Irishmen. But still less does it partake of English nationality. In no part of Ireland would a proposal to assimilate the land-laws to those of England be more sturdily resisted. It remains a province of Ireland with some distinctive industrial conditions.

On the other hand, Ireland as a whole, has a strongly marked territory, bounded by the sea, a national consciousness of long duration, and a very distinct national character. Like other nations, it has differences of religion and politics within its borders; but it has two characteristics, which are only found where the national feeling is rooted deep, the power to assimilate foreign elements even when introduced in large numbers, homogeneous among themselves, and the power to retain the affection of its emigrants to other countries. The explanation of this persistence of nationality can only be found in a study of Irish history—in the long period of isolation which preceded the long period of foreign interference.

S. H. SWINNY.

DISCUSSIONS.

OLD AGE PENSIONS.

I. THE DANGERS OF THE NON-CONTRIBUTORY PRINCIPLE.

Ought every man and woman to be assured of adequate provision for his or her maintenance when past work through old age? There can be but one possible answer to that question, and that is in the affirmative. How is that assurance to be obtained? There is again but one answer:—through thrift, self-denial, and forethought in youth and during the years of working life.

Conclusive as this answer is, it does not appear to satisfy the generality of people, and the House of Commons has just affirmed, by a majority of 417 to 29, that there is another answer. The Prime Minister roused them to enthusiasm by an appeal, the sophistry of which is concealed by its splendid eloquence:—

“There is no Parliamentary short-cut to the millennium. But are we, because of the difficulties and because of the complexity of the task, to sit still, with dumb lips and with folded arms and bewildered brains and palsied energies, while this great procession of the poor and necessitous and unbefriended linger out the last days of lives the strenuous years of which have been given to the service of industry and of the State? We say not, and we ask the House to say not, but to take the first step towards the accomplishment of this great and beneficent work.”

This first step is a proposal to grant a free pension out of public funds to every person above the age of seventy, subject to certain discriminatory conditions. It is to be followed by other successive steps, which will by degrees lower the age at which the pension is to begin, relax the conditions, increase the pension in amount, and apply it to the circumstances of those who are disabled from working by invalidity, whatever their age may be—each of those successive steps greatly increasing the sum required from the public funds to meet the cost. If the bottom is ever reached, the tax-paying portion of the community will be impoverished, in order that the pension-receiving portion may be relieved of the necessity of exercising the virtues of thrift, self-denial, and forethought. The great procession of the poor, and necessitous, and unbefriended will be reinforced at every stage by a new contingent, until self-reliance and independence cease to be regarded as praiseworthy, and the very motive which leads men to spend strenuous years in the service of industry—namely, the desire by that means to provide for the future as well as for the present—ceases to operate.

The sophism which lies at the base of Mr. Asquith's eloquent appeal is that those who have spent these strenuous years have earned by their labour a sum which is insufficient to enable them to provide for the future—perhaps, indeed, insufficient to provide

for their due maintenance according to a reasonable standard of living during the working years; and that it is the duty of the State to make up that deficiency. That is the very vicious principle upon which the old Poor Law was shipwrecked. Supplement insufficient wages by doles out of public funds. The man who is not paid for his work the full value of all that that work takes out of him—future as well as present—is not paid enough for his work, and ought to be paid more. His is a sweated industry, and everything the State pays to him is really paid to his employer, the sweater, who is the true pauper and ought to bear the taint of pauperism. How it is that the labour party, who are the strongest advocates of the system of free pensions, do not see that their contention is ruinous to the independence of the workmen they represent, and can only tend to lead them to accept inadequate pay for the benefit of the employer, I cannot understand. The procession of the poor and necessitous, therefore, consists either of those who have had insufficient pay, which the State ought not, in their interest, to supplement; or those who have had sufficient pay, and have spent on the present that portion of it which belonged to the future. When these two classes fall out the remaining procession, that of the unbefriended, will not be a long one. As Mr. Mackay says, the proposal to make the maintenance of old age, in part at all events, a public and no longer a private charge is a revolutionary change in our social economy. In many cases, the pension paid to the aged will be treated as a discharge from responsibility by children, who ought to support their parents, employers, who ought to pension their old servants, friends, who ought to prove their friendship, charitable people, who desire to relieve distress and to show kindness—who now exercise their several functions to the good of giver and receiver alike, and for whom the State will substitute a pension officer and his staff.

Much of the discussion of the question has turned upon the distinction between contributory and non-contributory schemes. These terms do not quite accurately define the point at issue. All pension funds must be raised by contribution. The "contributory" scheme is one in which that contribution is made by or on behalf of the person who requires the pension. The "non-contributory" is one in which that contribution is made by the taxpayer and no contribution, beyond that which the pensioner may have made by way of taxes, is required for the specific purpose of obtaining the pension. There are objections common to both contributory and non-contributory schemes so far as they involve State-action. The contributory plan provides for old age by means of the purchase of a deferred annuity. That purchase involves the sinking of the money paid on a contingency that may never happen. It is a common mistake, with regard to contingent assurances of this kind, that the premiums ought to be returned, or some other payment made, in the event of death before the pension age has been attained, and that the man who dies has forfeited or lost the money he has paid. That is not so: there is no such thing as a returnable premium in a contingent assurance. The man who insures against fire, or accident, or shipwreck, knows that, and does not ask for his money back when the risk is over:—but the man who assures a deferred annuity cannot understand it, and the

plan adopted by annuity companies and by the Government of granting what are called returnable premium policies for an extra premium tends to bewilder him. The fact is, that in both cases, the premium for the deferred annuity is absolutely sunk; the premiums returned at death are the equivalent of the extra premium charged, for what is in reality an entirely separate transaction. This may be easily shown by supposing the non-returnable annuity to be insured in one Company, A, and the payment at death of a sum equivalent to the premiums in another Company, B. If the man died, A would pay nothing, and B would pay the sum at death. If the man lived, A would pay the pension and B would pay nothing. The necessary sinking of the money makes the purchase of a deferred annuity an unpopular investment.

As there are many other ways of providing for old age, the proposal that people should purchase a deferred annuity from the State, especially if coupled with a State subsidy, has a tendency to induce people to prefer that particular form of investment to others that might be more suitable to their circumstances, and to interfere by competition with private enterprise. That has, in fact, been already done:—during the last 55 years, the Government has kept open a shop for the sale of deferred annuities. Though it gives no subsidy, and only allows in pensions the equivalent of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent compound interest on the money paid to it, it has succeeded in attracting 3000 customers, who have bought pensions averaging 8s. a week each (they cannot buy more than 20s.) finding the absolute guarantee granted by the Government more attractive than the higher pension they could get from an annuity company without that guarantee. With regard to every contract for the purchase of a deferred annuity, it is to be noted that only two contingencies are involved—that of survivorship to the time when the pension is to begin, and that of earning throughout all the long time during which the contract lasts the full rate of interest required to provide the pension. Anyone may buy a pension of a friendly society or insurance company, but only the Government can enter into such a contract with an absolute guarantee that this condition will be fulfilled. There is therefore something to be said for the proposal that the business which the Government has been carrying on for the last 55 years should be continued and extended. To be of any real use, however, far better terms would have to be offered to the public. There is precedent for that, for in past years, Government has allowed to savings banks and to friendly societies who have entrusted it with their funds a rate of interest exceeding that which it has earned; and the deficiency has been voted by Parliament. We suggest that Government should raise the $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent which it now offers to 4 per cent, and that that excess should be voted annually by Parliament. While this plan is admittedly open to the objections that have been stated, we think it open to less objection and likely to do less harm than any other plan.

The special advantage of a contributory over a non-contributory system is that it gets rid of the whole business of discrimination, a difficulty which must beset every plan of free pensions until bottom has been reached, and pensions become universal. The only safe discrimination is that which a man exercises on his own behalf.

If he thinks he wants a pension, and is willing to pay for it, there can be no question whether he deserves it or not; for it is his. It cannot be withheld and it cannot be revoked.

As Mr. Mackay has said with great force in the excellent letter we have already quoted, the most important consideration is—how the policy of free pensions will affect the character of the poor. If personal responsibility can be abolished without fear of a disastrous relaxation of the obligations that bind men to work out their own future, there is no intelligible reason for confining this principle to the treatment of old age. "There are many other risks of life to which the same measure must logically be applied, and without doubt an irresistible agitation will be set on foot to increase the amounts and multiply the occasions on which public money must be expended. If because it may be difficult for a poor man to maintain his independence in this or any other vicissitude of life we are therefore to withdraw the whole series of life's obligations, as at present understood, from the individual and to make the State responsible for their discharge, the whole training ground" on which men have hitherto been forced to acquire habits of self-reliance "is closed, and a momentous change in the discipline and education of the nation must inevitably follow. This is a step in a much larger revolution, for which, it is submitted, the country is by no means prepared, and the beginning of a change, which all who regard character and thrift as necessary contributory elements in the comfort and happiness of the mass of the people, should strenuously resist."

EDWARD BRABROOK.

II. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE TO THE AGED POOR.

In considering the social significance of the government scheme of Old Age Pensions I do not propose to dwell upon even the more important provisions of the scheme relating to age, amount of pension, or disqualifications, but to confine myself to an exposition and defence of what I conceive to be the social principle and policy which it embodies. That society, through the instrument of government, has an obligation to safeguard its interests by offering public relief to destitute persons is a principle already expressed in our Poor Law. In the case of aged or otherwise weak or infirm persons such relief is not accompanied by any labour test, and in the case of out-door paupers it is a money payment as a public provision against starvation. But this public relief has been accompanied by inquisition, political disqualification and by other brands of personal degradation.

The present proposal secures to all aged needy persons a right to receive public support free from any obligation to make any special contribution to the fund for which payment is made and from any formal degradation attached to the receipt of such support.

This new personal right is created by the State upon two grounds, first, that it is detrimental to the Social welfare that a number of aged men and women should be living in want and misery, secondly that such public provision is the most efficacious mode of stopping or reducing this social injury. There is, as I conceive, no acknowledgment of any "right" natural to or inherent in the individual to demand that Society or the State shall relieve him of an obligation to support himself: the right is created or conceded by Society for its own protection and gain.

The State is to be the instrument for the provision of a pension, and there is to be no contribution on the part of the recipients. These two conditions require particular consideration. If it is the interest of Society to secure that all old people shall escape destitution, the State must either provide or guarantee the pension, for no private or corporative investment on the part of workers can furnish such security.

Provision by means of regular voluntary contributions of individual workers to Friendly Societies and other instruments of private thrift will not secure the result. For, in the first place, such contributions are impracticable, or, as regards a large section of the workers, if practicable, they are not defensible on true grounds of domestic economy. The wages of a large proportion of adult male workers, when they are in regular employment, are not in fact sufficient to enable them to set aside even a small weekly sum against old age without impairing their expenditure on objects to which a prior importance attaches, viz., the maintenance of themselves in a standard of efficiency, the proper rearing of such a family as is required to maintain the national supply of labour-power, and the provision against sickness and other emergencies which are entitled to take precedence of old age as claims for such "thrift" as they can afford. These conditions certainly apply to

the large majority of agricultural and other rural labourers in the South of England, except where proximity to London or other large centre of industry produces higher rates of pay, and to considerable members of unskilled or low skilled workers in towns. Moreover, in many fairly skilled town trades where the man's wage, or, at any rate, the family income, would enable something to be saved for old age, if it were reliable and continuous, the fluctuations of employment afford no reasonable expectation of regularity of payments for such a purpose. Large sections of the building trades fall under this category. Those who insist that even in these classes the obligation to provide against old age devolves by right, sometimes urge that, if they were forced to rely upon their thrift for this purpose, they would be able to insist upon a higher rate of wages, when in work, so as to enable them to make this provision, and that in this constructive sense a state pension is a subsidy to wages which operates to keep down wages, as does indiscriminate out-relief.

But this contention ignores alike the economic and the moral conditions of the wage-bargain for these classes. It is idle to allege that the probability of old age penury is, or can become, a real factor in the determination of wages for agricultural labour and for unskilled or casual town labour, or that the conditions of the labour market in normal times could enable them to give efficiency to such a motive, even if they entertained it.

To other critics who insist that provision for old age could be made by all or nearly all wage earners if they would spend less on drink or on other useless or injurious objects, there are two replies; first, that, if such improvements in expenditure were made, other elements in a progressive standard of comfort have a prior claim which would easily absorb the savings; secondly, that the State in its policy is bound to consider not some theoretically wise economy of resources but such economy as is actual or probable.

The economic and moral environment of most of our workers is such as practically to preclude calculations for a comfortable old age or wisely discriminative expenditure in the present.

On all these points the case of women workers is even more conclusive than that of men; for the normal wage of women workers, even in tolerably skilled town industries, is a "sweating" wage, insufficient to maintain them in full efficiency, much less to afford provision for old age. The only considerable class of women workers, outside Lancashire, who are economically competent to make any such provision, is the better paid grade of domestic service: many of these workers do attempt some saving for this and other purposes, but much of it is sucked up to assist in family emergencies, often going to support the old age of their parents.

Taking our current wage system as a whole, and having proper regard to the growing irregularity of employment which accompanies the attainment of middle age in most modern industries, it is unreasonable to expect that any large proportion of the lower paid workers should make any sort of adequate provision for their maintenance in old age. Can their family, then, be expected to maintain them? To this the answer is that the modern industrial family, for reasons relating chiefly to the mobility, the division of

labour, and other characteristics of modern industry, tends to become less and less a self-sufficient economic unit, so that the strength of some wage-earning members is less available than formerly to compensate the weakness of others. In many instances it is impossible to find close relatives who either voluntarily or on compulsion can support the aged members of the family : in many cases where such support is given it is at a heavy cost to the efficiency of the family standard of comfort, and is thus a social injury.

If this economic analysis is substantially correct, it is impracticable to endeavour to secure any considerable contribution to an Old Age Pension from the bulk of those whose need of a pension is most urgent. Only what is called the aristocracy of labour could afford such a regular contribution as would be required, and, if a State contribution were applied as a stimulus to private thrift for this purpose, some risk of diverting money from a better form of personal expenditure or thrift would be incurred.

At best, a contributory scheme, subsidised out of taxation, would imply taking from the poorest grade of workers to give to the better-to-do workers, in so far as the former would pay taxes and only the latter receive pensions. The non-contributory policy is a bold and plain recognition of the salient facts of the situation, that there is much old age poverty which is a burden on the workers and an injury to civilisation, that it is not possible for workers or working class families to remedy this evil out of their own economic and moral resources, and that the State alone is competent to undertake this provision out of the public resources.

Those, however, who are disposed to treat the old age pensions policy as a distinctively eleemosynary matter, which the State seems driven into undertaking because no other method of abating old age poverty is possible, miss the full significance of the step in State socialism.

In most modern industrial nations the growing inability of the individual and the family to anticipate and make adequate provision against emergencies arising from the increased complexity of industry and commerce is driving the State to take a larger and larger part in the business of Insurance. This is due, not merely to a growing recognition of the true interests of organised society in the repression of needless suffering and want, but also to a perception that the State can furnish a security which can be furnished in no other way. The State is by nature better qualified to undertake certain branches of Insurance than almost any other business, and can thus impart to the individual life an element of that stability which its very name implies.

For such general purposes of security as are involved in an Old Age Pension, a great routine system of insurance can undoubtedly be worked more economically as a single public system than as a number of private competitive profit-seeking businesses, while, on the other hand, the actual assurance of the pension, and, what is almost as important, the confidence of the ordinary person in that assurance, is far better with a State guarantee than with any guarantee from even the most reputable Friendly Society or other private business. The credit of such a State as ours is better than the credit of the strongest financial company, and this is an

economy of paramount importance in such an undertaking as an insurance business for old age pensions.

The perception of these truths is driving the most intelligent nations to entrust an increasing quantity of insurance business to public bodies. There is little doubt that all or most branches of this business relating to ordinary general and fairly calculable risks will become State functions. Provision for old age certainly belongs to this class of risks.

A modern State, then, recognising its duty to secure its members against poverty in old age, not as an eleemosynary but as a business proposition, is confronted with the question whether such provision shall be made out of a vast number of little individual funds, collected in dribblets over many years from the men and women who are to receive the pensions, or whether it is better to raise the necessary annual sum as a single whole by the normal process of taxation.

If we suppose, as we are entitled to do, that every citizen is, during the active economic portion of his life, a taxpayer, part of the taxes he pays goes to defray the current expense of old age pensions for other aged persons: when he becomes old his turn comes. In as far as he has paid taxes, he may be considered to have been making a direct provision for his own future pension, just as much as if he had made a special contribution earmarked for this purpose: he may not know he does it, but he does it. It may, of course, be urged that poor people who will get pensions have during their lifetime paid less in taxation towards pensions than well-to-do persons who are not getting State pensions, and that in this sense the poor are subsidised by the rich. But so far as this is true it is no more applicable to pensions than to other public benefits, and it only means the normal operation of what is generally recognised as a sound canon of taxation, that taxes are imposed according to "ability to bear." The objection, that the well-to-do have contributed to the pension fund and get nothing out of it themselves, is merely a reassertion of the invalid assumption above discussed, viz., that a pension is to be regarded as an individual right instead of a public utility. As taxes are raised according to ability to bear, so they are expended according to public needs: the fact that any taxpayer falling into straitened circumstances in old age can get his pension satisfies every equity of the case. Pensions are paid not as favours to individuals but as a self-protective policy of society. It is no more reasonable for a rich taxpayer to complain that he gets no pension than for a childless taxpayer to complain that he gets nothing out of the public expenditure on education.

The contributory method is rightly rejected as one involving a false conception of state expenditure, and a wasteful and injurious system of raising the pension fund. To substitute a niggling method of retail collection for the wholesale method through the ordinary channels of taxation would be most palpable folly. To require any special regular payment from the poorest and most casually employed workers, whose need of an old age pension is greatest, would have one of two inevitable effects: if the payments were made, a wanton injury would be done to the standard of comfort and efficiency of the family; if they were not made and the

pension was therefore withheld, the Pension Scheme would fail to achieve the chief part of the public purpose for which it was designed.

The only really valid criticism directed against the Government's proposal relates to the somewhat inelastic form given to what may be regarded as a rough preliminary draft of a policy designed for various modifications.

Old age and its needs cannot be measured in rigid terms of years and money, and it is desirable, so far as sound modes of administration permit, that the method of a sliding scale should modify the operation of the pension, while the age limit should be relaxed to meet cases of infirmity. But important as such considerations are in their bearing on the practical efficiency of the pension policy, they do not affect the question of the validity of the social principles embodied in it.

J. A. HOBSON.

REVIEWS.

A SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY.

"WEST HAM: A STUDY IN SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL PROBLEMS." E. G. Howarth and Mona Wilson. 6s. net.

During the last few years several causes have combined to thrust West Ham on the public attention. The distress due to unemployment in the winter of 1904-5, and the newspaper funds started with well-intentioned ignorance to relieve it: the so-called Socialistic *regime* of the Council during the years 1898-9, and the comments, apparently the misleading comments, made upon it by papers such as the *Times* (pp. 315); the revelation of corruption on the Board of Guardians (pp. 352); the striking increase in official pauperism between 1895 and 1905 (pp. 339), have taught the public to associate certain industrial evils with West Ham. In this book, which is the fruit of an enquiry instituted by an "Outer London Inquiry Committee," of which Canon Barnett was chairman, and several well-known Sociologists, like Mrs. Sidney Webb, Miss B. L. Hutchins, Professor Bowley, and Mr. J. A. Hobson were members, an attempt is made to present a scientific analysis of the problem of which the public knows only the symptoms. The secretaries of the Committee, who were responsible for organizing the inquiry, and for compiling the present work, were Mr. Edward G. Howarth and Miss Mona Wilson, the former Head of the Home for students in connection with Trinity College, at Stratford, the latter part-author of an excellent report on "Social Conditions in Dundee," published by the Dundee Social Union.

The book is divided into three parts—Housing, Employment and Wages, and Local Government, preceded by a brief Historical Introduction, and followed by a chapter dealing with miscellaneous matters such as religious institutions, charities, settlements, and public-houses. The chapters upon Housing and upon Dock Labour seem to me the most valuable and the most original. In spite of all that has been written upon overcrowding, there have been in this country hardly any attempts to deal with the economics of the question in the same way as has been done in Germany. As it is, Mr. Howarth's and Miss Wilson's chapters are, in my opinion, too chary of generalization, and too much disposed to be content with a record of facts. But they nevertheless throw a very valuable light on the causes at work to produce the two main elements in bad housing conditions, first overcrowding of houses to the area, and secondly overcrowding of occupants in a single house.

In particular they give a good and full account (a) of the inner meaning of what are called vaguely "speculative building" and "speculation in land, and (b) of the movements in the rent paid by occupants, and of the causes which produce them. The chief housing evils of West Ham seem to be the result of hasty building, and of carelessness on the part of the local authority in not buying up land for open spaces. When, in the years 1897-9, there was a rapid increase in population and therefore in the demand for houses, every landowner was anxious to reap the harvest. As a result there was keen competition to dispose of land to anyone who

could undertake to cover it with houses. This was the golden opportunity of the small builder, who requires credit to build at all, and who cannot afford to wait with unoccupied houses on his hands for a return on his money. Relieved from difficulties caused by want of capital by the fact that they were often financed by the owners of the land, and with a keen demand from a poor population which was not particular as to the quality of the accommodation, these men ran up cheap and ill constructed houses in thousands. "Suppose a builder was prepared to put up a house worth £150, the freeholder would advance £140, and give him a present of £10 on the completion of the building. . . . The builder would be required to pay off the loan in, for example, three months, and in the event of his doing so, and becoming the owner of the house, the freeholder would receive from him a ground rent of, say, £3. By selling the ground rent at twenty years' purchase, the freeholder would pocket a sum of £60." As far as the *quality* of the houses put up are concerned, there seem to be causes mainly for making their deterioration—the rapid growth in the demand for accommodation by an extremely poor class, and the absence of efficient bye-laws, or of an efficient administration of them, by which the standard could be set up and maintained. The poor get rotten houses for the same reason that they would get rotten meat, if the law allowed. The remedy would seem to be much the same in the one case as in the other, and is suggested on page 127 (it is not clear whether the authors of the book endorse it). "It is urged, first, that the public authority should be able to enforce repair as well as sanitation; and secondly (according to the proposal of the County Council in 1900), that the freeholder should be made responsible for both, by throwing on him the duty of making the owner carry out the repairing clauses in leases, and taking all other steps necessary to make the working-class houses on his property fit for human habitation." West Ham shows the not uncommon paradox of city life overcrowding (in 1901 24,790, or 9·27 of the population were living in an overcrowded condition) accompanied by empty houses; i.e., there is an over supply of houses too expensive for the present class of occupants and an under supply of houses within their means. The figures given show that "the lower rents have a greater tendency to rise than those of better class property, and that the rise is greater in proportion to the rent." The rise in rents, which was greatest in the years 1897–9, has had a set-back since. But the enormous increase in the demand for accommodation over a long period of years is increased by the rise in the selling value of land. "In the Plaistow ward land with a frontage on a main thoroughfare was sold in 1875 for £925 an acre, and the present selling price is at the rate of £5,550 per acre; in other words the value has increased six-fold in thirty-two years. . . . Land was let at £3 per acre for market-garden purposes until 1900. At thirty years purchase the freehold was worth £90 per acre as agricultural land. It was sold in 1900 for £800 per acre in bulk. Roads were made, and in 1902 the selling price was £1,250 per acre. The present selling price of the portion not yet built upon averages £2,540 per acre." . . . The owner of the soil is enabled by the increased demand for building land to realize in 1908 £2,540 for a plot which was in 1900 worth £90. He forces up the price: the tenant's rent rises accordingly; and he in his turn saves on rent by crowding his family into two rooms instead of three, or one room instead of two. *Thus, where the demand for housing is very great, the exactions of the full economic rent of the land seems to have the overcrowding of inmates per room as an inevitable consequence.* The other side of the argument could be seen by looking at

Mr. Rowntree's estimate of the proportion of their earnings spent by the working classes in rent, or by turning to the information as to the rise in house rents given in Part II. of the Fiscal Blue-book. In their last chapter on housing, (chapter VI.) Mr. Howarth and Miss Wilson give a clear statement of some of the remedies suggested for the evils of overcrowding. These are familiar and need not be dwelt upon. The Glasgow system of "ticketed houses," i.e., of labelling certain particularly notorious tenements on the outside with a tin ticket, might have been mentioned. It facilitates inspection and cultivates public opinion. But it is a pity that the ticket does not bear the names and addresses of the various persons who have a financial interest in the property.

The three chapters devoted to employment and wages contain a historical and statistical account of the chief industries of West Ham, a very valuable description of the precise methods of engagement and remuneration which are summed up in the phrase "casual labour," and an account of home work, a subject which is closely allied to the second because home work is largely carried on by the wives of casually employed dock labourers; to use the convenient expression of Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb these two forms of employment are parasitic on each other. The main industrial problem of West Ham is fixed by the preponderance in it of trades demanding low skilled or "unskilled" labour (of course no labour is really unskilled). This at once differentiates it from engineering towns like Glasgow, or cotton towns like those of Lancashire, where the chief problem is Trade Unionism, and the chief evil the recurrence of disputes. Outside the "Metal and Machines" group there appears to be in West Ham very little combination on the part of workpeople. The six industries employing the largest number of males over 15 are the following:—

1. Metals and Machines (excluding dealers).....	10,818
2. Building and Works of Construction	8,700
3. General labourers	6,983
4. In Docks and Harbours	5,928
5. Chemicals, grease, oils, fat, etc. (excluding dealers)	2,560
6. Food (excluding dealers).....	1,876

Of those employed in group 2 at least half, of those employed in group 4 nearly two-thirds, are likely to approximate in position to the general labourers employed in group 3. As a matter of fact builders' labourers, as well as some carmen, and labourers employed in factories, continually take work in each others occupation, and there exists between them something like the trade mobility (though not the place mobility), postulated by the Ricardian School of Economists. The earnings and employment of the "mere labourer" are, therefore, the most crucial factor in the social life of West Ham. Of these two elements, employment is incomparably more important than earnings. In the case of Dock Labour, which is usually and rightly taken as more or less typical of the evils of low-skilled labour, the earnings of men who are in work are comparatively high. Tables of the Daily Wages of "casual labourers" at the Docks (pp. 205-6), show that the median wage per day in the months of March, June, September, and December, stands about 5s. 10d., and hardly ever drops below 5s. What causes the evils of dock labour (and of general and building labour as well) is much less the lowness of the rate paid per hour than the method of engagement which tends to make labour "casual," i.e., offers no certainty, in the case of the majority applying for work, that a man employed on one day will also be employed on other days. The

irregularity of labour at the Docks is partly due to the fluctuations in the amount of work required, but mainly to the fact that no adequate organization exists for adjusting the supply of labour to meet the demand. The state of things as told in this report is briefly as follows. The chief employers of labour at the Victoria and Albert Docks are (1) the Dock Company, (2) the shipping companies, of which 27 have berths at these docks, some of them employing labour direct, and some giving out one or other department of their work to master stevedores and master porters, (3) master stevedores and master porters. Of these the Dock Company employs a comparatively small and diminishing number of men, but those whom it does employ get work pretty regularly. Since 1892 the 45 departments in the Company's docks have been unified for the purpose of engaging labour. The men are classified in four groups: Regular staff, A or regulated men, B or preference men, and casuals. Of these the first two groups are paid by the week, the rest by the hour. They are shifted from one place to another as there is a demand for them, the permanent men being employed first, then the A men in their order, then the B men in the same way. Extra men are taken on only when all the men in the other three groups are employed. The result is that little casual labour is employed: in 1903 and 1904 more than 96 per cent. of the work was done by one of the first three classes, and over 70 per cent. was done by weekly labour. Unfortunately the Company employs a small part of all the labour required at the Docks (only about 700 men permanent, and in A and B), while apart from them the engagement of labour is almost unorganized; each shipping company and master stevedore takes on hands separately, with the result that many more men hang about the Docks on the chance of work than are needed for the work available on any average day. "The shipping companies, master stevedores, and porters, have their men taken on by a foreman, usually at fixed hours. He goes to a "pitch" where the men are assembled, and picks the number required from among the applicants by one of the methods above explained. . . . The men selected by the foreman are given metal tickets or passes. Sometimes foremen will shirk the selection of the whole number required, and when they have given out a certain number of tickets will hold the rest in their hands to be snatched by whoever can get them. Such a fight was seen by the writers" (p. 200). The remedy was suggested by Mr. Charles Booth long ago, and has been explained in detail by Mr. Beveridge, the Chairman of the London Employment Exchange Committee, in the *Economic Journal* for March, 1907. It is to see that all the labour required is engaged at offices in communication with each other, so that surplus men can be immediately drafted to the place at which they are wanted. This should be made certain in the Port of London Bill, and one of the functions of the new Trust created should be the regularization of labour. But though some provision is made for this in the Bill, nothing will be done unless Labour is directly represented on the Trust, and this apparently is not to be the case. Shareholders, shippers, the public, are all considered, and the 7,000 or 8,000 men most concerned are not even to be consulted! What were the Labour members in the House doing?

The chapter on Home Work contains some valuable information and useful statistics, though owing to the recent concentration of public attention on sweating, the general nature of the problem is better known than in the case of overcrowding and of casual labour. Home work is the counterpart of casual labour: out of 294 husbands of home workers

whose occupations were ascertained 142, or nearly 50 per cent. were either general labourers or dock labourers. The evils caused by home work fall into two broad divisions: (1) Those due to faulty administration of existing laws, (2) those due to the general industrial character of the system and apparently inseparable from it. Under (1) may be placed the failure to enforce those provisions which are designed to improve the sanitary conditions of the homes. The writers think (p. 257) that the clause requiring a list of home workers to be sent to the Local Authority is not observed, and that the system under which an inspector interferes under the Factory Acts *after* notice has been given, instead of levelling up all houses by means of the Public Health Acts, is a mistake. In 1904 not a single prosecution took place in the whole country! Further the "particulars clause" is not enforced, and since a judgment of the High Court in *Squire v. Midland Lace Company* the Truck Acts appear not to apply to home workers (259-60). Under (2) is to be put the irregularity of work. For the economic motive to home work is mainly the desire to escape the fixed charges of plant and machinery in season trades where plant can't be kept in full work regularly. The facts as to low wages and long hours are familiar and need not be dealt upon here. Mr. Howarth's and Miss Wilson's statistics seem to have been compiled with praiseworthy care and completeness.

Book III. consists of four chapters, of which the first deals mainly with the history and growth of the Borough, the second with education, the third with the Poor Law, and the fourth with the various attempts made locally to deal with the Unemployed Problem.

West Ham has been held up to notoriety by certain papers as the victim of a "socialistic régime of extravagance," and the writers discuss briefly the causes which have led to a rise in rates. There are three possible explanations. First there is the socialism theory favoured by the *Times*. This is picturesque; but unfortunately, as the authors point out, the increase of expenditure between 1895 and 1900 from £160,971 to £240,071 took place "under a Council in which the socialist group only numbered six." The real causes seem to be two, the great increase in the population of the Borough (from 128,953 in 1881 to 288,425 in 1904), and the fact that prior to the conversion of West Ham into a County Borough under the Act of 1888, necessary services had been shamefully neglected. During the whole existence of the Board of Health which preceded the creation of the Borough Council—a period of 30 years, only £294,249 were raised for capital expenditure. The new Council had to spend money on sewerage and sanitation (in 1902 the debt for these was £218,000 odd), street improvements (a debt of £400,643), lunatic asylums (£303,478 debt), and hospitals (£131,475). Thus "ratepayers' candidates" prepare a burden for posterity, and then curse "Socialism" when posterity shoulders it.

What, to sum up, are the main causes of the poverty of West Ham? They seem to be (1) the exceedingly large number of dependent persons. Of every 100 persons living in London 34, of every 100 in Hampstead 27, of every 100 living in West Ham 40, are dependent. This will, of course, tend to right itself as the influx of young persons into West Ham diminishes.

(2) Casual and irregular employment, due to want of organization in the labour market.

(3) The employment of boys on work which offers them no training in industry, and from which they are turned adrift at manhood.

(4) Insufficiently regulated home work, carried on without plant and machinery and therefore unproductive.

(5) Demoralization caused by bad housing and sanitary conditions, which mean that whole sections of the population are condemned to life-long physical and mental inefficiency.

If at the end of this long review the writer may offer a suggestion which springs from reading a very interesting and valuable book, he would plead that future investigators should not confine themselves to an analysis of industrial evils, but should give a far fuller account of the geographical, economic, and historical circumstances under which particular towns have grown up. We want not only a pathology, but a history and a morphology of urban life and conditions, in order to understand more fully the broad economic causes which are normally operative. The sort of questions which one would like to see treated at greater length are: Why do particular industries settle in particular localities? What has caused a very rapid increase of population at particular moments? What function does West Ham perform in the general economy of the Thames valley and of Southern England? What are the commercial causes which make for home work and casual labour as distinct from the evils produced and the remedies suggested? Generalization is very dangerous; yet is it not worth the risk? But it is an ungrateful task to suggest additions to a book which the writers may well have thought quite long enough, and for which every student of social problems will be grateful.

R. H. TAWNEY.

"LECTURES ON HUMANISM, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS BEARINGS ON SOCIOLOGY." By Prof. J. S. Mackenzie. Pp. vi., 243. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1907. Price 4s. 6d.

Interesting, candid, clear and suggestive rather than cogent and conclusive are the epithets that naturally occur in connection with these lectures. Could Prof. Mackenzie develop fully the theory of Man and the World adumbrated in this and other volumes the reader is often tempted to think that he would present a more tenable form of idealism than has yet been worked out. It would be more tenable because more fully conscious of difficulties, and more ready to recognise the contributions made from opposite points of view. Yet the very fulness of this recognition, the almost superabundant garnering of the fruits from all quarters tends to obstruct the clear utterance of the writer's own thought. He pushes Catholicity almost to the point of a fault. Yet it is a fault so rare as to be a virtue compared with the narrowness of some of those whom he treats as spiritual pastors and masters.

Idealism in this volume is called Humanism, and its handling is more original than the author's modest treatment might suggest. The central thought is first, that human life is to be understood on the basis of its meaning or purpose; and, secondly, that human life must stand in integral relation to the process of the universe. It follows—I do not say as a conclusion but as a suggestion—that the universe is to be understood on the basis of a purpose analogous to the purpose of humanity. This is the point of view of humanism illustrated in the compass of this short volume by applications to metaphysics, politics, economics, education and religion. Its originality consists in this—that an idealistic interpretation of reality is avowedly based on the analysis of human and social

life. Human nature is, as in Positivism, the centre from which thought starts, but not, as in Positivism, the sphere within which it revolves. "Human nature may be regarded as containing the key to the universe, or at least as containing the key to itself." If I read the last two lectures aright the view is that it cannot contain the one without the other.

We touch here the question of the connection of Sociology with General Philosophy—a question which underlies all theories of social evolution. It may be put in this way, among others: A scientific analysis of individual and social life leaves us with no doubt as to the reality of human purpose as an agency in the movements of life. Upon the whole, the interpretation of social and psychological evolution taken together goes to establish a certain growth of such purpose, and that in a double sense. The social purpose evolves out of conflict and obscurity to unity of meaning and consciousness of aim, and as it evolves its control of the conditions of life extends. It gains in power to realise its objects. But suppose this to be true—and much has yet to be done before it can be taken for granted—what is its bearing on the final interpretation of reality? Is this particular form of evolution something peculiar to this earth and to a certain epoch of the earth's life, or is it a stage or phase of some much vaster evolution? Is it a casual incident in the history of an insignificant planet, or a significant part of some general plan of things? To these questions the Positivist answer is that we cannot tell, but that the fact that progress is a genuine possibility for human effort up to the limits of our horizon is sufficient. The Idealist answer is that the teleological view of things is a necessity of thought. Prof. Mackenzie's answer seems to be rather that the validity of human purpose is itself the central conception working outwards from which we are led on to infer an element of purpose in the framework of things. To attempt a provisional statement of that purpose is at any rate scientifically justifiable so long at least as the whole conception is regarded as tentative and hypothetical, and in this attempt Prof. Mackenzie makes more than one suggestion of interest which one would be glad to see worked out in fuller detail in a larger volume.

L. T. H.

"ADAM SMITH AND MODERN SOCIOLOGY." By Professor Albion Small.
The University of Chicago Press. London: Fisher Unwin.

This little book is a study in the methodology of the social sciences, and is declared by its author to be a portion of a larger and more complete investigation of the relations between nineteenth century social science and sociology, now in progress in the Seminar of Professor Small at the University of Chicago.

In the introduction, Prof. Small, with the clearness which characterises all his writing, draws a sharp distinction between the present mental attitude of economists and that taken by Adam Smith in his "Wealth of Nations."

The capitalistic position of writers and thinkers for whom the production of wealth exists for purposes of social control, is thus contrasted with Smith's innocence of the assumption that capital is ever the goal of economic activity. Prof. Small maintains that the dominant note throughout the economic teaching of Adam Smith is the assumption that all economic activity must necessarily be for the purpose of putting people in possession of the means of life.

Hence the aim and purpose of the book before us are to prove that the

founder of economic studies belongs to the school of humanistic sociologists rather than to that of the materialistic economists. In other words, Adam Smith was first and foremost a moral philosopher, concerned, therefore, with human values and with the increase and conservation of human wealth rather than with technical activities and material products. In the conception of Smith, according to Dr. Small, the latter, although included, were wholly tributary to his general system of philosophy. It was necessary to work out a science of ways and means, because only thus could the essential material conditions of all spiritual achievement be secured.

In the two chapters on the economics and sociology of labour, Prof. Small puts forward a brief, but lucid and interesting analysis of the "Wealth of Nations," and incidentally gives a running commentary and comparison of Smith's position and that of Marx. How far and to what extent Smith expressly correlated economic facts with other social activities is very well shown. The whole of the argument is ably summed up in the words of our author on pp. 179-180.

"The modern economists who want to give their science a different scope may have broken with the tradition which the "Wealth of Nations" established. Some of them are tending towards readjustment with the fundamental moral philosophy of which the "Wealth of Nations" was a specialisation; others are tending toward a specialisation of a different sort, as for instance, on the one hand, the theory of taxation or finance, or currency, or banking, or transportation; or, on the other hand, the converting of economics into a psychology of economic valuations. This readjustment of the perspective of economic science cannot be complete until it brings economic activities into focus as merely one of the interdependent factors of the evolving purposes of persons."

Prof. Small in this book demonstrates very forcibly the distinction which rightly belongs to Adam Smith in his employment of both the deductive and the historical methods in close association, and in such a way as to afford mutual support, thus evolving a more catholic and more convincing line of argument than most of his successors, who fell into the error of over-working the one or the other element of proof in seeking to establish economic principles. From this error arose two divergent schools of economic theory, whereas the whole methodology of the social sciences must be rather an endeavour to elaborate the implications of both these principles. The abstraction of the economic phase of activity from the totality of human activities, and from a comprehensive moral philosophy which took place after the "Wealth of Nations" was written, Prof. Small describes as "a temporary provincialism," and argues that whatever be the content of economic theory it must find for itself a valid correlation with the whole scope of positive moral philosophy, before it can recover the relative dignity which belonged to it in Adam Smith's scheme of morality.

J. C. HUDSON.

"PRODUCTION: A STUDY IN ECONOMICS." By P. H. Castberg. Sonnenschein.

From internal evidence we gather that the author of this work is a man of practical business training, probably connected with finance. His book has both the merits and the defects to be expected in a writer of keen intellect and wide business knowledge, but not well acquainted with the

literature of Economics. His work might better have been entitled "Movements of Goods and Money," for it is virtually devoted to a skilful attempt to show how goods and their monetary equivalents are put into, move about in, and are withdrawn from the industrial system.

Mr. Castberg starts with the two millions of inhabitants of his native country Norway, and with the annual production of its labour in fish, timber, ore, etc., as the source of real and money income, and after classifying the members of the industrial community in relation to the part they play as direct or indirect producers, he traces the destiny of the product as it passes, partly along the direct current towards consumption, partly through savings to enlarge the fabric and current of production, and partly as it is used to get other commodities by foreign exchange. This concrete handling of his subject enables him to avoid any direct formulation of theories of value, laws of rent and wages, and in fact almost all the doctrines over which theoretical economists have fought so fiercely.

In some respects his method is eminently successful. For example, he shows, as most economic text-books fail to show, the actual movements of goods and money comprised in the process of saving, and he is not the dupe of the false doctrine of unlimited parsimony which Adam Smith foisted on to English theory. On the other hand, when he enters upon so essentially intricate a theme as that of tariffs for the protection of home industry, his method of keeping close to concrete facts deceives him into a partial endorsement of some of the typical errors of protectionism, such as the claim that a protective tariff can stimulate and increase the aggregate of employment and production inside the protective wall. From a similar failure to realise the full reactions of a tariff he partially endorses the economic validity of agricultural protection for certain States. Though his general position upon this as upon other controversial topics, is moderate and well-informed, his disregard of abstract theory sometimes disables him from obtaining a full correlation of the working of wider unseen tendencies in trade.

A large and most valuable portion of his work is occupied with a description of the structure of finance, and with the respective parts played by banks and the money market.

J. A. H.

"LA DÉMOCRATIE INDIVIDUALISTE." By Yves Guyot. Paris: V. Giard and E. Brière.

Amid all this flood of controversial literature upon modern Socialism it is an advantage and a positive relief to read this close and confident statement of the Individualist doctrine by so powerful an exponent as M. Yves Guyot. With admirable French lucidity he traces the evolution of society from primitive barbarism as a continuous series of steps in the enlargement of individual liberty through the progressive realisation of private property. From the almost unlimited despotism of primitive chiefs and castes we proceed by a series of changes, mainly economic in their directive forces, towards a condition of society in which the functions of government tend more and more to be confined to the protection of personal liberty and property.

M. Guyot traces with great skill this process in the objective conditions of modern civilisation and in the progress of political thought. The

course of civilisation is summarised by him in the following two aphorisms:—

"Individualism is the substitution of contract for imperative law."

"Political progress is in inverse ratio to the coercive action of man upon man."

Now in this interpretation of history one difficulty occurs to the mind, which neither M. Guyot nor Mr. Spencer nor any other Individualist really faces. Why is it that suddenly this constant and continuous tendency towards the weakening of the State and the enlargement of individual liberty should be threatened by this new counter-tendency of Socialism? To M. Guyot as to Mr. Spencer, it appears an essentially arbitrary, vexatious and artificial interference with the true order of Nature. The truth is of course that this Socialistic tendency is as old and as natural as the other, Individuation and Association being two related principles of evolution throughout the entire history of organic life. M. Guyot chooses to take for his goal the complete and independent individual just as there are Socialists to whom progress is measured only in terms of the unity and solidarity of society.

M. Guyot's interpretation of social evolution is doubly vitiated, first, by a too materialistic or economic interpretation of history, resting over-much upon the idea of property; secondly, by a refusal to assign any real intelligible meaning to society. Indeed, as he himself expresses it, Individualism alone is objective, for the individual is an irreducible reality, while society and humanity are nothing but vague general expressions. Destitute of any tincture of modern psychology, M. Guyot seems to regard his individuals as complete watertight monads from the beginning; they come into social relations and set up governments simply to preserve their separatism intact. So thoroughly inhibited is his mind from any other conception of society that he fails completely to understand the important meaning of Rousseau's doctrine of the *volonté générale*, which is the beginning of a constructive theory of modern democracy. The notion that the machinery of government, other than military and police, can be utilised to assist in a more equitable distribution of property and to secure a fuller and more real personal liberty, seems incapable of entering his mind. In the artificial extension of governmental powers which he finds proceeding in France and other civilised States, he sees nothing but corruption, public inefficiency and waste, loss of liberty, and interference with the rights of property of the well-to-do classes.

His haunting terror is the employment by the State of progressive taxes levied upon personal incomes. No wonder such an individualist feels alarmed when he sees democracies possessed for the first time of the power to take rents and other profits of protected and privileged industries away from those who have not earned them, in order to devote them to the good of a society which to his imagination is little better than a chimera.

J. A. H.

"ESSAI SUR LES RÉVOLUTIONS." Par Arthur Bauer. Paris: Giard & Brière.

In this somewhat abstract treatise M. Bauer attempts to apply the methods of the physiologist to the study of social problems. It is, he says, the province of the historian to supply verified historical facts—the material which the sociologist desires to use in his study of comparisons.

But as no two societies are alike, the necessity of analysis arises. Hence the first part of this book is devoted to an analytical study of the causes leading to revolutions, the second deals with the crisis, and the third to the renaissance, or transformation of the state.

The revolutionary act is primarily an act of violence. It is for psychology to explain the importance of the personal factor. The great man has the same nature as his fellows but it is raised to a higher power. In a popular revolt the crowd consists of heterogeneous elements, incapable of unity, but it attains a kind of personality, and the character of the revolt is determined by the people who take part in it. One of the signs of a coming revolution is a change in the moral values, as in the antithesis between paganism and Christianity. Karl Marx's theory that interest is the sole factor of social revolution is an exaggeration. In order to understand the conflict of ideas preceding revolutions we must go back to the true causes—the dispositions of the public which have favoured the growth of new ideas. But the real cause of a successful revolution is the decadence of the State.

When the revolution breaks out there is always an unstable equilibrium among the different parties: many acts of violence are abortive, as they need an appropriate *milieu*, where they can set free reserves of latent force. The conception of a fatalistic evolution in humanity is only apparently true. If Cadoudal's plot against Bonaparte had succeeded, can we imagine that another general would have taken his place, and turned Europe upside down? The rôle of eminent personalities is beyond the grasp of Science in its present state. It is essential to remember that the individual is powerless without the collaboration of a party disposed to action. Hence the importance of political ideas which interest a great number of people. The democratic idea is the revolutionary idea *par excellence*.

The struggle between the two opposing parties may be economic, political, or religious, but always the secret spring is class interest, *i.e.*, everything favourable to the development of the social being, or which raises the social rôle which each one plays as the member of a well-defined group. Change in the dominant class is the one feature common to all revolutions. After victory has been achieved the united party tends to break up, and there is danger of reaction as in the French Revolution of 1848. History shows us that the victorious party establishes laws in accordance with its own interests. The new State has no capricious development, but follows the tendencies of its own nature.

There is no panacea for social disorders. Progress is not the result of a fatalistic evolution: its primary cause is the intelligent activity of men. Hence the fundamental dogma of practical sociology should be the power of the intellect—mental and moral efficiency. "Finally intelligence, energy, morality in the governors and the governed are the essential factors of progress, *i.e.*, of the force, greatness, and prosperity of the nation. It is owing to these qualities that a society is able to develop, without the need of passing through those formidable crises called revolutions."

These are the main points which M. Bauer has elaborated, and, to a certain extent illustrated, by historical examples, of which there are perhaps too few. There is an excellent table of contents but no index.

A. M. LEIGH.

"SOZIALISMUS UND DEMOKRATIE IN DER GROSSEN ENGLISCHEN REVOLUTION."

By E. Bernstein Stuttgart: Zweite Ausgabe. 1908.

Herr Bernstein has wisely issued a revised edition of his scholarly treatise on Socialism and Democracy during the Puritan Revolution, which originally formed part of a bulky volume on the history of Socialism, in a cheaper and more handy form. Thirteen years ago he was something of a pioneer, and I may perhaps be permitted to say that in writing on the same subject a year or two later I derived more assistance from his chapters than from any other modern book. One of its merits was that it firmly established the importance of Lilburne both as one of the leading actors in the drama and as the father of English radicalism. An even greater merit was the virtual discovery of Gerard Winstanley, the boldest political thinker of the seventeenth century, a Communist to whom Communism was neither an intellectual plaything nor the fruit of religious exaltation but a living conviction based on a carefully constructed system of moral and economic principles. Since the appearance of this volume interest in him has steadily grown, culminating in Mr. Berens' monograph two years ago.

Though Lilburne and Winstanley are the most striking figures in these pages, other men and other movements receive their share of attention. Beginning with Ket's revolt in 1549 and keeping steadily in view the development of the democratic movement, Herr Bernstein conducts us through the Puritan revolution, calls our attention to the political and economic aspects of Quakerism, and closes with a full account of the teaching of John Beilers. Though the working-classes were too undeveloped to become a political party and to take part as a class in the great upheaval which forms the main theme of this volume, the author throughout surveys events in relation to their fortunes and explains the ideas, political, economic, and philosophical, that fermented in the minds of their more original spokesmen.

G. P. GOOCH.

"THE FACTORY AND SHOP ACTS OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS." By Miss Violet Markham: with a Preface by Mrs. H. J. Tennant. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode. 2s. 6d. net.

This little book is a very useful *aperçu* of factory legislation in England and her colonies. The abstract of Australian and New Zealand laws is especially opportune at a moment when we are considering the advisability of imitating the policy of those States which have enacted laws for regulating wages. Mrs. Tennant reminds us in her preface that a high standard in industrial conditions is more likely to be realised if, through the interchange of statistics and the comparison of laws, a healthy spirit of emulation and stimulus can be set up: the Mother Country, with the history of her long experience shewing the errors and pitfalls to avoid, and the daughter States, whose industrial degradation is not as yet confirmed and rooted by centuries of use and wont, being happily free to initiate that larger constructive policy which it is to be hoped we may eventually adopt at home.

B. L. HUTCHINS.

OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS.

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE CENTRAL (UNEMPLOYED) BODY FOR LONDON TO MAY 12TH, 1906.

SECOND REPORT OF THE CENTRAL (UNEMPLOYED) BODY FOR LONDON MAY 12TH, 1906, TO JUNE 30TH, 1907.

A summary of the applicants for work, and how they have been disposed of, is given in the Second Report only, as follows :—

Number of men registered	26,155
Number of women registered	1,415
Number actually employed by (or through) Central Body—Men...	5,432
"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	Women	308
Number registered by Employment Exchanges—Males	63,238
"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	Females	11,000
Number placed by Employment Exchanges—Males	9,556
"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	Females	2,973

There are now 25 employment exchanges federated under the Central Body. Of these 8 were open during August 1906, 13 during September, 21 during October, 22 during November, 24 during December, 25 during January 1907.

The Central Body provides work in two ways, through Public Bodies and Labour Colonies.

(1) It allots sums in aid of schemes for exceptional work undertaken by Borough Councils. This work consists chiefly in the laying out of open spaces and burial grounds, planting of trees, etc. The sum contributed by the Central Body must be used solely in respect of wages.

H.M. Office of Works submitted a scheme for the employment of men in Richmond Park and Hyde Park, and the L.C.C. also offered facilities for work in its Parks. Recoupment was made according to a valuation by the Council's officers, "but what must cause grave apprehension is the fact that, by the valuation of such an authority as the London County Council, the product of the work is but *one-fifth* of its best."¹ The L.C.C. Superintendent of Works reported that, although the work, when completed, was as good as that done by skilled workmen, it took longer to do. He also said that when the men first started they were not in a physically fit condition to do a fair day's work.

The chief of the Labour Colonies are Hollesley Bay and Farnbridge. The work at Farnbridge consisted of reclaiming the flooded land and repairing the sea-wall, and it lasted from February 1906, to July 1907. The average number of men employed was 150.

Hollesley Bay is primarily an agricultural training college, but the men are also trained in building construction and estate repairs. The usual term is 16 weeks, but a few "selected" men who have shown a special aptitude for country life were kept longer and given a training that would fit them to become small holders, "it being then understood by the Committee that a suitable scheme for the provision of small holdings for the selected men could be put into operation." Owing to an adverse decision of the Local Government Board, this was found to be impossible. Attempts to secure situations in the country were unsuccessful, and "some of the men who had become thoroughly discouraged at having the hopes which had been raised in their minds with respect to settlement on the land

1. *Second Report*, p. 64.

defeated, returned to Town." This should be borne in mind when considering the following table of the reasons for leaving Hollesley Bay, which is taken from the table compiled for all the colonies, 1905—1907 :—

Time expired	310
Found work	270
Did not return... ..	157
Trouble at home	55
Misconduct	54
Sickness and medical attendance	93
Unfit	19
Emigration	145
Own accord	157
Dissatisfied	8
Migrated	22
Drink	35
Discharged (various reasons)	20
Reduction of numbers (completion of work)	103

Total 1,448

An analysis has been made of 159 out of 540 Record Papers of men provided with work by the Central Body during the season. The papers were chosen at random and the result is interesting as showing some of the causes of unemployment :

Slackness	58
Introduction of machinery	8
Bankruptcy of employer	11
Illness	12
Staff changes	11
Own accord	3
Disputes and disagreements	8
Lost time	1
Incompetence	4
Bad marks	13
To better himself	2
Shortening hands	4
Reason unknown	4
Death of employer	1
Job finished	14
Accident	2
Unhealthy occupation	1
Miscellaneous	2

Total 159

Work rooms for women have been opened in Camberwell, St. Pancras and Poplar. The women make clothes for the Emigration Department and also for sale to the men on the Labour Colonies. The majority of the women seem to have benefited by working under these conditions, but only in few cases have they been able to obtain permanent employment afterwards.

This is the first attempt to deal with unemployment amongst women, and the evidence points to the fact that the need is greater during the summer than the winter, the worst time for certain classes of women workers being between August and November.

D. SHENA POTTER.

THE CONTROL OF INFANTILE MORTALITY.

Huddersfield has distinguished itself by its campaign (1905-07) against preventible mortality among infants with (apparently) enviable results. The Bristol authorities would follow suit, but before adopting special measures, their Medical Officer has furnished a comparative statement and charts showing the course of the Infantile Mortality in the two towns during the last 30 years (Letter to Health Committee, January, 1908). The general course and extent of the decline of this source of loss is seen to be almost identical in these widely-separated industrial centres during the last 13 years. This does not prove that the Huddersfield efforts have borne little or no fruit, but it is a warning against hasty assumptions and claims; it shows that there are factors beyond our control at present, as the extreme oscillations of the curves alone would suggest; among them the weighty influence of meteorological conditions is of course prominent.

CHILDREN UNDER THE POOR LAW. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD. [Cd. 3899.]

This Paper gives an instructive account of the stewardship of the State as foster-parent; it leaves a very favourable impression of good work achieved by methods marked by the characteristics of most English institutions, e.g., compromise and multiformity. A brief "retrospect" describes the evolution of the present system in regard to Maintenance and Education (the Home and the School). Until about 45 years ago, these child-waifs were practically confined to the Workhouses, wherein they got such schooling as was deemed necessary; since then, the policy pursued has been to withdraw them from the enervating "pauper" atmosphere and to establish them in special institutions or "Homes" to which schools are attached; the public elementary schools provide for about half the total at the educational age. The aim is to secure a more human, home-like *milieu* under good personal influence with the best training for the after-career, in place of the old unintelligent "institutional" methods. Of the total of 69,000 children under care on January 1st, 1907, only 14,676 were living in the Workhouses, apart from 6,690 under treatment in the Infirmary; the rest were distributed in District and Separate Schools (11,809); in other Training Homes and Schools (8,450); in Cottage Homes (about 11,000); in Scattered Homes (4,963); while 8,659 were boarded out in private homes under supervision. Even those now left in the Workhouses attend the public elementary schools where they mix with other children.

It is clear that we have a very important experiment in progress, and the general policy appears to be amply justified by the record of the results in the after-careers both in England and in Canada, whither over 7000 have been sent since 1883; there is evidence that the essential end of the development of character along with a good training for life-work is being attained.

Taking 11,000 of the children in the metropolitan area, the average cost of each child amounted to 11s. 3d. per week, and of this 4s. 7d. was for "Maintenance" (Provisions, Necessaries and Clothing); the cost for provisions alone was equal to 4d. a day.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI E DISCIPLINE AUSILIARIE. Vol. xlii, Fasc. clxxxiv.—Mathia Mayer: *Il contratto d'appalto in Germania*. Antonio Boggiano: *Il protezionismo marittimo e il naviglio mercantile*. Pietro Pisani: *I problemi dell'emigrazione italiana*.

Vol. xlvii, Fasc. clxxxv.—Emiliano Pasteris: *Religione e clero in America*. G. Gorla: *Caratteri e tendenze del movimento socialista in Italia*. Pietro Silvio Rivetta: *Shinto, la religione dei Giapponesi*.

REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE. Vol. xvi, No. 3.—G. L. Duprat: *L'éthique des adolescents. Nécessité d'une morale sexuelle*. Sexual morality is of central importance for the experiences of adolescents. A plea is made for the adequate presentation of ethical standards and ideals by showing how far-reaching are their consequences. E. Chauffard: *Désir, besoin et progrès*. A desire when satisfied passes into a need and is replaced by a new desire. There is therefore no necessary connection between well-being and happiness. But the desire for happiness is the cause of progress in well-being. Société de Sociologie de Paris. Paper by the Vice-President Léon Philippe: *Les types sociaux. Le Professeur*.

No. 4.—Louis Gumplowicz: *La sociologie de Ratzenhofer*. J. Novicow: *Erreurs générales du socialisme*. Société de Sociologie de Paris. Paper by Mme. J. Misme: *Les types sociaux: L'institutrice*.

No. 5.—Scipio Sighele: *Eugène Sue et la psychologie criminelle*. A study of the types and situations in Sue's *Mystères de Paris*, showing him a precursor of modern criminal psychology. Raoul de la Grasserie: *Des intermédiaires sociaux*. A study of the evolution of means or instruments specialised by the social order for accomplishing its ends. Société de Sociologie de Paris. *Les types sociaux: le professeur*.

ARCHIV FÜR RASSEN- UND GESELLSCHAFTS-BIOLOGIE. Jahrgang 5, Heft 2.—Dr. med. Adolf Steiger: *Gedanken über die verschiedenen Formen der Kurzsichtigkeit*. Dr. Rudolf Poch: *Rassenhygienische und ärztliche Beobachtungen aus Neu-Guinea*. Prof. Karl Pearson: *Über den Zweck und die Bedeutung einer nationalen Rassenhygiene*. Dr. Christian von Ehrenfels: *Erwiderung auf Dr. A. Ploetz Bemerkungen zu meiner Abhandlung über die konstitutive Verderblichkeit der Monogamie*. Dr. G. Hagmann: *Die Landsäugetiere der Insel Mexiana als Beispiel der Einwirkung der Isolation auf die Umbildung der Arten*.

Jahrgang 5, Heft 2.—Professor Manfred Ziermer: *Genealogische Studien über die Vererbung geistiger Eigenschaften nachgewiesen an einem Material von 1334 Waldauer Haushaltungen*. The inheritance of psychical qualities as exemplified in 15 families of one village, whose family-histories extend over 300 years. The qualities are chiefly predilection for certain occupations and efficiency. Prof. Dr. Eduard Westermarck: *Moralbegriffe über die Ehelosigkeit*. A study of the customary and religious sanctions which have conduced, with various peoples, to marriage and parenthood, or to celibacy. Sexual purity as a factor in holiness. Dr. A. Nordenholz: *Soziologische Probleme. 1. Das Problem von Ganzen und vom Teil*. A methodological study of the application to society of certain concepts as those of the whole and the part, of integration and dissolution, and of quality and quantity. Dr. A. Forel: *Gelbe und weisse Rasse. Ein praktischer Vorschlag*. An enquiry into the conditions under which the results of race-mixture might be studied. In order to investigate the

relative effects of organic and social inheritance, small groups of children from each race should be placed under the social conditions of the other. C. L. W. Noorduyn : *Die Erbllichkeit der Farben bei Kanarienvögeln.*

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. Vol. xvi, 2.—V. Brochard : *Le Dieu de Spinoza.* E. Meynial : *Du rôle de la logique dans la formation scientifique du droit.* A. Job : *La méthode en chimie.* H. Norero : *La Philosophie de Wundt.*

Vol. xvi, 3.—F. Colonna d'Istria : *Bichat et la biologie contemporaine.* J. Mالدیدier : *Les caractéristiques probables de l'image vraie.* M. Winter : *Importance philosophique de la théorie des nombres.* H. Norero : *La Philosophie de Wundt.*

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Vol. xviii, No. 3.—J. S. Mackenzie : *The Problem of Moral Instruction.* A discussion of the difficulties incident to moral instruction due to lack of agreement as to principles and lack of qualified teachers. Mabel Atkinson : *The Struggle for Existence in Relation to Morals and Religion.* George H. Mead : *The Philosophical Basis of Ethics.* Waldo L. Cook : *Wars and Labor Wars.* The strike, or labor war, is compared with war between states. Evolution of the right to strike, its incitements to violence and its relations to the whole community. A. C. Pigou : *The Ethics of Nietzsche.* H. W. Wright : *Evolution and the Self-Realization Theory.* Ray Madding McConnell : *The Ethics of State Interference in the Domestic Relations.*

RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA. Anno xii, Fasc. 1.—G. Beloch : *Ricerche sulla storia della popolazione di Modena e del Modenese.* B. Brugi : *Eguaglianza di diritto e diseguaglianze di fatto.* F. Coletti : *Alcuni caratteri antropometrici dei Sardi e la questione della degenerazione della razza.* G. Luzzatto : *La proprietà fondiaria nell'epoca precomunale.* F. Flora : *Per un trattato completo di economia politica.* A. Pagano : *Del concetto di persona giuridica di diritto pubblico.*

Anno xii, Fasc. ii. A. Tamburini : *La pazzia nell'evoluzione della civiltà.* W. Cunningham : *Il cristianesimo e i moderni ideali sociali.* P. Bonfante : *Tendenze e metodi recenti negli studi storici.* A. Solmi : *La diffusione della civiltà romana e della civiltà britannica.*

MAN. Vol. viii, No. 4.—Worthington G. Smith : *England: Archaeology. "Eoliths."* C. Partridge : *Folklore. The Killing of the Divine King.* J. Gray : *Physical Anthropology: Pigmentation.* Prof. R. W. Reid : *Solomon Islands.*

Vol. viii, No. 5.—R. Campbell Thompson : *Africa: Sudan. The Ancient Gold-mines at Gebel in the Eastern Sudan.* David I. Bushnell : *America, North. Primitive Salt-Making in the Mississippi Valley.* Rev. J. Jette : *America, North-West. On the Language of the Ten'a (II).* Rev. R. Ashington Bullen : *England: Archaeology. Further Stone Implements from Harlyn Bay.*

Vol. viii, No. 6.—R. E. Dennett : *Africa, West. At the back of the Black Man's Mind.* C. Punch : *Africa, West. Further Notes on the Relation of the Bronze Heads to the Carved Tusks, Benin City.* A. Lang : *Obituary. Alfred William Howitt.* Prof. Eug. Dubois : *Physical Anthropology: Pigmentation.* C. M. Woodford : *Solomon Islands.*

REVUE DES ETUDES ETHNOGRAPHIQUES ET SOCIOLOGIQUES, March 1908.—A van Gennep : *Une nouvelle écriture nègre; sa portée théorique.* The discovery has been made by Herr Göhring of a system of writing among the Bamum, the second known to have been invented by negroes. The system has only lately been formulated. It consists largely of ideograms. Gaudefroy-Demonbynes : *Rites, métiers, noms d'agent et noms de métier en arabe.* Linguistic changes as regards certain names may be

interpreted sociologically by reference to the evolution of funeral rites which pass from the hands of the family to those of paid professionals. A. Werner : *Some Notes on the Bushmen Race*. Maurice Delafosse : *Le peuple Siéna ou Sénoufo (suite)*. Gabriel Ferrand : *Note sur le calendrier malgache et le Fandruana (suite)*.

YALE REVIEW. Vol. xvii, No. 1.—Henry C. Emery : *Ten Years' Regulation of the Stock Exchange in Germany*. Failure of the German system of stock-exchange control. While succeeding in diminishing speculation, it eliminated the better element from the market, transferred business to foreign exchanges and narrowed the market to a small professional group. Lester W. Zartman : *Mistakes in State Regulation of the Insurance Business*. The enactments of the State legislatures have been characterised by conflicting aims and ignorance of the issues. The remedy suggested is in laws securing publicity and responsibility, these laws to be enforced by a national department of insurance. Max Ferrand : *The West and the Principles of the Revolution*. The relation of the Colonies to Great Britain at the time of the Revolution was duplicated in the internal relation of the frontier to the coast. W. W. Willoughby : *The Political Theories of John W. Burgess*. A critical estimate of Professor Burgess' theories as found in his *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*. Henry S. Lyon : *What Proportion of Voters neglect to go to the Polls?* The normal average of voters for presidential elections is 84·5 per cent. Deducting the disqualified from the remainder, it is found that 8·5 per cent. voluntarily abstain.

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL. Vol. xviii, No. 70.—Prof. W. J. Ashley : *The Enlargement of Economics*. The study of economics in England is passing from the old academic basis to one more closely related to the business requirements of the community. Prof. A. C. Pigou : *Equilibrium under Bilateral Monopoly*. Miss B. L. Hutchins : *Gaps in our Factory Legislation*. Advocates reforms in the way of shortening the hours of work, improving the regulations for health and increasing wages, the latter involving control of the fine-system. R. A. Bray : *The Equalisation of Rates in London*. William Smith : *Back to the Land*. Progress of the small-holdings movement in Scotland. In small-holdings generally, the success of experiments has been indifferent. Dependence upon conditions and methods. F. O. Lyons : *A Plea for Reform in the Assessment of Railways*.

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS. Vol. xxii, No. 3.—F. W. Taussig : *Capital, Interest and Diminishing Returns*. Henry C. Adams : *Administrative Supervision of Railways under the Twentieth Section of the Act to Regulate Commerce*. Alvin S. Johnson : *The Relation of Monopoly Price to the Rate of Interest*. Victor S. Clark : *Australian Economic Problems. I. The Railways*. Edward Sherwood Meade : *The Price Policy of the United States Steel Corporation*.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

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- Hook, Alfred. *Humanity and its Problems*. Methuen, 5s. net.
 Hall, J. Fielding. *The Inward Light*. Macmillan, 10s. net.
 Balfour, Right Hon. A. J. *Decadence*. Cambridge University Press, 1s. 6d. net.
 Vinogradoff, Paul. *English Society in the Eleventh Century*. Clarendon Press, 16s. net.
 Villiers, Brougham. *The Socialist Movement in England*. Fisher Unwin, 10s. 6d. net.
 Scullard, H. H. *Early Christian Ethics in the West*. Williams & Norgate, 6s.
 Webb, Sidney and Beatrice. *English Local Government: The Manor and the Borough*. Longmans Green & Co., 2 vols., 25s. net.
 Wells, H. G. *New Worlds for Old*. Archibald Constable, 6s.
 Markham, Violet. *The Factory and Shop Acts of the British Dominions*. Eyre & Spottiswoode, 2s. 6d. net.
 Adam, James. *The Religious Teachers of Greece*. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 10s. 6d. net.
 Draganof. *Macedonia and the Reforms*.
 Wilson, Albert, M.D. *Education, Personality, and Crime*. Greening, 7s. 6d. net.
 Strachey, J. St. Loe. *Problems and Perils of Socialism. Letters to a Working Man*. Macmillan, 6d.
 Sighele, Scipio. *Littérature et Criminalité*. Giard & Brière.
 Graham, David. *The Grammar of Philosophy*. T. & T. Clark, 7s. 6d. net.
 Kidd, Benjamin. *Individualism and After*. Herbert Spencer Lecture, 29th May, 1908. Clarendon Press, 1s. net.
 Jones, Russell Lowell, M.A. *International Arbitration as a Substitute for War between Nations*. University Press, St. Andrews, 5s. net.
 Soziologie. *Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung*. Duncker & Humblot.
 Green, Alice Stopford. *The Making of Ireland and its Undoing*. Macmillan, 10s. net.

NOTES AND NOTICES.

THE INTERNATIONAL VISITS ASSOCIATION.

As a result of some experimental visits to Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the International Visits Association has been founded this year. The Earl of Stamford, who has taken part in a visit to Denmark, is the president; the council numbers amongst its members Professor Edgeworth, Professor Geddes, Mrs. J. R. Macdonald, Mr. Michael Sadler, Professor Vinogradoff, Mr. Sidney Webb, and Mr. Philip Wicksteed.

The object of the international visits is to give the people of different countries an opportunity of making each other's acquaintance, in person, and of learning something of each other's institutions, on the spot. With this object, courses of lectures have been arranged in Copenhagen, Stockholm and Christiania, on the most characteristic features of the different countries, their history, government, institutions and literature. These lectures are delivered in English by "native" lecturers, who themselves are either among the leaders of the different movements, or else, as teachers and officials, have practical acquaintance with the different systems and institutions. In connection with the lectures, visits have been paid, under "native" guidance, to the most characteristic institutions of the country while, at receptions and debates, the visitors and "natives" have learned to know something of each other and to interchange views on different subjects. The visitors are not all English: since the first year there have always been some Dutch among them and, on one occasion, a small party came from Bohemia.

Five visits have been paid to Denmark, one to Sweden, and one to Norway. This year, the last visit is to be repeated. The programme has been drawn up with the help of Hr. Chr. L. Lange, the secretary of the Nobel Committee and the University of Christiania has kindly placed a lecture-room and office at the disposal of the party. The lectures are given in English by some of the best Norwegian authorities on the different subjects. They are arranged in five sections:—"The History of Norway," "Social and Industrial Life," "Government and Institutions," "Social Movements," "Norwegian Literature and Art." The programme may be had on application to the Hon. Secretary, Miss F. M. Butlin, Old Headington, Oxford. A glance at the syllabus which accompanies each lecture will show that there is much that is likely to interest English visitors in the state of Norway. Manhood suffrage, one chamber parliamentarism, unrestricted municipal activities, employment bureaus, women with votes, five daily Socialist papers, local veto at work, total prohibition in certain districts, peasant proprietors, co-operative dairies, commercial banks, small holdings and state holdings might almost be called sensational items in the light of some burning questions here at home. For those who are interested in social and national questions, these lectures form a complete guide-book with the additional advantage that, as questions are allowed, difficulties may be solved on the spot.

F. M. B.

At the last meeting of the Senate of the University of London a resolution was passed making a paper on "Social Philosophy and Comparative Ethics" one of the nine required for the B.A. (Honours) examination in Philosophy. For this paper the following syllabus was adopted.

I. General Conditions of Social Life.

Ethical Principles and Psychological Factors.

Personality and the Community.

Self Interest, Duty, and Social Feeling.

II. Social Organisation.

The Family.

The Social Unit.

Political Society.

The State and Political Obligation.

Greek Views of the State. The Social Contract.

The Principles of the Greatest Happiness, and of the Realisation of Personality in Society.

III. Moral Aspects of Social Relations. Morality in relation to Law and Custom.

(a) Rights.

The Law of Nature. Modern conceptions of the Basis of Rights.

Caste and Class Relations. Slavery and Serfdom.

Liberty and Equality.

Fundamental Principles of International Law and Morality.

(b) Sanctions.

Responsibility.

Reward and Punishment.

Revenge and Justice.

IV. Property. Its basis and functions.

V. Moral Evolution—Its meaning and criteria.

Factors in Growth. Moral Psychology. Morals and Religion.

Morals and the Social Order.

Another of the nine papers may be on Economics, *Æsthetics*, Experimental Psychology or Sociology. If chosen in Sociology the following syllabus will be used.

SYLLABUS IN SOCIOLOGY.

Note.—As the subject of Sociology has been so recently introduced, it is thought desirable to indicate the scope of the subject as set forth in the following Syllabus.

In dealing with this subject in the Examination candidates will be allowed a choice of questions.

1. Sociology in its relations to Biology and Psychology. The principle of evolution applied to Social Phenomena.
2. Forms of Family Structure :—Maternal and Paternal Descent. Power of the Head of the Family. Joint and individual property. Regulation of Marriage. Position of Women.
3. The Forms of Social Structure :—The Clan and Tribe. Monarchy, Feudalism, the City State. The Modern State. Federal Government.
4. The Development of Social Control :—The Blood Feud. Retaliation. Compensation. Primitive Courts and Processes. The Oaths and the Ordeal. Growth of Public Justice and Rational Procedure. Individual and Collective Responsibility. Punishment and Prevention of Crime.
5. Religious and other beliefs in their bearing on social relations. Influence of Magic, Animism, Ancestor-worship, Polytheism, the World Religions, on Social Morality. Antithesis of Temporal and Spiritual Powers.

At the last meeting of the Council of the Sociological Society, Lieut.-Colonel Ernest Roberts, I.M.S., was appointed Assis. Hon. Secretary.

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THE PROBLEM OF DECADENCE.

In his interesting Sidgwick Lecture* Mr. Balfour discourses, with his accustomed felicity and acuteness, on questions of grave importance to the sociologist and politician. His main question is the old one—whether, through mere lapse of time, states and societies of men tend to decay and dissolution just as the individual does, or whether, unlike man himself, they are potentially immortal and subject only to accident and disease. Is decadence a feature of the group, as senescence is of all its component members? The author is inclined to answer that it is. But his discussion is professedly tentative, and his arguments may be said to indicate a preference without seeking to establish a thesis. Perhaps a definite conclusion is impossible in the present state of our knowledge. Little more can be done than formulate the problem and examine the conditions of its solution.

In order to understand the problem aright the question should be asked, What do we mean by Decadence when we speak of it as a feature of the social group and compare it with the senescence of the individual organism? This question, however, may be turned by asking, What is Senescence? and by saying that the latter question is as puzzling to the physiologist as the former is to the sociologist. Now, it is true that the physiologist is unable to give a definition which will satisfy all the demands of science. He holds that living protoplasm does not carry the "seeds of death" within itself. It is potentially immortal. And yet all organisms except the very lowest become in time less able to maintain their life. The physiologist is thus in a difficulty; but in face of this difficulty he is not left without resource. He can describe with some exactness the processes in which senescence is manifested. Reduced to their simplest terms these may be said to consist in the diminished efficiency of bodily metabolism. The organism as a

* Decadence. Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture. By the Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour, M.P. (Delivered at Newnham College, January 25, 1908). Cambridge: at the University Press, 1908.

whole and its several organs become in time less able than before to assimilate nourishment and to reject waste products. The explanation of this phenomenon is indeed still to seek. At any rate it has not been explained in physico-chemical terms. The body does not deteriorate as a machine does. From the first day of its use a machine begins to wear away by friction, and it has no way of restoring the loss. It is different with the organism. Up to a certain period—fairly well marked in the life of the human body as a whole and in that of its separate organs—metabolic efficiency increases; thereafter ensues a period of what may be called roughly equilibrium; after which the organism as a whole—or the particular organ—becomes less able to cope with its environment, repair of tissue becomes less sure, waste accumulates, and decay begins. Why is it that the curve of life thus changes in direction from efficiency to inefficiency, from growing power to increasing weakness? The only answer that has been given to this question is frankly teleological in character: the individual decays and dies in the interests of the race; the time of his maturity and the period of his life are determined by the needs of the next generation. Whether facts are forthcoming to support Weismann's contention that this adaptation is itself a result of natural selection is a biological question which need not trouble us at present. The physiologist cannot explain senescence just as he cannot explain life; but he is able to describe its fundamental features and to show its correlation with the interests of the race. Can anything similar be done for the idea of Decadence?

If we would answer this question it is necessary, first of all, to have some idea of the kind of group or community of which decadence is asserted. Is it the race that decays? or the nation? or the state? Many other types of community might be mentioned. But these may be taken as fundamental forms, seeing that they correspond with different principles of grouping. Race is a biological conception: it implies simply the fact of common ancestry and whatever other characteristics that fact may carry in its train. Nation, on the other hand, may be asserted to be primarily a psychological conception. Community of race contributes to national unity; but, with such a case as that of the United States before us, can hardly be described as indispensable. Again, a nation may persist even although its members are dispersed over the face of the earth and subjected to different governments. Nationality is, therefore, not a political conception; it is a *Culturbegriff*; its essential features are neither physical nor

political but mental: community of tradition, of culture, of interests. If there is not also a common language to serve as the vehicle of these experiences, some strong spiritual force—historical or political in origin—is needed to fuse them into unity. The State is an entity of a different kind—however much national unity and some similarity of racial origin amongst the people may contribute to its strength. Its essential character consists in its being a self-governing unit, which can act and be acted on as a unit: in other words, it is a subject of rights and duties. State is accordingly an ethical and political conception, and is in this way contrasted with the conception of Nation, which is psychological, and with that of Race, which is biological. It is true that races and nations and states are not grouped apart. But, if Decadence is asserted, we wish to know whether it is as a biological, a psychological, or a political characteristic: whether it holds primarily of the race, or of the nation, or of the state, or whether it results from some combination of the three.

It is easiest to begin with the race, for it is a biological conception, and the question which we have to ask is whether anything analogous to the biological fact of senescence applies to it: whether the race, like the individual, is marked for death. At first sight, at any rate, there seems much to be said for an affirmative answer to this question. It would seem reasonable to expect that, the purer the race, the less varied will be the characters of its members, and the greater its fixity of structure from generation to generation. In this way we may anticipate that a pure race will not readily adapt itself to a changing environment: so that it will compete unfavourably with a mixed race in an environment which is in process of modification; intermixture of races will thus be necessary to progress—in the long run, even to survival. But even if this conclusion holds—and the biological premises are perhaps doubtful—the analogy of race to individual is by no means exact. Although the environment remain unchanged from year to year the individual organism loses its power of adaptation; on the other hand, it is only to face a changing environment that the race is held to be unfit. Were there any evidence to show that, with the mere lapse of time, the race becomes increasingly set and hardened in structure so that it gets more and more difficult for it to respond to the call even of the same environment, then indeed this evidence would be to the point. But such knowledge as we have of the matter hardly seems to support the view. It is difficult to believe that the full-blooded negroes, for example, have less vitality to-day

than they had five hundred years ago, or that the Jew of pure race is less able now to cope with circumstances than his ancestors were in the days of the Maccabees. The record of extinct and decadent races—were we able to read it—might be found to be a record of inability to respond to new conditions by which no earlier generation had been tried, rather than a history of increasing weakness in presence of similar circumstances. The persistence of certain types makes it dangerous to assert that a race simply as such tends to decadence.

Perhaps, however, it may seem that the teleological principle that determines the senescence of the individual has its analogue for the race. Just as the interests of a race are served by the death of its individual members, so it may be held that the decay and disappearance of particular races will be for the good of mankind as a whole. It is difficult to deny the bare possibility of this being true, though the advantage to be gained seems less obvious than in the former case. The benefit which a race derives from the death of its individual members is correlated with the inability of the individual not merely to adapt himself to new surroundings, but even to continue adapting himself to the conditions of life to which he has been accustomed; and it does not seem to have been made out that the race fails in the latter respect, although it may be unequal to the former adaptation. Thus the interests of mankind are not so clearly implicated in the disappearance of races as the interests of a race are in the death of individuals. History tells us of many dead or decadent races. But there is no evidence that I know of sufficient to justify the belief that their decadence is analogous to man's senescence, that their vitality dries up of itself—as it were—quite apart from the stress of new and changed circumstances. We have frequently witnessed the extinction of races when their mode of life was disturbed by new conditions and contact with an alien civilisation. If races which once flourished have died out without their extinction being preceded by any marked change in their physical or social environment, the record of their decay would be evidence to the point.

It seems to me, therefore, that there is no sufficient evidence to prove that there is a racial principle of decadence corresponding to the individual principle of senescence, and that such analogy as exists between race and individual does not justify us in expecting *a priori* that there should be such corresponding principles. And, even if such racial decadence were a reality, it would apply to pure races only. Otherwise the principle would tend to the extinction

of mankind, not merely to the decay of races; if the pure race is doomed, it is only through intermixture of races that man can possibly survive. Accordingly, if pure races decay, there must be conditions in which mixed races are free from decadence; and the nature of these conditions will become a question of prime importance. Mixed races have taken the lead in civilisation: even a race such as the German, which may be called pure in comparison with some other race such as the French, cannot make out a claim to purity in the strict biological sense. Degrees of purity, or—what comes to the same thing—degrees of intermixture vary indefinitely. And the relative value for human progress of different degrees of intermixture is a complex question on which not only history may shed light. The physiologist also may have something to say as to the limits within which intermarriage with an alien stock will strengthen the fibre of a race, and the point after which biological differences between the parents are so great as to act unfavourably upon the offspring.

There is nothing in the life-history of individuals to compare with the intermixture of strains which characterises the development of races; and, on this account, the biological principle of senescence which applies to the former cannot be translated literally into an assertion of the decadence of the latter. When we pass from the race to the nation the biological principle becomes a still more uncertain analogy. It is not merely that the nation may preserve its continuous identity in spite of considerable modification of its physiological basis by the intermixture of races. It is because the essence of nationality is not "organic"—as we use that term to describe physical life. It might be called super-organic, in Herbert Spencer's phrase; more exactly, it is mental or super-mental: for it is constituted by ideas and psychical tendencies which are not restricted to an individual consciousness. If we are to assert decadence of the nation, we must mean that this complex of ideas and tendencies becomes by lapse of time unfit to deal with its environment, so that the spiritual bond is loosened and the nation falls—a victim of internal discord or a prey to the enemies on its frontier. Such has often been the fate of nations; but is there anything to show that it is a necessary fate? It is hard to set limits to a nation's power of adapting itself to circumstances. Not merely the infusion of new blood by racial intermixture, but also the power of learning by new experiences produces modifications on the national spirit. There is ample evidence to show how great this modification may be without the

identity of the nation being obscured. The short history of the American people is a case in point. Their character has been changed by the races they have absorbed and by the problems they have faced; but the national identity has not been destroyed. Is there any ground for asserting that progressive modification of this sort must at some point cease to be adequate to maintain the life of the nation, which must then be supplanted by some other nation? If this is the case the supplanting nation will presumably be a "new" nation, that is, a nation less matured to the arts and habits of civilisation. It is impossible to deny *à priori* that this is the course of human history: that the progress of nations is necessarily followed by decay, their place and their work being handed on to ruder or less cultured successors, and that civilisation, like Antæus, must renew its strength from time to time by contact with mother earth. It is impossible to deny all this. But to produce any evidence for it worthy of the name would need an analysis of the causes of the fall of nations more accurate than has yet been attempted, or perhaps than is possible with our limited store of facts.

The grounds for the prevalent belief in the principle of national decadence are largely *à priori*, and depend on the vague analogy with individual senescence. When we examine this analogy more closely two questions emerge. One question is, Do nations in the course of time exhibit diminished power of so dealing with their environment as to assimilate the factors in it which contribute to a healthy national life and to reject the products which are merely burdensome or noxious? This is not a question of progress or adaptability to fresh conditions, but simply of ability to preserve a relatively stationary state. To establish the required thesis it would be necessary to show that the decline of national life in any given case was due simply to internal decay and not to the action of new and hostile forces acting from without. It has not even been made out that "new" nations are better fitted than old nations to strike out the fresh varieties of activity required by the progressive state. It is true that historical reflexion has been everywhere impressed by the analogy between the rise and fall of nations and the growth and decay of individuals. A nation, like an individual, may win its position in the world by a struggle which calls forth all the energies of its members. Afterwards, when its position is secure, the strain is relaxed, there is less call for the old keenness, activities slacken, ideals degenerate into catchwords, and men take their ease in Zion. The characteristic is

often seen in smaller groups as well. "Clods to clods in three generations" is an old phrase used to describe the rapid rise and fall of manufacturing families in the early days of the factory system. But the causes of this deterioration are patent, and would seem to be preventible. It is hardly justifiable to place them on a par with the diminishing efficiency of bodily metabolism which is an essential characteristic of every human being. They have never been shown to be universal characteristics of society. Many families of factory lords have continued their successful careers far beyond the proverbial three generations. And the persistence of national life among such a people as Jews, even without the help of any political organisation of their own, shows that it is possible to maintain the national spirit for an indefinite time and to counteract the tendencies hostile to its survival.

The second question referred to is, Would the interests of mankind be promoted by national Decadence? If we could show that humanity would be served by the perpetual repetition of this process of the extinction and rebuilding of nations, then perhaps we might be justified in admitting Decadence, not as an established principle, but as an hypothesis in the light of which facts might be viewed and whose validity might be tested by its ability to shed light on these facts. It is difficult, however, to justify this view, even as a working hypothesis. A national civilisation does not disappear without untold loss to mankind—a loss which can be made good by its successors by slow and painful steps only. It would have been a gain to humanity if the older civilisation could have been cured of the elements of weakness that led to its decay without the advantage of its solid achievements being lost. The hypothesis goes on the assumption that this is impossible, and that at some undetermined period in the life of every nation the valuable results of its civilisation must be sacrificed to some inherent and growing weakness. This is the analogy of national decadence with individual senescence. The defect of the analogy is that the period at which senescence begins is fairly well marked in the case of the individual, whereas there is nothing to enable us to mark the period in a nation's life at which senescence may be expected to appear. When a national civilisation—whether young or old—falls to pieces, by what criterion can we decide whether the disaster was due to curable disease or to accident or to this mysterious principle of decadence? We may indeed point to cases in which the historical explanations commonly given of the fall of nations seem to us inadequate. But it has not been established that this

difficulty arises only or even mainly in accounting for the disappearance of civilisations that have had a long history behind them. When a young man succumbs to a disease from which an older man recovers, the result is not put down to senescence, although the physician may be unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the difference between the two cases. The principle of senescence can be used to explain mortality in some cases because it has been shown that after a certain number of decades the physical organism begins to lose its metabolic power. Senescence has its period of commencement. Similarly decadence might be admitted as a working hypothesis in historical explanation if we could show that after a given number of centuries or millennia a nation lost its power of responding successfully to its environment. Until this has been done it is not a good working hypothesis. No sort of definition is given as to what constitutes age in a nation by means of which we might be able to draw some kind of rough distinction between the circumstances in which the hypothesis of decadence may be applied and the circumstances to which it is inapplicable. When we talk of the birth, maturity, and old age of nations we use a biological analogy which is as apt to mislead as to instruct. Nations are, of course, historical products which have their rise and fall in time. Sometimes we are able to date the birth of a nation from a combination of striking events which awakened a consciousness of common interests and destiny amongst a people. But more commonly the national spirit arises without observation, the product of many forces acting through long periods of time, so that the birth of the nation cannot be even approximately dated. Whether we are to call it old or young at any given time will depend on an arbitrary decision as to the most fitting period for beginning to describe the people as a nation; and on this arbitrary decision it will also depend whether at some subsequent period it will be possible for the nation to be suffering from decadence.

In this respect the State differs from the nation. It has a definite organisation which makes it less difficult for us to mark the time of its origin and the periods of its historical growth. In other respects, however, it resembles the nation, inasmuch as its constituent factors are psychical forces; and the difficulties already met with in attempting to apply the principle of decadence to the nation re-appear when we seek to interpret the history of states by means of the biological analogy. It is unnecessary to repeat points which have been already made. And the leading difference by which the state is distinguished from the nation does not make the hypothesis

of decadence more probable. In the state the psychical forces that make the nation—assuming, for simplicity's sake, that the state consists of a single nation—are organised in such a way that it can act and be acted on as a unit. For this purpose the state must be served by individual administrators or rulers who act for it or even as if they were it. The problem which constitutional government is trying to solve is to make these individual administrators and rulers both representative of the national life and at the same time a force tending to its improvement. The two objects are not irreconcilable. For the national life is never at rest : wise guidance of its changing tendencies may make it stronger, nobler, more self-reliant ; while the folly of dishonesty of statesmen may lead to its deterioration. Intelligence and deliberate purpose are thus more powerful agents in determining the destiny of states than they are in directing the life of a nation which is not organised politically.

This is one circumstance that makes it difficult for us to admit the proposition that decadence is inherent in the nature of a state. We see ruin overtaking states both new and old. The former event affects the imagination less than the latter, but it is far more common. In the former case we frequently blame bad government for the result. Do we allow sufficiently for the operation of the same cause when the gradual dissolution or sudden fall of an ancient empire is set down to decadence ? Before we accept this conclusion we should be prepared to show that the result was not due to a bad system of government or to lack of intelligence or honesty on the part of the rulers. And if these were the operative causes then it may be hoped that they are preventible causes, that it does not pass the wit of man to guard against them. Or, if decadence is still asserted, and these are said to be but its signs, then we shall be compelled to assert the further proposition that social or political life, by its mere continuance, tends after a certain time to deteriorate the mental and moral qualities of its members. It is impossible to disprove this proposition, or to prove it. Indeed, the whole question of the existence of a social principle of decadence is singularly elusive : at first sight it is an attractive analogy ; but it ignores the differences between an individual organism and a society, and it evades definite tests. Perhaps there may be a certain consolation to some minds in the reflexion that the disasters which happen to societies of men are due to an inexorable law of their being and not to preventible causes in their members and rulers. But there are other observers of political events who are less astonished at the fall of empires than at the relative stability of states in spite of the inefficiency of their governments.

W. R. SORLEY.

AUTHORITY IN UNCIVILISED SOCIETY.

"European visitors," says Dr. Codrington in *The Melanesians*, "carry with them the persuasion that savage people are always ruled by chiefs." But so far is this from the truth, that anthropological research constantly increases the number of rude societies known to us in which the authoritarian principle is very slightly developed. Among "savages," in fact,—among people whose material culture is markedly simple, it is rarely that we find a form of authority which can properly be called chieftainship.

When Nordenskiöld asked an Eskimo in N.W. Greenland whether he would not admit that the Danish Inspector was superior to him, he got for answer: "That is not so certain; the Inspector has more property, and appears to have more power, but there are people in Copenhagen whom he must obey. *I receive orders from none!*" The same haughty self-esteem, Nordenskiöld adds, one meets with in the gamma of the reindeer Lapps and the skin tent of the Chukchi.¹

To the Yahgans, the Veddahs, the Nicobarese—of whom Marco Polo notes² that "they have no king nor chief, but live like beasts"—chieftainship is equally unknown. On the other hand, absolute equality is to be found in no human society. The rudiments of authority appear within the Family itself, in the subordination of wife to husband and children to elders, though even this subordination is less marked under conditions of great material simplicity.³

1. Nordenskiöld, *Voyage of the Vega*, trans. Leslie, London, 1886. 31.

2. Dampier, of the Nicobarese: "They live under no government that I could perceive, for they seem to be equal, without any distinction, every man ruling in his own house."

C. Boden Kloss, *In the Andamans and Nicobars*, 242. The Nicobarese enjoy "complete social equality. Everyone, even children, is his own master; but persons who have been abroad, in virtue of their experience, are respected and have some authority, as also have the aged and wealthy. But there is no one who has power to exercise control even over a single village, save in the way of carrying out popular ideas."

Cf. Svoboda, *Die Bewohner des Nikobaren-Archipels*. *Internat. Archiv für Ethn.*, Bd. v., 191.

3. For example, among the Shom Pen (wild tribe of Great Nicobar), the Semang of the Malay Peninsula, and the Chukchi of Cape Irkaipi, the women appear to be on an equality with the men. Boden Kloss, *In the Andamans and Nicobars*, 220. Skeat and Blagden, *Pagan Races*. Nordenskiöld, *op. cit.*, 184.

There are some societies considerably removed from the state of savagery—especially societies organised on the basis of paternal kinship—in which this patriarchal authority, extending its scope with the enlargement of the family by natural increase and fictions, continues to suffice for government. Thus in the pastoral communities of the Asiatic steppes, the pater-familias holds entire and unquestioned authority over all his descendants for the whole of his lifetime : at his death, his power passes to the oldest surviving member of his generation or of the next. The patriarch is supreme within the enlarged family, and outside the family, authority is simply non-existent.¹

At the same time, in the simplest local association of families, there will be personal inequality, however slight, and certain individuals will take the lead under certain circumstances. Thus among the Shom Pen, there was generally one man in each party, who by virtue possibly of superior intelligence or knowledge of the coast language, seemed to have some slight authority over the remainder.²

Certain lines of development from this casual and informal type of authority are to be studied in this paper. From the present enquiry must be excluded those interesting cases where authority has been developed in simple societies under the pressure of outside influence. The expectations of foreign visitors, who look to find in savage institutions something comparable to their own government—the necessities of trade—responsibility for taxation or for the maintenance of order under new conditions—these often lead to a shifting of the balance of power, and even set up a form of authority in societies where it was almost unknown. "A trader or other visitor looks for a chief, and finds such a one as he expects; a very insignificant person comes in this way to be called, and to call himself, the king of the island, and his consideration among his own people is of course enormously enhanced by what white people make of him. The practice, moreover, of the commanders of ships of war, by which local chiefs are held responsible for the

1. Patriarchal authority over an enlarged family-group may survive the appearance of a *pouvoir public* outside it, *e.g.*, the pastoral-agricultural community of Montenegro.

2. Boden Kloss, *op. cit.*, 219. Cf. Guillemard, "The Papuans," *Australasia*, 1894, vol. ii. : "Chiefs are unknown. Certain individuals, by force of character, have more influence than others . . . but this influence seems to be but slight, and each person is obedient to himself alone, or to some unwritten code of public opinion."

conduct of their people, and are treated as if they had considerable power, undoubtedly increases their importance.”¹

In Kar Nicobar “The village headman and his deputy are a recent institution of the authorities to simplify the procedure of controlling the natives. The opinion of the village is generally taken on the question, and if approved of, their nominees are invested with a certificate, a flag, and a suit of clothes, presented yearly. The headmen can command no obedience, and enforce no laws; they work only by persuasion. . . . the more influential deliberate on vexed questions, and impose fines, which seem always paid. As the headman now stands, he is the successor of the village ‘captain’ or presiding elder, who had no other functions but to represent the community on the arrival of ships, and to regulate barter. His office and title were instituted by the natives when relations with European vessels became frequent, in order that they might have some representative to correspond to the commanding officer.”²

Setting aside these artificial developments, let us enquire in what forms the principle of authority manifests itself in simple societies, taking as the point of departure, the fact of personal inequality. It will be convenient to set down a few concrete examples before proceeding to any generalization:—

Among the Northern tribes of Central Australia, there is no one to whom the term chief can properly be applied. . . . But in everyday life the greatest deference is paid to old men. Men of superior ability and tribal learning are especially respected: tradition credits them with reforms in custom: such old men have a special title, Oknirabata. . . . The leading men, headmen of totem-groups have a special title; their persons are sacred to some extent. This headship descends, with some exceptions, from father to son. . . . Whenever a number of natives are met to perform ceremonies, there are always the heads of local

1. Codrington, *The Melanians*, 46. Cf. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, New York, 1907, 145 (King of the Iroquois).

2. C. Boden Kloss. *In the Andamans and Nicobars*, 241. The history of the mamoose of the Torres Straits Islands is somewhat similar. Cf. Nordenskiöld, *op. cit.*, 1881 ed., i., 449; ii., 125 (Chukchi of Cape Irkaipi). A person somewhat better off than the rest supposed at first to be a chief and treated accordingly—this found to be a mistake—A sort of chieftainship created among the reindeer Chukches of the interior by the action of the Russian authorities, from whom some natives hold commissions as *starosts*.—Their pretensions derided by other natives—On the coast “we could never discover the smallest trace of any man exercising the least authority beyond his own family or his own tent.”

groups present. The elder and more important among these seem naturally to associate together as an informal but all-powerful council. (This council controls the ceremonies and punishes serious offences like "bone-giving;" if a native breaks the marriage laws the older men consult together and arrange for an *atninga* party to punish the culprit.) The fact that any individual is the headman of his group gives him in itself no claim to attend upon these councils. If, however, he be at all a distinguished man, whose conduct has shown that he is to be trusted, and that he is deeply interested in tribal matters, he will be invited by one of the older men to come and consult over matters. He will probably be invited several times, and will then gradually take his place as a recognised member of the inner council of the tribe, his influence increasing as he grows older.—(Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes*: 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 280 et passim.)

Among the Bongo of Central Africa, so far as a government has not been imposed on them by conquest, the leading man in each village is the rich cultivator. Among these negroes few men grow rich—on the cultivation of the dourrah—until they are old, and few live to be old, so that the *nyéré* are a small class. The man who has a surplus of dourrah every year, whose daughters have married well and brought him a store of hoe-money, is surrounded by client-debtors who work for him. His experience gains him prestige. He is in communication with a strong fetish; and undertakes the policing of the village, because he has most to lose. (De Prévile, *Les Sociétés Africaines*, 257—259.)

In Melanesia the chief is essentially the person who shows himself possessed of more than the ordinary share of *mana*—which in this connection may be roughly translated luck. Every eminent man is supposed to be in communication with a powerful *tindalo* or ghost, from whom he derives his *mana*. His orders are obeyed and his *tambu* respected because they are backed by *mana*. A chief tries to hand down this position to his son or his sister's son; he teaches him the proper way to approach his *tindalo*; but unless the son can show himself

1. Ling Roth, T. A. I., 1899; 117. With the Yekris, Sobos, and Ijos of the Niger Protectorate, the head of the village is the oldest man or the richest man; there is no hard and fast rule. C. Boden Kloos, *op. cit.*, 243. Much deference is paid to age, especially when it is combined with wealth.

possessed of *mana* by success and general impressiveness he will not retain any authority.

Mana manifests itself in successful hunting, speaking, head-hunting. Perhaps most of all in wealth. In the Suqe, a club found in every village in the Torres Islands, Banks Islands, and North New Hebrides, advancement depends entirely on a display of superfluity. At each stage the candidate makes a feast to the members, sometimes very elaborate, to gain social distinction; pigs and yams are eaten, money given away. "No one can have this superfluity unless he has *mana*; therefore a man high in the Suqe is evidently a *man with mana*, a great man, one who may be called a chief, whom traders may call a king." In the absence of political organisation, a valuable bond of society is furnished by the Suqe. Control is vested in the rich men. Most men never rise above middle rank. Very few fail to be entered, as boys, by their friends. At every step money has to be paid to those who have already attained it, and a feast given.¹

"The Bororo have the most centralised tribal organisation that we know of among the South American Indians. As soon as the children have been weaned they enter the Bahito. This is a public school, where the children are taught spinning, weaving, the manufacture of weapons, and above all singing, upon perfection in which is centred the ambition of all who wish to become chieftains. "If chieftain has son who sings not Bakururu, he is a common Bororo. *Bororo who sings Bakururu well, he is chieftain.*" If there are two good singers in the same village, either the one who is adjudged to sing somewhat the better is chief, or one of the two secedes with his followers and establishes a new village. On all occasions the chief is the leader, even on the plantations, where he generally works harder than anybody else. No tributes are paid him, and he supports himself from the produce of his own plantation. . . . Every evening he goes before the Bahito where all the men are assembled, and, singing, gives his commands. . . . he begins with a traditional religious chant. . . then recounts a journey or some matter of interest, and ends with definite commands to each person of the village regulating his work for the next day."²

Who, then, are entitled to take the lead in the simple society? The following classes, not mutually exclusive, suggest themselves :

1. Codrington, *Melanesia*. For privileges and duties of chiefs, see Codrington, 47.
2. Fric and Radin. J. A. I., 1907.

(a) *The elders*, in virtue of their seniority. This seems to be an extension of the discipline of the family; it is developed on rather different lines in the patriarchal and in the "classificatory" kinship societies. Under favourable economic conditions, it is complicated with the question of wealth, and everywhere, with personal ability and experience.

(b) *The rich*; from their economic importance (as in West Africa); or from the prestige obtained by an unproductive display of wealth (as in Melanesia).

(c) *The controllers of the dominant industry* (what Demolins calls the chefs d'atelier). With the Bongos and Jekris this is agriculture; with the Tartars and the Arabs, the pastoral art; the whalers take the lead among the Aleuts,¹ the dairymen with the Todas.²

Where the whole community pursues the same trade, individual prestige must depend on personal aptitude for it, superior industry, dexterity: where specialisation is possible, all the practitioners of the dominant art enjoy collective prestige. They form a guild or free masonry, into which admission is by apprenticeship or initiation with payment, or an hereditary caste—a guild where much aptitude is wanted, a caste where tradition will suffice. This is why the only Central Australian leaders are elders, with the natural prestige of age, or else men of personal force. Poverty of local resources obliges all the inhabitants to pursue the same industry, *i.e.*, to hunt food in the same way. Scarcity of food compels nomadic habits, hence chattels are few, wealth is not accumulated. No one can devote himself to cultivating or manufacturing any one thing; there can be no guilds. Two exceptions prove the rule: (1) The *totem-kins* devote themselves to the magical increase of particular species for the benefit of the rest of the tribe: here is differentiation of industry, and here we have

1. Reclus, *Primitive Folk*, 114. The Aleuts had no government before the Russians came. The whalers and the angakout exercised a predominant influence. . . The old men also acted in the capacity of public counsellors.

2. De Prévile, *Sociétés Africaines*, 32. In North Africa the pastoral society is modified by the climatic necessity for frequent migration and dispersal. Par suite, les qualités nécessaires à un chef de nomades, une certaine prévoyance, la connaissance des lieux, l'aptitude à la direction, l'énergie, se développent chez un grand nombre d'individus comparativement à ce qui a lieu chez les autres races pastorales.—See 33, 34, for the effect of industry on the authority of the wife.

Such "matriarchate" as exists among the Iroquois seems to depend on the importance of maize-growing, an industry industrially and magically reserved to women.

the prestige of something like a guild; the more important intichiuma totem-kins show a tendency to turn into guilds with entrance by initiation¹ and hereditary succession to the headship. (2) the *sorcerers* have a special art, and they tend to form a guild with collective prestige, entrance being by initiation, with preference to the sons of members.²

(d) In all these classes the part played by *personal ability* must not be under-rated. Not the elder merely, but the wise elder; the successful whaler; the sagacious farmer; the guide with a genius for direction—is the leader in the last resort. Uncivilised people are very sensitive to the force of *personality*. "Every personality has qualities which enable it to persist, to influence others, or to overcome them. The savage knows what it is to be overmatched by the qualities of woman, elder, warrior. . . . Not merely was every personality, human and other, endowed with qualities, but by virtue of these qualities it possessed a potentiality, an atmosphere of its own. The successful warrior and hunter, by more than his successes, by his confidence and his brag, his readiness to quarrel and his vindictiveness—or the many wintered elder, wise and slow to wrath, experienced in war and forestry, of far-reaching purpose and subtle in execution—would be enshrined in a belief in his powers, surrounded with a halo of which we still see a dim reflection in the touching regard entertained for a political leader, or the worship paid to an ecclesiastical dignitary."³

All our conceptions of luck, success, influence, energy, spirituality, charm, seem to be summed up by uncivilised man in the striking generalisation, appearing in so many savage vocabularies, which is best represented by the Melanesian *mana*. *Mana* is the common root of religion and magic, but no less is it held to account for every kind of success; and the eminent man is, *ex hypothesi*, the man with *mana*.

The Bororo chief's ability to "sing Bakururu" is possibly a special test for the possession of *mana*.⁴ But to regard such "chiefs" as kings without the powers and privileges of kingship,

1. Lang. *Social Origins*, 198.

2. Wiradjuri, S. E. Australia. Spencer and Gillen. "*Making and Power of Magicians*." *Nat. Tribes*, 522; *North Tribes*, 467.

3. Hartland. *Brit. Ass.*, York, 1906.

4. Cf. Hewitt. *Amer. Anthr.*, N.S. 4, 37. All singing interpreted as a putting forth of *orenda*.

chosen for unusual and fantastic qualifications, would probably be to look at the question from the wrong end: it is rather the case that in these simple societies authority is very slightly developed, so that a man noted for some special quality gains so much prestige as to be deferred to in other matters as well. Probably there is no formal election of the Bororo "chief"—a good singer is talked about, his prestige grows, and it comes to be well known that he will be the most eminent man when So-and-so dies.

This fluid and informal character of authority in simple societies offers one possible explanation of the existence of sacred and magical chiefs. In the country of the blind the one-eyed are kings; and where there is equality of material advantages, no predominant industry, and no organised warfare, it is not surprising that such specialists as the magician and the rainmaker should gather round them authority and influence. Or again, if *mana* makes itself felt as a social factor in the affairs of daily life, in the catching of whales or the accumulation of pigs and feather money, how much more when the possessor concentrates his energies on wonder-working! The man with *mana* who develops his mysterious powers, who devotes himself to making the rain fall and the crops thrive, becomes highly interesting to his neighbours; and where there is no definite secular authority to compete for their interest, he monopolises respect, observances, and petty tributes. The concentration of the public attention on his person and actions tends to associate him very closely with the fortunes and misfortunes of the community. With his life and vigour is bound up the prosperity of the crops and herds on whose behalf he exerts his powers. Hence (in part) the multiplication of precautionary taboos, even to that last tragic precaution which has established itself, in theory at least, as the characteristic fate of the "Divine King." Further, this sacred personage, once known, becomes indispensable; the office must be filled; it becomes traditional and formal, open to a sort of undistinguished persons who seem to derive from it more *mana* than they confer! European travellers, enquiring for a "king" with court and attendants, accept as such the harmless Chief Ekpei Mbei of an African village—an insignificant old man, too poor to escape office by forfeiting the value of two slaves, who exercises no single function of government. "They keep me here to look after the jujus, and to conduct the rites celebrated when women are about to give birth to children, and other ceremonies of the same kind. By the observance of

these, I bring game to the hunter, cause the yam crop to be good, bring fish to the fisherman and make rain to fall. So they bring me meat, yams, and fish."¹

Generally speaking, the chiefs, whom we have described so far, develop a moral sovereignty only. "Les nyéré ne sont point des dominateurs, il n'agissent que par persuasion et par influence." The whalers and the angakout and the elders among the Aleut "exercised a predominant influence . . . but anyone might gainsay them if he liked." Reclus draws the inference that "the Esquimaux seeks less for domination than for superiority; he prefers direction to command." The fact is that *command* must be backed by *force*, which chiefs of this sort have no chance of acquiring.

Their material privileges are slight. Sometimes, like the Bororo chief, they serve at their own expense; sometimes they receive a moderate contribution from their neighbours, as compensation for their loss of time and the expense of hospitality, or as a recognition of the value of their services on special occasions.²

Such chiefs have very little concern with public justice. The resentment of personal wrongs, including homicide, is left to the vengeance of the individual, the family, or the kinship-group. Only in the case of offences which shock and alarm the community, such as the practice of sorcery and breaches of the major taboos, the chiefs take the lead in getting rid of a dangerous nuisance.³ Akin to this is the action of the elders in composing bloodfeuds

1. Partridge, *Man*, 1908, 29. From *Cross River Natives*, 1905. Cf. Marker, *Die Masai* (Berlin, 1904), 18ff, quoted by Dr. Frazer, *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship*. "The designation chief (for the Masai *ol oiboni*) is, strictly speaking, not correct; the chief does not govern directly and exercises no administrative function. . . . The firm belief of his subjects in his prophetic gifts and his power of sorcery gives him an influence on the destinies of his people. . . . He is not so much a ruler as a national saint or patriarch." He averts civil war by withholding his sanction, supplies remedies for plagues, appoints religious festivals, delivers predictions.

2. At the Engwura festival, the younger men have to hunt for the benefit of the elders who stay in camp and consult upon the procedure. Sp. and G. *Nat. Tr.*

3. The Australian elders meet in council to deal with branches of the marriage regulations, and organise an *atninga* party to kill or wound the offenders, or else agree to surrender them to a hostile tribe, or call in a neighbouring group to carry out their sentence (i.e., the executive does not feel strong enough to defy a bloodfeud with the offender's relations). A man "quarrelsome and strong in evil magic" may be disposed of in the same way. Sp. and G., *Nat. Tr.* 490-495.

which are dangerous and troublesome to the community.¹ Disputes of other kinds are sometimes referred to them for settlement; but here they have no force to back their decision; they can only give an expert opinion on the question of equity.

The leading men direct the operations of the community in the most important industry, especially in agriculture. Sometimes they appear to decide questions of peace and war; but obviously they depend on the agreement of the fighting men in general to make their decision effective.²

Where the personality of the individual counts for so much, we must not look for fixed rules of succession. The son of the Melanesian chief may inherit his dignity, but only if he can give proof of similar powers. Nothing succeeds like success. In short, the conception of authority in the simple society is loose, indefinite and informal.

Generically distinct from the foregoing types is a class of chiefs whose power seems at first sight less significant, being professedly temporary, but with whom alone we find, in fact, the germ of real authority. These are the chiefs who are chosen for a particular enterprise—the leader of the hunting-party, the captain of the fishing fleet, the Tajoun of the Aleuts,³ the migration-chief of the Tartars and the Arabs, and, typically, the war-chief.⁴ Such leaders

1. There have been a few instances of murder among the Aleuts, on which occasions the nearest relative avenged the victim. But if retaliation brought about fresh retaliation, several villages called up the affair, and the chief men pronounced sentence. It is in the most exceptional cases that the permanent jury intervenes, save to adjust differences and explain misunderstandings. Reclus, *Primitive Folk*, 86.

2. In Central Australia, the Alaturja sends round accredited messengers, carrying *churinga*, to summon the local groups for war when some other local group has been aggressive. When the men are assembled, a council of elder men is held, and it is decided to send an avenging party, *Atninga*, against the aggressors. (This is not a real war but an expression of the community's resentment against outsiders, comparable to the resentment against a member who has made himself a nuisance.) Sp. & G., *Nat. Tr.*, 490.

3. Reclus, *Primitive Folk*, 114.

Livingstone, *op. cit.*, 599, informal supremacy of leader of hunting-party.

Hill Tout, *British N. America, The Far West*, 158, Among the Eastern Dené, a nomadic people of slight social organisation, each family group looked after its own interest; but when united action was necessary, the direction of the hunt was left to . . . the most experienced of the elder men . . . the nearest approach they ever made towards constituted central authority.

4. Reclus. *Primitive Folk*, 136. The Apache are unhampered by any form of government. But for an expedition, they unite under the command of an individual of striking personal superiority, whose authority ends with the enterprise. If hostilities are prolonged, the influence of the war-chief often grows greater than is

are chosen by popular election, explicit or implicit, for they must have the confidence of all who share in the enterprise.

As long as the enterprise lasts, their authority is unquestioned. To the war-chief in particular the necessities of discipline give absolute power. When the fiery cross or the quartered oxen have been sent round the country, woe to the man who does not hasten to the chief's standard.¹ Insubordination, treachery, cowardice, desertion are punished with instant death, just as in time of peace the community asserts its power to put away the dangerous or troublesome offender, so the war-chief slays the man who imperils the undertaking of the moment.² In this case, too, it is not a punishment but a precaution. The man who breaks the war-taboos must die—he would bring bad luck to the army.³ The people flee before the men of Ai until Achan and the accursed thing are taken away from among them. The chief controls the spoil; his word on the distribution of it is final;⁴ otherwise discipline would be at an end. He regulates the commissariat, or the warriors might break some capital tabu,⁵ or the enemy's cattle might divert them from the task of fighting. Disobedience in either respect means death. The chief's sentence is carried out by his "young men," the picked warriors who fight near his person and share his special exploits. More than this, popular feeling supports the chief's discipline as necessary for success and safety; the omen-god "answers neither by urim nor by thummim" when the chief's orders have been disobeyed⁶—all Israel stone Achan with stones

desirable. Some tribes recognise a purely moral authority in their peace-chiefs, personages always distinct from the military chiefs.

Doughty, *Wanderings in Arabia*, 1908, i, 98 et passim. The head-sheikh of the Beduin tribes is essentially the man who conducts the journeying and the foray. The temporary authority of the Pasha in command of the Mecca pilgrimage is likewise absolute.

1. i. Samuel 11, 7. Judges 5, 23; 8, 12.

2. Livingstone, *op. cit.*, 84. Sebituane (the Makololo chief) led his men into battle himself. When he saw the enemy he felt the edge of his battle-axe and said, "Aha! whoever turns his back on the enemy will feel its edge." So fleet of foot was he, that all his people knew there was no escape for the coward. . . . In some instances of skulking, he allowed the individual to return home; then calling him, he would say, "Ah, you prefer dying at home to dying in the field, do you? You shall have your desire." This was the signal for his immediate execution.

3. Joshua, 7.

4. i. Samuel, 30, 24. As his share is that goeth down to the battle, so shall his be that tarrieth by the stuff.

5. i. Samuel, 14. Roll a great stone unto me . . . bring me hither every man his ox . . . and slay them here and eat, and sin not against the Lord in eating with the blood. . . . Cursed be the man that eateth any food till it be evening.

6. i. Samuel, 14, 38.

and burn him with fire.¹ In cases of hardship, there is an appeal from the king to the army—"shall Jonathan die, who hath wrought this great salvation in Israel?"²

The occupation of arms can hardly be called a highly specialised occupation, for in primitive society all the able-bodied are potential soldiers; but it is an occupation which demands the highest degree of specialisation of faculties while it is being exercised. If for any reason a part only of the community undertake it, they acquire special honour and special privileges; when the whole community is put on a war-footing, individual excellence is peculiarly conspicuous. Nothing exceeds the prestige of the military caste unless it be the prestige of the successful general.

But under normal conditions the primitive community is on the war-footing only temporarily. The danger is over—"God is forgotten and the soldier slighted." When the lifted cattle and the women have been recovered, the boundary vindicated—at least before the bad weather sets in—the soldiers return to their everyday occupations. Here the chief's absolute authority should also come to an end. As with the Tajoun at the end of the fishing-season, so for the Apache war-chief, "farewell to command." The dictator should lay down his imperium, and retire, with added glory, to his plough.

But if a tribe is continually at war with its neighbours, the need of the war-chief may be indefinitely prolonged;³ and with it his power, and the prestige of the fighting men. And even when the occasion has gone by, the war-chief may find a pretext for keeping up a bodyguard⁴ of men trained under his own eye, responsible to himself alone, among whom military discipline is maintained. They become a standing army of professional soldiers. Here at last we have a king, with real authority, because he has force to back his commands.

Such a king may gain despotic power, so as to dispose of life and property at his pleasure. There are two possible checks to this development of absolutism: one existed before the war—the council of elders or of heads of households, with their tradition of

1. Judges, 7, 25.

2. i. Samuel, 14, 45. Livy., i., 26.

3. So the continual necessity of migration in search of water and pasture has made the office of the leading sheykh permanent and hereditary among the Arabian Beduw. Doughty, *Wanderings in Arabia*, 1908, i, 98 et passim.

4. *Asking for a bodyguard* was the regular gambit of the Greek tyrant. Sometimes a foreign bodyguard, still more irresponsible, is hired, e.g., David's Carians.

deliberation; the other is proper to the state of war—the assembly of the fighting men, with their right of voting yes or no on the campaign in which they are to risk their lives, and the appeal to them which the king allows in hard cases. Where these two checks survive, there is the germ of constitutional government.

We noted that in the simplest societies known to us Public Justice was almost undeveloped—that the elders were sometimes consulted on questions of equity—that they expressed the general resentment of certain dangerous offences, and that when they decided on the removal of an offender, their sentence was put in force by a sort of organised lynch-law. But personal wrongs, including homicide, were left for private vengeance to redress, though the elders sometimes interfered to stop the bloodfeud when it was a public danger.

With an authority rather more developed, the 'great sheykh' of the nomad Beduins presides over the daily assembly of the sheukh, heads of families and kindreds.¹ "This is the council of the elders and the public tribunal: hither the tribesmen bring their causes at all times, and it is pleaded by the maintainers of both sides with busy clamour; and every one may say his word that will. The sheykh meanwhile takes council with the sheukh, elder men and more considerable persons, and judgment is given commonly without partiality and always without bribes. This sentence is final, The loser is mulcted in heads of small cattle or camels, which he must pay anon, or go into exile, before the great sheykh send executors to distrain any beasts of his, to the estimation of the debt." Yet the sheykh has only a moral authority, without material means of enforcing his orders. "The sheykh may persuade, he cannot compel any man, and if the malcontent will go apart, he cannot detain them" (p. 175). There is no capital punishment, even for homicide; it rests with the kindred to accept a composition in lieu of vengeance.²

Sometimes this judicial institution survives the establishment of the war-kingship. The warlike emirs of the Rashîd dynasty at Hâyl administer justice under the same forms as the Beduin sheykhs; with this significant difference, that "a hundred and fifty men-at-arms, executors of the emir and riders in his ghrazzus,

1. Doughty, *Wanderings in Arabia*, 1, 96.

2. The patriarchal justice of the Hottentot chief and council of twelve elders is less mild—capital punishment is inflicted with the consent of the culprit's family. De Prévile, *Les Sociétés Africaines*, 130.

sit here (before the tyrant) in the place of the people in the nomad mejlis."¹

But as a rule, after the war, there is a marked extension of the judicial powers of the chief. Firstly, because power draws power to itself. People are likely to refer all sorts of questions to the king in person rather than to any former arbitrators, because he is known to have power to enforce his decisions.² Secondly, the war-chief settled disputes among the warriors as they arose, and the habit of appealing to him remains. Again, during the war, the war-chief undertook, for the safety of the army, to enforce the major tabus; the king retains his jurisdiction, and punishes witchcraft, sacrilege and breaches of the marriage law;³ the bodyguard carry out his sentences.

How the king acquires jurisdiction in homicide is not so clear. But, during the campaign, it is pretty certain that he forbade fighting in his presence or in his camp; if a man slew another in his presence, he took it as an offence against discipline and slew the aggressor; and against the war-chief there was no bloodfeud. Hence killing and wounding near the king's court is an offence against the king.⁴ Further, when the clans met for war, blood-

1. Doughty, *op. cit.*, i. 256. Cf. Livingstone, *op. cit.*, 184. Complaints brought before the Bechuana chief and people assembled in the kotla; the chief delivers judgment, guided by the opinions expressed by the elders. Cf. Roscoe, *The Bahima*, J.A.I., 37, 97.

2. Whenever the British forces made an advance in Northern Nigeria, the camp was besieged by discontented suitors appealing from the native courts to the new power. Hazledine, *The White Man in Nigeria*.

3. Dennett, *At the Back of the Black Man's Mind*, 35 and 53. Fjote tribe, Kongo:—Ordinary offences (both civil and criminal in our phraseology) are tried by a court of justice, which orders a fine to be paid to the injured party; but it is left to the winner of the case and his family to enforce payment. But certain violations of morality are "God palavers," and are said to provoke drought and famine. In such cases the culprits, male and female, are entirely in the hands of the King: they are generally burnt. Witches who fail to pass the poison ordeal are also burnt. The king has the right of pardon.

4. *Ethelbert*, cap. 2. If the king call his leod to him and anyone there do them evil, let him compensate with a two-fold bot and fifty shillings to the king—*Alfred*, cap. 32. If a man fight before a king's ealdorman in the gemot, let him make bot with wer and wite, and before this 120 shillings to the ealdorman as wite. If he disturb the folknote by drawing his weapon, 120 shillings to the ealdorman.—*Cnut.*, cap. 83. And I will that every man be entitled to grith (i.e., the king's peace) to the gemot and from the gemot, except he be a notorious thief.

Before the Conquest the English kings had only special peace, of things done in their court, on festivals, or on their high roads. In Norman times any breach of order or justice throughout the kingdom came to be regarded as a breach of the king's peace.

feuds were suspended; if a warrior nevertheless killed his hereditary enemy, the war-chief might kill him for the breach of discipline, and there was no retaliation; the vendetta, however long, came to an end with the war-chief's intervention. So the king, if his power warrants it, may stop a dangerous blood-feud by putting the latest aggressor to death. Thirdly, with some peoples—for instance, the Greeks and the Israelites—the horror of blood and the resulting blood-tabu were so strongly developed that the manslayer was regarded as a danger¹ to his neighbours. This made homicide one of the crimes which the community resented. Even in war, the shedding of tribal blood would be forbidden, and the war-chief would enforce the tabu. But how widely this aversion to bloodshedding, as such, extends over the ancient or the uncivilised world, is not at present clear.

No blood-feud lies against the king. There is no redress, short of rebellion, for wrongs done by him. People with a strong ethical turn, like the Israelites, saved the situation by making the king responsible to the tribal God, with whom, as the god of the war-league and the battle-omen, the war-chief had been in such close connection. Where no such conception arose, the doctrine of the royal irresponsibility opened the way to infinite cruelty and injustice.

The war-chief disposed of the spoil during the campaign. For obvious reasons of discipline, he assigned the cattle for the commissariat and presided over the final distribution when the war ended, giving prizes to the deserving and keeping a special share for himself.² The leaders who formed his council of war shared his mess.

The king's nominal ownership of goods and cattle is modified by the same sort of stewardship. The Homeric kings feasted their council and kept open house. Among the warlike Makololo, the chief was expected to feed all who accompanied him.³ "The acknowledged rule throughout this country is, that the chief should feed all strangers who come on any special business to him and

1. Frazer, *Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Taylor*, 104.

2. Doughty, *op. cit.*, i, 278.

3. Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, 1857, 206. He selects oxen from his own cattle-stations or requisitions them from the headmen of villages. After the oxen are cut up, the joints are placed before Sekeletu, and he apportions them among the gentlemen of the party. 225: The chief cannot, without a deviation from their customs, eat alone.

take up their abode in his kotla." ¹ In the etiquette of rude courts, the formalities of the patriarchal household alternate with those of the camp.²

The rule of succession to these warlike kingships varies widely. Normally it depends on election by the members of the ruling (warrior) caste. Sometimes the most able of the king's sons is chosen—in West Africa 'not often the eldest son' ³—among the Banyai a distant relation is preferred.⁴ In many cases the king acknowledges as heir-apparent a kinsman of his own generation, whose support he wishes to secure. Speaking generally, personal ability overrides hereditary claims;⁵ but in saying this we are leaving on one side not only the perplexing question of female chiefship,⁶ but also the toleration not seldom shewn to incompetent kings.⁷

All these consequences of the war-chief's supremacy are intensified when a victorious tribe settles in the territory of a conquered enemy. The development of kingship is then almost inevitable. The warriors cannot return to the customs of civil life—they have left the old associations and the authority of the elders behind them in their native country. The only possibility of order lies in perpetuating the discipline of the army: the king is the only judge and arbitrator. The warriors and their descendants form a superior caste, exacting tribute from the conquered people or reducing them to slavery. An inner circle of young men remains near the king's person, and maintains the military tradition with even greater strictness. For instance, among the Banyai, there was a class of freemen under the chief who could never be sold, and under them a class of slaves. Monina, the chief, had with him a number of young men from 12 to 15 years of age. These were all sons of free men, who lived with him to learn 'manhood.'

1. *Op. cit.*, 196 and 89. Sebituane would accost poor strangers and prepare a meal for them with his own hands.

2. See description, *op. cit.*, 206.

3. Ling Roth, *Great Benin*, 99: 101.

4. Livingstone, *op. cit.*, 617.

5. Roscoe, *The Bahima*, J.A.I., 37: 97.

6. Livingstone, *op. cit.*, 179, 273, 281, 461.

7. Maples, *Journals and Papers*, 1899, 38, 42, 44. The Mkaya of Meto in Portuguese East Africa . . . a foolish dissipated boy of nineteen . . . they will put up with folly, immorality and drunkenness and only rebel when cruelty and injustice are added (1881).

They were kept under a strict discipline, and remained unmarried until a fresh set of youths was ready to take their place.¹

The history of Africa south of the Sahara is practically the history of such conquests. Almost everywhere is found a ruling caste, living under an organisation which sufficiently betrays its military origin; keeping their cattle, the patent of nobility, wherever the climate allows, and supplementing the products of the pastoral art with tribute exacted from their subjects. Such were the Makololo among the Barotse; such are the Niam-niam on the Upper Wellé, the Fulani among the Haussa. Below them, a stratification of tribes, in which it is not easy to distinguish the aboriginal population from the depressed conquerors of yesterday. Thus, in the Upper Wellé district, there are (1) the Niam-niam, a warlike invading race from the north, whose chiefs have much greater power than most Central African chiefs; their rule is absolute even to despotism, with power of life and death; (2) the Mangbettou, who were the ruling people of the district fifteen years ago, now a dispersed remnant; themselves divided into commons, and nobles, who carry spear and shield in battle; "these men do not work," says the chief; (3) under the Mangbettou, further south, the Mege, a bush race, using bows and arrows, ruled by a chief of the old Mangbettou tribe, now scattered; (4) further south again, the Mabode, an agricultural tribe, using poisoned arrows, smaller and darker than the tribes round them; (5) living among the Mabode, the Akka pygmies.²

Supreme though the king's authority may be, it is a physical impossibility for him to exercise it without delegation, if his territory is at all large; the question is, whether his servants will become an official class or his warriors a feudal nobility.³ Development in either direction may end in the disappearance of his personal power.

The sacred aspect of authority, in the pre-military society has been touched upon;⁴ the same feature appears in the authority of the post-military king. Not only is it natural to explain his prestige as general and ruler in terms of *mana*, but other

1. Livingstone, *op. cit.*, 618. This association of free-born children with the king is not uncommon. Cf. the King of Benin's retinue of boys. The canoes of the Nigerian kings are rowed by boys. The Bororo chief's ceremonial singing is accompanied by a chorus of children. Why do the Westminster School boys acclaim the king at the Coronation? and what are the Children of the Chapel Royal?

2. Burrows, J.A.I., N.S. 1: 40, 41, 42.

3. Roscoe, *The Bahima*, J.A.I., 37: 98 ff. Ling Roth, Great Benin: 92.

4. Pp. 336, 337.

current manifestations of *mana* tend to attach themselves to his reputation. Thus, to take one instance only, the warrior king of the Bakwains provided rain for his people.¹ But is the king typically a divine person or a magician? Rather, whenever the sacrosanct conception of kingship, with its attendant restrictions, develops beyond the limit of practical convenience, the royal power becomes unreal and disappears. The "Divine King" is not the working king who rules, but the King Archon, the Rex Sacrificulus, the Mikado, the Son of Heaven, or the Dalai Lama. We might almost venture to say that the Divine Kings are not kings at all, at least in the sense which concerns the study of Authority.

BARBARA FREIRE-MARRECO.

1. Livingstone, *op. cit.*, 20. Cole, J.A.I. 32 : 321 ; and other evidence quoted in Dr. Frazer's *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship*.

[The greater part of this paper was read at a meeting of Professor L. T. Hobhouse's seminar in Sociology, at the London School of Economics, in March 1908.]

RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF SOCIALISM.*

Socialism, in its most modern form, has some claim to be regarded as an essentially British product, with Robert Owen as its principal creator; and, though perhaps its development, both prior and subsequent to Owen, has been more conspicuously seen in other countries—on the more Utopian side of France, on the more scientific side in Germany—there are not wanting signs that the leadership, at least in its more practical aspects, may revert to us. It seems clear, at any rate, that our countrymen are not content to be mere disciples of any continental school; and that there are vigorous movements, in directions that can be more or less definitely characterised as Socialistic, which are distinctly and emphatically British in their spirit and method. The most notable of these are the Fabian Society and the Independent Labour Party. Neither of these is Socialistic in any extreme sense of the word. The British tendency to opportunism and compromise is very visible in their work. The Independent Labour Party does not appear, any more than other political parties in this country, to be committed to any formal creed; and the Fabian Society, though avowedly Socialistic, is prepared to understand that term in a somewhat more elastic sense than that which is sometimes given to it. Both are certainly opposed to the dominating influence of capital in private hands; and this is at least sufficient for the time to unite them in common action, however much they might diverge in their ultimate conceptions of the ideal that is to be aimed at.

The two books now before us are typical instances of this characteristically British attitude towards Socialism. Both are distinctly good—thoughtful, clear, temperate, sensible, with hardly any trace of that visionary enthusiasm which is still associated in many minds with Socialistic schemes. They have much in common, and yet they are sufficiently different to have, each of them, an independent interest of its own. The one by Mr. Wells is, at least on a first view, the more original and attractive of the two. It represents a more individual point of view, and is

* *New Worlds for Old.* By H. G. Wells. London: Archibald Constable and Co., Ltd., 1908. Pp. 355. *The Socialist Movement in England.* By Brougham Villiers. London: T. Fisher Unwin. Pp. xiii., 340.

more picturesque and stimulating in its style. The other is more purely historical and is even, by comparison, somewhat matter-of-fact and unadventurous; but it certainly contains a great deal of valuable material well put together, and a great deal of careful thought and genuine insight.

The general view of Mr. Wells is based upon a fundamental optimism with regard to human nature and the universe as a whole—an optimism which he expresses by the statement that ‘Good Will’ is a dominating force in history. “This Good Will of our race, however arising, however trivial, however subordinated to individual ends, however comically inadequate a thing it may be in this individual case or in that, is in the aggregate an operating will. In spite of all the confusions and thwartings of life, the halts and resiliencies and the counter strokes of fate, it is manifest that in the long run human life becomes broader than it was, gentler than it was, finer and deeper. On the whole—and now-a-days almost steadily—things *get better*. There is a secular amelioration of life, and it is brought about by Good Will working through the efforts of men” (pp. 5—6). This persistent optimism prevents Mr. Wells from the temptation to an acrid criticism either of the present or of the past from which many Socialist writers are unable to guard themselves. “For all our sins,” he says (p. 9), “I am sure the sense of justice is quicker and more nearly universal than ever before.” And he is even eager to insist, as against some earlier utterances of Socialists, that “property is not robbery. It may be a mistake, it may be unjust and socially disadvantageous to recognise private property in these great common interests, but every one concerned, and the majority of the property owners certainly, held and hold in good faith, and do their best by the light they have” (p. 162). This fine ethical optimism gives to the statements of Mr. Wells an unusual suavity, tolerance, and fairness.

Another specially noticeable feature in his book is the emphasis that he lays on the rearing and education of children. He puts this in the very forefront of his study. “The first—the chief aspect of social life in relation to which the Socialist finds the world now planless and drifting, and for which he earnestly propounds the scheme of a better order, is that whole side of existence which is turned towards children, their begetting and upbringing, their care and education” (p. 28). He takes, like Plato, as quite the most fundamental conception in an ideal society “the principle that the Community as a whole is the

general Over-Parent of all its children; that the parents must be made answerable to the community for the welfare of their children, for their clear minds and clean bodies, their eyesight and weight and training; and that, on the other hand, the parents who do their duty well are as much entitled to collective provision for their needs and economic security as a soldier, a judge, or any other sort of public servant" (p. 44). Mr. Wells treats the problem of industrial reorganisation as being really subordinate to this question of the satisfactory upbringing of the children of the State. In this he is, of course, largely at one with Robert Owen and others; but on the whole this is not the most prominent consideration with Socialists in general.

In connection with this question, it should be noted that Mr. Wells does not by any means ignore the difficulty that naturally occurs to most minds as involved in the point of view here suggested. "A State," he says (p. 216) "that undertakes to sustain all the children born into it will do its best to secure good births. That implies a distinct bar to the marriage and reproduction of the halt and the blind, the bearers of transmissible diseases and the like." This species of social selection is naturally not a subject on which the dreamers of social Utopias care to dwell; yet it seems clear that it is a very essential part of any such proposals; and one cannot but regret that Mr. Wells has not brought it out a little more fully. Plato had a much fuller conception of what is implied in it than most of our modern writers.

The strong sense of the supreme importance of education not only leads Mr. Wells to put the problem of the children in the forefront of his argument, but reappears at intervals throughout his treatment, and especially leads him to emphasise the need of securing certain forms of freedom and individuality in a society that is predominantly Socialistic. "*We must insure,*" he says (p. 293) "*the continuity of the collective mind*; that is manifestly a primary necessity for Socialism. The attempt to realise the Marxist idea of a democratic Socialism without that, might easily fail into the abortive birth of an acephalous monster, the secular development of administrative Socialism give the world over to a bureaucratic mandarinat, self-satisfied, interfering and unteachable, with whom wisdom would die. And yet we Socialists can produce in our plans no absolute bar to these possibilities. Here I can suggest only in the most general terms methods and certain principles. They need to be laid down as vitally necessary to Socialism, and so far they have not been so laid down. They have

still to be incorporated in the Socialist creed. They are essentially principles of that Liberalism out of whose generous aspirations Socialism sprang, but they are principles that even to-day, unhappily, do not figure in the fundamental professions of any Socialist body." The principles here referred to are *freedom of speech, freedom of writing, and universality of information.*

Nor is this the only way in which Mr. Wells recognises the importance of freedom. It may even be said that his ultimate ideal is one of complete freedom. "The Anarchist world," he says (p. 257) "is our dream; we do believe—well, I, at any rate, believe—this present world, this planet, will some day bear a race beyond our most exalted and temerarious dreams, a race begotten of our wills and the substance of our bodies, a race, so I have said it, 'who will stand upon the earth as one stands upon a footstool, and laugh and reach out their hands amidst the stars,' but the way to that is through education and discipline and law. . . . Socialism is the school-room of true and noble Anarchism, wherein by training and restraint we shall make free men." It would seem, then, that the discipline of Socialism is, in the end, to lead us to something akin to Nietzsche's "Superman"; and one wonders a little whether the discipline is not rather too far removed from that which is intended to be its outcome. If a free humanity is the goal, can it be quite true that a mechanical discipline is the path? But, at any rate, Mr. Wells is not unique in this view of the relation between Socialism and Anarchism. Something very similar is to be found in the writings of William Morris and others. The Socialistic State is, we might even say, in general, the Purgatory of the social idealist, rather than his Heaven.

The last quotation that I have made from Mr. Wells suggests a qualification on the previous statement as to the temperateness of his views. I think it must be allowed that occasionally he gets a little carried away in a whirl of words, and approximates even to the extravagances of some of the earlier Utopia-builders. But this is, on the whole, exceptional. Most of his utterances are clear, accurate, and well supported. One must protest a little, however, against such a statement as that "There can be no doubt that many of those older writers who were 'Socialists before Socialism,' Plato, for instance, and Sir Thomas More, did very roundly abolish private property altogether" (p. 141). Surely Plato intended his industrial class to have private property, though with some restrictions. Again, is it right to refer to Ruskin as "a professed Socialist"? (p. 232). The remarks about the legitimacy

of interest (p. 144) seem to treat in a rather off-hand fashion a matter that has in recent times been submitted to a very searching analysis. "J. H. Robertson" (p. 198) is no doubt a mere misprint.

If the work of Mr. Villiers seems at first less striking than that of Mr. Wells, it is probably not in reality any less important. If not as picturesque in style, it is more careful in its reasoning and more exact in its expression. It is a good deal more than a history of the Socialist movement in England: it is also an appreciation and a criticism. The purely historical part occupies, it is true, the bulk of the volume. "There is an international aspiration in Socialism," says Mr. Villiers (p. 18), "there cannot be an international method." Much of the interest of his book lies in the way in which he brings out the peculiarities of the British method. He points out that it is only quite recently that Socialism has become much of a power in this country. "No existing Socialist organisation in England can claim a history of over 30 years, while it is only within half that time that Socialism has again become a power in the land" (p. 51). The earlier history of Socialism in England is consequently little more than a record of individual efforts, including of course those of John Ball and Sir Thomas More. This record is, however, very well given; and the interest of the story increases as the writer passes on to the Industrial Revolution and the pioneer work of Robert Owen and others. But it seems pretty clear that the main interest of Mr. Villiers is in the more recent developments of Socialism, and especially in its present prospects, rather than in the remoter causes that have led up to it. His account of William Morris is particularly appreciative, and he has interesting references to Carlyle, Ruskin, Maurice, Kingsley, and others, which are usually instructive—though the phrase "Carlyle's deep sympathy with oppression" (p. 61), contains an unfortunate ambiguity. But the account of the Fabian Society and of the growth and influence of the Independent Labour Party, together with the general remarks on the present position and future outlook of the socialistic movement, is probably the part of the book by which most readers will be chiefly attracted.

Mr. Villiers opens this part of his work with the remark (p. 103) that "the deep-rooted character of English politics, the thing that has broken the hearts of generations of idealists here, is an essential Whiggishness, a spirit of compromise, that prevents us, as a nation, ever doing anything the way its advocates want us to

do it. British politics are politics of experiment, very largely, in all ages, the politics of rule of thumb. Before this general spirit, the *doctrinaire* breaks down hopelessly; for though he may sometimes get the nation to pay lip-service to his teaching, the old habit of compromise always asserts itself in practice; and just at the moment the *doctrinaire* fancies he has won the battle for good, the nation does something or other that shows it has never paid the least attention to his theories." Mr. Villiers evidently believes that it has been largely by paying heed to this characteristic of English thought that the Fabians have secured so much success, though he seems to think that their influence is now somewhat on the wane. "The Fabians," he says, "living mostly in London, in very imperfect touch with the organised workers, taught much, but learnt comparatively little. In spite of its surface appearance of modernity, there is a flavour of the nineties about Fabianism yet. We move fast in these days, and ten years may make of a man who fails to keep in touch with the people as much out of date as a Chartist or Owenite" (p. 117). (The first "of" in the last sentence of this passage is presumably a misprint.)

Mr. Villiers has apparently more confidence in the work of the Independent Labour Party. He points out (p. 215) that the political influence of the party is mainly due to the fact that they make it difficult for the representatives of other parties to evade the fulfilment of anything approaching a pledge on matters that are regarded by working men as important. "Members will be accorded an opportunity of voting, for or against, any measure they have undertaken to support, if the passing of it would be any gain to the working-classes." He adds (pp. 176-7) that "in a very real sense, the Labour Party is Socialist. The unity of the party does not come from its machinery, effective as that has shown itself to be, but from the common spirit that animates its members. . . . While as yet only a minority are avowed Socialists, there is no objection to Socialism anywhere; while practically all the Unionists are in favour of the immediate political implications of Socialism."

But perhaps the most interesting point of all in the work of Mr. Villiers is the indication that he gives of the spirit of what he describes as "the Higher Socialism." He brings out very effectively the close connexion between socialistic organisation and the use of machinery; and suggests that the Socialism of the future must endeavour to draw a sharp distinction between the mechanical and the non-mechanical aspects of life. "Human work," he

declares (pp. 251-2), " may fairly be divided into two classes—that which is elevating and generally more or less pleasant in the doing, and that which is essentially unintelligent and brutalising. Even apart from purely economic considerations, it is obviously desirable to do as much as possible of the latter by machinery." And again (p. 259), " I think we have here the first germs of the Higher Socialism that may develop after the completion of the present political movement. ' That which is useful should be produced by the community, by machinery; that which is beautiful, by the individual and by hand,' has been given as the method of the future. Many things we buy are capable of beauty; and if such are all to be produced ' by the individual and by hand,' there must obviously be a great return, some day or other, to earlier methods of manufacture. If that is so, the limits of *State Socialism* will be narrower than many advocates expect or opponents fear. It is the centralisation of industry, with the consequent tendency to form monopolies, that is forcing forward *State Socialism*, and rendering it easy for the public to control it. Any check on the centralising tendency seems at least to imply a check on the collectivist tendency which is its result. Yet the establishment of decent minimum conditions of Labour by corporate action would, if present indications count for anything, almost certainly lead to a revival of handicraft work."

It should be noted, further, that the type of Socialism that is in the mind of Mr. Villiers is one that becomes, in the end, communistic. " Let us assume," he says (p. 326), " that the town, instead of being poor as our towns are at present, owns its land and houses, derives a revenue from its electricity and other monopolies, and caters for the people, at a profit, in whole hosts of ways now unattempted. In particular, it is supplying all its citizens with bread and milk, either at a profit, or cost price. Would not the project of supplying all the citizens with these free, out of the ample public revenues, look very different from what it does now? It must be remembered that bread and milk are things the freeing of which is not likely to be abused. People seldom care to take more of either than is really nourishing; and if everyone had enough of these, the foodstuffs consumed would actually produce an equivalent in increased human vitality. Nor, if they were free, could anyone sell either, and buy worse things instead. Those who receive these things from a charity, may sell their bread and buy beer; but free bread would destroy the market for it altogether, and the recipient of a municipal loaf must either eat it or leave it.

But, in so far as food is concerned, free bread effectually solves the problem of poverty altogether. If sufficient for the day were taken round to each house every morning, there could be no starvation. Nor does it follow that free bread and milk would lead to idleness; it might very readily mean merely more universally diffused ability for industry." "Possibly," he adds (p. 328), "everything produced by the community may be communised some day, simply because this becomes, in practice, the cheapest and easiest way of supplying to everyone his needs."

This suggestion of course raises again the question of the rearing of the population, and also the question of possible limits to immigration; and Mr. Villiers does not appear to be quite as ready as Mr. Wells to enter upon the discussion of these difficulties. It was one of the jokes of the late Professor Ritchie, that the loaf must not go to the "loafer;" and we do not appear to be sufficiently informed how this is to be guarded against.

There are many other interesting points in this book; but these must suffice for the present. Neither this book nor the one by Mr. Wells has any special distinction of style (though the latter, at least, has a great deal of brightness); nor does either of them display any very remarkable originality in the treatment of the subject. But both have very considerable value as indications of the direction in which British Socialism is moving. And certainly the outlook is in many respects a hopeful one. Both writers show a disposition to face difficulties frankly. Mr. Wells is particularly emphatic on the importance of this. Referring to some of the "lions in the path," he says (p. 111), "I will even go so far as to say that, to my mind, the contemporary Socialist controversialist meets all this system of objections far too cavalierly." In both writers, also, we see a distinct attempt to set limits to Collectivism. Mr. Wells, as we have seen, regards Anarchism as a more ultimate ideal; and, even in the transition stage, recognises the supreme importance of certain forms of individual freedom. Mr. Villiers goes even farther; and maintains, with a good deal of force, that the very object of socialistic legislation is to secure a more genuine freedom. "The *intention*, at least, of Socialism is to increase freedom, by bringing the possibilities of civilised life to all" (p. 283). We see also, in both writers, some effort to define the exact province of desirable collective action. Mr. Wells emphasizes especially the education and care of children, and treats the State control of the larger forms of industrial enterprise as in the main a means for securing this

educational end. Mr. Villiers, again, brings out the two points, (1) that it is the prime necessities of life that specially need to be communised and controlled by the State; and (2) that such control can be most effectively applied in those cases in which the work is of a definitely mechanical kind.¹ Both writers recognise, though in somewhat different ways, that there is an aspect of life that is more purely personal, and even a kind of property through which human individuality is fittingly expressed. The present reviewer believes that these distinctions are substantially sound. Education, machinery, the prime necessities of life—perhaps also some of its supreme temptations (such as drink)—appear to constitute the special spheres of legitimate State control. But it is not easy to separate these off entirely from those activities—such as art, religion, invention—in which individuality is best displayed. Probably the demarcation could only be made in a very gradual and tentative fashion. But it is encouraging to find that prominent writers are beginning to recognise this broad line of distinction. It leads one to hope that we may soon witness the euthanasia of Socialism as a final political panacea. The “anti-Socialist,” who figures so largely on the pages of Mr. Wells, is surely already, among thinking men, something of an anachronism. What is wanted now is not either Socialism or anti-Socialism, but an earnest attempt to distinguish what can be advantageously undertaken by the State or Municipality from what is best left to the enterprise of the individual. We want also a more thorough consideration of the difficulties involved in the communising of the prime necessities of life—especially the fundamental difficulty about the control of population (the breeding of children, “social surgery,” and the immigration of inferior races). But the two books before us are certainly important contributions to the discussion of these problems.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

1. I believe it is substantially the same point that Mr. Wells has in view when he compares (in his second chapter) the work of Socialism with that of the mechanical sciences. It may be doubted, however, whether the comparison redounds so greatly to the glory of Socialism as Mr. Wells appears to suppose. It is beginning to be recognized that the mechanical sciences have their limitations.

CHELSEA, PAST AND POSSIBLE.

Introductory Note. Following upon the various papers on the "Survey of Cities" and on the "Study of Civics" which the writer has of recent years brought before the Sociological Society (*Sociol. Review*, January, 1908, and *Sociological Papers*, vols. i, ii, iii), the following transcript of an address to "the Utopians" of Chelsea may serve as a suggestion towards the interpretation of an individual borough, and especially of some of the ways in which our knowledge of and respect for local tradition may not only enhance our interest in the present, but assist our outlook towards the future. The historic retrospect, the utopian forecast, too often mutually exclusive, must thus be united; for an evolutionary interpretation is not merely an enquiry into antecedents, but an endeavour to define the general course of events, to discern its elements of enduring inheritance, and of contemporary variation. Nor is this enlarged enquiry of purely scientific interest; in the measure of its clearness, it affords indications towards action, and this especially as regards the selection and preservation, the continuance and culture of the vital and characteristic elements of our local heritage. In short, historic appreciation and utopian anticipation must be increasingly united to bring forth fruit in civic aspiration and endeavour.

The method of sociological enquiry indicated in the paper above referred to, that from Regional and Civic Surveys, thus leads us towards activities no less definite and localised. There is thus need of a Civic Museum for each city and town. In Chelsea, as in many other towns and cities, the permanent nucleus for this already exists as an historic collection, while temporary exhibitions, supplementary or initiative, may be easily organised anywhere. Records of the past, surveys of the present, projects and suggestions for the future, may thus for the first time be brought together. Public feeling and individual interest are thus aroused—the very deficiencies of this threefold collection being perhaps no less suggestive than its contents—and improvement becomes possible accordingly. Our ideas of our city, thus beginning with observations and records, generalise towards unity of view, towards common action also. For given such and such elements of the local heritage, especially those which have reappeared in generation after generation, given too such and such

advantages of the local situation in our own day, practical possibilities appear, and from these the conception of a Civic Policy begins to arise.

In this way, in Chelsea, small local groups, like the Utopians, small beginnings, like that of University Hall of Residence, tend to become associated in endeavours of citizenship; such are the recent formation of a nucleus of a Chelsea Association, and that of a General Committee for the Re-Erection of Crosby Hall.

Examples of analogous studies towards this union of regional sociology and practical policy, applied to a larger and a smaller city respectively, may be found for Edinburgh in the writer's "Edinburgh and its Region" (*Scot. Geog. Mag.*, 1903) and for Dunfermline in his "City Development" (Edinburgh, 1904). The feeling, the interest and the energies which have been aroused of late years in so many of our historic cities, and not least in Chelsea, by their respective Pageants, and the interest now spreading through London and its constituent boroughs in the approaching Pageant of London, are but the more prominent and vivid symptom of a civic awakening which may soon become general in this country, as apparently already in the United States. Everyday examples, such as the improvement of existing city areas which has been in progress with greater or less wisdom and skill throughout the past generation, and the constructive endeavours of the Garden City Movement (itself so lately but a "mere Utopia") to escape from the present limitations of town life as far as possible altogether, are yet more convincing that this civic arousal has fully begun. The Town Planning Bill, at present before Parliament, is thus but the natural outcome of this movement; and its general approval in principle, its scrutiny and improvement in detail must further advance this. Most important, therefore, as an example immediately available towards enquiry and effort in any and every city and town, is the recent formation of a "Leicester Civics Committee," and its decision to inaugurate its work with a "Leicester Civic Exhibition." Their co-operation from the first with the "Cities Committee" of the Sociological Society is also being extended to other cities, and with mutual advantages of association and interchange. So far then this introductory note.

I.

To this gathering of Utopians of Chelsea—that is, of ordinary citizens, yet active and aspiring ones—let me first plead that we should take a more active and definite interest in our borough. At

the outset I submit that we hardly any of us adequately know our facts, and hence that we cannot even dream our Utopia more than vaguely, much less define any single portion of it until we have come to know and understand something at least of what it is that gives this local character which we value to our neighbourhood, our town.

The exploration of Chelsea is crowded with interest, full of significance; and the detailed instructions for setting about this, in ramble after ramble, are to be found in no mere scanty summary as of Baedeker, but in the admirable guide-book of Mr. Reginald Blunt, a topographic survey which I must not only recommend but assume as one of the essentials of our Utopian library. Those whom he leads on to desire yet further particulars will find no better incentive or example, street by street, than his "Paradise Row"; and since all can have the guidance of an antiquary at once so thorough and sympathetic, I need not here attempt to enumerate the multitudinous points of local and general interest which await them upon such outings. Yet let me at once generalise this to other cities. In London, antiquaries like Mr. Philip Norman, or in Edinburgh like Mr. Bruce Home, are no doubt to some small extent appreciated by an intelligent minority of their respective fellow-citizens, but to bring such men in every town and city to public knowledge, and to public influence, is a matter of ever increasing civic urgency, since almost all the surviving memorials of the past are still in frequent jeopardy, and since their value is thus increasing on the tragic principle of the Sibylline books.

Chelsea Church and its memorials then, Church Street and its associations, and the like, I assume as more or less known to all of us, and so with each of our main assets. But it is easy for us to undervalue the secondary ones; thus the reverent visitor of our Old Church often passes by the new Parish Church with utter indifference, if not with a remark upon the tameness of its modern Gothic. Yet this is one of the notable buildings not only of the borough but of the nineteenth century, since it is the very first modern Church with a stone-vaulted roof—that is the first real attempt to construct a Gothic edifice since the close of the Middle Ages. No wonder it is not completely satisfactory; it is rather a wonder it is so good; and even if we may no longer feel our fathers' enthusiasm for modern Gothic at all, we see that this edifice has none the less its place, and that an initiative one, in one of the most influential movements of modern history.

Even in the nooks of Chelsea, in its retreats from the general stream of local and national life, we everywhere find points ranging from individual interest to world-significance, to history in its largest aspects, temporal and spiritual. Thus the Cavalier associations of Chelsea are ever with us; but from Lindsey House, once Count Zinzendorf's chateau, it is but a step in thought to the Thirty Years' War—and from the quiet little Moravian meeting house with its austere cemetery, to one of the greatest and best of Puritan movements in history. Even their tiny disused school-house, dingy though it be, is more than a mere surviving landmark for progress. It has a tradition of its own, older than that of any of our schools and colleges, than those of South Kensington to boot; for among the educators of history there are few more significant and perhaps none at this moment more vividly modern, more directly indicative of the twofold needs of progress, than the Moravian pedagogue and bishop Comenius, author of the "*Orbis Pictus*," yet also of the "*Pilgrimage of the Soul*."

Our historic houses are known to us all. There Turner spent his last year and died, there Rossetti, there Whistler. But fill in minor names, at least of the thirty mighty men who attain not unto the first three—say from Cecil Lawson onwards and back—and see what a wealth of artistic associations. Yet here in our own day are more painters than ever, and though none be a prophet in his own borough, is it not a matter of common knowledge all the world over that even if the old excellences be gone, new excellences have arisen? At any rate while we may rightly regret the vanishing of the old Pottery with its dainty figulines, we need not forget that we have now in progress, and in more studios than we can number, the expression of a higher idealism, of a more varied realism than of old, and this upon a far greater scale and in more enduring forms. It is time to recognise that even now our local group of sculptors is initiating an art movement which may before long be recognised throughout the land as not less vital and significant in its way than those of the great painters we are wont here to recall.

Here, in More's Garden of all places, our local memories of the Renaissance are not likely to be forgotten, nor how the advent of the New Learning in England would have had a far less easy progress but for the convinced and persuasive ally whom Erasmus found in the hospitable Chancellor. But hardly less significant, though less often remembered, is the later yet completer development (since including also the scientific movement of the later Renaissance), which we owe to More's successor in the same

garden, Sir Hans Sloane. Few in Chelsea but know his Botanic Garden, but it is sometimes forgotten that to his collection the British Museum itself owes its origin, and more often forgotten still how stately and generous was Sloane's design—for had that been carried out, his historic mansion would even now be in existence, and this as the centre of the nation's treasure houses, not crowded out of sight in Bloomsbury, but displayed like the Louvre, perhaps indeed better, in park as well as on river. Hence perhaps it is through the inward fitness of things that a vast group of museums has returned to our immediate neighbourhood, so that we need now no longer refuse morally to incorporate into at least the outer court of our sacred enclosure South Kensington itself, albeit so long the mere hinterland of Chelsea.

II.

This tracing of traditions, as all Chelseans, all historians know, might be continued and amplified. I need not even speak of the local record in literature, in criticism, in affairs; it is time to draw to our conclusions. First, that we are here well on in the fourth century of a focus of thought, a cloister of meditation, a centre of learning, a creative home of art, and above all these a radiant centre of moral and social idealism, arising in the joyous sunburst of the Utopia, but never wholly dying away. To recall once more only a few of the greater names of Chelsea, who can doubt but that this local association of imagination and humour since More, and since the "Encomium Moriae," must have stirred in turn the passionate imagination, the fierce humour of Swift, and the heroic visions, the blazing satire of Carlyle. Or, again, after these first three, has not the same Utopian tradition aroused the generous ardour of Kingsley, or strengthened the lucid optimism of Thomas Davidson, whose whilom Chelsea Brotherhood has grown into what, whether we like it or not, we can hardly deny to have been one of the most potent groups of Utopians of our day and generation, the Fabian Society, and again whose later teaching is so manifest in that renaissance of educational and civic idealism which withstands the omnipotence of mammon even in New York.

Next our civic conclusion. Here in Chelsea, albeit but one of the minor boroughs of London as regards area, wealth, population and other crude quantitative measurements, we have a city in its own way second to none, and in general view claiming to be reckoned after the City and Westminster themselves as making

up the main triad of Central London. True, the City stood for commerce, for material wealth, financial greatness, and Westminster for sacred traditions and for governing powers, when this was but a country village. Yet when the Reformation closed the story of Westminster as a mediæval cloister of thought, the history of Chelsea opened, as its Renaissance equivalent or analogue, and as since affording once and again some needed subjective counterpart to the material and political greatness of the two metropolitan cities. In many ways, of course, this position, while here in Chelsea but individually and sporadically realised, has been more fully and more consciously taken as well as educationally applied by Oxford, but while that has been mainly a citadel of the causes and ideals of the past, the record of Chelsea, as we have seen, lies essentially in its initiatives of new ideals, of constructive movements. Here in fact has long been established, not indeed More's "Utopia," yet another and practically contemporary one, that "Abbey of Thelema," in which each lives his own life to such purpose as he may.

Individual though is our record of local history and achievement, it is yet no mere retrospect of sporadic genius, but a perpetual renewal of certain recognisable elements. Though to historians and their readers the past may too often seem dead, or at best a record to be enshrined in libraries for the learned, it is of the very essence of our growing sociological re-interpretation of the past to see its essential life as continuous into the present, and even beyond, and so maintain the perennation of culture, the immortality of the social soul. The definition of culture in terms of "the best that has been known and done in the world" is but half the truth, that which mourns or meditates among the tombs; the higher meaning of culture is also nearer its primitive sense, which finds in the past not only fruit but seed, and so prepares for a coming spring, a future harvest. History is not ended with our historian's "periods"; the world is ever beginning anew, each community with it, each town and quarter. Why not then also this small town of ours, this most productive cloister of thought and art in what is now the vastest of historic cities?

III.

How then shall we continue the past tradition into the opening future; that is the problem, the essence of our Utopia. A few months ago we were discussing here the ways and means of bringing together into a civic union, a Chelsea Association, the

many scattered endeavours and feelings after more active citizenship, and this in no mere limited sense such as it seems to retain in less developed communities, still wholly taken up with their gas and drains, and exercised only over their taxes. We are surely capable here of aspiring to more Athenian ideals of Citizenship, to more cultural views, to more associated yet more individual life. Of all these there are many sides, but here especially is ours. Here has long been growing up the tradition of many culture-activities, and here are now the essentials of a University City in the general sense; for as the community in its religious aspect was the Church, as the community in its political aspect is the State, so also the community in its cultural aspect will be the University. Here and beside us, moreover, in our own day, has been developing a University quarter in the literal sense; why not now bring these two beginnings together—like our mingled memberships in this very meeting? Might not that be a fresh impulse at least even to ourselves—and why not one of value to London by and by—as to its University, which has still a corresponding growth before it if it is to accomplish its needed task? Towards all this, the re-erection of Crosby Hall, well nigh the last surviving relic of Old London, upon More's Garden, is no mere act of archæological piety, still less of mere "restoration," but one of renewal; it is a purposeful symbol, a renewed initiative, Utopian and local, civic and academic in one. It is first of all a renewed link with the past and its associations; it is to be of daily uses, both public and collegiate, but these above all as preparing the future, not simply dignifying the present and commemorating the past. In sum it is a new link between Chelsea Past and Chelsea Possible.

P. GEDDES.

ASPECTS OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN INDIA.

The readers of the SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW have a right to demand that a paper on the salient features of the social movement in India should be a genuine sociological essay. It should take into account not only the alleged new growth towards political consciousness, but the actual condition, so far as it can be summarized, of the agricultural and artizan population, the effects, direct and indirect, of the introduction of new industries with their displacement of labour, the economic and other results of education, the changes of custom and belief which are slowly modifying the secular structure of Indian society. It would be obviously absurd to contend that the materials for such a discussion are meagre in quantity. They are, in point of fact, almost unlimited. But they are scattered and inchoate; they are hard to collate and difficult of verification; they have not been worked upon or even collected by students of the modern habit. It would, I suppose, be true to say that no more perfect statistical and reportorial machine exists than the Government of India. Every officer of the Indian Civil Service is put through the mill. He learns how to tabulate percentages of crops and crime, revenue and education, pestilence and famine. He acquires, more or less successfully, that wonderful literary style which is the tradition and the secret of the Indian Secretariat. He is expected to be, as Sir George Trevelyan put it long ago, "a dead hand at a minute." If his aptitudes and opportunities are a little above the common, he is able, during his visits to Europe, to pick up a few tricks of the anthropologist; to devote a few weeks of furlough or special leave to inquiries into agricultural banks in Denmark, technical institutes in Germany, prisons or fisheries in America, and he records his conclusions in pleasant little reports which may earn a word of commendation from His Excellency or His Honour in the Council Chamber. He begins to measure heads; his gaol reports contain paragraphs on recidivism; he is given, may be, a chance of expounding custom or caste in a census report. But much of this is academic, or merely irrelevant. The genuine sociologist is not at work in it all; nor does there seem among the younger generation any investigator whose work can even partially challenge comparison with that of the late Sir William Hunter, whose Statistical Account of Bengal, completed more than thirty years ago, remains the nearest

approach to a survey, in the modern sense, among the records of British India. For the rest, we have the countless district and departmental reports, turned out according to a rigid plan, and since Lord Curzon's time with strict regard to the page limit; and we have that characteristic product of the India Office, the annual "Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India"—an illustration of what Matthew Arnold thought so common in England, the grand name without the grand thing.

In the presence of these aids to the misunderstanding of India the sociological student must admit himself baffled. Nowhere does he find an application to the actual conditions of village, town, or revenue district, of those methods of investigation long since adopted by the social surveyor in the West. The Indian city is an unknown unit; the village appears only as a field of conflict for rival theories concerning the ancient rural community; and so rare are attempts to summarize the facts of a specified area that one is apt to give an extravagant welcome to so modest an essay in descriptive economics as Mr. Theodore Morison's inquiry into the industrial organisation of the United Provinces. The foregoing statement of the difficulty is, I feel sure, in no way exaggerated. India provides an unlimited field for such inquirers as have been gathered into the fold of the Sociological Society, and it may perhaps be not unreasonable to hope that the Society may exert an influence towards bringing about some such inquiry into economic and social conditions as the acuteness of the difference between official apologist and non-official critic would seem to demand. Is it impossible that where other, perhaps somewhat suspect, societies have failed, the Sociological Society may succeed, and thus not only render a valuable service to the people and Government of India, but also inaugurate that regional survey which we all hope to see in progress?

For the absence of the kind of data which I particularly have in mind, the Government of India is certainly in large measure to blame. It will be remembered that after the last great famine, in 1900, the Government was approached by means of an influentially signed memorial praying that a detailed local inquiry should be made into the economic conditions of typical villages in the famine area, with a view to ascertaining the facts upon which preventive as well as remedial measures might be safely based. In other words, the Government, with its vast and costly official machinery, was asked to do for a few villages, or groups of villages, in India

what Mr. Charles Booth and Mr. Rowntree have accomplished in London and York, single-handed and at their own expense.

The suggestion, unfortunately, was declined, for reasons stated in a dispatch which to the members of the Sociological Society might seem something of a curiosity. The Government of India was of opinion that the proposed inquiry was earnestly to be deprecated; the results would be misleading and even harmful; the carrying out of such an investigation would be well-nigh impossible; it would be intensely resented by the people and would create hopes that would be impossible of realisation; typical villages could not be selected, and the inquiry would be too great a burden for overworked officials. Moreover, the Government thought that any such special inquiry would be superfluous, because of its possession of extensive machinery for the collection of general statistics, and inquiries so made "over large areas simultaneously furnish a far juster and more adequate representation of the conditions of the people than could result from any detailed inquisition into the circumstances of a few individual households or villages." This is a conclusion all the more unsatisfactory from a sociological standpoint, since it implies that the Government of India had not then (eight years ago) emerged from the notion that the extensive method of inquiry was superior to the intensive. A further cause of regret that the suggestion was not adopted is that the report of the Famine Commission, presided over by Sir Anthony MacDonnell, gave authoritative expression to conclusions from which, not unnaturally, the Government of India had shrunk.

Behind all discussions of social movements in India lies the problem of existence as it affects 300 millions of people. Every observer who takes upon himself to speak of social growths, of political claims, of industrial changes, is conscious that such matters are of little or no account unless they can be directly related to the needs of a population living permanently on the bare subsistence level. Semi-official estimates of Indian poverty are often quoted. According to one of the most familiar of these, a total of not less than 100 millions are living in a condition of hopeless poverty—a poverty which would have to be represented by a deeper black than Mr. Charles Booth or the recent inquirers in West Ham have had any occasion to use. For us, as the ruling race, the basic question is whether under our system the lot of the Indian peasant and labourer is, or is not, more abject than it was under Asiatic rule. That question still requires to be answered scientifically. Most of

the answers available are of a strongly controversial character. I quote one by a recent writer,* who will not be suspected of hostility to the administration :—

The one aim that Britain sets before herself in the government of lands like India and Egypt is the bringing to them of a material content. If she has failed to accomplish that, she can boast of no success. And certainly in India she has not succeeded. There is nothing more painfully evident than that in the midst of trials of every kind that seem year by year to increase in this distressful country, the power of resistance on the part of the people has shown no sign of growing greater. . . . There is no village so remote, no villager so humble, but there and on his bowed shoulders, the burden presses heavier year by year, and as he feels it his heart is bitter against those who lay it on him. It would be the same, whoever were his lords, Brahman or British. The difference is that what in other days was dumb has found a voice, and it is far other than it ever was before and far more formidable just because it is articulate.

The Indian economist and political reformer is nearly always condemnatory, and his language is generally more violent in tone than that used by Mr. G. K. Gokhale, who in a speech in London, in 1905 said :—

I firmly believe, and I say this after a careful study of about twenty years, that the economic results of the British rule in India have been absolutely disastrous. That the mass of the people in India are at present sunk in frightful poverty is now admitted by all, including the most inveterate official optimist.

Mr. Gokhale, like most other serious critics of the administration, tests his conclusion by various official returns, such as the estimate of the average annual income in India at £2 per head, contrasted with £42 per head in England. The question as commonly argued touches the weight of the actual burden imposed upon the people by the British system. In intention more just, in method indefinitely more regular, than any earlier system known to the country, that system yet provokes the question whether its rigidity, its impersonal mechanism, has not involved a greater drain upon the land than the system in vogue under the Hindu monarchies or the remarkable organisation of the Moghul conquerors. The testimony of the last Famine Commission is valuable. Speaking of the poverty and indebtedness of the struggling cultivator, the

* The Rev. N. MacNichol, of Poona, *Contemporary Review*, July, 1908.

report says: "In good years he has nothing to hope for except a bare subsistence; in bad years he falls back on public charity," and "it is the rigidity of the revenue system that forces him into debt." Accordingly, the report calls for early and drastic measures of reform: "the time for palliative measures has passed, and the hour has come for recognising facts as they exist, and for applying those measures which the facts demand, no matter how unwelcome the disillusionment that they bring."

I turn, however, from this, the enduring problem of India, to a brief consideration of recent social movements.

It will have been apparent to even the most casual student of Indian affairs that the popular movement has undergone a change of character and direction during the past few years. Half a century ago the energies of that section of the community which had felt the impact of Western education were devoted to the bringing about of reforms—domestic, educational, and religious—closely in harmony with Western notions. Macaulay's prediction that the fabric of Hinduism would crumble in thirty years under the dissolvent of European education seemed at one time not particularly far-fetched. In the sphere of religion the Indian theistic movement gathered strength, and, under a succession of powerful leaders, drew within itself much of the active intelligence and nearly all the reforming zeal of the time. The advanced Hindu seemed in danger of cutting himself off completely from the traditions of his race. He wanted to overthrow idolatry, to sweep away all those features of Indian society which to Western eyes seemed primitive or evil, to transform even his domestic life according to the Western model; to abolish the purdah and remarry his widows. For two decades at least these were the declared objects of Indian reformers. The political idea was hardly realised. To such a leader as Keshub Chunder Sen, who visited England in 1870, politics was practically non-existent; and even those of his younger followers who broke away from him with broader ideas at the end of the seventies conceived the field of their activity to lie mainly in education and philanthropy. But by that time the political movement was incipient, and its rise gives us the second stage in the movement that has now come to be described as national. The foundation, in 1885, of the Indian National Congress marked its definite formulation. Henceforward the reform party had a platform and a programme. The platform provided room for representative speakers from every province of India, to whom, as it soon appeared, the practice of Western forms

of motion, discussion, and voting was the merest child's play. The programme comprised a policy of orthodox Liberalism—constitutional advance, decreased military expenditure, readjusted taxation, experimental self-government, the freeing of justice from the executive power, and, necessarily, the association of qualified Indians in ever greater numbers with the administration. The National Congress served the purpose, so to say, of a permanent Opposition, as well as a school of politics for Indian publicists who as yet had no share in the government of their own country. In the opinion of the impatient idealists, as Lord Morley styles the advanced sections, the Congress has been practically infructuous; but it is fair to remember that such small concessions, political and fiscal, as having been granted during the past two decades are directly on the line of its programme. It has been mainly through the annual proceedings of the National Congress, moreover, that we in England have been kept in touch with the movement of political thought in India. We may count its active lifetime at twenty years, for the disruption of the 23rd Congress at Surat in December, 1907, was merely the consummation of an activity the real nature of which had been apparent for a few years only and the emergence of which marks a further stage in the progress of the educated community in India.

This later stage is by far the most significant manifestation of Indian feeling with which we have so far been confronted. Most observers will agree that a Nationalist movement in India was inevitable: that it was implicit in the conception of imperial duty to which we paid partial homage by granting a species of education and governing the country with the aid of Indians. Influences of many kinds have operated to drive the movement into newer channels, and, without going into controversial matters, one may say that the genius of such a Governor-General as Lord Curzon was precisely calculated to force it into eruptive vigour.

Lord Curzon's ideal in India was the perfection of the governmental machine. He was, by preference, an administrative reformer, and those who on his arrival in the country begged him to eschew all schemes of political change spoke to the converted. At that date a strong hand was undeniably needed in the Secretariat. The machine had got out of gear, and Lord Curzon set himself with remarkable energy and with no undue self-depreciation to put it to rights. For a time he was supported by Indian public opinion. But it was not long before the political leaders began to realise that a more efficient administrative machine would

involve not less but more bureaucratic domination. Yet it was not until Lord Curzon, having left his mark upon the Secretariat, turned to matters more nearly affecting the people themselves that popular hostility was fully aroused. I am not here criticising Lord Curzon's policy: I want merely to indicate some of the results concerning which there can be no material difference of opinion.

Lord Curzon was opposed to the theory, accepted in some degree by most of his predecessors, that the objective in India was the gradual progress towards a system of self-government by the Indian people. His conception of efficiency involved much more than the maintenance of supreme power in the hands of a British *corps d'élite*. It implied that, for the peace, security, and good government of India, we were required to administer every department of the public service by means of an increasing staff of trained Europeans, restricting Indians, even those most highly qualified, to comparatively subordinate offices. Holding this view, he could not look with sympathy upon the continued demand of the educated classes for increased political and administrative power; nor could he help regarding the steady growth of those classes in numbers and influence as other than a danger to the State. His policy was thoroughly consistent. It was built upon the assumption that those English administrators who had applied a modified Liberalism to India had not envisaged the results that were bound to follow in time from their theory and practice: hence Lord Curzon's scheme of strengthening the Executive and his measures for checking the expansion of what his supporters commonly referred to as Babudom. It is unnecessary for me to examine them in detail. I need only mention the more important: the curtailing of municipal self-government in Calcutta; the Universities Act, with its provisions for stiffening the standards and extending official control over the whole province of education; the partial abolition of competitive examinations for the subordinate public service, the capture by the Civil Service of judicial and administrative departments hitherto kept independent of the Executive, and, finally, the partition of Bengal. The defence of these measures was in each case the need of greater efficiency in the administration; and there can be no reasonable doubt that, undertaken in a different spirit, they might not only have fulfilled their ostensible purpose but have compelled the assent of the Indian public. That they did not do this was due to the suspicion with which they were generally regarded, and to the methods by means of which they were carried through.

The public temper was undoubtedly ripe for some form of resistance. The wave of new life in Asia met with an immediate response in India and found its allies in local causes of disturbance. Political concessions had ceased; the power of the bureaucracy had been greatly augmented; a series of famine years, coupled with a continual rise in the price of foodstuffs and a consequent hardening in the struggle for existence; a change, as it seemed, for the worse in the spirit and personnel of the public service; a growing suspicion that justice was harder to get in the courts—all these influences and many more united to increase the force of the popular protest when, partly as the result of the renewed agitation in Bengal, it began to assume a national character.

The most noteworthy characteristic of the agitation, undoubtedly, was the change which came about in the temper and aims of the people. It had long been made a reproach to the educated Indian that his horizon was bounded by a university degree and an insignificant post under Government. This contracted outlook had been deplored by clear-sighted Indians, who had come also to despise the "mendicant" attitude of Indian public bodies in their attempts to secure concessions from the Government. But the undefined dissatisfaction with a state of things which, it was felt, was injurious to the Indian character, did not receive any great impetus until the political leaders resolved, as a final protest against the partition of Bengal, to proclaim a boycott of European goods. The move was inspired by the Chinese boycott of America, and it revealed the possession of a hitherto untried weapon of offence in Asia. As a political move for a particular purpose, the boycott, as might have been expected, failed. But as a means of embodying the popular feeling in collective action it succeeded beyond expectation. The ability and unanimity displayed in its working were a revelation to the Anglo-Indian community, and it was this, probably, more than any fears for the future of British commerce, that led the official classes to set themselves systematically against the boycott as it developed. Its most noteworthy feature was that the movement captured the popular imagination, not in its political, but in its social aspect. Boycott, as a merely political expedient, gave place to Swadeshi, a belief in the national duty of using Indian products and encouraging indigenous industries to the exclusion of all others. My impression is that the success of the Swadeshi agitation when it reached the villages and the zenanas had little to do with the aggressive character with which the political leaders strove to invest it, but

much with the intuitive feeling that herein lay a way of escape, a whisper of hope, for the Indian peasant and craftsman ground under the weight of an immemorial burden. Not otherwise, I think, can we account for the enthusiasm with which the idea was seized and put into practice. It fell in with that passion for all things Indian which had been struggling for years past against Westernizing influences; it breathed a message of self-help to the millions who for so long had lain helpless and inarticulate. The clerk and shopkeeper once again clothed themselves in Swadeshi cotton; the housemother banished foreign products from her domain, and insisted on clothing herself, her husband, and her family in indigenous stuff; the weaver went back to his handloom. It cannot be said that Swadeshi has had any great effect upon the import trade, nor has it resulted in the founding of new industrial concerns of the modern kind. But, as the advertisement sheets of the Indian newspapers show, it has given an impetus to the manufacture of all those necessities and luxuries which can be undertaken on a small scale and without the laying out of large capital.

The industrial effects of Swadeshi, however, are perhaps the least important from the sociological standpoint. Its principal justification, to the Indian mind, is that it represents a general revolt against the moral and social decadence that afflicts a subject people grown quiescent under alien domination. Mr. Gokhale says:—

Of these moral evils none is so great as this continuous dwarfing or stunting of our race that is taking place under your rule. Our rigorous exclusion from all power and all positions of trust and responsibility, on a scale never before attempted in the history of humanity, involving as it does an enforced disuse of our national abilities—is leading to a steady deterioration of our race, and this, I venture to think, is a cruel, an iniquitous, wrong you are inflicting on us.

Swadeshi is the embodiment of the resolve to throw off this reproach, to give form and substance to new ideas, the working out of which no observer of current tendencies in India can fail to trace. It inspires the endeavour to promote educational institutions that shall be independent of the government system; it is behind the growing passion of young India for physical culture; it is the main-spring of the incipient labour unions which, on the railways, in the jute mills and the printing works, are rapidly teaching the

Indian workman to realise his solidarity and to enforce his demands by collective action.

Recent visitors to India have been interested in inquiring how far the popular movement can be described as anti-British, or as actively "seditious." Mr. Nevinson, for example, who travelled through the country last winter, came upon no evidence of anything rightly to be called sedition, but he noted the prevalence, in every province, of a temper which predisposes the populace to seize upon every grievance and to look with suspicion upon every act of Government. Remembering the history of the past few years, I submit that the impartial observer is bound to recognise some justification for this attitude. It is probably true that the mass of the Indian people know nothing of policies and are untouched by constitutional arguments. But the executive acts of an autocratic Government carry far. Word of them reaches every village, and we may be sure that the news never lacks interpreters. The difficulty of our present position arises, in great part, from our failure to realise the sources of our own strength. The law, not the sword, is the foundation of our rule in India; and it has been exactly in our administration of the law that we have been least successful since the beginning of the present upheaval. In a time of popular disturbance, as we know, the executive officers of Government have a peculiarly difficult task, especially where conflicting racial and religious interests tend to confuse the issue. In India this is pre-eminently so, and I am afraid it could be shown that, in attempting to meet the difficulties created by the present agitation, the officers have taken a line which must be regarded as unfortunate. In the early days of the agitation they, doubtless in obedience to the higher authorities, entered upon a course of anti-Swadeshi procedure which involved in many cases a straining of the law and in some few a severe rebuff from the High Courts. No impartial witness, I think, would contend that they acted always without provocation; but it is an open question whether, had the official attitude towards the boycott movement been one of strict correctitude, the recent development of extremist writing and oratory, to say nothing of the Bengal terrorist organisation, would not have been in great measure prevented.

I have used throughout the word National to define the movement which, as everyone agrees, has lately acquired characteristics not hitherto existent in India. The word is now in common use, even in the Viceroy's Council; but it is continually challenged. We are assured that India is not a nation but a continent; a congeries

of discordant races, languages, and religions; a geographical expression. Also, that in such a country the mass of the people must for ever remain outside any organised political or social movement, which movement indeed can only at the most affect what Lord Dufferin called a microscopic minority; and that the millions of Mahomedans remain detached from, or hostile to, the Nationalist agitation, so called.

These objections, so often stated, may be briefly considered before I conclude.

First, then, as to the depth and extent of the new political or social consciousness. It is ordinarily said, especially in England, that the Indian agitator and newspaper represent nobody but themselves. I do not think that in India to-day the heads of the Government would maintain this old position. The feeling which accompanied the preaching of Swadeshi swept through the multitude, as the reports from hundreds of remote villages showed. The disturbances in the Punjab last year, it was everywhere admitted, were agrarian in character. When Sir Denzil Ibbetson, the Lieutenant-Governor, demanded the deportation of Lajpat Rai, he was really paying a tribute, not merely to an educational and religious reformer, but to a popular tribune whose power was assumed to extend to the peasants of every district. Again, we cannot estimate the power of the Indian Press by reference to the statistics of illiteracy. They have nothing to do with the case. The spiritual leaders of India are, as often as not, unhampered by the ability or the desire to read and write. With them, in a very literal sense, the word is made flesh. The influence of the Press is, of course, immense. In addition to the Indo-English newspapers, read by the whole English-speaking native community, there has sprung up an innumerable host of vernacular journals, counting their readers often by tens of thousands, their hearers by tens of thousands more. When we say, as sometimes we do, that there is no such thing as public opinion in India, we forget that all these organs embody, in effect, one opinion only—a constant, untiring, unmerciful criticism of our alien rule; an insistence, with varying degrees of fervour, upon the idea of unity, the hope of emancipation, the certainty of national renewal. Nor can we forget that the newspaper Press, ubiquitous as it now is, represents only one agency for the instruction of the populace. Those who know India do not need to be told that the influence of journalist and platform orator is supplemented by a personal propaganda—subtle, private, all pervasive—which brings the smallest village into direct relation

with the centres of thought and action. And, further, India is the heart of Asia, responsive in her every province to the dramatic successes of Japan, the wonderful and world-wide renaissance of Islam, and the stirring of the huge body of China after her sleep of centuries. For my part, I cannot share the view of those who, with all the evidence of a mass movement before them, are able to rest in the belief that the depths of Indian society are still undisturbed. It is a pleasant and a comfortable view. I decline to accept it, first, because it seems to me that the logic of recent events, especially during the past eighteen months, is against it; secondly, because its prevalence among us constitutes a peril to the Empire of which we are members. We exaggerate the natural divisions of India; we exaggerate enormously the differences of race, of speech, and of creed; we misread, I am persuaded, the moral of Indian history before our own beneficent advent.

Now, as to the second point—the alleged hostility of the Indian Mahomedans to the Nationalist movement. The ordinary Anglo-Saxon belief is that Hindu and Mahomedan are irreconcilable enemies, adding to religious animosity the mutual hatred of conqueror and conquered. Unregenerate Anglo-Indian opinion goes one better in persuading itself that our rule is contingent upon the perpetuation of this antagonism. Here I want to speak with all due caution. The current view strikes me as, to put it gently, inadequate. Nothing could be more misleading than to conceive of Hindu and Moslem as being sharply distinct in race. It is matter of common knowledge that whole communities of Moslems are the descendants of converts from Hinduism; and, one may add, deeply tinged with the religious beliefs and even the idolatrous rites of their Hindu compatriots. It is, of course, true that the educated Mussulmans as a body have stood aside from the National Congress—the reasons are well known. Generally speaking, the community is less advanced in education and political sense than the Hindus. But it would be a serious mistake not to realise that an advance movement exists in the Indian Islamic world, and no less a mistake to imagine that that movement is anti-Hindu. The most material facts tell against any such theory. For years past all the spontaneous influences of the country have tended towards co-operation. Hindus and Mahomedans work together in public life—in municipalities and district boards, on social, charitable and educational committees, in the universities and the legislative councils. Those who point to recent occurrences in East Bengal as evidence of a widening

breach omit to take account of the special circumstances which everyone acquainted with the facts can explain. There exists, again, in the ranks of the younger Mahomedans the beginning of a vigorous public movement which, though it may not coalesce with any of the established Hindu organisations, is practically certain to run on parallel lines. Moreover, we must remember that, notwithstanding special or traditional jealousies, the interests of one Asiatic race in India cannot be identified with those of the alien ruler as opposed to the interests of a second people native to the country. In the last resort they belong to one world and we to another. A difference of creed among them is not a difference in the structure of emotion and consciousness : and it is such differences that finally count.

What I have written is, I am aware, the most meagre and incomplete presentation of a social condition which, being without parallel in history, constitutes the most obscure, the most baffling problem which any empire has ever had to face. My personal feeling is that we are failing at the task—failing largely because of our departure from the principles which, in a simpler and more confident epoch, we laid down for our own guidance. It is a favourite thesis of a distinguished member of this society that the city states and the empire states of antiquity alike came to grief through their lack of political philosophy, their inability to grasp the new conditions engendered by their own polity. As one looks upon the problem of India to-day, with its myriad facets, its endless contradictions, its viewless perils, the fear intrudes whether we in our turn are to be tried and found wanting.

S. K. RATCLIFFE. .

DISCUSSIONS.

THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE.

I. THE NEED FOR REFORMATIVE TREATMENT.

I am asked to contribute a note on the Indeterminate Sentence. My first thought is that, in this country, it is perhaps safer not to advocate it without qualification. For the public in this country is not yet quite familiar with the term and its various meanings. So that my answer, if I am asked whether I approve of the Indeterminate Sentence, had perhaps better be, "It depends" It depends on the kind of sentence that is to be indeterminate. If it is a course of reformative treatment, or, in the case of a person who cannot be reformed, if it consists of that amount of control, supervision or help which is required to afford him or her the best opportunities of decent and useful livelihood—then let the "sentence" by all means be indeterminate, but not otherwise.

Let us, then, begin by stipulating that the sentence shall be reformative or hospitable (of the nature of asylum, with necessary check, stimulation or support). Granted this, it may be said that the Indeterminate Sentence is our only way, under present conditions, of carrying it out. Reformation requires an indeterminate or indefinite period of treatment, and the Indeterminate Sentence, properly understood, implies reformative treatment, or asylum of some kind or other for those who cannot be reformed.

This may seem an exaggerated and too comprehensive statement of the matter. But I am anxious to urge that, rightly understood, the theory and principle of the Indeterminate Sentence apply to the criminal problem throughout. You diagnose your case, find the best available treatment, and apply it just as long as necessary and no longer. That is the principle or theory. And so the out and out, ideal Indeterminate Sentence has no pre-determined limit. It will go on as long as is thought right by those entrusted with the ordering of its termination, that is, the administrators of the sentence. Granted satisfactory reformative treatment and trustworthy administrators, I am for the out-and-out Indeterminate Sentence.

But such an Indeterminate Sentence is, as far as I know, nowhere in the world in force. Let us glance briefly at some of the modifications of it that are in force. From the reformative point of view perhaps the nearest approach to the ideal is to be found in America; while, for the nearest approach to the ideal "indefiniteness" of period, perhaps we should look to Australia.

A number of States in North America have adopted some form or modification of the so-called Indeterminate or Indefinite Sentence. They are all subject to a *maximum* limit. In Massachusetts, by the Acts of 1886 and 1892, the Indeterminate Sentence

was limited to a *maximum* of five years for felony and of two years for misdemeanour. Sentences over those periods were pre-determined; and prisoners sentenced to Indeterminate sentences might be released by the Commissioners of Prisons "upon such conditions as they may deem best." In some places the judge fixes the *minimum* and *maximum* limits of the sentence, within which release is left to the discretion of the prison authorities.

In the Reformatories of New York State the term of imprisonment is decided by the managers; "but such imprisonment shall not exceed the maximum term provided by law for the crime for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced." (Chap. 711, Laws of 1887, §9.)

This is the Elmira system, the essence of which is that it is reformatory. Prisoners are graded, are drilled, taught in a "school of letters," and in a school of industry, and have religious and other influences systematically brought to bear upon them. They are paid and marked and given progressive privileges. When they have worked their way up to the top, that is, have six months "perfect demeanour" in the highest grade, a certain balance of money to their credit, are otherwise considered fit, and have a situation for which they are fitted secured for them, they are released "on parole." They then have to report monthly by letter to the superintendent and comply with certain regulations. Six months unexceptionable behaviour on parole generally procures their final discharge. In the reformatories (Elmira and Nappanoch) marks are given for conduct, industry and studies. They are so trained that, if discharged on parole, they leave with a certificate of character and of proficiency in a trade. Here we have a really reformatory system with a partially indeterminate sentence. Some prisoners have to be discharged unreformed when their maximum sentence expires.

The Indiana Reformatory Act of 1897 establishes the Indiana Reformatory for male prisoners found guilty of felony, other than treason or murder in the first or second degree, between the ages of 16 and 30. The Court are to name the crime and the prisoner's age, and to sentence him to the custody of the Board of Managers of the Reformatory "for a term not less than the minimum time prescribed by the statutes of the State, as a punishment for such offence, and not more than the maximum time prescribed by such statutes therefor." "The Board of Managers may terminate such imprisonment when the rules and requirements of such Reformatory have been lived up to and fulfilled according to the provisions of this act." And after a year's good behaviour on parole the prisoner may be finally discharged.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law of Indiana makes like enactments with regard to felons over thirty years of age, who are to be sent to the State Prison for a term not under the *minimum* nor over the *maximum* fixed by law, and who may be released on parole and absolutely discharged by the Board of Commissioners.

Here we have the modified Indeterminate Sentence carried very far; applied, in fact, to felons of all ages over sixteen.

Now let us pass to Australia where we find, in New South Wales, the "Habitual Criminals Act, 1905." Here we have a system long advocated, I believe, by Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise,

the chairman of our own prison commissioners. I may as well quote the Comptroller-General's own description :—

The Act provides, where a person has been convicted of an indictable offence and has been on three previous occasions (in certain offences, two) convicted of offences of a similar class, that the judge may declare, as part of the sentence, that he is an habitual criminal. A sentence is therefore divided into two parts, the definite, as regards the fixed term (two years, five years, or whatever may be the time imposed) for the particular offence, and the indeterminate portion, which he serves by reason of his being an habitual criminal, and which commences at the expiration of the definite part of the sentence. Regulations have recently been framed dealing with the indeterminate part of the sentence, and under them an "habitual" finds the ordinary conditions of gaol life somewhat relaxed in various ways. A progressive-stage system has been brought into operation by which a well-behaved and industrious person can rise from grade to grade, each step upwards being attended by various concessions and indulgences. One feature of the treatment is, that an industrious man is able to earn a fair wage, a portion of which he can spend on extra articles for his comfort. Should he so desire, he may send a portion of his earnings to his family or relatives, the remainder being credited to his account against the time when he will regain his liberty. A consultative committee composed of the visiting justice, the chaplains, the medical officers, and such other persons as may from time to time be appointed, carefully observe each case and forward reports at periodical intervals; and, at stated times, the Comptroller-General furnishes full particulars, showing conduct, industry, stage of reform, &c., concerning each person to the Minister of Justice, who determines if the time has arrived for restoring the prisoner to liberty, but no release is absolute until a period of twelve months' probation has been passed under a modified system of restraint, during which time the probationer is always liable to be sent back for further treatment should his conduct be unsatisfactory. During the indeterminate stage, the deprivation of rewards and privileges, with reduction in grade, form the chief disciplinary methods, and upon any "habitual" attaining the special division he is allowed to specially address the Minister, putting his own case in his own way."¹

On commencing the indeterminate portion of his sentence the "habitual" is placed in the Intermediate Grade, from whence he can be degraded to the Lower grade (including Penal and Ordinary sub-grades), or promoted to the Higher Grade, and from that placed on the Special List. Marks are given for industry and good conduct.

The latest rules in my possession (5th February, 1908) state :—

"A 'Special' will have no right to be released on licence; but it is only prisoners of this class who will, under ordinary circumstances, be allowed to place their case before the Minister."

1. Report by the Comptroller-General of Prisons, New South Wales, 1907 (for year 1906), p. 2.

.... "Papers in such cases should state if definite employment can be found for the prisoner, and every facility should be afforded to an eligible prisoner to communicate on this subject with the Association for Aiding Discharged Prisoners or any kindred organisations or reputable persons likely to find a situation for him. Prison officers are enjoined to render all possible assistance in this respect, as unless suitable employment is obtained for a prisoner prior to discharge, there is little hope of his being able to lead a reformed life."

In his latest report (1908) the Comptroller-General says, "There can be no doubt as to the value to the community of this new departure in criminology. It forms a most powerful deterrent as regards the professional criminal, and it should add to the security of life and property."

And now, after three years, our own prison authorities seem to be going to persuade Parliament to sanction a similar system in this country.

It has been well said by Professor Van Hamel that "the indeterminate sentence has to be considered under two aspects—as a sentence of reform and as a sentence of surety." It may perhaps be said that the Americans have considered it more from the aspect of reform, the Australians more from the aspect of surety. The latter—and this appears to be the point of view of some advocates in this country—are bent on getting hold of the "habitual" and locking him up. The Americans try to catch him young and save him from a life of crime. Yet it is noteworthy that in both cases the element of reclamation is decided and prominent. I think we may have some faith that it will be so also in this country.

And each type has the defects of its qualities, if one may put it that way. The Americans, fearful of handing over the individual indefinitely to the tender mercies of the administrator, place a maximum limit, and thus release a proportion of their prisoners unreformed. American advocates and administrators, therefore, ask for the abolition of this maximum limit. The New South Wales authorities, anxious not to treat an offender as a regular criminal too soon, lay themselves open to the criticism that their "progressive-stage system" of reformatory methods is somewhat belated. Why not begin it earlier, at the first hint or symptom of criminality? And surely the determinate portion of the sentence is simply a relic of the old system of so much punishment for so much crime, and is destined to disappear.

I plead, then, for the extension of the principle of the indeterminate sentence, and its application all along the line. We want to catch the potential criminal (and who is not a potential criminal?) at the first sign of potential criminality, and apply the required educative treatment. That is, our general education wants perfecting, and should be made elastic. We want also to secure the proper treatment for every criminal at whatever stage his criminality shows itself, to keep him, as far as practicable, from harm to himself and to society until his reformation is fairly advanced. And if his reformation should prove to be impossible of achievement, then we want to secure on his behalf, and for the sake of the community, such supervision and help as will give him the greatest

measure of liberty and usefulness compatible with the public order and welfare.

But predetermined sentences and our present system of punitive imprisonment are surely incompatible with these ends. Treatment must be reformatory; our prisons must become schools, colleges of decent life. And to give them a fair chance of doing their work, the periods of consignment must not be settled beforehand. Discharge must also be tentative and conditional, or probationary.

We have hopeful beginnings already in our Industrial and Reformatory Schools for juveniles, and a promising experiment in the Borstal system for juvenile-adults, which is to be extended and improved. But they all want improving in the indeterminate and reformatory direction—to be more indeterminate and more reformatory. The judge or magistrate is not in a position to know how long it will take to cure a prisoner, or what treatment he needs. Educational experts, after close study of the individual, may be in such a position.

All this may seem very idealistic and unpractical; but I think that it is in this direction that we are moving and must move. How much of it we can obtain, or at what rate, is another matter. We want an intelligent and effective public demand, and that we have not yet got. Then we want competent and trustworthy public servants to supply the demand; and how far we have got that I am not in a position to state. This is the great desideratum. To organise and administer the reclamation of criminals we require a man of whom it can be said, as has been said of Superintendent Scott, of Elmira, "He is a king, a prince, among men." We have to find our "kings," our "princes," and set them to the task. I believe we have them amongst us if we want them. But, however that may be, I have some faith that with the inception of the Indeterminate Sentence, methods will improve and officers will improve. Although I believe that an Indeterminate Sentence with a continuance of our present prison system would be a monstrous inhumanity, yet I do believe that the Indeterminate Sentence will itself necessitate more reformatory methods, and also that really reformatory methods will call for indeterminate, or at least, more elastic, sentences.

Undoubtedly in "Anglo-Saxon" communities—and perhaps especially in this country—the Indeterminate Sentence has to meet great obstacles. I should class them as (1) traditional and (2) economic.

The traditions and principles of our law and politics lead us to distrust the administrator, or at least hedge him about with checks and safeguards; and we look for these to our law-courts as well as to our representative institutions. Though the Crown can pardon or remit, no one can increase the award, whose maximum is definitely fixed in open court. But the Indeterminate Sentence demands that the period of loss of liberty shall be decided behind the scenes by the administrator—nominally by the responsible minister, but really by permanent officials, whose susceptibilities in the matter of the freedom of the subject are under suspicion.

Here, then, we find ourselves right up against a good old British prejudice, or principle. And we can only urge that satisfactory safeguards are to be found. But it may be pointed out

that the only real safeguards lie in sound and effective public opinion and in finding, and trusting, the right public servants. These are safeguards which will make almost anything safe. Without these how can we have an efficient system at all?

As to economic difficulties—they are common, in some degree, to all civilised countries, but are especially felt under representative institutions, and perhaps most of all in this country. There is, of course, the great difficulty that if you treat your prisoners decently they are better off than thousands of honest poor. Well, it is so now. We cannot be expected to starve them because many poor people are starving. The only thing seems to be to make our institutions for criminals into schools or colleges of better life, and make of them a lever to lift the whole standard of life—to shame ourselves into cleaner, honester, more decent ways of living and working all round.

But the special economic difficulty I meant to refer to is that of organising industry for our criminal institutions. I see no chance of a satisfactory reformatory system while it is possible to have in our prison reports such passages as this:—

"During the year 1906-07 great difficulties have been experienced in finding suitable and sufficient employment for all the inmates of our prisons owing to a serious scarcity of Government work adapted to the capacity of our workers, who are mostly unskilled."

If we are to provide an adequate industrial training for prisoners, we must have a thorough organisation of their industries. And this can only be brought about by an understanding with the industrial world outside.

Here is one of many examples of the need of thorough understanding, confidence and co-operation between the general public and the appointed executive, without which no system or measure can be a great success, and which are certainly essential to the right working of the Indeterminate Sentence.

ARTHUR ST. JOHN.

2. Report of the Commissioners of Prisons, etc., 1907.

Since writing the above, I have received the 1908 report, and find in it this (p. 43):—

"For over two years we have been seriously handicapped in our endeavour to provide skilled work for prisoners owing to the reduced requirements of some of the Government Departments, more especially the Admiralty and War Department, with the inevitable result that the value of the labour performed has declined from £245,084 in the record year of 1904-05, to £240,362 in 1905-06, to £229,502 in 1906-07, and finally to £224,931 in 1907-08. . . . The drop would have been greater but for the steady increase in the orders so kindly placed in our hands by the General Post Office. That great Department is, without doubt, our sheet anchor in the matter of prison employment. In 1907-08 it provided work for an average of about 2,400 men and women."

But I fear the educative value of making mail bags is not great; and its value as a preparation for employment outside must be still less.

II. THE EFFECT ON THE CRIMINAL.

When Mr. Gladstone sets himself the Herculean task of solving the problem of the chronic criminal, he approaches the question with a far-reaching knowledge, but from the official side only. No true solution of the criminal difficulty can be so obtained.

Society has the right to be protected from these dangerous social pests; and the indeterminate sentence appears the easiest and surest way of attaining a certain degree of security. Who indeed can object to seeing the "unreformable" burglar incarcerated for ten or twenty years? Does he not hold some of us in terror of his visits, and why should we submit tamely to such constant fear? Are we not entitled to a remedy, however drastic and inhuman, against some of the shocking cruelties of crime?

What do the criminals say? There are two chief types: the "mug," or stupid low class criminal, who is held in cheap contempt by the other or skilled class. The mug lives only for to-day; yesterday is ancient history and he never worries about to-morrow. He is not sufficiently intelligent to be resourceful. The skilled and daring criminal, whom Providence placed on this earth for better purposes and events, at once assumes a defensive attitude. If he is liable to the indeterminate sentence, he won't take it "lying down"; and why should he? There will be some trouble, probably murder, but this is a question for the officials to settle.

The officials appear to have very much underestimated the number of chronic criminals, who are eligible for the indeterminate sentence. They calculate on the few very superior men, who drive about in motor-cars, visiting out of the way mansions and castles, reckoning their haul in thousands of pounds sterling. These form but a drop in the bucket, when we think of the army of unskilled, troublesome pests, who seldom receive long sentences. Then there are the degenerates who commit revolting crimes, and are always a danger when at liberty. Mr. Gladstone's scheme does not appear sufficiently comprehensive. It is the man in the street, the girl in the shop, and the child in the highway, who have equal claims with the wealthy, for protection against organized crime.

The Bill, with the highest respect to its promoter, presents some inconsistency in making an effort and suggesting a faint hope of reform. Reform! Absurd. Does the chronic wish to reform? Why should he? He is a sportsman through and through. If he is held tight in a trap, he must *pro tempore* submit, but will the relaxed discipline and the chaplain's gentle persuasion touch his heart? The whole idea is too grotesque. Is he going to turn religious in the second year, in the hopes that when he is examined in his tenth year he may be liberated? Certainly he will find religion rather a poor comfort during our present prison methods. There is a ring of humour about philanthropy in prison, even when applied to the Borstal system.

I once spoke to a poor lad of 19 in his prison cell. The offence he had committed was one of depravity. The cure could have

been attained without imprisonment by a good thrashing, or equally well by the influence of a court missionary or other religious agency, with a change of surroundings. It was most desirable that, in any case, he should have mental occupation. As things were, he spent hours alone in his dingy cell, and had to drag out a miserable sentence of three years. He "thought" he was reforming, and was becoming religious, but at the same time, never too strong mentally, he was really becoming "dotty." Officialdom had destroyed him mentally, and left him no backbone when turned adrift on Society. The chaplain did not consider him bad at heart, but the State has spent about £200 in order to turn him into an imbecile. Could not the tax-payers protest against such misapplication of public funds?

The Bill almost absurdly hopes to reform, at the same time as inflicting one of the worst of punishments. On the other hand, the State officially will not succour any effort to reform ex-convicts. Nor will the State give the slightest thought for the welfare of the convict as soon as he is cast outside the prison gate. If the Government would endow philanthropic bodies, not otherwise interfering with them, the army of criminals would not be so over-recruited.

Let us now turn from the official side without minimizing its importance, and consider how closely we are related to the criminal, and if so what can we do for him.

It will hardly be disputed that many of our worst criminals are victims of their surroundings. If such be true, it places us in the position of potential criminals; so we cannot afford to be self-righteous. Again, much of crime is not actual wrong doing but merely law breaking; whilst sufficient notice is not taken of actual wrong doing, which by skilful manœuvring does not break the law. Society on the whole suffers more by the latter than by the former. The cause of this complex incongruity is class legislation, and the unseen influence of the old feudal system.

To common sense folk, it seems a mistaken policy to shut up for life a burglar, who has perhaps broken into five or six mansions, without perceptibly affecting the owners; and allowing the illicit financier a long run, while he not only bleeds but ruins hundreds, perhaps thousands of families.

At once we feel inclined to lose interest in the Bill, or in anything Parliament may do for the criminal, until it legislates on just, true, and honourable lines. It can close the avenues of crime in many ways without endangering Society. It is iniquitous to send a poor lad to prison for three months for "sleeping out;" or for a similar period because he cannot pick 4 lbs. of oakum a day in a workhouse. Those who can only be accused of poverty, must not be manufactured wholesale by the State into criminals; and when hardened and rebellious against Society, finished off with a life sentence.

To the casual observer it may appear that I have got off the track in discussing the etiology of crime or the evolution of the criminal in connection with the Bill which is now before the country. It is not so. Did we not for years endeavour to trace the origin of diphtheria and typhoid, whilst making every effort to stamp out these diseases? We had to treat symptoms as they

occurred; but could we hope to check the progress of the epidemics unless we understood their pathology?

In the same way officialdom is treating symptoms when merely inflicting punishment. In medical circles this is described as empiricism, and in vulgar parlance as quackery. In past ages we were obliged to act as quacks, but now with the strides of Science, we attack the underlying cause or origin of disease. Crime grows like a cancer in the body of Society. Like cancer, crime rots in the centre, because it cannot live on itself; whereas they each grow actively in their surrounding areas. Cancer extends into healthy uninfected tissue, whilst crime penetrates the purest sections of Society. Parliament cannot take a broad view of the situation, and consequently grubs about in the dead central mass, making no impression in the actively increasing and infecting areas. Therefore the punishment of the "hopeless" criminals, who are dead to the world, cannot be separated from the rapid increase of crime and the cause thereof.

Let us pause to consider what sort of material makes up the criminal "classes." The term classes is here, however, a misnomer, as there is no one class more criminal than another in the incipient conditions. Criminals are drawn from all classes

From personal investigation I would sub-divide the criminal masses into two groups:—

DEGENERATES AND DERELICTS.

Degenerates are bad mental machines. Their bodies may be perfect, but more commonly show ugliness and malproportion in form and feature. Hence Lombroso, who had studied this subject closely, has suggested the term "stigmata of degeneration" for these various malformations, such as badly shaped and arranged teeth or jaws, ill-formed noses, skulls, and so forth. But the evidence to Society is the ill-judged acts of these unfortunates; their stubbornness; their stupidity, and their incorrigibility. They are hopeless from the beginning, and punishment, however severe, makes no impression.

Whilst admiring Lombroso's research, I cannot agree with his very wholesale statements. There are many who are profoundly ugly in body, but perfect in thought and mind; whereas many cunning people of evil purpose are superbly handsome. In a paper which I read to a medical society, I speculatively hinted at the criminal's brain, by describing him as having "the body of a man, the impulse of youth, and the control of a child." A little later, I had the opportunity of obtaining the brain of a man whom I had seen in life, and who was a most degraded and repulsive individual. He was also a murderer and had spent a good portion of his life in penal servitude. I found in his case that those parts of the brain devoted to sensation and motion, were about normal. He had indeed the body of a man. On the other hand the "silent" areas of the brain which are devoted to the association of ideas, the psychic areas were in a condition of arrested evolution. They were but little more developed than in infancy. He never could have been an intellectual man, and his life history showed that he never "went straight." He was physically a complete man but

mentally a child. Fancy trying to propel a man of war or a cruiser with the machinery of a tramp steamer. Is the cruiser responsible for the damage it would do in a crowded river, or does the fault lie with incompetent engines and steering apparatus? So it is with our poor degenerates when they run amuck.

The man in the street has recognized the degenerate, but has not understood him. If these observations on the brain are corroborated, the degenerate will take his place in the rolls and archives of Science. There will then be no excuse for any Government if he be overlooked, any more than for neglecting a man with smallpox parading the public thoroughfare. It is indeed safer to allow people with smallpox to roam the streets and spread infection.

Far more loathsome is the degenerate, for wherever he goes he spreads poison and infects the purest moral atmosphere. Still worse he propagates superabundantly.

What will this new Bill do for Society in getting rid of the degenerates? As far as I can see the Bill hardly touches this class. Some official writing to *The Times*, unofficially stated that the new prison at the Isle of Wight was only expected to receive a few hundreds, and the number would rapidly decrease. This statement was advanced as a *placebo* to the inhabitants of that beautiful island. Degenerates, however, amount not merely to a few hundreds, but to some hundreds of thousands, and are always on the increase. The degenerates pester the masses. They beg; they pilfer; they are filthy in act and word; and frequently burst out into every degree of crime and violence. The degenerates spend their lives in and out of three public institutions, prison, workhouse, and asylum. The new Bill, however, will not segregate them.

Even the solace of religion cannot assist the degenerate very much, for he has earned the title "weak-minded" or "feeble-minded," and so has no appreciation of higher things, or even of his true surroundings.

The new Bill has no terrors for him. When he commits a brutal murder or revolting crime, he may get his ten or twenty years, but this is not sufficient to entitle him to the indeterminate sentence. Surely there is some misconception in this effort to protect Society. After the degenerate has served his sentence, he is cast on the world, but with this addition, that in many cases he was labelled in prison, W.M., weak-minded. He probably escapes another long term in prison, for he is not clever enough. He is none the less a chronic criminal, an intolerable nuisance, and the new Bill does not protect us from him. We want some perfectly new system on the plan of the indeterminate sentence, but more of the type of a colony. These men are not lunatics. Yet their ultimate treatment must be as if they are irresponsible. A degenerate is to a normal as a bad Geneva watch is to a good English lever. Their sentence must be indeterminate, in a determinate manner. That is to say, no liberty or casting them on the long-suffering public, unless it be shown that they are responsible, and have self-control. With this limitation, most of them will spend their lives in the colony.

Whilst we demand protection, we must be full of compassion for these men. They are bad, very bad, but not of their own

making. The causes are chiefly inherited syphilis and tubercle; alcoholism in one or both parents or grandparents; and poverty.

The new Bill seems specially directed against the more successful members of the other group,

THE DERELICTS.

Derelicts are normals who have lost their way. They have gone wrong through adverse circumstances. They include all sorts and conditions of men, and we find amongst them individuals who are sober, intelligent and even refined. With many their only fault is their particular speciality. Some of them are men of high morals; that is to say, we may find a man, who would not stoop to injure a helpless child or woman, although he would justify himself in robbing the mansions of the rich. Such a man is more or less of a Socialist. He is willing to assist the weak and needy, but an enemy to the moneylender and extortioner. Can we really blame him? Are not the prophetic books of the Old Testament full of anthemas against this very class? They are robbers. Is it then wrong to rob them in return? That is the argument, and it is not devoid of feature. I have frequently heard the long timers say that they never robbed the poor.

A large number of these men are of respectable lower middle-class. The father of one skilled pickpocket whom I met was a respectable carriage builder. This was the only blemish in the family. He was a sport or variation. Why he enjoyed crime and was regardless of his many long sentences, it was impossible to find out. He will be one of the first occupants of the new prison. But they won't tame him. He promises his guardians a warm time and is now again in penal servitude. But he can be tamed. He is docile under argument and persuasion. There is, however, only one way of taming him, and that lies in the methods of the Salvation Army. If I were a farmer instead of a doctor, I should like that man to look after the live stock. It would be his hobby, and he would not neglect the animals. Cannot the Government, with its inexhaustible taxation, not too wisely employed, spare half a million to start some 8 or 10 labour colonies? It is a small sum, a six-hundredth part of the price of our last war.

The Government think that gentler methods will reclaim these men, and make them more reconciled to permanent seclusion. In this they are very much mistaken. Their watchword is now "No surrender." Opportunities to escape will have to be more closely watched, and chains may have to replace the anticipated gentle suasion.

The present Bill offers protection for one class of Society, chiefly the wealthy, but it will prove a failure in stemming crime or reforming the criminal. The cure comes when the disease has reached an incurable stage. Moreover, the so-called cure is absolutely futile, for while we look to officialdom for protection in return for taxation, we are not so unpractical as to expect either sympathy, philanthropy, or moral elevation from that quarter, as things are constituted. At the same time I fully recognize the humanity and sympathy of many of our present officials as individuals. Alas, the entanglement of red tape thwarts all their efforts.

ALBERT WILSON.

REVIEWS.

THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF AFRICA.

- "HISTORY AND ETHNOGRAPHY OF AFRICA, South of the Zambesi, from the Settlement of the Portuguese at Sofala in September, 1505, to the Conquest of Cape Colony by the British in September, 1795." By George McCall Theal. In 3 vols., with maps and plates. Vol. i., "The Portuguese in South Africa from 1505 to 1700." London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1907.
- "THE NEGRO RACES: A Sociological Study." Vol. i., "The Negritos, the Negritians, the Fellatahs." By Jerome Dowd. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907. 10s. 6d. net.

A third edition of Dr. Theal's well-known "History of South Africa" is now appearing, and, as the author has made several additions to the information previously given concerning the native races, he has added the words "and Ethnography" to the original title. As thus re-written the book presents us with an extremely useful general account of the native population south of the Zambesi which will suffice for ordinary purposes. The student, however, will be disappointed to find that the author rarely gives his authorities, and the scanty allusions to the literature bearing on the ethnography of South Africa are painfully inadequate and often not up-to-date. Dr. Theal claims to have "been engaged for many years in studying the traditions, habits and powers of thought of the Bantu tribes of the south-eastern coast." Thus presumably much of the information here given has been obtained first-hand, but one fails to find any acknowledgment of the labours of other well-known workers in similar fields, and no allusion is made to the discussions which have arisen among students concerning the nature of various customs and beliefs.

Scant reference is given to the subject of stone implements of which such a surprising number have been found in so many places in South Africa, and no mention is made of the publications of Mr. J. P. Johnson and others which have revealed the existence of unexpected problems. The matter is one of great importance as it opens out a vista of remote antiquity for the residence of man in South Africa of which few are aware. There is no evidence one way or the other for associating with the Bushmen these implements of diverse types and varied date. Indeed, legends have been gathered from the Bushmen themselves in which they speak of an older race.

It is decidedly startling to an anthropologist to read (page 8) that "the Bushmen show affinities, as Dr. Bleek has pointed out, with tribes in Australia, and, as Mr. Stow has shown, with sections of the Mongolian race." Dr. Bleek referred to certain "Resemblances in Bushman and Australian Mythology." Mr. Stow, however, states that in giving these comparisons "Dr. Bleek says it is not the special coincidences of belief between the Bushmen and the Australians which he should conclude to have been derived by them from a common source, 'but rather the spirit of mythological conception in both nations, due probably to similar

causes." This is quite another matter, a perfectly legitimate position to adopt. Mr. Stow's remarks about the resemblances between the Bushmen and "some of the branches of the Mongolian race" are based solely upon skin-colour, short stature, and absence of a beard. No anatomist would regard these as sufficient evidence. The Mongol and the Bushman are respectively extreme types of the two most widely divergent races of men. According to the latest researches of Meinhof the Bushman language belongs to the isolating Sudanic (pure negro) group, and their clicks are in reality consonants. Dr. Theal says: "It is difficult to conceive of a human being in a more depraved condition than that of a Bushman"; but adds, "They probably enjoyed more real happiness in life than the destitute class in any European city."

Dr. Theal states that Dr. Bleek, by comparing the language of the least modified Hottentots with the speech of sections of the inhabitants of the Northern Africa, pronounced them to have close affinities, the Hottentot agreeing with the Hamitic, Semitic and Indo-European languages in having a grammatic sex or gender. Meinhof extends this comparison, and decides that the Hottentot language is Hamitic. There is other evidence to show that the Hottentots themselves may be a Hamitic-Bushman cross which probably took place somewhere in Eastern Africa, perhaps in what is now British East Africa.

Concerning the vexed question of the ruins of Rhodesia, Dr. Theal maintains a discreet impartiality. He evidently thinks that the Bantu were not sufficiently advanced in knowledge to undertake the reef-mining of which such extensive remains exist, but who these energetic people were and when they lived is still a mystery.

"There is no mention of any of them [the massive buildings and lines of fortifications] being occupied at or after the beginning of the sixteenth century, and if those farthest east had been, the fact could hardly have escaped the knowledge of Portuguese residents at Sofala and the Zambesi stations. Of those south and west of their trading posts they might never have heard. . . . Bantu tribes with only the ordinary amount of intelligence and energy possessed by these people [were living there then, and they have since continued in possession of a] territory where once so much industry had been expended. Still a little gold was obtained from a few of the shallowest of the old workings down to the days of Tshaka (p. 179). . . . At the beginning of the sixteenth century, when South-eastern Africa was first visited by Europeans, small quantities of gold—chiefly alluvial—were collected, but no traditions were extant of either the first working of the mines or of the erection of the great stone buildings. The Bantu who occupied the country had not been there for many generations. Asiatics were in possession of all the trade, but not of the soil, or of dominion over the inhabitants (p. 181). . . . How far up the Zambesi the Mohammedans were accustomed to go cannot be ascertained with precision. They had a small settlement on its southern bank, where the Portuguese village of Sena now stands, about 225 kilometres from the sea, but it is doubtful whether they had any fixed post farther inland, though travelling traders probably penetrated the country to a great distance" (p. 196).

The second half of the book deals with the discovery and colonisation of South Africa by the Portuguese. "The time was critical, for the Turks were then menacing Christendom, and if they had secured a monopoly of the Indian trade their wealth and strength would have been so augmented that it is doubtful whether they might not have succeeded in entering Vienna in 1529. As yet the Moslem power was divided, for Egypt was

still under the Mameluke rulers, and the greater portion of the Indian products that found their way to Europe was obtained by the Venetians at Alexandria." The Sultan Selim overthrew the Mamelukes in 1517, and made Egypt a province of his dominions; thus the whole trade from the Indian Ocean would have been theirs if the Portuguese had not just in time forestalled them. In 1487 Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope. Vasco da Gama reached the Limpopo on January 6th, 1498, arrived at Mombasa on the 7th of April, and on the 24th of that month reached India, the object for which the Portuguese had striven so long.

From the date of Vasco da Gama's return from his first voyage to India rumours concerning the gold of Sofala had fascinated the minds of all classes of men in Portugal. These rumours greatly exaggerated the quantity of the precious metal actually obtainable, and all the difficulties of acquiring it were lost sight of. There was considerable trouble in occupying Sofala, but the island of Mozambique was taken without any opposition on the part of its Mohammedan occupants. The African settlements appear to have never really thrived; they were based solely upon exploitation; for a very long time no attempt had been made to colonise any part of Africa south of the Zambesi; commerce and the conversion of the heathen were the sole objects of the Portuguese who visited the country, but the latter never proved successful. There was no surplus population in Portugal with which to found colonies. To procure labourers to till the soil of the southern provinces, slaves were introduced from Africa; they first arrived in 1441, and "then the doom of the kingdom was sealed." No other Europeans have ever treated negroes so mildly as the Portuguese, or been so ready to mix with them on equal terms. Corruption of the grossest kind was prevalent in the administration everywhere. The influence of Portugal was destroyed in 1578 by the total destruction of the armies and death of King Sebastião by the Moors in Northern Africa. All these events naturally weakened the power of the Portuguese in South Africa, and the natives continually asserted themselves and harassed and frequently worsted the Portuguese. Portugal was annexed to Spain in 1580. The enemies of Spain now became her enemies also, her factories and fleets were exposed to attack, but she received no assistance from Spain in defending them.

The French were the first to follow the Portuguese round the Cape of Good Hope, and they were followed by the English; but neither troubled South Africa, the Indies being their objective. When Portugal came under the dominion of Spain, the merchants of the Netherlands, who had been accustomed to obtain at Lisbon products which they required for home consumption and for the large European trade which they carried on, determined to open up direct communication with the East. In 1602 a National Company was inaugurated which soon wrested from the Portuguese their choicest possessions in the East, but they were never able to eject the Portuguese from the comparatively worthless coast of South-eastern Africa. Table Bay was first occupied in 1608 as a port of call and refreshment, and a report was made on "the possibility of opening up a trade, of bringing the Hottentots first to 'civility,' and then 'to a knowledge of God'" (p. 424).

It will be seen from this brief sketch that this volume covers a wide range, and contains a mass of valuable information. Dr. Theal informs us that the Ministry of 1904 brought his researches to an end, although it would not have cost the public treasury a sixpence had he been permitted to continue his work two or three years longer. Hence he asks to be

forgiven for commencing his "narrative with the arrival of the Portuguese instead of with the crossing of the Zambesi by the first Bantu invaders of the south and giving a detailed account of the movements of the tribes thereafter." Whatever may have been the reason for this step, it has resulted in a great loss.

Mr. Dowd's book is an interesting application of the methods of the Le Play school of sociology as elaborated by M. E. Demolins and the numerous contributors to *La Science Sociale*. The brilliant articles in that journal written by M. A. de Preville on "*Le Continent africain*," and reprinted as "*Les Sociétés africaines*," have evidently inspired the author, who has, however, very largely supplemented his French colleague's facts and inferences by data obtained from the works of a considerable number of travellers, to which references are copiously supplied. The map is partly adapted from that designed by de Preville, but it is a pity, to take only one instance, that, following his model, Mr. Dowd did not include Uganda in the banana zone, since the Baganda live almost entirely upon bananas.

The first volume, which is the only one yet published, deals with the Negritos (it is, however, customary to confine the term Negrito to the black Pygmies of the East Indian region) in which are included the Pygmies, Bushmen and Hottentots; the Negritians, by which term is meant the true negro of the West Coast and the Sudan, and the Tibu of the Sahara; and the Fellatahs, who are more generally known as Fulbé, Fulah, etc., but whose true name is Pal-be. The author definitely accepts the view that the Fulah are a Berber-Negro mixed race; there may be in parts some Berber or Mediterranean admixture, but it seems more probable that the ancestors of these pastoral people were Hamites from Eastern Africa.

The author first describes the physical conditions under which each main group lives, with allusions to the flora and fauna of the areas under consideration; he then passes on to a description of the people, their economic life, including family life, political life, religious life, æsthetic life, and psychological characteristics. The general scheme is well conceived, and on the whole carried out in a satisfactory manner, but the book would have gained considerably if the author had held himself in more restraint. Many explanations are given without warning the reader that they are purely hypothetical; for example—"The superiority of the Bushmen over the Pygmies in art development is due to two influences, first, contact with the superior races that passed southward along the eastern chain of mountains [a statement that no ethnologist will support, since the remarkable pictorial art of the Bushmen was certainly not inspired by the inartistic Hottentots or by the Bantu], and second, the more temperate climate which stimulates the mind and favours reflection;" but why did it not have this effect on the Hottentots? We are shown a pleasing picture of the Bushmen sitting round their camp-fires "on winter evenings" (!) "rehearsing in their fancy the events of the past day, the past week or year." Then follows a glowing account of the fancy-stimulating effects of camp-fires, with a reference to the burning-bush of Moses and the musings of David while the fire was burning, "and may it not be that the open fire will have to come back into our modern life [in the United States of America] before we can have another great age of art literature?"

Occasionally Mr. Dowd makes slips in his natural history; thus in the Sudan, "the tiger (*sic*) makes the circumambience hideous with his

paning aspiration," or again, "butterflies and other insects glory in their motley colours and brilliant illuminations." The works of Reclus and Ratzel have been considerably drawn upon, but none of their ethnological data are first-hand; on the other hand, the original observations of Sir Harry Johnston on the Pygmies, or of Stow on the Bushmen and Hottentots, are not mentioned, and other publications might have been consulted with advantage. The book will prove helpful and stimulating to many teachers and students, but it must be used with caution. There is a great deal to be said in favour of grouping multitudinous tribes according to their prevailing economic conditions, and seeking an explanation of social, political, æsthetic, and religious activities therefrom, which is the method of the school of Le Play; but this method is at times somewhat too facile and is subject to the serious danger of occasionally explaining too much. A very wide knowledge of ethnology is a necessary preliminary to successful generalisation, and it should be remembered that unsupported hypotheses do not advance science.

A. C. HADDON.

THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY.

"FACTORS IN MODERN HISTORY." By A. F. Pollard, M.A., Professor of Constitutional History in University College, London. Constable and Co., 1907. 7s. 6d. net.

In this exceptionally interesting course of lectures, Professor Pollard boldly essays the fascinating task of explaining processes of historic causation. Knowing, doubtless, how such work is regarded by the specialists, he throws down the gage of defiance in his first sentence. "Whatever I may hope to say or do in the ensuing lectures," he begins, "one thing I shall not attempt, and that is, to give you a history of England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. An effort of that kind would simply result in the perpetration of yet another of those miserable text-books of English history, which may be necessary but are certainly evil, which prefer knowledge to understanding, and seem expressly designed to nip the bud of historical interest and to clip the wings of historical imagination. It is almost a miracle that any incipient students of history survive this crushing ordeal. . . ." It is not possible to raise the sociological issue more emphatically. Many times over, during centuries, men have seen and said that the real interest and value of history lie in the comprehension of it; and, apart from the empirical explanations with which even the most conventional history-tellers pepper their pages, a few writers have aimed at systematic interpretation, with very varying fortune. Every miscarriage has caused glee in Gath; and in the latest histories proper the effort given to sociological explanation is still trifling in comparison with that spent on documentary research. There is thus something in the nature of a new manifesto in Professor Pollard's resonant and inspiring challenge. Here at last, one would say, is the qualified sociological historian. For the academic who thus braves the academic frown is the learned biographer of Henry VIII. and Cranmer, and the historian of England under Protector Somerset—an expert who knows the sixteenth century in particular as only an expert can.

It is hardly necessary to say that the book is full of value. In the opening lecture Professor Pollard gets rid practically, though unfortunately

not theoretically, of the spurious factor of "National Character"—the *virtus dormitiva* of pre-scientific history. In the second he puts in a striking light the functions and reactions of the middle class; in the third, fourth and fifth he studies the interactions of monarchy, opinion and Parliament in the sixteenth century; in the sixth the economic factors; in the seventh the developments and reactions of new political ideas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and so on. Almost always he has his hand on *verae causae*; and there can be few students for whom any chapter does not yield fresh light, and the satisfaction which comes of realising causation. It will go hard if such a book does not go far to create a school.

This said, it may be permitted to suggest that Professor Pollard inevitably forces on a critical reader a new perception of the difficulty of the undertaking. He is open, perhaps, to the criticism that he does not fully realise this—does not perceive, or at least does not posit, the complexity of the historic process and the number of the factors; and that he at times offers an explanation which does not take account of the most important. While ostensibly discarding the verbalist formula of national character, he advances propositions which involve it, as this:—"France was more successful because its unity was more real. Unity, in fact, *has been its passion* under all its forms of government, and mountain chains have not secluded its people in close compartments" (p. 65). Instantly one asks, But *why*? and there is no answer. Explanation is not even attempted; and the undergraduate, here cited, who "remarked that the great thing about history was that it required no thinking," has had undue encouragement.

Again, in the lecture on "Henry VIII. and the Reformation," it is implied (pp. 92-93) that the "Teutonic strain" counted for more in the working of the Reformation than the question of the divorce. But elsewhere our author in effect makes "a middle class" the most essential factor in the Reformation everywhere, though on his own later showing the middle class in Scotland became a measurable factor only after the Church was there overthrown. In making the lack of a middle class the cause of the collapse of the Reformation in Poland, therefore, he has misstated the causation. In Poland, as in Scotland, the landowners were the prime workers in the revolution; and the proximate cause of the reversal in Poland was that there, under a Catholic king, the feudal tenure of the great estates was made a means of endowing the Catholic reaction. In the Scandinavian States, similarly, the effective forces of the Reformation were kings and nobles, equally bent on lands and revenues, not the middle class. And in Switzerland, yet again, in nine cantons the inhabitants are mostly Catholic and mostly German.

This tendency on our author's part to be *trop simpliste* is probably the cause of a certain lack of coördination in his reasoning concerning the monarchy and the people in the English Reformation. In one lecture the King figures as succeeding in virtue of the hearty and willing support of his people and Parliaments; while in another the poor moral quality of his Parliaments is brought out; and in yet another his despotism is acknowledged. The forces are never properly under view together. In a word, Professor Pollard's brilliant and capable performance, while yielding much light, reveals once more that civics, albeit, as the Professor claims, necessarily an "inexact" science, is not on that account less in need of vigilant and *logically* exact handling than physics, and is finally quite as difficult. It cannot, in fact, be properly developed without just some

such manifold comparison of notes and counterchecking of theories as have gone to build up the other sciences of organic nature. What it needs at present is not a sequence of "systems"—our author, happily, does not obtrude one—but a series of mutually supplementing and rectifying observers and reasoners. The charm and the merit of Professor Pollard's pioneer adventure lie in its combination of so much accurate knowledge and just insight with a delightful readableness and a faculty of stimulating thought no less rare than any of these qualities.

J. M. ROBERTSON.

"THE BRAHMANS, THEISTS, AND MUSLIMS OF INDIA." By J. Campbell Oman. T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1907.

The new volume by Mr. Campbell Oman on "The Brahmans, Theists, and Muslims of India," is less closely knit than its predecessor on the Indian mystics, ascetics, and saints. It is divided into three unequal parts. The first contains four chapters, on the cultus of Kali and Durga, on caste in India, on Theism in Bengal, and on Hindu Social Reformers. In the second part the author describes the Holi Festival, and usages connected with lunar eclipses and funerals. The last part is devoted to the Mohammedan Muharram and stories of some Indian Faquirs. These two parts have much the nature of magazine articles. Readers interested in "Fire-walking" will find a careful account of a scene witnessed by Mr. Oman at Lahore, pp. 323—326. There are some excellent illustrations from photographs and drawings by the writer's son, Mr. William Campbell Oman, A.R.I.B.A. In this arrangement the opening chapter of the book would seem more naturally to precede the sketches in Part II; and the three chapters that follow, pp. 34—237, would then constitute a weighty contribution to the discussions of Indian reform. Throughout the volume the writer can draw on a large and varied store of personal memories and observations. His citations from modern books and periodicals published in India will often be of great value to readers at home; and his grave and measured judgments suggest many new aspects of social problems to students who cannot hope to acquire the first-hand knowledge, extending through a period of more than forty years, which this work reveals.

In dealing with the general history of Caste Mr. Oman follows good authorities in laying stress, among the manifold and complex causes which have produced it, on elements of race and religion; and he dwells with emphasis on the effects of the Brahman conquest of India, as distinct from the original Aryan immigration. He points to the supremacy of the Brahmans in "vast territories where the Aryan race is not ethnically represented," and to the additional fact that Brahmans are not always themselves of that race. The tendency to sub-division is illustrated in a curious way by the Gujarati Brahmans where one sub-caste act as *gurus* or spiritual advisers to the agriculturists, another in the same way to the shoemakers, and so on. Nor are they confined to religious functions. Law, business or agriculture, may occupy them, even the army and the Government department may enroll them in the service of the State. Numbers are even cooks in Sudra households; and one sub-caste known as the "evil" Brahmans who claim the clothing, bedding, and drinking vessel of the dead, are held in such abhorrence that to meet one in the morning is a very bad omen. Other castes have split up in similar ways, so that the last census could reckon no less than 2,378 main castes and

tribes. The persistence of such an institution must have (urges Mr. Oman) profound social consequences: had it not in some ways suited the life of the people, its obvious drawbacks must have long ago led to its dissolution. The author has no difficulty in showing the futility of some of the criticisms of Western philosophic historians, and in pointing out some features of value which can only be noted on the spot. For instance the Indian trade-castes have preserved the tradition of various arts; and "the value of the Indian caste as a co-operative society in full working order has been so far recognised that the official Registrar of Co-operative Credit Societies in the United Provinces recently suggested that the caste should be made the unit of co-operation." In a land where there is no poor-law, the union of family groups under the caste-system has been of great importance in preventing or relieving destitution, and it has also tended (in Mr. Oman's judgment) to suppress immorality. Of course modern conditions slowly modify its power. Railways, hospitals and jails ignore its claims. So do the college class-room and the play-ground. Foreign travel, the administration of justice, and the growth of democratic sentiment, are all hostile to its exclusiveness. But the marriage customs which depend upon it, show extraordinary tenacity, and the author does not expect any successful assault upon them for long years to come.

These, also, must be judged not by Western but by Eastern standards. The question of social reform is approached by Mr. Oman through the history of the Theistic movement in Bengal, begun by Ram Mohun Roy, and expounded with so much eloquence by the late Keshub Chunder Sen. The author's sympathy with it is imperfect, though he tries hard to be just to the remarkable personalities which have been associated with it. He finds it too much infected with the "austere occidental views" of foreign Unitarians; and it departs too widely from the inherited beliefs of Indian pantheism. But he recognises the social importance of some of its developments, such as its encouragement of the re-marriage of widows, and its efforts for the education of women. Very interesting are the sections devoted to the subjects of infant marriage and enforced widowhood, where the writer again endeavours to find out the social causes which have produced and maintained these practices. As in other cases he is careful to cite evidence from different parts of India, with the view of mitigating the impression of uniformity so easily produced by hasty generalisation. His expectations of the effects of improved female education are not high; and he dreads the economic and moral results of the entry of Indian women into social freedom. The standard of living will rise and impose a much more strenuous labour on the people in order to meet it. Competition between the sexes will become keener, and marriages will be less frequent and less permanent. Mr. Oman touches on many other interesting questions, such as the temple-women, strange practices of immodest bathing in the Punjab, the difficulties of social intercourse between Europeans and natives and the like. His views are the result of long observation and reflection, and deserve the serious consideration of all who are interested in Indian reform. In another edition perhaps Mr. Oman will break up some of his long sentences, and correct occasional infelicities of grammar. More attention should be paid to the printer's errors, such as *parusha* for *purusha*, p. 50; *Atarva* for *Atharva* (twice), p. 76; *Ghrantha* for *Grantha*, p. 111; *Angir-dsmriti*, p. 181. The date 1883 on p. 148 should be 1893.

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

"CAMBRIDGE: A BRIEF STUDY IN SOCIAL QUESTIONS." By Eglantyne Jebb.
Macmillan and Bowes, Cambridge. Price 4s. 6d. net.

Miss Jebb has not in this volume made a study of Cambridge in order to throw a light on social questions, but rather to throw light on Cambridge, and the work seems intended for undergraduates and residents.

An interesting account is given in Chapter II. of the local government of Cambridge in the early part of the last century. In 1833 a Commission of Inquiry into the state of municipal affairs was held, "The population of the town exceeded 20,000 but its government was vested in a small body of 'freemen' who numbered at the time 158, but of whom only 118 were resident. The funds of charities had been misappropriated, some of them had entirely disappeared and were lost to the town for ever. Corporate property had been alienated to members of the Corporation. If it had not been for these alienations Cambridge would have been one of the richest Corporations in England. One alderman had bought for a guinea land worth £150." One Common Council-man maintained to the Commissioners "that he thought the Corporation had a right to expend their income on themselves and their friends without being bound to apply any part of it for the good of the town" (p. 17).

One would like to know whether ill gotten goods really never prosper. The history of the municipal plunderers and of their descendants might be recommended as an object of research to sociological students.

The proximity of the wise and learned seems to have had no effect on the sanitary conditions of Cambridge. "I feel it incumbent on me to state," wrote the superintending inspector in 1849, "that the sanitary condition of numerous courts and places is so wretched as to be a disgrace to humanity and still more so to civilization; and I believe it next to an impossibility for their inhabitants to be healthy, cleanly, or even moral" (p. 22).

In the chapters on want of employment Cambridge is stated to be more hardly hit than the rest of the country by the decline of the building trade, because it may be regarded as the staple trade of the town. It is also noted that "in Cambridge it is more possible than in many places to live without an income. . . . It is partly because there are so many ways of earning money casually without submitting to the strain of continuous labour. Quite a lot of money can be made at times by lifting down luggage from cabs, picking up tennis balls, etc., enough to tempt young men from the drudgery of regular work, yet not enough for a livelihood" (p. 66).

Miss Jebb calls attention to the class of men whose case needs more consideration than is ever given to it—the men "who call themselves skilled workmen, but who are really only half-skilled. Many young men will learn a little here and a little there, will not stay in one place long enough to master what they learn, but will go off in the hope of getting higher wages for work which they are incapable of doing well. The printing trade, for instance, cannot be mastered under seven years, and this particularly lengthy period of instruction is rather daunting, more especially when the trade can be partially picked up in half that time" (p. 70). We doubt whether this type of youth has ever received fair play either from employers or friends. The demand for specialisation during boyhood is not justified by nature. Industry should adapt itself to the needs of man, to those of the worker as well as to those of the consumer; and youth has a right to change of occupation, of thought, of scene,

most of all to change of aim in life. Perhaps it is because society ignores this right that we have so many men in the casual labour ranks whose principal drawback seems to be instability rather than laziness.

That the Cambridge colleges are trying to make up for past neglect is obvious as we read the list of societies which aim at increasing health, temperance, thrift and self reliance. The essays on these subjects are rather didactic and occasionally, as in the chapter on thrift, the illustrations remind one too much of an eighteenth century tract with the attraction of the character names omitted. But on the whole they bear witness to the good sense and experience of the contributors to the volume.

C. E. C.

"WORK AND WAGES." By S. J. Chapman. Part II.: "Wages and Employment." Longmans.

This is the second of a series of volumes in continuation of the important work in which Lord Brassey laid the foundation in this country of the comparative international study of work and wages. The first volume set forth certain groups of facts relating to the industrial and commercial efficiency of the principal nations engaged in international competition. Here we have a study of distinctively labour problems in the several countries, containing a large amount of carefully assorted facts and figures drawn from the best available sources in Great Britain, Germany, America and France. A very full and valuable statement of the history, present status and policy of labour organisations in the several countries is followed by a discussion of the principles underlying the sliding scale, and the machinery of voluntary or compulsory conciliation and arbitration. A long chapter is then devoted to an analysis of the nature of unemployment, its directly traceable economic causes, and the various attempts made, especially in Continental countries, to reduce or relieve unemployment by means of insurance, labour bureaux and exchanges, relief works and colonies. Finally, we have a chapter summarising what is done in the several countries for workmen's insurance and old age pensions. In the text and the appendices a large amount of valuable recent statistical evidence is set forth. A very shrewd and careful running commentary accompanies the narrative and helps to interpret the statistics.

Regarded as a work of reference upon the facts of "the labour question" it is of immense value. The facts and figures it contains do nothing, however, to validate or even to illustrate the theory of distribution of wealth set forth in the introductory chapter under the title of Analytic Groundwork. The essential feature of theory is thus stated: "It is possible to impute to each factor the product contributed at the margin to the total quantity produced—that is, to discover *what would be lost if the factor in question were withdrawn and all things else remained the same*. The theory, then, merely declares that each person will tend to receive as a wage his value—that is, the value of this marginal product—no more and no less. In order to get more than he actually does get, he must become more valuable—work harder, for instance—that is, he must add more to the product in which he participates." This theory of marginal productivity, which is also applied to other factors besides labour, is beautifully simple and convenient in its results: everybody tends to get just what he or his factor is worth. Unfortunately, it

contains two flaws, each of which is fatal to its applicability. The words I have italicised assert that the logical 'method of difference' can be so applied as to earmark a particular product attributable to the work of a marginal factor. But such an application is not possible, for if the factor in question is withdrawn it is never true that "all things else remained the same." The withdrawal of a so-called marginal factor of labour or of capital will affect the efficiency of the whole corporate structure of the business. The result is that an incorrect, usually an excessive, product will seem to be attributable to the marginal factor upon its withdrawal, as will be seen by multiplying the product attributed to the marginal factor by the total number of units of this factor in use.

The second flaw consists in the fact that in order to apply this hypothesis to the several factors it is necessary to assume that an equal abundance of each factor exists, and such fluidity as to give the conditions of absolutely free competition. This is nowhere the case: taking labour, capital, land, ability, we always find one or other relatively scarce, and taking as part of its earnings a wage or rent of scarcity. In particular the actual part played by employers as dealers in the other factors of production is such as wholly to invalidate the notion that we are justified in holding that "the remuneration of the employer is linked to his marginal worth to society somewhat as the remunerations of other factors are linked to their marginal worths to employers."

This theory of distribution by marginal productivity is altogether so remote from the world of facts that its intrusion into such a volume seems curiously out of place.

J. A. H.

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SWEATED INDUSTRIES, HELD IN CHARING CROSS HALL, GLASGOW, on the 11th and 12th of October, 1907. Glasgow: Scottish Council for Women's Trades, Renfield Street. 1s.

Following upon the Sweated Industries Exhibition in London in 1906, a Conference was convened by the National Anti-Sweating League to discuss minimum wage proposals. One year later the Scottish Council for Women's Trades called a further Conference in Glasgow, of which the Report is now available. To some extent the papers read to the Glasgow Conference are repetitions of those heard in London. Mr. G. R. Askwith tells again the very interesting story of his experiences as Board of Trade arbitrator under the Conciliation Act of 1896, and Miss Irwin and Miss Clementina Black state facts of a character familiar to students of the Sweating Problem. In other papers, Mr. Edward Carpenter, basing himself on Mill, theorises as to the effect of minimum wage upon Foreign Trade, and Mrs. Bramwell Booth and the Rev. Russell Wakefield concern themselves with moral issues. A paper by Mr. Peter Fyfe, Superintendent Sanitary Inspector of Glasgow, giving the results of an investigation made by himself, is of unusual interest. Mr. Fyfe's method may be briefly explained. Eliminating as non-essential insanitary conditions and prolonged hours, Mr. Fyfe defines Sweating tersely as underpayment in relation to physical needs. Calculating that a single woman in Glasgow could not live "reasonably" on less than 10s. 10d. per week, and that 51 hours constitute a "reasonable" week's work, he classes as Sweating the condition in which a worker of average ability in her trade,

will be unable to earn such amount in such number of hours. Armed with this definition, Mr. Fyfe investigated 16 trades in which much home work is carried on in Glasgow. His enquiry entailed visits to 977 homeworkers, but only 528 of these supplied information. In finishing men's suitings and trousers, in shawl-fringing, shirt finishing, and in embroidering and needle work, Mr. Fyfe found the average worker to receive less than his minimum of 10s. 10d. per week, or 2'55d. per hour, and in another group of trades including gents' underclothing, lady's underclothing, shirt making, and hosiery, average workers receive less than 3d. A very valuable feature of Mr. Fyfe's paper is its statement of the variation in the payment of the homeworkers for similar work. Here are some of these variations:—

	Best firms.	Other firms.
Shawl-fringing	2/- per doz.	1/6 per doz.
Shirt finishing	-/3½ "	-/1½ "
Gents' underclothing	-/9 "	-/4 "
" "	1/6 "	-/8 "
Lady's underclothing	3/6 "	1/6 "
Shirt making	2/- "	1/6 "
Nightdresses	50% more than worst firms.	

A diagram for each of the investigated trades enables the reader of this most informing paper to quickly assimilate its findings.

The remaining paper is a pessimistic utterance by Mr. J. R. MacDonald, M.P. Disorganised and little skilled workers, says Mr. MacDonald, are apart from, and indeed almost hostile to one another, and the shadow of the machinery with which they are often competing, is upon them. In such a case the "iron law of wages" operates without a check and the result is "sweating." For this condition, Mr. MacDonald does not believe there is a direct remedy, and he is opposed to Wages Boards which "cannot guarantee an income" but can only deal with "nominal wages." Licensing of homeworkers, help to the aged and the widowed, work for the unemployed; these are indirect ways, and in Mr. MacDonald's view the only ways, in which Sweating can be treated.

J. J. MALLON.

"CO-OPERATIVE INDUSTRY." By Ernest Aves. (Methuen & Co.) 5s. net.

"Co-operation" is one of the hardest-worked words in the language of economics. It covers such a number of quite distinct forms of industrial organisation that a work like Mr. Aves', describing in a short space all these forms, is particularly valuable as a means of emphasising their differences and making their characteristics unmistakable. The first place in his account of "Co-operative Industry" is naturally given to the distributive stores organised on the Rochdale system. In size and in its established success this co-operation of consumers to buy wholesale and sell to themselves retail, sharing the profit thus made as a dividend on purchase, dwarfs everything else that Mr. Aves has to describe. Size, however, is less important than growth, and consideration of both these needs to be supplemented by an estimate of the degree of "loyalty" shown by the members to their stores. Since the sales in 1905, amounting to £60,901,553, were distributed between 2,146,242 members, i.e., at an average of only £28. 7s. per member, it is clear, after all allowances have

been made, that "a large margin of the expenditure of the members of the various societies that might have been spent at their stores is diverted elsewhere." As the result of some very careful and interesting calculations Mr. Aves reaches the conclusion that, while the movement of co-operative distribution "is strong and steadily growing, the rate of growth, or at least of expansion, is somewhat slackening, and that the average trading hold upon individual members, reflecting, as the figures do, a somewhat limited loyalty, is either stationary or tending to become slightly weaker." In view of this special interest attaches to the attempts to establish stores in "poor districts" and by vigorous propaganda to bring in sections of the population which still remain in the mass untouched by the movement. From "The Store" Mr. Aves passes to "The Workshop." Under this heading comes both the treatment of employees in the producing sections of the stores and wholesale societies organised from the point of view of the consumer and the fundamentally distinct type of organisation from the side of the producer, which again includes such varied species as the pure co-operative workshop without an employer at all, and the profit-sharing schemes, whose most conspicuous example is afforded by the South Metropolitan Gas Company. Mr. Aves suggests that "the most important conclusion that can be deduced from the modest position that productive co-operation at present occupies is that a satisfactory and appropriate form of business structure depends not only upon the particular characteristics of individual trades, but also upon the available reserve of business capacity and trust." Co-operative distribution grows enormously, even in the hands of average people, because it has a definite economic advantage. Co-operative production lags behind because it needs apparently a manager of more than average abilities to make it a success. It would, however, be impossible to deal in order with all the points raised by Mr. Aves. His book is not only a valuable and judicious summary of facts, but also full of suggestions as to the problems of the future. Moreover, by its full treatment of the many activities of co-operators outside the store and workshop—in education, housing, health propaganda, social life—it brings into prominence the unity of idea and the common attack upon disorganised individualism which, after all, underly all the many meanings of the word co-operation.

W. H. BEVERIDGE.

"THE MAKING OF THE CRIMINAL." By Charles E. B. Russell and L. M. Rigby. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1906.)

The object of this excellent little volume is, in the words of the authors, to discuss the circumstances of those who are unhappy enough to be described in general terms as young criminals, dealing more particularly with those who have passed the age of sixteen and are technically known as "juvenile adults." It is as a rule easy enough to get public institutions of some kind to take charge of juveniles under the age of sixteen. But when this age has been passed it is considered that a youth can look after himself and does not require the assistance of external agencies. It is perfectly true that juveniles between the ages of sixteen and twenty who have been brought up under normal conditions and live as a rule under the parental roof, are able to look after themselves. But there is a considerable section of the juvenile population, especially in our large cities, who do not possess these advantages, and it is from their ranks that

the man who afterwards becomes a habitual criminal or a habitual vagrant is usually drawn. If a young person between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one has been disciplined in habits of industry it is very seldom that he degenerates into a habitual vagrant or criminal unless he becomes a drunkard. It is between youth and early manhood that permanent habits of life are generally formed, and if we had a more effective method of dealing with juvenile outcasts at this critical period of life society would be rewarded by a diminution in the numbers of vagrants and habitual criminals. We have only to look at the criminal returns to see what a high proportion of young people find themselves within the clutches of the law between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one. A certain number of these criminal cases are no doubt boyish escapades, but there is a considerable percentage of them which may be described as the first steps towards a life of crime. In the preliminary chapters of this volume the authors, who speak from personal experience, give us an illuminating insight into the lives of the incipient criminal population. They tell us of the life of the young outcast, of the orphaned juvenile, of the lapsed industrial and reformatory school boy. In the following chapters they proceed to discuss the best methods for dealing with these juveniles. This leads to a consideration of the value of the existing vagrancy laws, the effects of imprisonment, the industrial and reformatory school system, and what has recently been called the Borstal system. Children's courts and the probation system also come under review, and the volume closes with a sketch of the methods of treatment which have been adopted with juveniles in England from 1756 to 1907. A useful appendix describes the systems in operation for the treatment of juveniles in the United States and on the Continent. The volume is written on right lines, and is a useful addition to our existing literature on juvenile offenders.

W. D. MORRISON.

"THE NEED OF THE NATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENT."

Watts & Co.

The slow experimental beginnings of international government are evident in many quarters. Apart from the formal basis of the Hague Conference, we have in the Postal Union and in the recent Berne Conventions upon conditions of employment fruitful methods of advance. More important still is the growth of commercial and financial internationalism outside the direct purview of politics. The increasing tendency to nationalise railways and other means of transport and communication will open up new large areas for political arrangements between nations. Distant as may seem at present the emergence of anything that can reasonably be called international government, it is certain that this must come, and that the speculations as to the form of international representative institutions will acquire increasing significance. Such reflections are required to turn the edge of a certain impatience with which practical people are prone to regard such a scheme as is here delineated. And yet it is surely worth while to consider what shape an international legislature and executive should take. This is what the anonymous author of this essay does, composing the text of a provisional constitution. The basis of Parliamentary representation is to be the educated adult population in each country, each nation settling for itself the mode of nomination and the

periodicity of election for its representatives. Each nation is to pay the expenses of its representatives, and the International Parliament is to be a permanent assembly electing its own President and Executive. Its general functions are thus laid down: "That the Parliament shall have supreme powers of arbitration and regulation (*sic*/) as between empires or nations, and conditional powers of interference in cases of internal dissension and civil strife, but no power to legislate or administer law in respect of the conduct of individuals who are not its own members or persons in its own employ." The Constitution further provides for the gradual disbandment of all military and naval forces not required to act as international and supplementary national police. An international language is to be recognised, with a standardisation of money, weights and measures, and an international sociological bureau is to concern itself with the collection and communication of all forms of knowledge, industrial, educational and other by means of which a real community of interests, tastes and ideas may be forwarded.

J. A. H.

OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS.

 REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME WORK, 1908, No. 246.
 Vacher. 5½d.

This report affords ample evidence how far the present Liberal party has travelled beyond and away from the old *laissez-faire* position. The question in regard to the regulation of home work and sweating is now one of practice rather than principle. Can regulation of wages be enforced? The Committee, after carefully considering the evidence of the working of wages boards in Victoria and South Australia, and the opinions of experts from the Board of Trade and the Factory Department, have decided that the difficulties, though great, are not insuperable, and that the experiment ought to be made. The Committee has been especially impressed by the testimony received that most of the employers would themselves be glad to have a minimum rate of payment fixed, as a safeguard against the fierce competition that characterises some of the sweated trades. They recommend, over and above the institution of wages-boards, the extension of the Truck Acts to all home-workers, and the stricter enforcement of lists of out-workers to be kept by employers and forwarded by them to the local authority, and they also recommend that out-workers should have to register name, address, and occupation with the local authority. Some will remember that Mr. Booth long ago recommended a double system of registration of out-workers, which should make the landlord and the employer jointly and severally responsible for the sanitary condition of homes used as workplaces. Mr. Booth's plan, in this respect, seems to me preferable to the requirements of self-registration of out-workers, which is beset by the obvious difficulty that no penalty for non-observance can well be inflicted. This is recognised by the Committee, who advise that the responsibility for registration should be placed with the employer, who is to be liable to a penalty if he employs an out-worker without a certificate of registration. For defects in structural sanitation and in the ordinary repair and upkeep of buildings, the responsibility should surely rest with the landlord, and it is somewhat disappointing to find this aspect neglected in the Report. For domestic and personal sanitation the workers themselves must of course be responsible, but it should be remembered that uncleanness is often itself the result of poverty and the physical weakness poverty brings. Better wages, and an increase in the number of health visitors and sanitary inspectors whose educational visits are so valuable in raising the standard of life, are the best remedy.

B. L. H.

 REPORT OF THE WAGES BOARDS AND INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION
 AND ARBITRATION ACTS OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.
 By ERNEST AVES.

The very careful and scrupulously impartial report by Mr. Aves on the different attempts in Australasia to secure a minimum standard of wages and conditions for all classes of workers is exceedingly difficult to summarise. The general impression left is that legislation directed to these ends has not passed beyond the first stages of experiment, but the most definite result that emerges is the determination of public opinion to persist in the experiment. As Mr. Aves says, the very existence of a

large volume of amending legislation seems to "strengthen rather than weaken the widespread determination of Australasia to adhere, at any rate for the present, to the principle of a minimum wage." The two most important experiments are the Wages Boards of Victoria and the Arbitration Act in New Zealand. With regard to Wages Boards, the first question naturally asked is, how far they have actually had the effect of raising wages. The answer may best be given in the following paragraph :—"The advances in thirteen Board trades previous to the Determination amounted in the aggregate to 26s. 7½d., equivalent to 7·6 per cent. on the combined average rates of these trades; in nineteen Board trades after the Determination the aggregate advance was 99s. 2d., or 16·5 per cent. on the combined averages; and in twelve non-Board trades the aggregate advance was 42s. 2d., or 11·6 per cent. on the combined averages."

This seems to indicate that the direct effect of the Wages Boards is real, though slight, but it leaves open the question how far there is an indirect effect in raising the standard in the unregulated trades as well. Mr. Aves writes that "although in many trades, especially women's trades, the effect upon wages appears to be inconsiderable, the lesson appears to be being learnt that low wages are not necessarily the cheapest." On the whole, Mr. Aves find a wide acquiescence in the operation of the special boards, and takes this as proof that their "determinations are, on the whole, not considered to militate seriously against regularity or certainty of employment." It should be noted, however, as some impairment of the value of the minimum wage principle that permits to work at less than the minimum wage have been found necessary for old, infirm and slow workers.

New Zealand has gone further than any Australian State in one respect, having in its Factory Act laid down by legislation a general minimum wage :—

"Every person who is employed in any capacity in a factory shall be entitled to receive from the occupier payment for the work at such rate as is agreed on, in no case less than 5s. per week for boys and girls under 16 years of age, and thereafter an annual increase of not less than 3s. weekly till 20 years of age."

It has also a Conciliation and Arbitration Act passed in 1894 and still, with some amendments, in operation, under which any union of employers and employees may bring a trade dispute before a Board of Conciliation. This in turn may refer the case direct to an Arbitration Court against the decision of which there is no appeal :—

"The powers of the Court are not confined to adjudicating on disputes brought before it. It has also the frequent duty of interpreting its own awards and fixing the penalties in cases of breach. In procedure it is untrammelled; cases can be heard as seems best, and the Court is not bound by the ordinary rules of evidence. In all matters brought before it there is 'full and exclusive jurisdiction to determine the case in such manner in all respects as in equity and good conscience it thinks fit.'"

The Boards of Conciliation have, on the whole, been a failure, but the Court has been very active. Applications to it "have practically always proceeded from the side of the employees," and "in the whole series of Awards there has been only one insignificant case when wages have been reduced and two when hours have been increased. There have, however, been many instances in which, on renewed applications to the Court, no fresh award has been granted, and when, therefore, conditions were left unaltered." The system has not yet had to stand the test of a serious decline in trade, and opinions are very divided, both among employers and employed, as to its value. For this country Mr. Aves, on the whole, recommends the formation of Special Boards for certain trades, on the ground that their statements and recommendations might exercise a beneficial and moral influence, "but the lesson of experience does not appear to carry us further than this on the direct line of the legal fixation of wages."

UNEMPLOYED WORKMEN ACT, 1905. RETURN OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF DISTRESS COMMITTEES DURING THE YEAR ENDING MARCH
31st, 1908.

This return deals with the proceedings of the 29 distress committees and of the Central Unemployed Body in London and of 88 distress committees in the country. During the twelve months in question these committees received 90,057 applications. A large number of these applications were, on various grounds, rejected, and 54,613, or 60·6 per cent., only were entertained, but of these again only 37,092 were provided with work. In London the usual rate of pay, except on the farm colonies, was 6d. per hour, and the period of employment ranged from 1½ to 9¼ weeks. In the provinces the rate of pay was very commonly 5d. per hour. Periodic employment of three days or more was given in some instances. In many cases an average of not more than seven or eight days' works, or even less, could be provided, but in a fair proportion of districts the men obtained several weeks' employment. The total amount earned in wages was £124, 387, the average being, in the Labour Colonies £6 8s., and on other works £3. 10s. per head. The expenditure on the farm colony at Hollesley Bay amounted for the year to £25,262, towards which £6,280 was derived from the working of the colony by sales of produce, etc. One thousand five hundred and six men were housed and employed on the colony at one time or another during the year.

On the important question of the value of the work done, the Report says generally:—"The quality of the work performed was reported fairly generally as satisfactory, regard being had to the fact that the men were in many cases unsuited to the work, and that more supervision was necessary than under ordinary conditions. The exceptional conditions under which the work was carried out are reported in many instances to have rendered it more costly than it would have been under normal conditions."

As regards London, the opinion of the Superintendent of Works is that the quality of the work, when completed, is "quite as good as that done by ordinary skilled or unskilled labour, although it takes somewhat longer to do."

REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CARE AND CONTROL
OF THE FEEBLE-MINDED. Cd. 4202.

This report has been issued in eight volumes. The first six contain minutes of evidence relating to England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, and also reports on medical investigations. Volume vii deals with the report on the visit of certain Commissioners to American institutions. The original reference to the Commission, appointed in September 1904, had regard to mentally defective persons not certified under the Lunacy Laws, but this was extended in 1906 to cover the working of the Lunacy authorities.

The number of the feeble-minded is estimated to be about 149,628 in England and Wales, to which must be added the 121,979 certified insane, making the proportion of mentally defective to the whole population of 0·83. The Commissioners indicate the gravity of the present state of affairs:—

"We find a local and "permissive" system of public education which is available, here and there, for a limited section of mentally defective children, and which, even if it be useful during the years of training, is supplemented by no subsequent supervision and control, and is in consequence often misdirected and

unserviceable. We find large numbers of persons who are committed to prisons for repeated offences, which, being the manifestations of a permanent defect of mind, there is no hope of repressing, much less of stopping, by short punitive sentences. We find lunatic asylums crowded with patients who do not require the careful hospital treatment that well-equipped asylums can afford, and who might be treated in many other ways more economically and as efficiently. We find, also, at large in the population many mentally defective persons, adults, young persons, and children, who are, some in one way, some in another, incapable of self-control, and who are, therefore, exposed to constant moral danger to themselves, and become the source of lasting injury to the community."

The scheme of control contained in the Commissioners' recommendations includes the creation of a Central Authority to supersede the Lunacy Commission, which will supervise local administration, this to be in the hands of the Council of each County or each County Borough. These agencies are to be in independence of the Poor Law, but are to utilise existing Poor Law institutions to such extent as they are available. The general policy is to be one of more continuous care and control of feeble-minded children which present educational agencies do not provide. The Commissioners find the need of more careful definition of crime as related to mental deficiency. Recommendations are made relative to a more economical provision for the feeble-minded, the cost of maintenance being found at present excessive.

The Commissioners are aware of the hereditary character of feeble-mindedness, and while their recommendations seem inadequate, their view of the matter is quite clear :—

"That, especially in view of the evidence concerning fertility, the prevention of mentally defective persons from becoming parents would tend largely to diminish the number of such persons in the population.

"That the evidence of these conclusions strongly supports measures, which on other grounds are of pressing importance, for placing mentally defective persons, men and women, who are living at large and uncontrolled, in institutions where they will be employed and detained; and in this, and in other ways, kept under effectual supervision so long as may be necessary."

ANNUAL SUMMARY OF THE REGISTRAR-GENERAL, OF MARRIAGES, BIRTHS AND DEATHS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, FOR 1907.

This Summary of the Vital Statistics for 1907 is preliminary to the more detailed analysis to be given in the Registrar General's next Annual Report, the complete data for which are not yet available; we can only refer to a few of the more important conclusions of a most instructive document which deserves careful study.

General Birth- and Death-rates. The following statement summarises the position :

	Births		Deaths
	(per 1,000 of estimated population.)		
Decennial Average (1897—1906).....	28·4	16·7
1906	27·1	15·4
1907	26·3	15·0

The rate, in each case, for 1907, is the lowest on record. As regards the Birth-rate, which is just 10 *per mille* below the highest point attained in 1876, reference may be made to the comparative statement of the decline in different European countries given on p. 202 of our last issue (No. 2) : but we may add the conclusions arrived at, by the Registrar General, as to the causes in operation, based on an analysis of the London statistics. "There are sufficient grounds for stating that, during the last

37 years, approximately 19 per cent. of the decline in the birth-rate (based on the proportion of births to the female population aged 15—45) is due to the decrease in the proportion of married women in the female population of conceptive ages, and over 5 per cent. is due to the decrease in illegitimacy. As to the remaining 76 per cent. of the decrease, although some of the reduced fertility may be ascribed to changes in the age-constitution of married women, there can be little doubt that much of it is due to deliberate restriction of child-bearing" (p. xvii). In a list of 26 of the largest European cities and capitals, London, with 227·8, takes the tenth place for "fertility" (proportion of legitimate births to 1,000 wives aged 15—45), which ranged in 1900—02 from 299 in Rotterdam to 106·6 in Paris. The extent of the decline during the last 20 years is shown to vary greatly, and this in no definite relation to the fertility-rates, but (apart from Dublin—and Ireland generally—which exhibits an increase) the tendency appears to diminish as we pass eastward. [In this connexion it is worthy of note that there is a more or less definite relation between the general character of the Vital Statistics and geographical position in a broad line running generally from the North and West of Europe to India. On the point of fertility, however, a careful estimate from the data available shows that to every 1,000 married Indian women of the reproductive age are born, under normal conditions, about 270 children, a rate which is below that yielded in certain parts of Europe. This is notable in view of the early age of marriage in India and of the supposed absence of any considerable deliberate restriction of births; but there is the fact of the immaturity of the wives and the large disparity in the ages of the parents to be taken into account.]

Mortality. There has been a notable diminution in the Infantile Mortality from the decennial average of 145 (per 1,000 births) to 132 in 1906 and to 118 in 1907, this figure being the lowest on record. But the reduction is proportionally least in the first month of life. It is pointed out that the low rate of 1907 "was mainly due to the showery and exceedingly cool weather of the past summer," always the season of greatest mortality.

Lastly, the Statement (p. xxix) of the Death causes shows a very notable saving of life in London during the year under review. Of the net saving amounting to 10,896 lives, nearly one-half come under the head of epidemic and infectious diseases, and, in addition, no less than 3,620 under diseases of the nervous and respiratory systems, items which have a very direct relation to the standard of the conditions of life. As regards London it may be said that with its death-rate of 15·2 (1907) it stands ninth in a list of 32 of the largest European and American cities (certain smaller Northern capitals alone showing to advantage), and that the reduction of the mortality during the last 16 years has sufficed to balance the decline in the birth-rate during the same period (p. xxi).

REPORT OF THE CHIEF REGISTRAR OF FRIENDLY SOCIETIES. (1906.)

The extent of the work done by Friendly Societies in general at the present time is best summed up in the following words of the Registrar himself taken from his address to the King at the opening of the new building of the Offices of the Hearts of Oak Society.

"The funds of these Friendly Societies at the present time amount to fifty and a half million pounds, and the membership to fourteen millions; if, however, all the registered thrift societies together with savings banks are included, the figures are respectively four hundred and two and a quarter millions of funds and thirty millions of members.

"The contributions of members of registered friendly societies and branches amount to upwards of six millions sterling per annum, while the interest on their invested funds amounts to two millions. Five millions annually are dedicated to relief in sickness and payments in old age and at death. One million is expended

in various other payments to the advantage of the members, and three quarters of a million or about ten per cent. of the total receipts, in management expenses; the remaining balance of one and a quarter millions per annum being set aside to meet the contingencies of the future."

The report shows that the Co-operative movement now embraces nearly two million members and the Trade Unions almost exactly a million and a half. For ordinary co-operative societies the exact figures are 1,848,704 members including the business of the Wholesale Society. Adding the trade of distributive and productive societies together, the total amount of sales effected during the year was 73.5 millions and the balance of profit 7.2 millions, being 9.1 per cent. on the sales. The Co-operative Wholesale Society alone does business to the amount of 20.7 millions in the year and it should be noted that its balance of profit is kept very low (2.06 per cent. only) its policy being to lower prices with view to the benefit of the retail stores to which it sells and which are its own members.

Among the Trade Unions it should be remarked that 36 large unions account for a membership of 1,017,638 and have an accumulated fund of £4,312,621. The largest single union is the South Wales Miners' Federation with a membership of 110,963, the Amalgamated Engineers following with a membership of 98,666. 531 smaller unions have a membership of 482,100 or rather less than an average of 1,000. It is noteworthy that upon the average of all the trade unions the accumulated funds are equal to a little more than two years' income.

HOMICIDE (PUNISHMENT IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES).

House of Commons paper, 316.

This white paper, which is a valuable document for the student of Comparative Legislation, illustrates the isolated position of English law in relation to the capital penalty for murder. In most of the codes here given we find the death penalty either abolished, or suspended by custom, or restricted to cases of murder with certain aggravating circumstances. Thus French law distinguishes *assassinat* from *meurtre*. *Assassinat* implies premeditation, *meurtre* is voluntary homicide but is punishable with death only when accompanied with another crime. A note states that capital punishment has not of late been inflicted in view of the Bill before Parliament providing for its abolition. The German Penal Code also distinguishes murder with deliberate intention (*mord*), for which death is the penalty, from *todtschlag* which is intentional homicide without deliberation, punishable by penal servitude. The Austrian code on the other hand treats all intentional homicide as capital, but in the Hungarian we again find the distinction between the premeditated and the unpremeditated. In Spain simple homicide is punished by "reclusion," while if aggravated by treachery or premeditation it is a capital offence. In Italy and Holland the severest form of penalty is penal servitude for life. In Belgium the death penalty nominally exists in certain classes of murder but no sentence has been executed for nearly fifty years. In Sweden the penalty for premeditated murder is execution or penal servitude for life, but the extreme penalty is rarely carried out. In Norway homicide with premeditation, or committed in connection with another crime, or if repeated, is punishable by imprisonment for life. The Danish code retains the death penalty for several classes of homicide with a term of imprisonment as an alternative. This code is noteworthy as imposing three months as the penalty for homicide in a duel and five years for a homicide in a duel arranged "to the death." In Switzerland eight cantons formally abolished the death penalty; the remainder have left it on their codes but do not enforce it. In Portugal deliberate homicide is punished by eight years solitary confinement

followed by deportation for twelve years. In Russia under the code of 1885, which is still applied in a majority of cases of a criminal nature, premeditated murder is punishable by hard labour for a period of from fifteen to twenty years, but a significant note is added that "where a state of "reinforced" or "extraordinary protection" has been declared, the authorities have the right to refer penal cases, including homicide, to the Military Tribunals which may pass sentence of death for homicide and even for grievous injuries.

In the United States the death penalty exists at least as an alternative in all States, though in Rhode Island only if the accused is already under sentence of imprisonment for life. Most of the States, however, restrict the death penalty to murder in the first degree. The term is thus defined in the Revised Statutes of Massachusetts, "Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in the first degree." The State of New York is remarkable for declaring homicide excusable "when committed by accident or misfortune in lawfully correcting a child or servant."

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL. Vol. xviii, No. 71.—Prof. O. M. W. Sprague: *The American Crisis of 1907*. G. I. H. Lloyd: *Labour Organisation in the Cutlery Trade of Solingen*. Prof. F. Y. Edgeworth: *Appreciations of Mathematical Theories*. F. Tajani: *Railway Nationalisation in Italy*.

THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS. Vol. xxii, No. 4.—A. Piatt Andrew: *Substitutes for Cash in the Panic of 1907*. The issue of inconvertible paper money and its effective working during the panic. Thorstein Veblen: *On the Nature of Capital*. Capital is the material equipment necessary to the effective application of a communal stock of technological knowledge. E. W. Bemis: *The Street Railway Settlement in Cleveland*. The issue of the street railway contest in Cleveland in the transfer to the Municipal Traction Company which is organised under such guarantees as to give most of the benefits of municipal ownership, which is forbidden by state law. Victor S. Clark: *Australian Economic Problems. II. The Tariff*. G. D. Hancock: *The National Gold Banks*. Harry G. Brown: *Competitive and Monopolistic Price-making*. Responsiveness of sales as the basis of monopolistic price-making; its relation to the law of increasing returns.

THE YALE REVIEW. Vol. xvii, No. 2.—Albert G. Keller: *Eugenics, the Science of Rearing Human Thoroughbreds*. Simon N. Patten: *The Conflict Theory of Distribution*. K. Asakawa: *Japan in Manchuria. I. The growth of two new principles of diplomacy, China's sovereignty and the "open door."* The evolution of the far-eastern question in the light of these.

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI E DISCIPLINE AUSILIARIE. Vol. xlvii, Fasc. cxxxxvi.—P. Aurelio Palmieri: *I procuratori generali del sinodo della chiesa russa*. V. Bianchi-Cagliosi: *La questione religiosa nel primo Congresso nazionale delle donne italiane*. G. Toniolo: *Riforme agricole-sociali*. Filippo Tolli: *I rappresentanti delle Potenze europee alla Conferenza di Bruxelles*.

REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE. Vol. xvi, No. 6.—Raoul de la Grasserie: *Des intermédiaires sociaux*. Further study of social instrumentalities in the religious, criminal, civil, political, international, ethical, æsthetic, economic and financial fields. Société de Sociologie de Paris: *Les types sociaux: l'homme de science*.

No. 7.—René Maunier: *La distribution géographique des industries*. The mutual reactions of industry and geographical conditions in the various types of English life, village, manorial and urban. Société de Sociologie de Paris: *Les types sociaux: l'étudiant*. Gino Bertolini: *Danemark (l'âme danoise)*.

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REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. Vol. xvi, No. 4.—R. Berthelot: *Sur le Pragmatisme de Nietzsche*. L. Vialleton: *La loi biogénétique fondamentale de Haeckel*. J. Dagnan-Bouveret: *L'Aphasie et les localisations cérébrales*. G. Milhaud: *La philosophie de Newton, par M. L. Bloch*.

Vol. xvi, No. 5.—*Etudes sur le mouvement philosophique contemporain à*

Étranger. J. Benrubi: *Allemagne*. J. S. Mackenzie: *Angleterre*. F. Thilly: *Etats-Unis d'Amérique*. G. Amendola: *Italie*. H. Höffding: *Scandinavie*. F. G. Calderon: *Sud-Amérique*.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Vol. xviii, No. 4.—Carl Heath: *The Treatment of Homicidal Criminals*. Considers the Return of the Home Office relative to punishment for homicide in modern states, and appeals for treatment rather than punishment for crime. Alfred H. Lloyd: *The Relation of Righteousness to Brute Facts*. J. Ellis McTaggart: *The Individualism of Value*. The basis of ethical values is found in individuals and their conscious states. Application of the principle to hedonism and socialism. William Mackintire Salter: *Mr. Bernard Shaw as a Social Critic*. George Unwin: *A Note on the English Character*. Walter Libby: *Two Fictitious Ethical Types*. W. J. Roberts: *The Racial Interpretation of History and Politics*. Frank T. Carlton: *Is America Morally Decadent?*

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOCIOLOGIE. Jahrgang xxxii, Heft 1.—H. K. Schwarze: *Die Ethik Herbert Spencers*. R. Hönigswald: *Zum Problem der philosophischen Skepsis*. Richard Müller-Freienfels: *Zur Theorie der ästhetischen Elementarerscheinungen*. I. Demetrius Gusti: *Die soziologischen Bestrebungen in der neueren Ethik*.

Jahrgang xxxii, Heft 2.—Richard Müller-Freienfels: *Zur Theorie der ästhetischen Elementarerscheinungen*. II. Franz Oppenheimer: *Moderne Geschichtsphilosophie*.

ARCHIV FÜR RASSEN-UND GESELLSCHAFTS-BIOLOGIE. Jahrgang v, Heft 3.—Prof. Dr. Manfred Ziermer: *Genealogische Studien über die Vererbung geistiger Eigenschaften*. Dr. Wilhelm Schallmayer: *Der Krieg als Züchter*. Dr. Erich von Tschermak: *Der moderne Stand des Vererbungsproblems*.

Jahrgang v, Heft 4.—Dr. Wilh. Strohmayer: *Zur Kritik der Feststellung und der Bewertung psychoneurotischer erblicher Belastung*. Dr. Grassl: *Zur Frage der Fruchtbarkeit und der Mutterschaft*. Dr. F. von den Velden: *Die Minderwertigkeit d. Erstgeborenen*. Dr. Georg Friederici: *Über die Mitwirkung der Neger bei der Erforschung Amerikas*. F. Reuter: *Kopfform und Körperbau*.

RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA. Vol. xii, No. iii.—L. Gumplowicz: *La sociologia ed il suo compito*. G. Salvadori: *Il diritto nella vita e nel pensiero*. G. Mazzarella: *Le fonti dell' antico diritto indiano*. L. Biamonti: *Un tentativo di costruzione del concetto del diritto*.

MAN. Vol. viii, No. 7.—F. Eyles: *Africa: Rhodesia. Firemaking Apparatus of the Makorikori*. Rev. H. G. O. Kendall: *Archaeology. Palaeolithic Microliths*. H. A. Rose: *India. On Caste in India*. J. B. Scrivenor: *Malay Peninsula. Malay Beliefs concerning Prehistoric Stone Implements*. Rt. Hon. Lord Avebury: *Obituary. Sir John Evans*.

Vol. viii, No. 8.—A. C. Haddon: *Africa, South. Copper Rod Currency from the Transvaal*. H. D. Hemsworth: *Africa, South. Note on Marali Currency*. C. G. Seligmann: *Ceylon. Quartz Implements from Ceylon*. W. G. Ashton: *Japan. A Japanese Book of Divination*.

Vol. viii, No. 9.—Hon. K. R. Dundas: *Africa, East. Notes on the Origin and History of the Kikuyu and Dorobo Tribes*. Rev. J. Roscoe: *Africa: Uganda. Nantaba, the Female Fetish of the King of Uganda*. J. G. Frazer: *Africa, West. Statues of Three Kings of Dahomey*. W. M. F. Petrie: *Egypt: The Peoples of the Persian Empire*. W. H. R. Rivers: *Fiji. Totemism in Fiji*. A. Lang: *Scotland: Marriage. Pirauru in Scotland*.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- Ross, Edward Alsworth. Social Psychology. Macmillan Co., New York. 6s. 6d. net.
- British Association for Labour Legislation, Report of. Administration of Labour Laws in the United Kingdom, Report on the. Twentieth Century Press. 6d.
- Archer, W., and Barker, H. Granville. A National Theatre. Scheme and Estimates. Duckworth & Co.
- Penty, Arthur J. The Restoration of the Gild System. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co. 3s. 6d. net.

NOTES AND NOTICES.

The First International Moral Education Congress met at the University of London, September 23—29. The papers and discussions were arranged under the following headings :—

- The Principles of Moral Education.
- Aims, Means, and Limitations of the Various Types of Schools.
- Character-Building by Discipline, Influence and Opportunity.
- The Problems of Moral Instruction.
- Relation of Religious Education to Moral Education.
- Special Problems.
- Systematic Moral Instruction.
- The Teaching of Special Moral Subjects.
- The Relation of Moral Education to Education Under Other Aspects.
- The Problem of Moral Education under Varying Conditions of Age and Opportunity.
- Biology and Moral Education.

The following programme of meetings of the Sociological Society has been arranged for the autumn session :—

- Professor F. TOENNIES - - - - - Monday, October 5th
 "A METHOD OF STATISTICAL ENQUIRY."
- Professor GEDDES - - - - - Tuesday, October 27th
 "TOWN PLANNING AND CITY DESIGN, IN SOCIOLOGY AND IN
 CITIZENSHIP."
- Mr. A. E. ZIMMERN - - - - - Monday, November 9th
 "WAS GREEK CIVILISATION BASED ON SLAVE LABOUR?"
- Mr. J. A. HOBSON - - - - - Monday, November 30th
 "THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIALISM."
- Lt.-Col. ERNEST ROBERTS, I.M.S. - - - - - Monday, December 14th
 "THE SOCIAL ECONOMY OF INDIA."

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